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Preface

Few American Presidents have been more respected, admired, and loved
than Franklin D. Roosevelt. In the eyes of many he was, and still is, looked
upon as a man who could do no wrong. Thus, there has been a tendency to
disregard, ignore, or ridicule those administrative officials who disagreed
with his policies and did what they could to change them. The numerous
accounts of United States foreign and military policy from 1937 through
1940 have been limited primarily to the activities of those members of the
Roosevelt administration who, along with the President, worked to aid the
Allies. There were, nevertheless, a few men in the War Department and in
Congress who opposed sending military aid to Britain and France as long as
the United States Army was so ill equipped. The men who opposed the
President's military-aid policy were not ignorant or disloyal; they were in°
telligent, patriotic Americans who believed that such - a program was ens
dangering the national security. This is the story of orie of those. men.
Any person familiar with the administration of President Franklin D.
Roosevelt is undoubtedly aware of many of the key figures who surrounded
that well-known Chief Executive. - The names of such cabinet members as
Cordell Hull, Henry Morgenthau, Jr., Harry Hopkins, Harold Ickes, Frances
Perkins, Henry Wallace, James Farley, Dan Roper, Claude Swanson, and
Henry Stimson are all well. known. There is, however, a colleague of those
individuals who is virtually unheard of. That person is Harry H. Woodring,
who served as Secretary of War from 1936 to mid 1940.
Vll

It is indeed surprising that Woodring should be the forgotten man of
the Roosevelt administration. In terms of length of service he was by no
means a short-timer, for he served on FDR's "team" for more than seven years
-three as Assistant Secretary of War and four as Secretary of War. Consequently, his anonymity does not stem from a short period of public exposure.
Neither should the position that he filled have contributed to his obscurity.
Although the activities of the Secretary of War and the War Department
are generally ignored in peacetime, such was not the case in the 1930s. With
the breakdown of world peace, the matter of national defense became a
major concern, and the United States military establishment became increasingly important. With the expanding influence of the Army came considerable publicity; before long, most Americans knew at least a little about
Secretary of War Woodring and his activities as head of the War Department. Nor should he be forgotten and ignored because he was less significant
or less interesting than other figures in the administration. His dealings with
Roosevelt were extensive, and on many key issues his influence was considerable. Furthermore, it is doubtful that the story of any of Roosevelt's cabinet
members is more interesting than that of Woodring. He was one of the most
controversial persons of the period, having the dubious distinction of being
the only man that Roosevelt ever removed from his cabinet.
A primary reason that Woodring is an "unknown" is that virtually
nothing has been written of his service as Secretary of War. Many members
of the Roosevelt administration who were far less important than Woodring
have either written, or have collaborated on writing, accounts of their activities in that period. Woodring, however, was one of the few individuals
closely associated with Roosevelt who did not write an autobiography,
memoirs, or some other personal account of what took place during those
years. His reasons for never attempting to explain or justify his actions are
not entirely clear, but in the years immediately following his removal,
Woodring did not wish to offend or embarrass President Roosevelt. Several
years after the latter's death, Woodring started to work on an autobiography,
but numerous business ventures, along with his policital activities, kept him
from getting beyond his childhood years.
Woodring's lack of notoriety on the national scene is hardly surprising
when one discovers that he is scarcely known within the confines of his home
state. Even the residents of Elk City, the village from which he came, and
Neodesha, the town that he considered home, seem to be unaware of, or at
least unwilling to acknowledge, the fact that one of their own -became Governor and later went on to influence national policy as Secretary of War.
After Woodring's removal from the cabinet in June of 1940, Duke Shoop
of the Kansas City Star wrote: "Some day, when the next chapter' of the
vm

career of Harry Woodring is written, the letters, reports, and records of the
present day international intrigue-all of it centering on the issue of how far
we should go in helping the Allies-will make interesting reading." It is the
purpose of this study not only to write the chapter that Mr. Shoop envisioned,
but also to examine, for the first time, Woodring's entire political career.
Very few individuals, including historians, know who Harry Woodring was,
what he attempted to do, and what he accomplished. This study will attempt
to answer those questions. Perhaps, with a better understanding of the man,
his problems, and his actions, it will be possible to place him in proper
historical perspective.
Little did I realize when I originally undertook this study that it would
ultimately involve so many people. I wish to acknowledge the help of all
those who assisted me in some way, because without their help this book
could never have been written. Special thanks must go to Cooper C. Woodring, of Plandome, New York, who permitted me to be the first person to
examine his father's personal papers. Not only did he give me complete
access to those papers, but he placed no restrictions on my use of them; his
only request was that I be objective. For his cooperation plus the fine hospitality that he and his wife, Sue, showed me during the period I was going
through the papers, I will be forever grateful. Thanks must also go to
Melissa Woodring Jager for granting me permission to utilize her father's
papers.
A number of friends and colleagues were of great help in this undertaking. I would especially like to express my appreciation to: Harry L.
Coles of Ohio State University, who guided this study in its initial phase;
to George H. Lobdell of Ohio University and Jack B. Gray of East Texas
State University for their suggestions on ways to improve the content and
style; to Debra Taylor Crawford, my typist, who somehow deciphered my
handwriting and turned it into meaningful drafts and ultimately into a
final manuscript; to Virginia Seaver and John H . Langley of the University
Press of Kansas for their assistance and understanding in the editing and
publishing of this book; to Dr. H. M. Lafferty and the Faculty Research
Committee of _East Texas State University for the confidence they expressed in me by the awarding of two research grants to assist in the
preparation of this study. Special thanks go to my East Texas State University colleague Nancy R. Lenoir, who put her editorial pen to this work
and greatly enhanced its value.
Many people took time out from their busy schedules to share with me
their recollections of Harry Woodring or some aspect ef his career; to all
IX

of those people, whose names appear on pages 320-22, I express my deepest
gratitude. Special thanks must go to Helen Coolidge Woodring, who
gave me so much time and answered so many questions on three different
occasions.
Many librarians and archivists went above and beyond the call of duty
to assist me in securing the materials needed. Unfortunately, not all of
those who helped me can be cited here, but a few deserve special mention:
Edgar Nixon and Joseph Marshall of the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library;
John Taylor and Thomas Hohmann of the Modern Military Records Division of the National Archives; Philip P. Brower of the Bureau of Archives
of the MacArthur Memorial; Joseph G. Gambone of the Kansas State Historical Society; and Diane Saucier of the East Texas State University Library.
Finally, most credit must go to my wife, Nancy, and to our three
children, Mark, Carolyn, and Dianna, for without their encouragement,
support, and understanding this book could never have been completed.

Commerce, Texas

Keith McFarland

28 April 1975

X

Contents

Preface
List of Illustrations
1 / From Boyhood to Banker

Vll
Xlll

1

2 / Venture into Politics

18

3 / Governor of Kansas

36

4 / The Governor Plays Politics

58

5 / Assistant Secretary of War

80

6 /Mr.Secretary

103

7 / Working for Military Readiness

117

8 / Politics Disrupts the War Department

138

9 / Problems of Rearmament

160

10 / Problems of Neutrality, 1936-1939

175

11 / Toward an "Army in Being"

195

12 / Obstructionism Brings Dismissal

209

13 / Years of Frustration

235

Notes

257

Bibliography

318

Index

335

List of Illustrations

Facing
Page

\Voodring at Camp Colt, 1918

50

Woodring campaigning, 1932

51

Farley, James Roosevelt, and Woodring, 1932

51

Garner and FDR campaigning in Topeka, 1932

66

Woodring, Dern, and MacArthur at swearing-in ceremony, 1932

67

Roosevelt signing Philippine proclamation, 1935

67

FDR's cabinet, 1938

162

Army Day Parade, Washington, 1938

162

The W oodrings on their honeymoon, 1933

163

Dinner honoring Farley, 1937

178

Woodring and Marshall, 1940

178

Woodring family at the White House, 1940

179

This page intentionally left blank

1
From Boyhood to Banker

"Is this true?" shouted Missouri Senator Bennett Clark on the floor of the
Senate.1 Many found the first reports hard to believe, but word of the cabinet
shake-up soon spread throughout the capital and across the nation. Secretary
of War Harry Woodring had been fired. Washington was stunned. It was
early on that spring afternoon that President Franklin D. Roosevelt made
the startling announcement that he had asked for and received the resignation of his controversial Secretary of War. On that day-20 June 1940--Harry H. Woodring achieved the dubious distinction of being the only man
ever booted out of the Roosevelt cabinet.2
Throughout his tempestuous tenure in Washington, Woodring had become embroiled in numerous feuds with Roosevelt, and the President had
always attempted to accommodate his contentious War Department head.
When, however, the question of aid to the Allies arose, Roosevelt determined
that he could no longer tolerate Woodring's divergent views. Roosevelt was
a strong advocate of providing that aid, but Woodring, whose position on
the issue had wavered in the past, had become a strong opponent of that
course. The President could no longer accept obstructionism in his War
Department. Secretary Woodring had to go.
The action created a furor in Congress, but such a response had frequently followed Harry Woodring. A number of congressmen called for an
investigation into the dismissal of this patriotic American; others condemned
his isolationism and the controversy within his department. Amid this at-
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mosphere of confusion, Harry Woodring and his family quietly bid a short
and pleasant farewell to Roosevelt at the White House, then headed back to
Kansas in the family station wagon. Thus ended his Washington career, a
major chapter in the colorful and controversial life that had begun fifty-three
years before in Elk City, Kansas.
A warm spring rain was gently sponging the lush green countryside of
southeast Kansas as the first light of day appeared in the eastern sky. Most
of the twelve hundred residents of the small, thriving town of Elk City were
not yet stirring, but in a small pink frame house on Montgomery Avenue
the excited Hines Woodring was anxiously awaiting the opportunity to
broadcast news of his good fortune to his many friends around town.3 On
the previous night, 30 May 1887, the fifty-one-year-old grain dealer had
become a father for the sixth time. The birth of this child, however, was
something special: it was the first boy.4 This new addition to the family
was like a dream come true for Hines Woodring and his thirty-eight-year-old
wife, Melissa, who, after more than twenty years of marriage and five daughters, had practically given up hope of ever having a son. The proud parents
first named the new child Jacob Cleveland, but after several days they had
second thoughts and decided to call him Harry Hines instead.5
To Hines Woodring the birth of his son was quite gratifying, because
it meant that he now had a male heir to carry on the family name as well as
its traditions. These factors meant a great deal to the new father, who was
very proud of his family heritage, even though it was not an especially distinguished one. The W oodrings pointed with pride to their lineage, which
could be traced back to the Vautrin family which lived in the Lorraine section of France about the time of the Protestant Reformation. Some members
of the family had become Huguenots, and when religious persecution of
protestants began in 1572, they fled to Kirrberg, in Alsace. In the years that
followed, the family became moderately successful farmers, soon winning a
respected position in the community. It was in Kirrberg that the German
influence caused the name to be changed from Vautrin to Wotring.
All went well in Alsace until the early eighteenth century, when increased persecution of Huguenots, plus continual warfare along the FrenchGerman border, forced many inhabitants to flee. One of those choosing to
leave was John Daniel Wotring, who, in the summer of 1739, loaded his
family on the ship Robert and Alice and headed for America. Arriving in
Philadelphia, the family remained there for two years before moving first to
York County, Pennsylvania, and then to a Moravian colony at Graceland,
Maryland. From Graceland the family, whose name gradually changed to

2

Woodring, spread north into New Jersey, south into Virigina, and west to
Kentucky. 6
One of John Daniel Wotring's grandsons, John Wotring, took his new
bride, Christina Wolf, to Hardin County, Kentucky, in the spring of 1796.
A year later the first of their twelve children, Jacob, was born. Jacob was
quite satisfied to scratch out a living on his small farm; thus, he grew to
manhood, married Mary Hahn in 1822, raised six children, and died without
ever leaving the hills of central Kentucky.7 Although Jacob was content to
spend his entire life in one place, such was not to be the case with his fourth
child, Hines, who was born near Elizabethtown, Kentucky, on 28 January
1836. Growing up on a backwoods farm in the 1840s and 1850s was difficult,
for it was no easy task raising livestock, clearing land, and harvesting crops.
Since the financial returns from farming were rather limited, Hines Woodring supplemented his income by buying and selling grain and by painting
houses and barns. Although such a life had its drawbacks, it also had its
compensations, for it instilled in Hines Woodring a fondness for hunting,
horse racing, and out-of-door living.8
When the Civil War came in 1861, Hines Woodring, like so many other
young Kentuckians, was unsure about which side he should cast his lot with.
While his sentiments were with the Union, he had reservations about joining
its cause, because all four of his brothers had joined the Confederate Army.
A reluctance to fight against his own kin, coupled with an unwillingness to
join them, led to several years of indecision for Hines. Consequently, he remained on his farm until March of 1865.
At that time he traveled north to Lafayette, Indiana, where he enlisted
in Company B, 154th Indiana Volunteer Infantry. It was less than two weeks
later that General Lee surrendered to General Grant, thus ending the long
and bitter war; however, because he had just entered the Army, Private
Hines Woodring was not immediately mustered out. Instead he was promoted to corporal and sent to Stevenson Station, Virginia, where he guarded
commissary supplies until his discharge in August 1865.9
Feeling that his family would not accept a "Yankee," Hines Woodring
decided not to return to Kentucky. Instead he traveled to Boone County,
Indiana, where he took up farming. It was here that he met, fell in love
with, and, on 30 September 1866, married Melissa Jane Cooper, the daughter
of Burnside and Eliza Bennett Cooper of Thorntown. The following year
the first of five daughters, Mary Lou ("Effa"), was born. During the next
four years Hines Woodring struggled to eke out a living on his small farm,
but as the westward movement gained momentum, he longed to become a
part of it. Stories of rich, cheap land in the west, along with encouraging
letters from his younger brother, Dr. William Woodring, who was living in
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Montgomery County, Kansas, convinced him that it was time to move on.
So, in the early spring of 1871, he sold everything he had and headed for the
"promised land."
With nothing more than the clothes on their backs and a few dollars
from the sale of their farm, Hines and Melissa Woodring and four-year-old
Effa set out for Kansas. Although he had come west to farm, Hines Woodring changed his mind when he arrived at the Territorial land office at
Humbolt and learned that, as an inducement to settlers, free lots were available at Elk City, forty-five miles to the southwest. To obtain a lot, one
simply had to build and settle on it. Never one to pass up a bargain, the
Civil War veteran accepted the offer and moved to the new town, where he
built a home and established a butcher shop. This new business venture
failed to prosper; consequently, seven months later the Woodrings moved to
a farm seven miles to the northwest. For the n'ext six years "Hi" Woodring,
as he was now called, made a living by growing corn, wheat, and sorghum
on the rich farmland of Montgomery County.10 It was during this period
that three more daughters, Dolly, who died at age three, Claudine, and Lida
were born. These were difficult years, for living in a flimsy, drafty house in
which one froze in winter and sweltered in summer was not conducive to
good health. Furthermore, Hi and his family faced the problems of contaminated water, outlaws, dust storms, drought, prairie fires, flash floods,
and grasshoppers. In spite of such obstacles, farming was generally profitable
for families that had several males. But for a household with only one male,
it was too burdensome; thus, in 1878 Hines Woodring moved back to Elk
City and entered the grain business. Upon returning to the village, which
now numbered nearly four hundred, the family moved into the small pink
house north of Duck Creek, where Grace was born in 1882 and Harry in
1887.11
From the time of his arrival in Elk City in 1871, Hines Woodring began
to take an active role in local affairs. In the following years he served, at
various times, as School-Board Clerk, City Clerk, City Treasurer, Councilman, and Mayor.12 Although not active in state or national politics, Hiexcept during the 1890s, when he became a Populist-openly proclaimed his
allegiance to the Democratic party and voiced support for its candidates.13
Busy as he was with his business and political pursuits, the jovial, outgoing
grain dealer still found enough time for social and religious activities. He
was a founder and one of the most active members of the local chapter of
the Grand Army of the Republic (G.A.R), as well as a leading member of
the Masons. Religion also played an important role in his life: he was for
many years a deacon and Sunday School teacher in the First Christian
Church. Of the many activities enjoyed by Hines Woodring, none provided
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him with more satisfaction than horses and horse racing. This love, which
he had developed as a child growing up in Kentucky, always stayed with
him; and limited though the family finances were, he nearly always owned
at least one race horse, which he would send around the county-fair circuit.
This love of horses was one of the few things that Hines passed on to his
son.14
Elk City was an ideal place to be raising a family in the 1880s and 1890s.
Thanks in large part to two railroads-the Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe
and the Missouri Pacific-the town was quite prosperous; its grain elevators,
flour mill, sorghum mill, bedspring plant, brickyard, and many lesser establishments provided employment for anyone who wanted work and was willing to do it. Discovery of both oil and gas in this area in the late nineties
added to the prosperity. By the turn of the century the outlook for Elk City
was indeed bright, and predictions were being made that the population
would soon climb to two thousand. The economic prosperity of the town
also accounted for other material assets, such as gas street lights, broad sidewalks, a good telephone system, and fine schools. Large trees and attractive
homes lining the wide streets made the village on the banks of the Elk River
a beautiful place in which to live. Added to this were the river and several
creeks for fishing and swimming, and rolling hills for running and hiking
-all of which made a first-rate place for a boy to grow to manhood.1 1i
But the many merits of growing up in a town like Elk City were of
little consequence to Harry Woodring. While other boys were swimming,
wrestling, playing marbles and baseball, he was unable to engage in such
activities. Two factors served to deny young Harry a typical childhood. The
first of these was his being dominated by four overprotective sisters; the second was the increasingly difficult economic plight of his family.
Because of his numerous business, civic, and social activities, Hines
Woodring did not spend much time at home. As a result, the task of rearing
Harry fell upon his mother and his four older sisters. Since the sisters were
between five and twenty years older than Harry, their relationship to him
was more like that of mother to son instead of sister to brother. Not wanting
to see their little brother get injured in any way, the sisters made sure that he
was rarely out of their sight. Because they kept "Son," as they always called
him, with them all the time, he never had the opportunity to engage in the
activities usually enjoyed by boys of his age. Instead of playing baseball, exploring, or engaging in a good mud fight, Harry grew up keeping spotlessly
clean, playing house or dolls, or doing needlework. His being surrounded
by women and having little contact with his father affected Harry's dress,
speech, and mannerisms. These effeminate characteristics were amusing to
other boys, and after first calling him "Sissy," they settled on "Daughter," a
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name that plagued him until he was in high school.16 There were some
positive aspects to being raised by his sisters, the most notable being an
appreciation for and a basic love of reading; thus, from an early age, Harry
was surrounded by books. As he grew older, he read more and more in the
area of history, politics, and current events. These reading habits were never
lost; consequently, he was always aware of what was happening on the state,
national, and international scenes.17
As influential upon "Son" Woodring's early development as the domination of his four sisters was his family's financial situation. The income of
a small grain dealer in a Kansas farm town was never very large, and it was
all that Hines Woodring could do to provide his wife and children with
food, clothing, and the other necessities of life. The family got by well
enough until 1893, when Hines, while working at the mill, fell and broke
his hip. Because medical treatment was inadequate at that time, the injury
failed to heal properly, and thereafter Hi Woodring could walk only with
great difficulty. As a consequence of this injury he was no longer able to
perform the physical tasks generally required in operating a mill. He was
able to do some light work and to serve in an advisory capacity at a larger
mill, but such jobs were intermittent. Since the family breadwinner was no
longer able to work steadily and since no other member of the household
was capable of taking up the slack, the economic condition of the Woodring
family became extremely difficult. In the lean years that followed, young
Harry came to know, understand, and appreciate the true meaning of poverty. It was not extreme poverty, for the members of the family never went
hungry or wore rags, but neither did they experience the standard of living
enjoyed by most other residents of Elk City.18
The economic plight of the Woodring family forced Harry out into the
"cruel world" at the age of nine. A desire to help carry a share of the financial load led him to embark on his first business venture-selling popcorn.
Each day after school the ambitious fourth grader would run home to pick
up the corn just popped by his mother or sisters and would go from door to
door, selling his product for five cents a bag. This humble beginning was
never forgotten by the boy from Elk City, who, years later, was to say on
numerous occasions, "I made enough money peddling popcorn from house
to house to buy my own clothes, and I enjoyed it."19
With the rise of Populism in Kansas in the early 1890s, Hines Woodring
temporarily turned his political allegiance from the Democratic to the Populist party, campaigning locally for its candidates. Such efforts paid dividends in 1897, when Hi was rewarded for his campaign activity by the newly
elected Populist Governor, John W. Leedy, who appointed him a Deputy
State Grain Inspector, at a salary of $75 a month.20 The new position, which
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required that the family move to Parsons, alleviated financial pressures. This
proved to be only a temporary boon, however, because Hines lost his job
when the Republicans regained control of the Statehouse in 1899. Shortly
thereafter the Woodrings returned to Elk City and moved into an attractive
two-story house on Maple Street.21
Again, hard times returned. Although the two eldest daughters, Mary
Lou and Claudine, had married and moved away, there was still a house to
be paid for and five mouths to feed on the irregular income and the small
pension of a sixty-four-year-old Civil War veteran. To help pay the family's
expenses, Harry, who was just entering his teens, began taking any job that
would add a few pennies to the family coffers. The young lad was no longer
afraid of getting dirty or engaging in work; thus, while other boys his age
were seeking to avoid work, "Daughter" Woodring was trying to find it.22
The financial needs of the family, along with considerable teasing by
other students, made the thought of quitting school rather appealing to
Harry, but his sisters, especially Claudine, who had been a teacher before
her marriage, convinced him to remain in school. Attending Elk City Grade
and High School through the tenth grade, Harry always proved to be an
excellent student, especially in math, government, and history.23 Going hand
in hand with his interests in the last two subjects was an interest in politics.
Although he was not exactly certain what the designation meant, Harry,
from the time he was a very young boy, proclaimed that he, like his father,
was a Democrat. The youngster soon discovered that such claims were
hazardous to one's health in a Republican state like Kansas, for on a number
of occasions he was snowballed and beaten up because of his political
affiliation. 24
When the Woodrings moved into the house on Maple Street in 1899,
their new neighbor was 0. T. Hayward, president of the First National
Bank of Elk City. During the next several years the bank president had
many opportunities to observe the honesty, reliability, and perseverance of
the boy next door; therefore it was not surprising that he offered the sixteenyear-old high-school student a job as janitor and errand boy at the bank. In
his new position Harry made the fires, swept the floors, washed the windows,
cleaned the spittoons, and ran errands; for all this he received five dollars a
month. 25 No one ever started any lower in the banking profession than
Woodring.
During this period he was maturing rapidly, and the youngster who had
been teased and ignored by his peers became increasingly popular with
members of both sexes.26 After the first semester of his junior year at Elk
City High School, Harry decided to change schools. This was a difficult
decision, because he had a job and numerous friends and he was doing well
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in school; however, he believed that the county high school, with its broader
curriculum, would offer him more. His mind made up, the boy from Elk
City, in January 1904, enrolled in the Montgomery County High School, at
nearby Independence, Kansas. Upon Harry's departure, the editor of the
Elk City Enterprise noted that one of the town's "rising young men" was
changing schools.27
Although Harry did well at his new school, he was not satisfied with
the type of education that he was receiving. By this time he had developed
more than a casual interest in the operations of 0. T. Hayward's bank, and
he hoped to find permanent employment there when he completed his education. The high-school courses he was taking would be adequate, but he
desired something with a more utilitarian value-courses that would help
him in the bank. A business-school education was what he really wanted,
but that seemed to be out of the question. While such schools could be
found in Kansas City, the tuition and the cost of living there were more
than the family could afford.
Never one to be defeated easily, Harry searched for and finally found a
solution to his problem. Living in Lebanon, Indiana, were Louisa and Samuel Cason, an aunt and uncle. A business school-the Lebanon Business
University-had recently opened in that town. What a set up!-he could
live with Aunt Louisa and Uncle Samuel and attend the "'University." When
Harry convinced his mother to write her sister to see what she thought of
the idea, the response was just what the boy had hoped for : the Casons
would love to have Harry come to live with them; after all, they had no
children of their own, and he could be their "son" for a while. Arrangements
were made, and in June of 1904 the boy from Elk City traveled to Lebanon,
where he was to spend ten enjoyable months at the beautiful home on South
Meridian Street.28
Shortly after his arrival, Harry enrolled at the "University," which was
a less-than-reputable commercial operation offering courses in bookkeeping,
typewriting, commercial law, banking, correspondence, and office practice.
Fortunately, the school's manager-teacher, Henry F. Raber, was a better
teacher than he was a businessman, and Harry learned well the subjects and
skills that were taught. This education was to be of considerable value to
him in the years that followed. 29 Having completed all the courses that he
felt were necessary for his future success, the young man returned home in
the spring of 1905, his formal education ended.30 Although he came close,
he never did earn a high-school diploma.
Upon his return to Elk City, Harry was given a job as a bookkeeper at
the First National Bank. The same good work habits, the care, and the
conscientiousness that had always characterized him continued, and two
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years later he was rewarded by promotion to assistant cashier. These were
happy but not carefree years for the young bank employee. Since his father
was no longer able to do any work, the burden of caring for his parents and
his sister Lida was now squarely on his shoulders. This responsibility to his
family caused the young banker to question seriously his future in Elk City.
He had a steady job, but it did not pay especially well; furthermore, his
future in the bank did not appear bright, because the once thriving village
was now in a state of decline. The oil and gas finds of the 1890s were playing out; hundreds of Elk City citizens were leaving for new fields; and it
was evident that the village had already reached its peak and was now on
the way down. Such a community is unattractive to any businessman, but
it is especially discouraging to someone in the field of banking. Under these
circumstances Harry Woodring began to look for greener pastures.81
An opportunity to move came early in 1909, when Harry was offered a
job, which he accepted, as an assistant cashier at the First National Bank of
Neodesha.82 Neodesha, a thriving town of three thousand, which lay
twenty miles northeast of Elk City, was, at that time, the center of the MidContinent Oil Field. The rapidly expanding gas and oil industries provided
the basis for the economic expansion of the town.33 Since new people
were arriving daily, new businesses were being established, and land values
were going up. Neodesha was definitely a town with a bright future, and
Harry Woodring was glad to be a part of it. The twenty-two-year-old assistant bank cashier worked hard at his new job, and within a few months
he was promoted to cashier. Feeling more financially secure than at any time
in his life, he purchased a home on North Eighth Street and brought his
parents and his sister Lida to live with him.34
The move to Neodesha in 1909 ushered in what proved to be the nine
most uneventful years in the life of Harry Woodring. The routine was
nearly always the same: five days a week he would walk to work, put in the
short work day that made a bank employee the envy of his neighbors, walk
home, work in his garden, and spend the evening reading and looking after
his parents. Because of a deep sense of obligation to his parents, he insisted
on remaining at home and helping Lida look after them; consequently; he
engaged in few outside activities, and he had few friends. 311 Occasionally
he would go to a movie, play tennis, or have a date with Helen McDonald,
whose father, J. C. McDonald, was President of Standard Oil of Kansas.
One was more likely, however, to find him spending a quiet evening at
home.36 Sunday would find Harry at the First Christian Church, where he
was one of the most faithful and hard-working members. Although his interest in state and national politics was increasing in these years, he did not
engage in any political activities.
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At the time that the United States entered World War I in the spring
of 1917, it is highly unlikely that anyone, including those closest to him,
would have predicted a bright future for the thirty-year-old introvert, who
appeared to be destined to spend the rest of his life as a cashier in a smalltown bank. When the newly enacted Selective Service System went into
effect, it did not call Harry Woodring; and because his mother, father, and
sister were dependent upon him, he was not inclined to join. For a time it
appeared that the war would pass him by, but when his mother suffered a
stroke and passed away in January 1918, Harry felt that a major burden had
been taken off his shoulders; he was then free to leave his family and join
the Army. He agreed to remain at home until the spring thaw permitted
burial of his mother's body.37 Interment came on 5 May 1918, and later that
afternoon Harry was on his way to Washington, D.C., to enlist in the
United States Army.38 On his own initiative he was giving up the secure
life of a banker for the uncertain but, in all likelihood, more exciting life of
a soldier.
The nation's capital was a beehive of activity when Woodring arrived in
May of 1918. Everywhere he went, people were busy doing their share to
help win the war that would "make the world safe for democracy." The
young man from Neodesha would have liked to spend several days touring
the city, but he had more pressing matters to take care of. Since he was not
one to take a major decision lightly, the choice of which branch of the military to serve in was of great importance. In order to be sure that he got
both sides of the story, he visited both the War Department and the Navy
Department to discuss the opportunities that each offered. On his return to
the War Department, he encountered a young lieutenant in the Tank Corps,
who told him of the advantages and opportunities in this new branch of the
Army. Convinced that the tank was the weapon of the future and that the
Tank Corps was the branch most likely to offer opportunity for promotion,
he moved in that direction. He enlisted on May 8, and three days later
Private Harry Woodring was on his way to the Tank Training Center at
Camp Colt, near Gettysburg, Pennsylvania.39
The training of Tank Corps personnel that took place at Camp Colt
consisted of both basic military training and specialized training in tank
tactics and equipment. The camp was under the command of a bright,
aggressive young officer, Maj. Dwight D. Eisenhower, who had more than
his share of problems-the biggest being the lack of tanks. Although the
weapon of the future was on the drawing board, America had not yet started
to produce them; therefore, Eisenhower had only one tank, a French Re-
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nault, with which to train the ten thousand officers and men stationed at
Colt. Under such circumstances, training was limited primarily to that of a
basic nature. 40
Upon his arrival at Camp Colt, Woodring, because of his clerical background, was immediately sent to the personnel section of Casual Company
Number 1 (the camp's administrative company), where a typist was needed.
For the next three months Private Woodring lived a rather leisurely and
pleasant life, processing records of new recruits and making up pay records.41
His job frequently necessitated working late or arising at two or three o'clock
in the morning to help process the records of incoming personnel. Although
such a position meant irregular working hours, it also meant extended
periods of free time. On some days it meant no work at all; consequently,
there was considerable opportunity for sleeping, playing tennis and baseball,
and writing letters home. Under such circumstances, securing a pass was no
problem, and Woodring and his buddies frequently went into Gettysburg
for supper, church, a dance, or a movie.42
Although the nature of his duties exempted Harry from some facets of
military life, such as reveille and K.P ., he did receive training in close order
drill, radio and telegraph operation, riflery, and the care and operation of
machine guns and light artillery. Except for a violent reaction to his typhoid
shots, several instances of food poisoning, and dysentery, Woodring was
quite pleased with army life. His satisfaction certainly had to stem from
other than monetary reasons, because the deduction of a $15 allotment to his
father left him only $8 a month. 43
From the time that Woodring arrived at Camp Colt he expressed a
desire to become an officer, but it soon became apparent that competition for
entrance into Officer's Training School was very stiff. His first attempt to
gain entrance into the school was unsuccessful, but in August he tried again
and succeeded.44 His joy was short lived when he realized that he had won
only half the battle; the mark of success was in finishing the school rather
than in getting into it.45 The purpose of the schooling and of its difficulty
was best described by the Camp Commander, then Lieutenant Colonel
Eisenhower, who stated that it "was intended primarily as a place of elimination of unfit candidates for commission, and . . . it was purposely made
as intensive as possible, in order to quickly eliminate the unfit." 46
On 25 August 1918 Woodring, along with five hundred other enlisted
men, entered the Tank Corps Officers Training School, thus beginning five
grueling weeks of training. The physical demands were great, for the days
were long and hard, with vigorous physical training, close order drill, riflerange firing, and cross-country hiking requiring a physical stamina that
Woodring did not know he possessed. Just as strenuous were the mental
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demands that resulted from classroom instruction and follow-up examinations in such subjects as communications, tank operations and tactics, reconnaissance, artillery principles, and administrative affairs. Predictably, the
"wash out" rate was high, and Woodring himself frequently felt that he
would not make it. On September 9, less than three weeks into the program,
he wrote in his diary: "Hanging on to school by a thin thread." On the
following day, after three interviews with evaluating officers, he sheepishly
wrote: "Bobbing up and down but still here." A week later he was almost
ready to give up, because he was convinced that there was "little hope for
me."47 Still, he carried on, working as hard as he could. When the original
500 students dropped to 300 and then to 250, he still remained; then on 24
September he survived the final cut, thus making him one of the 150 members of his class to earn a commission. On 6 October, in what he described
as "one of the greatest satisfactions of my life," Woodring was commissioned
a second lieutenant in the Army Tank Corps. 48 Two days later he received
his new assignment: he was to return to Casual Company as its Personnel
Officer. He was pleased to return to Casual, because he had many friends
there, and he understood the operations of the Personnel Section. As the new
lieutenant settled into his first assignment, the war in Europe was rapidly
coming to a close. Several weeks later the Armistice was signed, and one
week after that, Camp Colt was abandoned, and most of its personnel, including Woodring, were sent to Fort Dix, New Jersey, for mustering out.
At Dix he continued to function as a personnel officer until his discharge
on 15 December 1918.49
Woodring's encounter with the Army during the war was both pleasing
and gratifying. Because of the nature of his duties, the winning of a commission, and the many fine acquaintances that he had made, he left the
military with a positive attitude towards it and its leaders. Perhaps one of
the most satisfying aspects of his "Army days" was the start of many friendships that were to last a lifetime, including those with Dwight D. Eisenhower and Floyd L. Parks (later a lieutenant general of World War II
fame) .rso But even more important to Woodring was the change that the
Army made in his personality. The new way of life brought about a metamorphosis in him; the introvert of Neodesha emerged as an extrovert at
Camp Colt, and before long he. had a large circle of close friends.rs 1 The man
leaving Fort Dix in December 1918 was also quite different in that he had a
confidence in himself that theretofore had been lacking. The bumps and
bruises of army life had also done much to dull and eliminate some of his
effeminate traits. As one close relative said, "Harry was a different man
when he came out of the army-he was a man-it took the sissyness out of

12

him." 52 There was no question that the Army had been beneficial for Harry
Woodring.
After being discharged from the Army, Woodring returned to Neodesha,
uncertain about his future plans. His old job was awaiting him at the First
National Bank, but because he felt that there was little opportunity for advancement in that position, he decided to look elsewhere. One thing was
certain: he wanted to remain in banking. Thus, after failing to obtain a job
as a state bank examiner, he accepted a job as assistant cashier at the MidWest National Bank in Kansas City, Missouri.53 For the next three years
he lived a quiet life, working in Kansas City during the week and returning
home on the weekends to visit his father and sister or to take out Helen
McDonald, whom he had continued to date intermittently for a number of
years. One of the things that Harry liked most about dating Helen was that
when he went to pick her up he had an opportunity to visit with her father,
J. C. McDonald. Every time the two men got together the talk inevitably
turned to banking and finance, for in addition to being President of Standard
Oil of Kansas, McDonald was President of the First National Bank of
Neodesha. McDonald was quite impressed with Woodring's knowledge of
banking, and as time passed, he became increasingly fond of him.114 This
relationship was to pay big dividends to Woodring in March 1922, when a
major reorganization of the bank was undertaken, and McDonald asked
him to become its managing director.115 The thirty-five-year-old assistant
cashier jumped at the opportunity, returning home to undertake his new job.
For the next seven years Woodring ran the bank in an efficient and
businesslike manner. With common sense and a good eye for property
values, he succeeded in creating one of the strongest banks in southeast Kansas.116 Woodring's business acumen not only made money for the bank's
stockholders; it also resulted in some handsome returns for himself. By making some wise investments, both locally and in a bullish stock market, he
accumulated enough funds to purchase a controlling interest in the bank
and make himself vice-president. His success soon won for him the respect
and admiration of local civic and business leaders, as well as the community
at large. Word of his effectiveness soon spread to others in his profession,
and they honored him with a term as Vice-President of the Kansas Bankers
Association.117
Being a small-town banker brought with it a number of community
responsibilities, and soon Woodring found himself thrust into a number of
business, civic, and fraternal activities. The cordiality that had emerged at
Camp Colt now became a major asset, and the personable, yet soft-spoken,
bachelor gained an increasingly wide circle of friends and acquaintances. As
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the 1920s rolled on, Woodring emerged as one of the major "work horses"
of the community.
Much of his time was spent in promoting the economic well-being of
Wilson County and the surrounding area, for the success of his bank was
dependent on the prosperity of the entire section. Because agriculture was of
primary importance to the area, Woodring worked hard to promote programs that would aid farmers and increase their production. As an active
member of the Grange and the Farm Bureau, he came to gain a deeper
understanding of the many problems facing the farmer. The desire to help
the tiller of the soil increase production led him to play a major role in
creating Southeast Kansas Incorporated and the Wilson County BankerFarmer Lime and Legume Project. In the latter program, Woodring, who
believed that bankers should serve as liaison between agricultural specialists
and farmers, gained state and national prominence by establishing a program
whereby county bankers brought farmers together with county farm agents
and state agricultural experts to set up test areas in order to demonstrate the
value of certain methods of fertilization. The results were so successful that
other farmers, after witnessing the increased yields, quickly adopted the new
methods. In May 1926 even Governor Ben S. Paulen came to Wilson County
to observe the project and to talk with the man responsible for it, Harry
Woodring. The Governor came away quite impressed with the program and
its coordinator.58
In 1927 Woodring joined with a dozen other prominent leaders from a
nine-county area to form Southeast Kansas Incorporated, a regional organization designed to promote the agricultural, industrial, and commercial development of the area. For several years the Neodesha banker served as
chairman of the group's Agricultural Committee.59 While serving in that
capacity, he became increasingly concerned over the damage that annual
flooding inflicted on the rich Kansas farmlands. In the spring of 1927 devastating floods hit the valleys of the Ohio and Mississippi rivers, and because of
his knowledge in this matter, Woodring was sent as a delegate to the Missisippi Flood Control Conference, which was held in Chicago in June. Coming
away from the session with the firm belief that flood control was a government responsibility, both at the state and the federal level, he called on
Governor Paulen to take action that would help alleviate the problem of
flooding. 60 The Governor responded favorably to the proposal by calling a
statewide Flood Control Conference in September, and subsequently he
appointed Woodring to serve as a member and Secretary of the ad hoc Flood
Control and Water Conservation Commission, the body that was largely
responsible for the drafting of the Kansas Conservatory Act of 1929. The
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Sunflower State was now headed toward effective flood control, and the man
from Neodesha had done much to start it on its way. 61
Although he was busy working at the bank and promoting areawide
economic development, Woodring still found time for many other activities.
It was in these years that he became an avid bridge player, and he and his
sister Lida frequently had another couple over to their house for an evening
of cards. Home gardening activity also began to increase in 1926, when he
bought a large two-story house set on a four-acre plot at the corner of First
and Wisconsin streets. Harry and his elderly father spent considerable time
outside, working on the grounds and maintaining the large vegetable garden
that graced the east side of the home.62 As in the past, he continued to be
one of the most active members of the First Christian Church, where he
taught Sunday School, sponsored the Christian Endeavor group, and served
as a deacon.63 Although he spent considerable time working at his home,
church, and bank, he increasingly engaged in activities outside their purview.
He was now going out more than ever: afternoons were spent on the tennis
courts; evenings at the movies; and Saturday nights at nearby Independence,
watching the fights. 64 Membership in the Masons, who had numerous activities, also added to his social life.
Of all the activities, both business and social, that he engaged in during
the 1920s, none offered Woodring more enjoyment and satisfaction or meant
more to his subsequent career than did his membership in the American
Legion. In June of 1919 the Tank Corps veteran had become a charter
member of Neodesha's Seward-Ayers Post of the American Legion.6 ~ During the next three years in Kansas City he maintained his membership in
that organization, even though he was not active in its affairs. Then in 1922,
upon his return to Neodesha, he plunged into the post's activities with unbounded enthusiasm. 66 His superior cooking ability, which he had gained
from his sisters, was a major asset to Woodring and the local group, for he
was able to turn their picnics, fish frys, and stag dinners into first-class feasts.
His culinary magic, along with his pleasing personality and tremendous
enthusiasm, soon made him one of the most popular and respected members
of the group. When, in 1925, Harry's fellow Legionnaires elected him to the
first of two consecutive terms as Post Commander, they had no idea that the
election would ·start Woodring down a road that would lead to the Statehouse and the highest echelons of the federal govemment.67
Under Woodring the Seward-Ayers Post became one of the largest and
most active in the state. His success in acquiring new members soon caught
the attention of state Legion officials, and in 1927 he was made Chairman of
the State Membership Committee. Although the national membership of the
Legion was increasing, the fortunes of the Kansas group were sagging, for
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it had lost nearly 1,800 members during the preceding year. Woodring met
the challenge of declining numbers with his usual zeal and enthusiasm, and
in the following year the state organization added more than 1,000 men to
its rolls, increasing its membership from 17,924 to 19,009.68
As State Membership Chairman, Woodring had the opportunity to visit
posts throughout the state. Before long he was known by Legion officials all
over Kansas as one of the most dedicated and hard-working members of the
Kansas Department. His labors were rewarded in September 1928, when, at
the state convention held in Pittsburg, he was elected State Commander.69
Heading one of the most active Legion departments in the country was
practically a full-time job, requiring the expenditure of considerable amounts
of time on business and administrative matters and even more time attending and promoting local Legion activities. Each week found Commander Woodring visiting two, three, or four local posts in order to participate in or observe one of their activities. Believing that one of his major
responsibilities was to make the public aware of the programs and activities
of the American Legion, Woodring used every possible opportunity to appear
before local civic and service groups to tell about his organization. Wherever
he went, he used his position and influence to meet local politicians and
businessmen and to speak to the Lions Club, the Rotary Club, and other
civic groups. Before long he was known to thousands of people from one
end of Kansas to the other.70 As State Commander, Harry Woodring began
to experience a new way of life, which included attending conferences and
conventions, making speeches, traveling, meeting people, and being wined
and dined. While it was a new and busy style of life, it was also exciting,
and the man from Neodesha loved every minute of it.
As Woodring became more deeply involved in the activities of the
Legion, his interest in the bank declined. At the same time that his enthusiasm for business started on the downswing, he began to toy with the
idea of entering politics. This new interest, which had long manifested itself
in a keen awareness of state and national affairs, was stimulated by the
growing awareness of his oratorical skill as well as by the sense of influence
and power that he experienced while serving as a spokesman for twenty
thousand Legionnaires. Because he had the glitter of politics in his eyes, the
prospect of spending the rest of his life as a small-town banker became less
and less appealing.71 Furthermore, Woodring had always liked a challenge,
and banking no longer seemed to be able to provide that challenge. Since he
had risen from janitor to vice-president and majority stockholder of a successful bank, there did not seem to be much more to achieve in that
profession.
Early in 1929, shortly after the death of his father, Woodring began
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seriously to consider selling his interest in the First National Bank. In
March, when he heard that some directors were trying to "sell out from
under him," he beat them to the punch by selling out first. Two weeks later
he severed all relations with the bank and announced that his plans for the
future were uncertain. Thus, the moderately wealthy bachelor had, at the
age of forty-one, retired from the occupation that had been so good to him. 72
His retirement from banking came at a most fortunate time for Woodring,
because seven months later came the great stock-market crash and a subsequent rash of bank failures. In leaving his profession of nearly twenty-five
years, Woodring brought one career to an end, but he was about to embark
on a new and more exciting one.
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2
Venture into Politics

When forty-one-year-old Harry Woodring left the banking business in the
spring of 1929, it was not with the intention of retiring, but with the idea of
striking out in a new direction. Although he announced that his future
plans were "indefinite," he had, during the previous twelve months, been
formulating plans to pursue a career in politics.1
Woodring's decision to become a politician was not really surprising in
light of his lifelong interest in history, government, and contemporary affairs
and his love of displaying oratorical skill. While the decision to enter the
rough-and-tumble world of politics can be understood in view of his deep
interest, it is difficult to comprehend when one considers his slim chances of
achieving success in such an endeavor. In entering the Kansas political
arena-particularly at that time-Woodring had two major handicaps. First,
because he had had no political experience and had not been active in party
affairs, he was not only politically nai:ve, he also lacked the close personal
acquaintances and associations so essential in gaining party support. His
second, and most important, handicap was his political affiliation: he was a
Democrat, and for a member of that party to seek political office in "Republican" Kansas was almost tantamount to political suicide.2
While W oodring's desire to enter politics may have gone back to the
early 1920s, he did not express such an idea until 1928. Early in that year
Woodring indicated to several leading Democrats in his section of the state
that he wished to seek political office-preferably a seat in the United States
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House of Representatives.3 Such expressions were well received by the officials of the Democratic party, who were always on the lookout for promising
candidates, especially ones like Woodring who could go a long way in
financing their own campaigns. With the encouragement and support of
Carl V. Rice, a Parsons attorney who was chairman of the Third Congressional District Committee, Woodring set out to build up his candidacy. To
make his name and face familiar to people throughout his congressional
district, Woodring made numerous nonpartisan speeches on such things as
the Lime and Legume Project, flood control, and current affairs. He also
used his position as State Chairman of the American Legion Membership
Committee to visit and talk to every Legion post in the district.4
Although he made a good impression and was well received by the
dozens of groups before which he appeared that spring, his enthusiasm for
seeking a congressional seat waned as the tide of "Coolidge Prosperity" increasingly convinced him that 1928 would be an unusually bad year for
Kansas Democrats. Feeling that this would not be the time to try to unseat
the Republican incumbent, Congressman W. H. Sproul, Woodring decided
instead to seek election as State Commander of the American Legion. 5 While
his support of and loyalty to the Legion were genuine, there can be little
doubt that he was constantly aware of the opportunity for public exposure
that the position afforded.6
As previously noted. Woodring not only won the state commandership,
he also used that position to make his name and face familiar to thousands
of people throughout Kansas. It was in late 1929 that Woodring, who still
had his eye on the Third Congressional District seat, attended a Legion
meeting in Parsons, Kansas, at which Harold McGugin, a Coffeyville attorney and a Republican member of the state legislature, spoke. In a private
conversation after the meeting, McGugin, a good friend of Woodring's who
had been instrumental in getting him elected State Commander of the
Legion, revealed that he was going to try to unseat Congressman Sproul in
the upcoming primary. This revelation was quite upsetting to Woodring,
who believed that McGugin had a good chance to win the Republican nomination; should this occur, it meant that he and McGugin would be facing
each other in the general election. Unwilling to face the prospect of a political battle with a good friend, Woodring, in December 1929, decided to give
up his idea of trying to go to Congress.7
The decision to abandon the congressional race did not mean that the
former banker from Wilson County was forsaking politics: it merely meant
that he was looking in another political direction. He turned his sights from
Washington to Topeka and the governorship of Kansas. This idea seemed
rather foolhardy to everyone except Woodring himself, for the gubernatorial
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prospects of a Democrat who was a political novice were not very promising.
Nevertheless, the fact that the state of Kansas had elected only three Democratic Governors in its seventy-six-year history did not discourage him. He
felt that his statewide acquaintances, along with difficulties in the state
Republican organization and a possible nationwide reaction against the
country's growing economic ills, could pave the way for victory. 8
Initially, many of the Democratic leaders in the state were not very
enthusiastic about Woodring's candidacy. This coolness stemmed from two
basic factors. First, they resented having a political upstart-a man who had
done nothing for the party in the past-seek the nomination for such a high
post. Because it had long been the accepted practice in Kansas Democratic
circles to give nominations for key posts to loyal party members as a reward
for years of faithful service, they felt that Woodring was attempting to cut
in on some Democrat who was more deserving. The second major reason
for the party's coolness toward his candidacy was the fear that the young,
ambitious Woodring might wage a vigorous-and expensive-campaign.
Believing that the Republican Governor, Clyde M. Reed, would be unbeatable in 1930, a number of Democrats were opposed to spending the party's
limited campaign funds on a hopeless race.
Woodring's .first major break in attaining the governorship came in late
December 1929, when Carl Rice, who was still chairman of the Third District Democratic Committee, agreed to support his candidacy. Although Rice
seemed to doubt that his friend could go all the way, he felt that the publicity gained in the campaign would help set him up for a subsequent
campaign for the governorship or a congressional seat.
Woodring's venture into politics officially got underway at Pittsburg,
Kansas, on 9 January 1930, when the Third District caucus-with Rice and
his influential wife, Ruth, wielding their influence-endorsed him as the
party's nominee for Governor.9 Two weeks later, on 24 January, the candidate announced that his "hat was in the ring." At that time he called for
lower taxes and set the major theme of his campaign by citing the state's
"due need of a business administration," which he could provide. Just what
such a business administration would entail was left conveniently vague.10
The former banker had thus taken the plunge into politics and had done so
virtually alone. He had the verbal support of a few Democrats from southeast Kansas, but that ,was about all. When Woodring opened his primarycampaign headquarters in the Jayhawk Hotel in Topeka in early April, he
had no organization and no funds except his own, which were not extensive.
His campaign started out as near to a one-man show as was possible.11
If securing the support of Carl Rice had been Woodring's first major
break, his second came in early April, when he succeeded in getting John W.
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Wells, the chairman of the Democratic State Committee, to manage his primary campaign. Convincing the politically experienced Wells, who had
numerous contacts in the party, to cast his lot with him was a tremendous
coup for Woodring; it gave his campaign a big boost. Wells's astuteness was
immediately displayed by the manner in which he resigned his chairmanship
of the state party. Instead of stepping down in a quiet manner, he tendered
his resignation with considerable fanfare, indicating that he was leaving his
important post in order to manage Woodring's campaign. In this fashion
the new manager succeeded in gaining considerable statewide publicity for
himself, his party, and his candidate.12
Facing Woodring in the primary was Noah L. Bowman, a seventy-yearold lawyer from Garnett. Bowman, who had announced his candidacy in
February, was a refined old gentleman who had served in both houses of the
legislature and was currently a member of the House. Nearly four decades
of legal and political activity-some as a Populist, but most as a Democrathad put him in good stead with many old party leaders, including the former
Democratic Governor Jonathan M. Davis.18
Woodring's strategy in the primary campaign was to win the nomination by appealing to the younger members of the party without incurring
the wrath of the old-line members; thus, throughout the contest he carefully
sought to avoid attacking the elderly Bowman, his ideas, or his supporters.
Party unity was the name of the game, and in order to maintain that unity
and still win the nomination, Woodring had to attack the corrupt Republicans and convince the majority of Democrats that he was the best man to
cope with the state's problems. Throughout the contest, Woodring divided
his time between telling what was wrong with the Republicans and what
was right about Harry Woodring. Highlighting nearly every speech were
references to Governor Reed and the Republican machine that controlled the
state legislature through the use of patronage, a call for an end to the "present intolerable situation," and a claim that the "only hope of the people"
was the election of a good, qualified Democratic Governor-namely himself.14 Both his campaign literature and his speeches emphasized that he
was the type of man who could best provide the business administration
that Kansas so drastically needed. Frequent mention was also made of his
Legion and business activities, especially his outstanding banking career, the
implication being that since he had succeeded in those endeavors, he could
certainly do the same in the business of running the state. 15 Although he
promised to provide efficiency, economy, and tax reductions, Woodring never
explained how he would do so. After all, he was trying to sell himself, not
a program; that would come in the general election.
During this campaign, Woodring capitalized on three of his major
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assets: oratorical skill, boundless energy, and age. Those Kansans who came
to hear the short, balding candidate give a speech were rarely disappointed.
His forceful delivery and the ability to express his thoughts and ideas clearly,
along with a rather folksy approach, enabled him to get and hold the attention of practically any audience. While his poor command of grammar
alarmed some individuals, his overall effectiveness as a public speaker generally caused them to overlook that fault.16 In fact, his poor English was
probably an asset rather than a liability while he was campaigning in rural
Kansas. Woodring benefited not only from the quality of his speeches, but
from the quantity of them as well. Because he was a very vigorous man, he
was able to pursue a hectic and demanding schedule. As one newspaper
noted during the course of the campaign, he "appears here, there and everywhere that two or three people gather together."17 He traveled continually,
frequently giving three or four speeches daily. In the hot, dusty days of June
and July 1930, he traveled to 94 of the state's 105 counties in quest of votes,
and his pace was so lively that even the staff of his own headquarters had
difficulty keeping up with him.18
Age was another asset utilized by Woodring. He emphasized his relative youth and the need for young blood in the governorship; and when the
press continually reported that he was forty years old, he did nothing to let
it know that he was actually forty-three. It was not long before he was
recognized as the candidate of the younger crowd in his party, and the fact
that the contest was essentially a young-old feud was openly acknowledged.
The young, or Woodring, faction had the support of Jouett Shouse-former
national committeeman from Argonia, who was serving as chairman of the
Democratic National Executive Committee-and national committeeman
Dudley Doolittle of Strong City. This group was aligned against the old,
conservative Jonathan Davis-Noah Bowman wing of the party.
Bowman, in spite of his age, carried on a rather spirited campaign,
making hundreds of appearances and claiming that he would cut taxes considerably.19 The financial advantage of the old-crowd candidate over his
opponent enabled him to spend considerably more on campaign literature
and advertising. Since Woodring's funds were rather limited, his newspaper
advertising was practically nil; however, John Wells came up with several
innovations that were quite successful in getting maximum publicity for the
campaign dollar.20 By occasionally using an airplane to fly into a rural community to make a speech, Woodring received more attention than a dozen
ads would have brought, because large crowds came out to see the landing
and the takeoff in a nearby pasture, and local newspapers gave considerable
publicity to such events.21 Movietone advertising-a two-minute film pitch
by Woodring-was used at several large theaters, and a number of radio
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speeches were made in the week before the election.22 The bulk of the
campaigning was on a much more economical scale: generally Woodring,
accompanied by a friend, drove from town to town, where they set up a
public-address system on the square, and the candidate made a speech. Winning the vote of the gentler sex was likewise done at minimum cost, with
female members of local "Woodring for Governor" clubs sponsoring
"Woodring Bridge Parties," which provided an afternoon of bridge, cookies,
and ice cream.23 Such innovations enabled the political newcomer from
Neodesha to run his campaign on a shoestring.
When the primary campaign came to a close on 4 August, a tired Harry
Woodring was confident that he would win the nomination, because, as he
said, "The Democrats of this state have come to the conclusion that the
nomination of a businessman, rather than a politician, would prove more
beneficial to the common people."24 This optimism was apparently warranted, because on the following day Kansas Democrats went to the polls
and cast 37,888 votes for Woodring and only 26,321 for Bowman.211 The
younger crowd was now in control. Although pleased by his victory, Woodring was not inclined to celebrate. He realized that the real challenge was
just beginning. Getting the nomination was the easy part of the journey to
the governor's mansion; the difficult road lay ahead. Exhausted by months
of traveling, speaking, and shaking hands, the newly chosen Democratic
nominee decided to spend several weeks resting for the vigorous campaign
that lay ahead. As he relaxed and reflected on the primary, he was gratified
that the contest "was conducted in a clean, constructive manner and resulted
in no personal animosity or bitterness" among the state's Democrats.26 Fortunately for Woodring, Kansas Republicans could not make the same claim.
Whereas the Democratic primary had been a gentlemanly, refined, and
rather dull contest which had ended with party unity still intact, the Republican contest had been an exciting knock-down-drag-out affair which ended
with the defeat of the incumbent Governor and with the party split wide
open. This was nothing new, for factionalism had rocked the Republican
party in Kansas throughout the 1920s as the old-guard conservatives and the
progressives fought to gain the upper hand.27 In 1928 the progressives had
succeeded in putting their man, newspaper publisher Clyde M. Reed, into
the governorship. Reed proved to be an able and effective state executive;
but his less-than-winsome personality, the deteriorating economic picture,
and the determination of the party conservatives to unseat him-all spelled
trouble. In the 1930 primary the old guard selected a young candidate,
Frank ("Chief") Haucke of Council Grove, to face Reed, and there followed
one of the most bitterly fought primaries ever witnessed by Kansans. Although the candidates avoided attacking each other, the members of their
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respective factions maligned and abused one another viciously. The contest
between the youthful Haucke and the elderly Reed was similar to that of
the Democrats in that it was a battle of young versus old; however, in this
unusual case, the younger crowd represented the conservatives, and the older
crowd represented the progressives. Although Haucke's followers represented the younger crowd, they were being led by old-time politicians who
were out to defeat Reed in any way they could. "Give the young men a
chance" became the slogan of the anti-Reed people, and Kansas Republicans
did just that as they gave Haucke 158,113 votes to the Governor's 131,988.28
The lines were now drawn for the November general election, with the
candidates of the younger crowd, Frank Haucke and Harry Woodring, set
to do battle.29
Frank ("Chief") Haucke, a soft-spoken farmer from Morris County,
possessed personal attributes that made him a nearly perfect candidate-he
was good-looking, modest, clean-living, and personable. After graduating
from high school, the tall, muscular man, who was of German ancestry and
had exceptional athletic ability, went first to Kansas State Agricultural College and then to Cornell, where he starred on the football team. During
World War I he joined the Army and was sent to France, where he received
two wounds in the battle of Chateau Thierry. After the war he returned to
his father's 1,500-acre farm outside Council Grove. Before long he was engaging in American Legion activities and was elected State Commander in
1924. It was about this time that he met and became friends with another
active Legionnaire, Harry Woodring. In 1926 he entered politics, being
elected to the first of two terms as a state representative. The nickname
Chief was first given to him by his friends because of his large collection of
Indian relics, which he had gathered since he was a boy; then, in the mid
1920s, when the Kaw Indian tribe "adopted him" and called him Chief as an
expression of its appreciation for an Indian monument that he constructed,
the name came into general use. Candidate Haucke's personal life was
above reproach, and his supporters always made much of the fact that he
was an honest, hard-working young man who did not smoke, drink, or "run
around."30
During the course of the campaign, newspapermen frequently pointed
out the similarities between the two candidates, "Honest Frank" and "Handsome Harry." Such comparisons were not surprising, because both men were
bachelors, shy, young, veterans, and past State Commanders of the American
Legion who neither smoked nor drank. Physically, however, the two presented an interesting study in contrasts: stretching up more than six feet,
the tall, muscular Haucke towered over his short, plump rival, who barely
hit the five-and-one-half-foot mark. Other than size, the most noticeably
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different characteristic was their hair. While the brown-eyed Chief had a
"good head of hair," the blue-eyed former banker had thin hair and frontal
baldness, which made his eyebrows seem high and his ears appear larger
than they really were. Although Haucke was probably the better looking of
the two, it was Woodring who picked up the nickname "Handsome." The
reason for this was that the term was used to refer not to physical attributes
but to his manner of dress, and it was in this respect that the stylish, immaculately dressed Woodring outdistanced his rival and consequently became "Handsome Harry."31
The day after the primary election, Woodring indicated that his campaign for the general election would be "no pink tea affair" but a vigorous,
hard-fought battle "for the interests and welfare of the average citizen" and
against "interests unfriendly to the masses." 32 After making this public
statement, he spent several weeks resting and mapping out his campaign
strategy. The first major problem he faced was the appointment of the
Chairman of the State Democratic Committee. Traditionally it was the prerogative of the Democratic gubernatorial nominee to name the State Chairman, a post that the candidate generally filled with his campaign manager.33
Had this precedent been followed, Woodring would have appointed John
Wells to the high post; however, that appointment was never made. There
was no doubt that Wells possessed considerable political skill and ability,
but an increasing tendency on Wells's part to indulge in alcohol and to engage in promiscuous activities caused Woodring to feel that such actions
could possibly be used by the opposition to discredit his candidacy. While
Woodring was grateful for Wells's contribution to his success, he felt that
he had no alternative but to let him go.34 To avoid embarrassment to everyone concerned, it was announced that Wells would be unable to assume the
state chairmanship because of poor health.35
The dismissal of Wells, which at the time appeared to be a blow to
Woodring's campaign, actually turned out to be a blessing in disguise,
because he was replaced by Guy T. Helvering, described by one historian as
perhaps "the best practical politician yet developed in Kansas."36 The Ohioborn Helvering grew up in the Sunflower State and graduated from the
University of Kansas before securing his law degree from the University of
Michigan. Hanging out his shingle at Marysville, Kansas, he soon gained a
reputation as a topnotch lawyer. In 1912, following a successful stint as
prosecuting attorney of Marshall County, the thirty-four-year-old Democrat
was elected to the first of three consecutive terms as Congressman from the
Fifth Congressional District. Six years in Congress gave him a good insight
into and understanding of the world of politics. After being swept from
office in the Republican landslide of 1920, Helvering went to Salina, Kansas,
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where he acquired milling, land, and banking interests, becoming in time
the head of the city's largest bank. Shortly thereafter he expressed his satisfaction with banking and vowed that he would never again become involved
in "big politics."37 He kept that promise until June of 1930, when Woodring
visited him at his Salina bank and asked for his political support. Helvering
was so impressed with the enthusiasm, apparent ability, and personality of
the young candidate that he agreed to help him.38 During the primary the
former Congressman used his wide acquaintance with local party leaders to
drum up support for his candidate. He was also involved in the formulation
of party strategy, but most of his work was behind the scenes. After the
primary and the decision to let Wells go, Woodring asked Helvering to serve
both as his campaign manager and as chairman of the State Democratic
Committee. The split in . the Republican party, along with pressure from
Woodring and other party leaders, led the "retired" politician to accept the
offer.89 Although the politically astute Helvering was the campaign manager, this did not mean that he told Woodring what to do. He gave advice
and he gave it freely, and his candidate frequently followed it; but there was
never any question that Woodring would, and in fact did, run his own
campaign.40
That the Democrats were going to take the initiative and wage an
aggressive campaign became evident when the party leaders gathered in
Topeka during the last week of August to plan their strategy and draw up a
platform. They immediately broke the Democratic tradition of waiting for
the Republican platform to appear before deciding on their positions. On
Sunday, 24 August, Woodring and a group of his advisers, which included
Helvering, Carl Rice, Mrs. Carl Rice ( who was acting chairman of the state
party), and Dudley Doolittle, met, hammered out, and released to the press
a tentative platform, which they hoped would be approved first by the Resolutions Committee and subsequently by the Party Council. Acceptance by
those two groups would make it the official party platform.41 The proposed
platform included the usual pledges to uphold the law, improve education,
lower taxes, and provide efficiency and economy; but it also promised continuance of the "splendid" highway-construction program of the Reed administration, supported a presidential primary, favored the establishment ·of
a separate state Labor Department, pledged itself to nonpolitical reapportionment, and promised more equitable distribution of taxes by adjusting
property valuations. On only one issue, the state income tax amendment,
did the proposed document fail to take a position. Instead of taking a stand
on this controversial subject, which was to appear on the November ballot,
the platform took no stand, indicating instead that the party would be con-

26

tent to "let the will of the people prevail."42 This position came close to
shattering party harmony.
Although Woodring personally favored passage of the income tax
amendment, he and his advisers were afraid that party endorsement of the
hotly disputed measure might antagonize a large number of voters and provide an issue that the Republicans could effectively attack. For these reasons
they favored a middle-of-the-road policy . that would alienate neither the supporters nor the opponents of the tax. When the Resolutions Committee met
on Tuesday, 26 August, to consider the proposed platform, all went well
until the plank on the income tax came up. At that time State Senator A. L.
Scott, after reminding the committee that over the years the party had supported the idea of a state income tax, introduced an amendment calling for
endorsement of it. Scott was joined by several others-including former
Governor Jonathan M. Davis, the party's candidate for the United States
Senate-who indicated that they were convinced that the party should take
a firm stand for the amendment. Guy Helvering also sided with the ScottDavis forces, but the defenders of the original plank stood firm. With neither
side willing to back down, a deadlock appeared to be imminent. At this
point Edgar Bennett of Marysville, after acknowledging the dangers of a
party split if a compromise were not reached, suggested that Woodring,
since he would be carrying the heaviest burden in the election, should be
permitted to write the plank as he saw fit. This met with the approval of
everyone except Davis. With the party on the verge of a factional fight that
could seriously hinder its upcoming chances for success. Woodring rose and
proposed that the plank read: "We believe in the principle of the income
tax, however, we believe the adoption of the amendment is not a partisan
issue. . . ." This change, which endorsed the principle of the tax without
committing the party to the amendment, was quite acceptable to both factions and thus became a part of the official platform.43 When the State
Democratic Council adjourned on that August 26, candidate Woodring had
won approval of his platform and had still maintained the party unity that
he knew was so essential if he were to achieve victory in November.
The 1930 gubernatorial campaign opened on a friendly note on September
1, when Woodring joined his friend and political rival Frank Haucke at the
State American Legion Convention at Emporia. The cordiality that prevailed was warm and sincere as the two former State Commanders chatted,
lunched together, and rode in the same car in the parade.44 Although neither
candidate made a speech or mentioned the election, there was no question
that the quest for votes, especially among Legionnaires, had begun. When
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Woodring left the convention on 2 September, his opening campaign speech
was still a week and a half away, but he and his staff were not idle during
that period. State headquarters were opened at the Jayhawk Hotel in Topeka, itineraries were arranged, position papers were drawn up, campaign
literature was secured, funds were solicited, and behind-the-scenes efforts
were made to get the covert, if not the overt, support of disgruntled Republicans, including Governor Reed.45
On Friday, 12 September, more than three hundred people jammed into
the Franklin County courtroom in Ottawa, Kansas, to hear Woodring give
the speech that launched his campaign for the governorship. It was no secret
that his only hope for success was to hold the votes of his own party and to
attract the votes of those Reed Republicans who were still bitter over their
candidate's defeat in the primary. His pursuit of this strategy led Woodring
to do the bulk of his campaigning in the areas that Reed had carried and,
while in those areas, to praise the Governor and his programs. This appeal
was evident in his keynote address, as he lashed out at the "machine crowd
of politicians-the Shawnee county dynasty," headed by Republican State
Chairman John D. M. Hamilton, which had repudiated the Reed administration because it "could not be controlled." Woodring expressed his contempt for such "gang rule," and he assured his audience that he was "not
the pawn of any faction or group of hungry or disgruntled politicians." He
then turned briefly to the tax question. While stating that this would be "the
dominant issue in the campaign," he carefully skirted the subject by declaring only that the tax burden must be distributed in a more equitable fashion.
He closed by pledging to carry forward the Reed road-building program,
and he promised to administer efficiently the business of Kansas.46 In attacking "reactionary machine rule" and pledging to run the state in a businesslike fashion, Woodring set forth the two issues that he was to dwell on for
the duration of the contest.
When Woodring opened his campaign in September, he was a decided
underdog, even though the Republican party was still split. One major
newspaper set his odds at 1,000-to-1, and political observers throughout the,
state gave him little chance of defeating Haucke.47 Nevertheless, the Democratic candidate carried his campaign to the people, speaking before gatherings large and small and telling them that a vote for him would not be
wasted, because he could win.48 One reason for his optimism, but a reason
that he never mentioned publicly, was the depression. As the problems of
unemployment, deflation, and hunger hit more and more Kansas homes,
Woodring stood to benefit politically, because he would gain support from
the disappointed voters who would react against the party in power. He was
counting heavily on the "discontent vote." 49 Throughout September the
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campaign remained a one-sided affair, because the Republicans had decided
to delay the start of their earnest campaigning until October, by which time
they hoped that "the enthusiastic young Mr. Woodring will have talked
himself out."50 There was another gubernatorial candidate, Socialist J. B.
Shields of Lost Springs, but no one, including Shields himself, seemed to
take his candidacy seriously.51 As the days of September faded, the race for
Governor gave little evidence of being anything other than a routine campaign. Little did Kansans realize that they were about to witness "the most
astonishing, dramatic, and colorful race in Kansas history." 52
The series of events that was to breathe new life and excitement into
the race was set in motion on September 19, when Dr. John R. Brinkley of
Milford announced that he was an independent candidate for governor.
With this announcement, one of the most unusual and controversial figures
ever to grace the Kansas political stage became part of the campaign struggle.53 Brinkley, who had "graduated" from several medical schools of questionable repute, had come to Kansas in 1918 and had set up a practice in
Milford, a small village seventy miles west of Topeka. The next few years
brought nothing but success to the likable country doctor as his medical
practice grew and he opened his own drugstore. In 1922 he received some
notoriety when he established the first radio station in Kansas, KFKB, a
powerful station whose signal could reach most of the state.
What started the red-haired, goateed medico on the way to fame were
his "goat gland" transplants, which supposedly restored masculine virility.
This idea had, in all likelihood, come from rejuvenation experiments involving the sex glands of chimpanzees, which were being undertaken in
Europe at that time. "Doc" Brinkley started performing his rejuvenation
operations, which consisted of implanting the glands of a goat into the
center of a man's testicles, for a modest fee of fifty dollars. A number of
individuals were more than pleased with the doctor's work, and the testimonials of childless couples who subsequently became parents and of impotent men who were now enjoying an active and satisfying sex life began
to spread Brinkley's name far and wide. When the patients started to roll
into Milford, the cost of the operation was raised to $750, but still they came.
It was soon necessary to build and equip a hospital large enough to handle
the nearly two hundred patients who underwent surgery every week. Brinkley increasingly used his radio station to tell Kansans about the "new life"
that they could enjoy after a short stay at the Milford clinic; and for those
who could not make the trip, the next best thing was to take his "four phase
compound," which could be purchased at drugstores throughout the state.
About this time, late 1927, he began to receive letters from listeners, who
inquired about their various ailments. In response, the "Doctor" began to
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dispense his medical advice via the air waves, and before long he was receiving thousands of letters each week for his "Medical Question Box of the
Air." The pride of Milford was a well known, wealthy man-just how
wealthy no one knew, but he was able to build a beautiful home, open his
own bank, enlarge his clinic, and purchase several airplanes.64 The "goat
gland" specialist was on top of the world.
Then in 1928 things went sour. Brinkley's troubles started when the
crusading Kansas City Star accused him of being a "quack" who was fraudulently taking advantage of a gullible. public, and this expose soon led the
State Medical Board to investigate the activities of the Milford physician.
During lengthy hearings, the board heard from many witnesses, both professional and nonprofessional, including a large number who came to Brinkley's defense by attesting to the success of the operation. In the end, however,
his license was revoked. This did not put an end to his troubles, because the
Star continued to mount pressure to have his radio license revoked.55 Frustrated by what he considered to be a campaign of persecution against him,
"Doc" decided to do something about it; thus, in mid September 1930, half
in anger, half in jest, he announced that he would be a write-in candidate for
Govemor. 56
Brinkley's announcement attracted practically no attention, because no
one, including the party leaders and candidates, took him seriously or gave
him the slightest chance of succeeding. It would be difficult for an independent to do well even if he were on the ballot; but Brinkley was not, and
could not be put on it, because Kansas law required that independents file
for candidacy forty days prior to the primary-a deadline that was already
past.57 Even if that law were successfully challenged in the courts, there
would be another problem, because the ballots had already been printed.
That Woodring and Haucke were not initially concerned over Brinkley's
activities seems evident from the fact that on 2 October, the day after
Haucke's keynote address at Manhattan, they boarded a train and headed
for Boston, Massachusetts, and the national convention of the American
Legion. 58 For the next ten days the two friends, who were both delegatesat-large, forgot their political differences as they roomed together and worked
successfully for the election of another Kansan, Ralph T. O'Neil, to the office
of National Commander.59 To see the two candidates enjoying themselves
at the convention, one would never have thought that in less than a month
they would be facing each other in an election. This enjoyable and leisurely
interlude came to an end on 11 October, just a little more than three weeks
before election day.
When the two candidates arrived back in the Sunflower State, they were
surprised and somewhat alarmed at the rapid tum of events that had taken
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place in their absence. While they had been vacationing, Brinkley had been
working overtime. Utilizing his radio station to the fullest possible advantage, the aspiring candidate was gaining a rather substantial following by
playing on the increasing discontent brought on by the depression, and by
promising to provide Kansas with good roads, free clinics, free schoolbooks,
fair taxes, and honest government. Thousands of Kansans who had previously looked to Brinkley to cure their physical ills now turned to him to
cure the state's political ills.60 Although both major party candidates were
becoming increasingly alarmed over Brinkley's growing strength, Woodring
was especially concerned, because that strength was coming primarily from
the discontented voters, a source of support on which he was counting
heavily.61
After returning from Boston, candidate Woodring met with chairman
Helvering to consider how they should handle the strange turn of events. In
the end they decided to follow their original strategy of attacking the Republican "machine," praising the administration of rejected Governor Reed,
and letting the electorate know that Woodring was the best man to give the
state a business administration.62 This decision to continue making Haucke,
not Brinkley, the main target was based primarily on the belief that it was
the former who was the major threat. Furthermore, there was uncertainty
over the reaction of the voters to a verbal assault on Brinkley, and that was
the only way to attack him, since he had no party or political record to
condemn. Woodring was apparently convinced that a name-calling contest
between himself and the "Doctor" would seriously divide the discontent vote
and thus give Haucke an easy victory. In this dilemma, Woodring pushed
vigorously ahead, as originally planned, virtually ignoring the man from
Milford.
Although "Chief" Haucke was out scouring the countryside for votes,
he never really went on the warpath. Because the Republican candidate
realized that if he were to be victorious, he had to unite his badly split party,
his strategy was primarily that of peacemaker. He continually appealed to
Republican Kansas to stay in the fold of the party that had served it so well
in the past.63 Almost as important as party unity was the emphasis on his
personal attributes. Haucke and his supporters frequently reminded the
voters that he was an honorable, honest, clean, and forthright young man
-just the kind of person that would make a good Governor. 64 He also
espoused a rather conservative legislative program, which called for good
roads, better schools, lower property taxes, economy, and all those other
wonderful things that no one could oppose. Promises to enforce prohibition,
as well as opposition to large corporation farming, also found their way into
many speeches.65 Predictably, Haucke took an occasional swat at Woodring
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or Brinkley, just as they did at him and at each other, but this was always
done in a dignified way. Mudslinging did not find its way into this contest.
As the campaign entered its last two hectic weeks, the speeches, programs, and campaign styles of Woodring and Haucke were quite similar;
but not Brinkley's. In addition to the hours spent on the radio, the Milford
medicineman was now making personal appearances before crowds numbering in the thousands. These gatherings would generally open with a few
songs by the Western singing star Roy Faulkner, after which Brinkley
would appear and give an emotion-packed speech interlaced with quotations
from the Bible, appeals for votes, and an explanation of where and how to
write his name on the ballot.66 With his almost limitless funds, he was also
able to flood the state with "J. R. Brinkley" pencils and bumper stickers.67
The large crowds he was now attracting, along with his strong showing in
a number of straw votes, indicated that Brinkley was a serious contender
who might well step into the governor's mansion. 68 As one seasoned political observer wrote just one week before the election, "Republican and
Democratic candidates and campaign speakers are talking issues-depression,
prohibition, party loyalty, party platforms, records and the usual line. But
to be quite frank about it, the voters are talking Brinkley."69
During the last week of the campaign, Woodring centered most of his
time on two new issues-prohibition and personal loyalty. Prior to this time
the prohibition question had been unimportant, because both candidates had
pledged them.selves to strict enforcement. Then, on 25 October, the Republican State Chairman, John Hamilton, issued a statement calling the voters'
attention to the fact that Woodring "was lined up with the same crowd
which is trying to make the Democratic party wet." When \Voodring indicated that he would not back a wet for President, the Republicans pointed
out that he had supported Al Smith, a wet candidate, in the 1928 presidential election. Woodring, realizing the importance of the liquor issue in
dry Kansas, struck back by noting that, as a State Representative, Frank
Haucke had originally opposed a $40,000 appropriation for the enforcement
of prohibition. Both candidates continued to question each other's stand on
the enforcement of prohibition right up to election day.70
The big issue that Woodring was forced to deal with on the eve of
the election was one that he had never anticipated and one that the opposition had not planned: the question of his personal loyalty. The issue arose
at a Republican rally that was held at the National Military Home in Leavenworth on 30 October. At this gathering of fifteen hundred former servicemen, William D. Reilly, a Leavenworth attorney who was active in the
American Legion, started out by lauding Frank Haucke, who was sitting on
the platform. He then told his audience that during the recent National
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Legion Convention in Boston, Woodring had deserted the cause of Kansan
Ralph T. O'Neil, who was seeking the comrnandership, and had returned
home to campaign, while Haucke had continued to work for O'Neil. This
incident, according to Reilly, showed "the difference between the two
men." 71 Woodring initially ignored the statement, apparently feeling that
responsible reporters would verify the story, see that there was no truth to it,
and learn that he was in fact in Boston at the time that he was allegedly
campaigning in Kansas. The reporters, however, reported only what Reilly
had said, and on the following day, papers throughout Kansas carried stories
with the caption "Woodring Accused of 'Running Out on Ralph T.
O'Neil.'" Feeling that the record had to be set straight, Woodring spent
election eve, 3 November, in Leavenworth, denying the "running out"
charge. He quoted statements from O'Neil thanking him for his support
in Boston, and he closed by saying that he would "rather not be elected
governor than run out on a friend." 72 That night a tired Harry Woodring
returned to Neodesha to vote and await the decision of the voters.
As the campaign came to an end, Woodring, Haucke, and Brinkley all
expressed confidence that they would win. But if they had no doubts as to
the outcome, the seasoned observers of Kansas politics did. There were
simply too many unanswered questions for an intelligent forecast to be
made. Would the disgruntled Reed supporters vote the party line or switch
their votes to one of the other candidates? Would the bulk of the discontent
vote go to Woodring or to Brinkley? How many votes intended for Brinkley would be thrown out on technicalities? These and many other questions
could be answered only by the electorate. If there was one thing that observers agreed on more than anything else, it was that "Brinkley's campaign
has just about destroyed whatever chance Woodring, the Democratic nominee, had of defeating Haucke." 73 This belief was based on the assumption
that the discontent vote would be badly split. Although one could find
newspapermen who picked Haucke, some who gave Brinkley the nod, and
a few who picked Woodring, their predictions were so couched with "ifs"
and "maybes" as to give them little credence. If ever an election was a
tossup, this was it.
It was perhaps appropriate that one of the most unusual political campaigns in Kansas history should have had a most unusual ending. When the
residents of the Jayhawk State went to the polls on November 4, they assumed that by that night or early the next morning they would know who
their new Governor would be. Such was not to be the case, however. In
fact, more than ten days were to elapse before the results of the contest were
known. The earliest returns made it clear that in spite of a very strong
showing by Brinkley, the contest was going to result in a battle between the
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two party regulars. In the days that followed, the lead changed hands so
many times that the two men were said to be taking turns being Governor.74
As Woodring later recalled, "perhaps no man was governor as many times
as I was for eleven days-I was governor in the morning, and in the evening I wasn't governor." 76
The election was so close that it was not until all the absentee votes
were counted on 14 November that it was fairly certain that Woodring was
the winner. Final tabulations showed Woodring gathering 217,171 votes to
Haucke's 216,920 and Brinkley's 183,278.76 With more than 617,000 votes
cast, Woodring squeezed out a victory by a mere 251 votes. Considerable
controversy developed over the election results, primarily because of the large
number of ballots cast for Brinkley that were allegedly thrown out because
they were not marked properly. Consequently, controversy raged and continued to rage over this so-called short count election.77 Charges of irregularities, fraud, and conspiracy filled the air, but for reasons still not entirely
clear, neither Haucke nor Brinkley asked for a recount, and on 26 November, Woodring was officially declared the winner. 78 Ten months before, they
had said it could not be done; but as a result of hard work, the Depression,
and a split in the Republican party, Harry Woodring had been elected
Governor of Kansas.

In early December, after several weeks of much-needed rest at his home in
Neodesha, the Governor-elect took up temporary residence in the Jayhawk
Hotel in Topeka. During the following month he met almost continually
with Guy Helvering and other key advisers, considering appointments, formulating programs and policies, and working on his message to the legislature. Since Kansas Democrats rarely got a chance to share the spoils of
office, they were not about to let the opportunity slip by when it arose.
During this period, Woodring was besieged by hundreds of loyal Democrats,
who were anxious to share in the political plums that they felt were rightfully theirs. While the Governor-to-be saw some of the office seekers, most
were dealt with by Chairman Helvering.79
Not all of Woodring's visitors, however, were unsolicited. He invited
leading businessmen throughout the state to confer with him on such matters as roads, welfare, unemployment, and taxation. He was especially concerned about the last, because the election that had brought him victory had
brought defeat not only to all the other Democratic candidates for statewide
office but also to the income tax amendment, which he had considered so
vital. 80 One thing that he wished to avoid during this period was prematurely committing himself to particular plans, programs, or policies that
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might later prove difficult, if not impossible, to implement. As a result he
refused to discuss his programs publicly until they had been formulated and
presented to the state legislature.81 The only exception to this was his announcement that he would urge resubmission of the income tax amendment
to the voters.82 While the Governor-elect buried himself in political matters,
his unmarried sister, Lida, who was to serve as the state's "First Lady" for
her bachelor brother, was busy preparing for their move into the executive
mansion.83 In early January 1931 Woodring put the final touches on his
message to the legislature, appointed Leslie E. Wallace, editor of a Democratic paper in Larned, as his private secretary, and prepared for his January
inauguration on 12 January.84
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3
Governor of Kansas

The cold north wind swept across the Kansas plains and into the streets of
the capital city of Topeka. The temperature was hovering near the freezing
mark as most of the city's sixty-five thousand residents huddled together
with thousands of out-of-town visitors to view the inaugural parade of Governor Harry Woodring. About eleven o'clock on the morning of that cloudy
12 January 1931, the Governor-elect and the outgoing Governor, Clyde M.
Reed, walked out of the Statehouse and stepped into the open automobile
that was to serve as their parade vehicle. Then, with nearly a dozen bands,
half a dozen National Guard units, and hundreds of marchers from a score
of patriotic organizations leading the way, the procession wove its way
through the business district toward the city auditorium, where the inauguration ceremony was to take place.
The auditorium was overflowing as hundreds of Woodring's friends
and acquaintances joined an array of state and local officials, newsmen, and
curiosity seekers to witness the proceedings. Outside the building, hundreds
more stood in the freezing weather to hear the program over a public-address
system which could be heard not only in the immediate area, but throughout the downtown business district. When the platform party entered the
assembly hall and headed toward the stage, the crowd lost its composure
and began to shout and cheer, much as it would have at a University of
Kansas football game. After the noisy throng finally quieted down, Guy
Helvering, who was presiding, introduced Governor Reed, who gave a short
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farewell address in which he recapped the accomplishments of his administration. At the end of the speech, Reed, in "an unusual and gracious proceeding for an outgoing governor," introduced his successor and "close
personal friend" in a most laudatory fashion. After wishing him good luck
and adding that he would need it, Reed turned the platform over to Woodring, who then stepped to the podium and gave one of the shortest inaugural
addresses in the history of the state.
Speaking both to a statewide radio audience and to those assembled,
Woodring began by describing the conflicting emotions that he was experiencing as he embarked upon his new task. On the one hand, he claimed,
he was honored by having been chosen Governor, but his joy was tempered
by the sobering realization that he had an obligation to provide the kind of
leadership that Kansas citizens expected. Next he expressed his utmost confidence in representative government and urged Kansans to take a greater
interest and a more active role in the affairs of the state. He then announced
that although he believed that "government is an agency of welfare," he did
not intend to flood the state with a large number of programs designed to
meet the "temporary" ills facing Kansas and its citizens: "It is not my intention to be swept off my feet by an instant demand to meet certain conditions that I consider are only passing. I shall stand firm for a safe, sound
business administration." He did not, however, spell out the programs of
his administration-he was saving that for the message to the legislature.1
Upon the completion of his speech, Woodring turned to William A.
Johnston, the Chief Justice of the Kansas Supreme Court, and took the oath
that made him Governor. With a National Guard artillery unit booming
out a seventeen-gun salute to the new Chief Executive, the ceremony ended.
That night, Governor Woodring, accompanied by his sister Lida, performed
his first official function-hosting the inaugural reception.2 For that event,
lights, flags, and flowers were used to turn the staid old Statehouse into a
large, attractive ballroom. Beautifully gowned women, tuxedoed politicians,
and uniformed officers talked, laughed, and danced until the wee hours of
the morning on that happy, festive occasion.3
But beneath the joy and gaiety of the moment lay the realization of
those present that their state, like nearly every other state in the union, was
in serious trouble. Although many people tried to ignore it, the impact of
the Depression was becoming more apparent with each passing day. The
deteriorating situation was especially evident in agriculture, which was the
basis of Kansas economy. The record crops attested to the fact that 1930 had
been a good year weather-wise. Kansas not only maintained its rank as the
nation's leading wheat-growing state, but it did so by producing a recordbreaking 186 million bushels. Production of the state's other leading staple
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crop--corn-also rose to a record high. But while production was nsmg,
prices were falling as an already saturated market became flooded. Wheat
prices, which stood at ninety-nine cents a bushel in 1929, dropped to sixtythree cents in 1930 and were to decline to thirty-three cents during Woodring's first year in office. Corn prices had likewise begun to plummet, going
from nearly a dollar a bushel in 1929 to sixty-two cents in 1930. Overall,
Kansas saw the value of its agricultural products drop from $548 million in
1929 to $441 million the following year, a loss of more than $100 million.
The problems of overproduction and deflation were playing havoc with the
incomes of thousands of Kansas farmers and were resulting in declining
land prices, delinquent taxes, mortgages, and foreclosures. Two of the state's
main industries-meatpacking and milling-were also suffering serious setbacks. Overproduction, high shipping costs, and the decreasing ability of
Americans to buy meat served to put a damper on the economically important packing industry. In flour production Kansas retained its number
two ranking, but declining exports and reduced consumption of bread resulted in an overall decrease in production and a subsequent increase in
unemployment in the milling industry.4
The impact of the growing economic crisis did not limit itself to agriculture. Banks, too, felt the impact of hard times as dozens went broke and
countless others were forced to absorb huge losses. The oil industry, which
had long been a major producer of wealth in the state, was also in serious
trouble. Not only had the bottom fallen completely out of the market, but
one of the state's largest purchasers, Prairie Oil and Gas Company, had
stopped purchasing Kansas oil eleven days before Woodring's inauguration.
The very survival of the state's oil industry was very much in doubt. The
coal industry also saw a significant increase in unemployment as lower
demands and mechanization took their toll. Throughout the state there was
a growing disillusionment as citizens witnessed and experienced declining
farm prices, increasing unemployment, and growing tax burdens.11 All was
not well in Kansas in January 1931 as Harry Woodring assumed the
governorship.
The official responsibilities of a Governor fall into three general categories: ceremonial, administrative, and legislative. Although the first two
consume the bulk of his time, it is generally upon the latter that an evaluation of his success is based. Woodring realized this, and he was determined
to achieve legislative success. He knew that by doing so he would not only
benefit his state and its citizens, he would also enhance his chances for reelection. There were, however, several obstacles. With a biennial session,
which would fall in the first two months of his term, there would be no
time to get his feet wet before dealing with the legislature. His legislative
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record, whether good or bad, would be made in those first crucial eight
weeks in office-there would be no second chance. To complicate matters
further, the Governor faced a legislature that was dominated by the opposition party.6 Realizing the difficulties facing him, Woodring had attempted
to prepare for them by using the period between the election and the inauguration to formulate, with great care and thought, his program. He had
made numerous public statements indicating his strong desire to cooperate
and get along with the Republican legislature.7
On 14 January, just two days after his inauguration, Woodring appeared
before a joint session of the Kansas legislature to give the most important
speech he had ever made. He started his "state of the state" message by
reminding those assembled that he could only make recommendations, that
they were the ones with the authority to accept or reject the measures. He
asked only that they approach his proposals, as he had, in a nonpartisan
fashion. 8 Woodring made such an appeal because he knew that the success
or failure of his program lay in the hands of Republicans, who held 37 of 40
seats in the senate and 76 of 125 in the house.9 Having made his plea for
bipartisan support, he then set forth the cures that he proposed for the state's
ills. First and foremost he turned to taxes-"the paramount problem that
confronts this legislature and the problem that should have prior consideration." As he saw it, immediate tax relief and reform were absolutely essential. Immediate relief could be provided by reducing state expenditures,
tightening the methods of assessment, and tapping certain additional sources
of revenue. Reform, he maintained, was necessary in order to bring about a
shift in the tax burden from real estate and tangible property, upon which
the tax had become practically confiscatory, to all forms of wealth. To bring
this redistribution about, he asked that the income tax amendment be resubmitted to the voters for approval. He also urged that steps be taken to
assure that governmental units would follow a "pay as you go" plan in
financing public improvements and would "not over-mortgage the public
income of future generations" by excessive purchase of long-term bonds.
The idea of ultimately easing the financial burden of the average Kansas
family, whose income was dropping rapidly, motivated both his tax program
and his proposal that adequate funds be made available to the Public Service
Commission so that it could undertake action to bring about reduction in
gas, electric, and telephone rates. Turning to education, he accused the State
Textbook Commission of making "needless and expensive changes" in textbooks, and he called for a complete investigation of that body. Highways
and automobiles received attention as he vowed to continue the highway
program of former Governor Reed, urged the licensing of motor-vehicle
drivers, and asked that commercial vehicles be forced to pay a greater share
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of road-maintenance costs. Other major recommendations included creation
of a crippled children's commission, a state program to support the crippled
and handicapped, the tightening of laws to protect purchasers of corporate
securities, and the establishment of a separate Labor Department. In closing
his lengthy message, the Governor once more reiterated his willingness to
cooperate with the legislature in order to see his proposals enacted.10
The Governor's message was very well received, and the favorable impression it made on legislators, newspapermen, and citizens in general did
much to win the confidence of many Kansans who had questioned this
young man's ability to be Governor. Even a staunch Republican like William Allen White wrote an editorial praising the speech, calling it "an
intelligent discussion of state affairs [ which J was straightforward, welladvised and well-spoken." Concerning the impresson made by Woodring,
White said: "One couldn't ask more from a governor in his first inaugural.
Kansas will mark up her estimate of the young governor appreciably."11
White's evaluation of the new Democratic Governor and his proposed program was not atypical.12 Even the pro-Republican Topeka Daily Capital
carried an editorial praising Woodring's message.18
In the weeks following his address, Woodring busied himself with the
state's oil crisis and other administrative matters as he anxiously waited to
see what action would be taken on his legislative proposals. One, two, and
then three weeks passed, and except for a resolution establishing the Textbook Commission and a few minor hills raising various fees, little was done.
Since the early weeks of a session normally found hills being hammered out
in committee, it was not unusual that so few had received consideration
after three weeks. But what bothered Woodring was that it seemed doubtful that much was going to be done.1 4 The legislature appeared to be dragging its feet, and around the Statehouse, talk was spreading that, in light of
the unsettled conditions throughout the state, "the wisest course was for the
legislature to pass the appropriation bills, local measures and just enough
tax legislation to appease Mr. John Taxpayer, then adjourn and go home."111
Up to this time Governor Woodring had trod softly, because he did not wish
to pressure or antagonize the members of the legislature; however, with
three weeks of an eight-week session gone, he felt that the time had come to
exert some leadership and to attempt to push through some legislation,
especially on the tax issue.
Early in February the Governor let it be known that if the legislature
failed to pass some major laws to help ease and equalize the tax burden, he
would call it back into special session for that purpose. The threat of a special session sent shivers up the backs of many legislators, who feared a violent
reaction from disenchanted voters if they were forced to return to Topeka to
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do something that should have been done in the regular session. The impact
of Woodring's warning was soon evident as various committees began to
reexamine his message and to review tax bills previously submitted. When
several committees began sending delegations to quiz the Governor on tax
matters and his proposals, it became evident that the major obstacle to tax
reform was the lack of leadership rather than the lack of interest. Woodring
therefore concluded that the best way to lead a body that was now looking
for assistance was to go before it with an even more detailed tax plan than
the one included in his "state of the state" address.16
On 16 February, Governor Woodring appeared before a joint session of
the Kansas legislature to deliver a special message dealing solely with taxation. He minced no words as he told of the need "to lift a part of the load
now borne by real and tangible personal property, and so far as possible to
distribute it to other forms of wealth which hitherto either in whole or in
part have escaped the tax burden." He then set forth, in considerable detail,
recommendations calling for resubmission of the income tax amendment,
submission of a tax-limitation amendment that would limit the general
property tax to 2 percent of the assessed valuation, creation of county assessment boards, assessment of all banks and public utilities by the State Tax
Commission instead of by local assessors, taxing of bank assets, a tax on insurance premiums, tightening of the cigarette tax law, and fee increases for
services performed by nine different state agencies. While he was reluctant
to accept the principle of the proposed intangibles tax law, he indicated his
willingness to accept it if it were the will of the legislature. The Governor
closed with a plea for economy and a pledge to institute drastic reductions
in departments and agencies that were under his control.17
The Governor's special message seemed to cajole a dallying legislature
into action, and during the next four weeks the solons forged a record that
they could be proud of. In an effort to establish a more equitable basis for
future taxation, it was decided to submit the income tax and tax limitation
amendments to the voters in the 1932 election. In order to improve present
conditions, an intangibles tax, providing for a rate of fifty cents per one
hundred dollars, was reenacted; the gasoline tax was raised from two cents
per gallon to three in order to carry on the road-building program; new bus
and truck mileage taxes were instituted; a bank tax law providing for the
taxing of the assets of banks and building and loan companies was passed,
in order to end a situation whereby those institutions were paying taxes only
on their real estate and tangible property; and teeth were put into the cigarette tax law. Another act that was not a tax measure per se but that was
closely related was a budget law that required all taxing districts to hold
open budget hearings. It provided that budgets had to be published and
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made available before a hearing took place.18 Governor Woodring was indeed pleased with the tax measures passed during the 1931 session, because
he had advocated and worked for each of them except the intangibles tax,
and he had failed only in his effort to get the assessment laws strengthened.19
In addition to seeing his tax recommendations enacted, the Governor
saw the legislature act favorably on nearly every other request made in his
initial message. The continual pleas for economy apparently had some impact, for the legislators cut biennium appropriations nearly $1 million below
those of the previous session. Although Woodring was disappointed when
the legislature refused his recommendation that utility companies be forced
to pay the full cost of the Public Service Commission's actions to establish
fair utility rates, he was pleased when it appropriated $100,000 for that purpose. The Blue Sky Commission received additional powers to police the
sale of stocks, thus giving Kansas, according to the commission's chairman,
"the best securities law in the United States."20 Probably no legislation made
the Governor happier than that establishing a permanent Crippled Children's Commission and providing a program of state and county care and
support for crippled children and for individuals who were otherwise handicapped. Upon leaving the office of Governor, Woodring was to say that, as
far as a permanent program was concerned, this was "the outstanding
accomplishment of my administration."21 Congressional reapportionment, a
law requiring the licensing of all drivers of motor vehicles, and the creation
of a separate Labor Department-all of which Woodring had advocatedwere also provided for. In addition, favorable responses were made to the
Governor's requests to set up a commission to study the textbook question
and a commission to examine conditions at state penal and charitable institutions and make recommendations for upgrading them.
Besides enacting measures that the Governor championed, the legislature
also passed a number of other statutes of great importance. These included
laws that placed holding companies under the supervision of the Public
Service Commission (P.S.C.), gave the P.S.C. the right to supervise oil proration, outlawed corporation farming, prohibited utilities from engaging in
merchandising, created a state aircraft board, and gave county commissioners
the power to levy a tax to care for the poor.22 In terms of the number of
bills passed, the 1931 session was not prolific, for it passed only about 329
measures, of which a mere 46 had statewide application; but, as can be seen,
the quality of them was impressive.23
Of the several hundred measures sent to Governor Woodring for his
signature, all except two were approved; however, his veto of those two-a
resolution creating a committee to investigate the State Highway Commission, and a capital punishment bill-was to cause quite a stir. As the road-
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building program of Governor Clyde M. Reed gained momentum in 1929
and 1930, the Highway Department, which was under the control of a sixman State Highway Commission, became the state's largest agency both in
terms of the number of its employees and the funds that it spent. Before
long the air was filled with rumors of graft and corruption in the letting of
contracts and with charges of employees being forced to make political contributions.24 With such reports circulating, it was not surprising that Republican Senator Claude Bradney of Columbus, at the beginning of the 1931
session, introduced a resolution creating a committee to investigate the activities of the Highway Commission. Both parties supported the measure,
which passed by large majorities in both houses.
Although Governor Woodring was extremely anxious to uncover any
graft and corruption that might exist in state government, especially if it
could be attributed to the Republicans, he realized that a probe might produce certain undesirable consequences; but the legislators had failed to take
this into consideration. For example, because no new contracts could be let,
nor could projects under contract but not yet under construction be permitted
to start, the seven or eight months required for a highway investigation
would delay the employment of hundreds of road-construction workers, set
the road-construction program back at least a year, and result in the loss of
a $2.2 million federal highway grant. The last would result from the
stipulation that funds not used for the stated purpose by 1 September 1931
would revert to the federal government. Therefore, in order to put large
numbers of unemployed men back to work, to prevent delay in the highway
construction program, and to save more than $2 million in federal aid,
Woodring vetoed the Bradney resolution.211
With this unexpected action, which came on 13 March, the next-to-last
day of the session, "Kansas beheld the strange spectacle of a Republican
legislature voting to investigate the activities of a Republican administration
and being thwarted by a Democratic governor."26 Legislative reaction to
the veto was mixed, the most bitter criticism coming from those leaders of
both parties who had worked to push the resolution through. Senator Bradney angrily denounced the action, claiming that "Governor Reed's friends
demanded their 'pound of flesh' for voting for Woodring last fall, and Governor Woodring paid . . . by protecting Reed's highway commission."27
Beyond the legislative halls, however, reaction to the governor's action was
overwhelmingly positive. The most famous editorial writer in Kansas,
William Allen White, not only got out of his sick bed to write a laudatory
editorial for his Emporia Gazette, but he also sent a personal telegram to
Woodring, calling his veto "one of the manliest things I have ever seen
come out of any governor in all my forty-five years I have known Kansas
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politics."28 The Topeka Daily Capital's editorial praised the Governor for
"passing up a partisan political opportunity, in order to promote the state
highway program."29
Governor Woodring's second veto, which came on the last day of the
session, was to raise more controversy and attract more attention than the
first. Early in the legislative session, Democratic Representative Donald
Muir of Harper, who hoped to cut the crime rate, introduced a bill restoring
the death penalty (Kansas had abolished capital punishment in 1907) . At
the time the measure was introduced, Governor Woodring, without giving
it much consideration, indicated that he would sign the bill if it were passed
by large majorities in both houses. The Muir capital punishment bill quickly
found its way to the floors of the house and senate, where it was passed by
more than a two-thirds majority. As the bill went through the legislative
mill and it became increasingly apparent that the responsibility of approving
or rejecting the measure would fall ultimately on him, Woodring began to
give the matter considerable thought and study.30 When the bill finally
reached the Governor's desk, the legislators expected the approval that had
originally been promised. Woodring, however, shocked everyone by vetoing
it.31 In his veto message, which is still a classic condemnation of capital
punishment, Woodring used historical and sociological studies to support his
contention that "the proposed legislation is unsound in theory, that it has
been demonstrated .to be bad in practice, and that its adoption would be most
unwise from every viewpoint." He saw no need for Kansas to go back to
"the dark ages in our criminal laws."32 This courageous veto was to pay big
dividends for Woodring, because it won widespread approval and acclaim
for him in Kansas and throughout the nation.33
The smoke from the Governor's two vetoes had not cleared when the
legislators adjourned, packed their bags, and headed for home. Technically,
adjournment would not come until March 17, but by the evening of March
14, to all intents and purposes, the 1931 session was over. In exactly two
months the legislative record of the Woodring administration had been
created. How successful had he been? Contemporary opinion held that he
had done very well. According to political observer Milton Tabor, "The
governor batted nearly 1000 per cent in his suggestions for new laws."34 In
a personal letter to the Governor, William Allen White said, "You have
come through the Legislature splendidly."311 Even Clif Stratton, the chief
political writer of the pro-Republican Topeka Daily Capital, came to the
conclusion that "the governor did a right good job of getting a Republican
legislature to enact his legislative program into law. In fact a better job than
some Republican governors in the past had been able to do.',s 6 Woodring,
too, was pleased. He had seen nearly every request that he had made to the
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legislature enacted into law, and so it was not surprising when he indicated
that "it had been a constructive and outstanding session."37
Kansas Republicans and Democrats rarely agree on anything, but in the
spring of 1931 they tended to agree that Governor Woodring had done a
good job in getting legislation passed.38 His success rested on several factors.
Of great importance was his ability to win the confidence of the lawmakers.
This he did almost immediately by showing them that he was an able and
competent individual. The legislators who came into contact with Woodring
during his first few weeks in office were amazed and impressed by his grasp
of legislative, administrative, and political affairs. If they had not known
better, they would never have guessed that they were dealing with a man
who had just entered politics.
A warm personality was another asset that the new Governor utilized
effectively. His pleasant, friendly "let's be pals" attitude was quite different
from that of his predecessor, and the legislators enjoyed it. Conveying a
sense of sincerity which was quickly translated into a feeling of trust, he
was able to convince the members of the legislature and the public at large
that he was deeply interested in the welfare of the state and its citizens.39
When he said, "I am working for only one thing always-the interests of the
average and majority citizen," people believed him.~0
Woodring's accessibility was just as important to his success as were his
ability and personality. It did not take legislators of either party long to discover that getting in to see the Governor was no problem. Furthermore,
once they got to see him they always received a warm welcome. He was
always willing to listen to their views and ideas and to explain his stand on
a certain issue. The Governor's "open door" policy was not limited to public
officials, for anyone wanting to see and talk with him on any subject received the opportunity. The open door was more than a gesture. Even
during the long, busy days of the legislative session he would take time out
from his hectic schedule to visit with job seekers, newspaper reporters, handshakers, and school children. The number of visitors generally averaged
more than one hundred a day and sometimes reached three hundred.
Woodring's accessibility both impressed those who met with him and endeared him to many Kansans who read in the newspaper about this busy
man who always had a "handshake and a smile for everyone." 41
Personal attributes were responsible for much of the smooth sailing experienced by the Governor during the legislative session, but considerable
credit must also go to his decision to delay questions of patronage. When
the legislature convened, the Governor announced that, with one or two
exceptions, he was not going to submit appointments that needed senatorial
approval until late in the session, and appointments not requiring approval
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would be made only after the session was over. One major benefit of this
action was that it discouraged thousands of Democratic job seekers from
pressing their claims at that particular time, thereby freeing the Governor
for more important and pressing matters. It also left the senate free to concentrate on vital issues. Most importantly, it avoided much of the controversy, ill will, and anger that nearly always develop in legislative bodies
when political appointments are considered. The decision was also sound
from a public-relations viewpoint, because "the average citizen took it to
mean here was a Governor who thought more of the state's business than
he did of patronage."42
Finally, a great deal of credit for the former banker's quick and successful transition from private to public life, as well as for his legislative success,
must go to several very capable advisers. Guy Helvering, the master politician, continued to be the guiding light on political affairs, but he was inexperienced in state legislative matters.43 In the latter area, however, the
Governor's private secretary, Leslie Wallace, and his legislative counsel, Carl
Rice, provided much of the valuable advice and assistance that enabled him
to carry out his legislative responsibilities so successfully.44
No sooner had the session ended than Woodring turned to the problems of
patronage. Before the senate adjourned, it had approved his appointees to a
half-dozen important positions, but the bulk of the positions were yet to be
filled. The Governor had at his disposal about a dozen really important
jobs, primarily on key commissions and boards, and several hundred other
positions such as inspectors, clerks, stenographers, and game wardens.45
There was no dearth of applicants to fill those few hundred positions, for
more than six thousand job-hungry Democrats appealed to "Harry" to repay
them for their role in putting him in the governor's mansion.46 After all,
each would claim that it was his efforts that had given Woodring the votes
needed to squeak out the victory. The Governor was literally besieged: on
some days there were so many expectant appointees that it was nearly impossible for anyone to get in and out of his office.47
The Governor used great care in making his appointments, generally
relying on proven businessmen and attorneys, nearly always those who had
actively supported his bid for the governorship.48 Woodring was always a
good judge of men, and this was reflected in his appointees, most of whom
won high praise from both parties.49 One appointment, however, caused
considerable controversy: that was the State Highway Commission's appointment of Woodring's choice, Guy Helvering, as State Highway Director.
Republicans were especially upset, because this gave the Democratic State
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Chairman control of the patronage in the largest state agency .50 While such
fears were to prove well founded in that Helvering did use the department
for political purposes and while, as will be seen, his actions were to become
a major issue in the 1932 election, the state highway program did make great
progress under his leadership. Helvering proved to be just as effective in
administering the Highway Department as he had been in administering a
political campaign, and, as a result, Kansas surfaced more miles of highway
(3,321) in 1931 than did any other state in the union.51
Of all the problems facing Governor Woodring when he assumed office
in 1931, the most pressing revolved around the calamitous conditions in the
Kansas oil industry. In the late 1920s Kansas retained its number four ranking among the oil-producing states; however, the industry was experiencing
difficulties. The basic problem was overproduction: Kansas, like the other
oil states, was "drowning in oil."52 Consequently, crude oil that sold for
$231 a barrel in 1926 was down to $1.00 a barrel in the summer of 1930.
Following the discovery of rich deposits in eastern Texas in the fall of 1930,
it fell to $0.18 a barrel. On top of the low prices, Kansas oil producers received another blow in December 1930, when the Prairie Oil and Gas Company announced that, due to surplus stocks, it would stop purchasing crude
oil in Kansas and Oklahoma as of 1 January 1931. The consequence of this
was to shut down thousands of shallow "stripper" wells in eastern Kansas.
Working to save the strippers were the Independent Petroleum Association
(LP .A., an association of small producers) and a special state-appointed
three-man committee headed by Alfred M. Landon, an Independence, Kansas, oil man. Efforts of the LP .A. and Landon to negotiate an agreement
with Prairie and other companies to purchase the "distress" oil failed, and
when New Year's Day, 1931, arrived, Prairie shut down. During the following weeks all efforts to provide markets for the stripper production were
unsuccessful.53 It was at this point that Woodring assumed his responsibilities as the state's Chief Executive.
The new Governor was vitally concerned by the turn of events, because
Prairie's action had shut down nearly .fifteen thousand Kansas oil wells. This
not only added to unemployment, it also deprived more than six hundred
operators, and ultimately the state, of the economic benefits of the "black
gold." 54 Woodring faced two problems: the need to .find markets for the
stripper wells and the need to provide some sort of long-range solution
whereby Kansas oil production could be held in line with demand. An
immediate solution to the first problem was absolutely essential, because if
the strippers were shut down for any length of time, salt water would breach
the wells and permanently destroy them. As Governor-elect, Woodring had
pledged to assist the troubled oil industry. Although he was aware of the
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critical nature of the oil situation, Woodring, whether due to more pressing
problems or to negligence, waited for more than two weeks after assuming
office before taking any action. When he did go to battle, it was on three
fronts: first, against Prairie, for it to continue purchasing the stripper oil;
second, against Standard Oil of Indiana, which was the largest ultimate
purchaser of stripper production; third, against President Hoover, who could
use his position to help the troubled producers.55
On 28 January, Woodring sent telegrams to President Hoover and to
E. G. Seubert, president of Standard Oil of Indiana, saying that he was
"astonished and appalled" that twelve thousand oil wells were being allowed
to be destroyed. He asked President Hoover to use his influence to bring
about a settlement, and then he added: "If the great leaders of the oil industry, moved by avarice and self-interest, refuse to adjust the intolerable
situation confronting the Kansas fields then a tariff on oil holds out the only
hope in sight as the solution to our problem."56 The Governor also appealed
to Seubert, as the biggest purchaser of Kansas oil, to use his influence to
settle the stripper problem by February tenth. If he failed to do so, Woodring warned, "every resource of the Kansas government will be invoked to
get the desired results." 57 Two days later, following an unproductive conference with Prairie's president, W. S. Fitzpatrick, an angry Woodring fired
off two more telegrams, one to Fitzpatrick and another to Seubert. After
reminding both men of their moral obligations to Kansas producers and
chiding them for attempting to pass the buck, he made some subtle threats.
To Fitzpatrick, whose firm was contemplating retail sale of oil in Kansas
gas stations, he indicated his conviction that if a settlement were not forthcoming, such products "would not be received favorably." To Seubert he
hinted at the possibility of a state probe into the relationship between the
supposedly separate Standard Oil Company of Indiana and Standard Oil
Company of Kansas.58
Apparently this last warning had the impact that Woodring had hoped
for, because Seubert immediately sent a negotiator to Topeka to confer
directly with the Governor about terms of a possible settlement. Some headway was made on these negotiations, and on February seventh, Governor
Woodring was able to announce that a temporary solution to the stripper
problem had been found and that the prospects for a permanent settlement
were good.59 The temporary settlement, by which Standard of Indiana
agreed to purchase 300,000 barrels of stripper oil in the next sixty days, was
of great significance, because it enabled the wells to start pumping again,
and it gave the Governor time to work out long-term agreements. Woodring
took full advantage of the extra time he had won, and in March and April
he successfully concluded agreements with Standard and other major com-
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panies to purchase nearly all of the state's stripper production.60 Although
he relied heavily on the advice and assistance of Alf Landon and Thurman
Hill of the Public Service Commission, Woodring personally did most of
the negotiating with the oil company representatives.61
Finding markets for the oil from the stripper wells solved the immediate problem, but Woodring was now interested in ways to protect the
industry in the future. He increasingly came to accept the idea of an oil
tariff as a solution to the domestic problem; thus, he actively supported
efforts of Kansas Congressmen to such ends, and he continued to urge President Hoover to support an oil tariff or to use the flexibility of current tariff
legislation to ease the burden.62 Another solution that he supported, but not
so enthusiastically, was state proration. Landon and independent Kansas
producers were urging that state machinery be established to control oil
production by the allotment of quotas (proration). Such control could be
used to conserve oil resources and, more importantly, to raise prices by limiting production. In early March a proration law, which gave the Public
Service Commission the power to set quotas, was passed by the house but
killed in senate committee. Reaction from the small oil producers revived
the measure, and it was subsequently passed.63 Although Woodring was
hesitant about approving the bill because he was "unable to reconcile restrictions on the production of natural resources in Kansas with the free importation of oil," he nevertheless signed it because of the widespread support it
had among the state's independent oil men.64 With the passage of the bill,
Kansas became the first state in the nation to provide an effective proration
system, and other oil-producing states soon followed the Kansas example as
they passed laws giving state agencies power to control oil production by
alloting quotas.66 Woodring also continued to work for the oil industry by
actively supporting the activities of the loosely knit Oil States Advisory
Committee, which made one of the first attempts to bring order to the oil
industry by interstate cooperation.66 Although he by no means solved all the
problems of the Kansas oil industry, Woodring did perform a valuable
service by finding markets for stripper production, by providing for oil conservation and higher prices through proration ( oil was back to eighty-five
cents a barrel by the end of 1931), and by helping to lay the basis for interstate cooperation in meeting oil problems.
In the meantime Woodring had started a battle for reduction of utility
rates-an endeavor that would ultimately provide him with his greatest public support, favorable nationwide publicity, satisfying victories, and demoralizing setbacks. Woodring had long been bothered by the fact that since the
World War the citizens of his state had witnessed a decline in the cost of
nearly everything except utilities. This meant that Kansans were paying the
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same utility rates in bad times as they had in good ones. Furthermore,
technological developments had lowered the operating cost of the utilities,
but the resultant savings were being passed on to the stockholders rather
than to the consumers. The new Governor wanted to correct this "undesirable" situation.67
That Woodring intended to challenge the utility companies became
apparent in his opening message to the legislature. In it he asked that the
Public Service Commission (P.S.C.) be given "sufficient funds to properly
perform its functions," which would "result in lower rates for all public
utilities."68 While failing to finance the project as he had suggested, the
legislature did provide a major weapon to fight the utilities when it appropriated $100,000 to the P .S.C. to be used specifically for securing lower gas
and electric rates. A companion law gave the commission the authority to
examine the books of holding companies associated with utility companies
operating within Kansas. Although the state now had the financial and legal
tools to help bring about reductions in rates, Governor Woodring did not
wish to use them except as a last resort. Because he hoped to reach his objective by getting the companies to act voluntarily, he conferred with officials
of various gas and electric companies and requested that they reduce consumer rates by at least 10 percent.69 This "soft" approach was extremely
successful, for during 1931 more than two hundred cities and towns benefited from lower rates for electricity, and more than fifty experienced reductions in gas rates. The following year was even more successful, with
nearly six hundred communities seeing reductions in rates for electricity, and
eighty having lower gas rates. In all, nearly two out of every three communities in the state profited from voluntary reductions in rates.70
There was, however, one important and powerful individual who would
not go along with the reductions-Henry L. Doherty, president of the Cities
Service Company, which supplied gas to nearly one hundred Kansas cities
and towns, including most of the larger ones. Henry L. Doherty's life was
a real rags-to-riches story. Born in Columbus, Ohio, in 1870, he quit school
at the age of twelve in order to go to work as an office boy for the Columbus
Gas Company. Serving later as an engineer and manager for various utility
companies, he soon amassed a sizable fortune. Then in 1910 he formed Cities
Service Company, a conglomerate which by 1931 had grown to include
more than one hundred utility companies with assets of more than $660
million. The headstrong ·multimillionaire watched over his empire like a
mother hen, making all major decisions himself; therefore, if one wanted
to deal with Cities Service, he did not deal with a vice-president or some
other underling: he dealt with Doherty.71 Woodring was determined to get
the Doherty interests to lower their gas rates, not only because of the large
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Lt. Harry H. Woodring at Camp Colt, Gettysburg, Pennsylvania, 1918.

Governor Harry H. Woodring campaigning for reelection in Kansas, 1932.

James A. Farley, James Roosevelt, and Harry H. Woodring (left to right) planning for the
1932 Democratic National Convention.

number of communities that were involved, but also because their rates were
higher than those of any other company in the state.
Realizing that Doherty would never come to Kansas to see him, Woodring decided to go to New York. In late April 1931 the Kansas Governor
traveled East to meet with the utility magnate. Armed with data on gas
rates throughout the state, Woodring appealed for Doherty to adopt a plan
that would provide lower consumer rates through a reduction in the "gaterate." Doherty listened attentively, promised to consider the proposal, and
indicated that he would probably send representatives to Kansas to confer on
the matter.72 Pleased with the tenor of the meeting, Woodring returned to
Topeka to await the Cities Service negotiators. Time passed, but nothing
happened. Every time Woodring asked the Doherty people to begin discussions, they asked for a delay. Six, eight, and then ten weeks passed after the
New York meeting, and still no negotiators appeared.
As the days of June ticked off, Woodring's patience began to wear thin,
and he became increasingly convinced that Doherty had no intention of reducing his rates. Finally the Governor came to the conclusion that it was
time to act, and on June twentieth he instructed the P.S.C. "to proceed to
force reductions." 73 This announcement alarmed Doherty at least enough
to have H. C. Caster, his general counsel in Kansas City, open negotiations.
On 26 June, Woodring informed Caster that he was tired of the delays and
was giving Doherty until the second of July to cut his city "gate-rate" from
forty to thirty cents per thousand cubic feet; if such action were not taken,
he would have the P.S.C. take steps to force the reduction.74 Whether it was
wise for Woodring to issue such an ultimatum is open to question. On the
one hand, it ended any hope for voluntary reduction, because it made Doherty
determined to avoid taking any action that might make it appear that someone else was telling him how to run his business. On the other hand, it
seems unlikely that Doherty would ever have taken action voluntarily.
Had he been sincere about voluntary reductions, he had had plenty of time
to institute them.
When the 2 July ultimatum date arrived, Doherty's representatives
asked, as they had so many .times in the past, for an extension of time. The
angry Harry Woodring refused their request and announced that all peaceful negotiations were off and that the P.S.C. was being ordered to proceed.
He served notice on the Cities Service Company that it could expect a real
battle. "We are in this fight to obtain reasonable gas rates," he said, "and
when the smoke clears away and the casualties are counted, the gas company
may find that it is not as big as the state of Kansas." 75 Later that afternoon,
Blue Sky commissioner Carl Newcomer announced that he was banning th~
sale of all Cities Service stock, except first preferred, in Kansas. While
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Woodring, in all likelihood, coordinated this latter action, he publicly denied
that he had had anything to do with it. He did, however, indicate that he
would support Newcomer's position.76
The irate Henry Doherty immediately swung into action. On 3 July he
not only sought an injunction to stop the state of Kansas from banning the
sale of Cities Service stock, but he also utilized the application for injunction
to charge "His Excellency" (Woodring) with conspiracy to "compel and
coerce" him to accede to demands for lower rates. Several days later, Doherty
lashed out again, this time with a three-thousand-word telegram to Woodring condemning his "arbitrary and reprehensible" actions to bring about
reductions. He also blamed Woodring for inaugurating and forcing an unnecessary fight. The lengthy telegram then proceeded to accuse the Kansas
Governor of being a tool of the Kansas City Star. The crusading but generally responsible Star had been quite vocal in urging rate reductions, and
Doherty was convinced that the paper was out to "impair Cities Service's
credit and to cripple its operations."77 Doherty won a partial victory on 14
July, when the United States Supreme Court said that Kansas could not halt
the sale of Cities Service stock.78 Nevertheless, the real winner of this July
1931 clash was Woodring, for a major result of the affair was a great deal
of favorable publicity for him in ·Kansas and throughout the nation. Newspapers in every state, including the New York Times, carried a blow-by-blow
account of the encounter.79 In nearly every news story Woodring was portrayed as a warm-hearted champion of the little man who was being pitted
against the cold-hearted "Robber Baron," who was out to exploit the consumer for his personal gain. Such stories served to increase the antagonism
between Woodring and Doherty, and this was to play a major role in the
1932 gubernatorial campaign.
While Woodring and Doherty engaged in bitter rhetoric, the P .S.C.
prepared to open hearings to assist it in determining what a fair rate would
be. The proceedings were originally scheduled to begin on 18 August 1931,
but lawyers from both sides needed extra time to prepare, and so it was
October sixteenth before the hearings finally got underway. This marked
the start of legal maneuvering that was to last throughout Woodring's term
and well into that of his successor. The gas-rate hearings continued for five
months, with Doherty's lawyer claiming that the forty cents per thousand
gate-rate was reasonable, and the attorneys for the state claiming that the
charge was excessive. Finally, in mid March 1932, the testimony came to an
end, and the commission retired to consider its findings and determine what
the rate should be.80 During the hearings, Doherty offered to cut his price
from 40 to 35 cents per thousand, but Woodring refused to accept and
ordered the commission to proceed. On 19 July the commission ordered a
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gate-rate reduction of 10.5 cents per thousand-from 40 to 29.5 cents.81 At
this point it appeared as if Woodring had won his fight for lower rates;
however, Doherty was not through. With a battery of topnotch corporation
lawyers, he took the case into the federal courts, where on 5 January 1933,
just four days before Woodring left office, a three-judge panel ruled that the
40-cent rate was not unreasonable and therefore could stand. At that time
the crushed Harry Woodring said, "I am rather disgusted with the whole
attempt at regulation of utilities."82 The Governor had made a very creditable record in rate reductions, but he grieved because he had let the "big
one" (Doherty) get away. Although the ruling of the federal court was a
blow to Woodring, it was only a temporary setback for Kansas, because
when Alf Landon became governor in 1933, he continued the fight against
Doherty, and in 1936 he succeeded in getting Cities Service to reduce its
rates by 20 percent.83
Of all the problems that Woodring faced as Governor, none were more
continuous and pressing than taxation and economy-two problems that
went hand in hand. As the depression deepened in 1931 and 1932, Kansans
found it increasingly difficult to meet their tax obligations; thus, as tax delinquency increased, state revenue decreased. This situation created several
difficulties for the Governor: first, it subjected him to considerable pressure
to lower taxes; second, it made it extremely difficult for him to balance the
budget. In spite of the difficulties, Woodring was convinced that he could
do both.
When farm prices dipped to disastrous levels in the summer of 1931, a
ground swell arose for the convening of a special session of the legislature
in order to provide relief for suffering Kansans. Numerous legislators, "general store" politicians, well-meaning citizens, and crackpots had ideas about
how to provide the necessary relief, but they rarely agreed with one another.
Some wanted to lower taxes and cut state salaries; others wanted to raise
taxes and provide more work relief; while still others wanted to raise the
gasoline tax or shorten the working day of state employees. There was no
dearth of ideas as to how the state legislature might improve the situation.84
While Woodring was sympathetic with the aims of those people who
were calling for a special session, he resisted their pressures, because he was
convinced that such action would create more problems than it would solve.
In spite of his announcements that he would not call the legislators back to
Topeka, the demands for such action continued. By fall the most vocal calls
were coming from two leading Democrats, former Governor Jonathan Davis
and State Representative Donald Muir, both of whom were demanding
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lower taxes by legislative action. When Davis and Woodring exchanged
harsh words over the subject of a special session, the former joined with Dr.
John Brinkley to try to compel the Governor to take the desired action. In
mid October, Davis and Brinkley secured the use of Representative Hall in
the Statehouse for a meeting of the Taxpayers Education League. When
Davis used that occasion to "call" a special session of the legislature and suggested that the legislators not only lower taxes but also impeach Governor
Woodring, a real fight for the 1932 Democratic primary appeared to be
shaping up between the two men. Woodring continued to resist such pressure, and when the sixty-year-old Davis remarried in December 1931, his
interest in politics temporarily subsided, and he stopped pressing for the
session.85
Woodring's reasons for refusing to call the legislators back were not
limited to his belief that they could accomplish little; they were also · due to
his feeling that he could effectively bring about tax relief by other means.
Although he had no direct control over the state tax levy, he could use his
influence with the members of the State Tax Commission to get what he
desired. When Woodring took office, the state levy was 1.43 mills, but declining collections were pressuring the Tax Commission to make up the loss
by raising the rate to 1.75. Violently opposed to any tax increase at that time,
the Governor went before the commission in August 1931 and pledged to
reduce state expenditures to a point where such a raise would not be necessary. Convinced of his sincerity and determination, the commission decided
to retain the 1.43-mill level. The next year he repeated the performance, and
this time he was so convincing that it cut the levy to 1.33 mills, the lowest
rate since 1916.86 Woodring was also instrumental in securing another
break for taxpayers when, in February 1932, he used his influence to get the
Tax Commission to lower the assessed value of real estate by 14 percent on
farm property and by 8 percent on city property.87 While the tax rates went
down only slightly under Woodring, nevertheless they did go down. But at
the same time that tax reductions helped relieve distress, they also created a
bigger problem: lower taxes meant lower state revenue, which in turn made
the problem of balancing the budget extremely difficult.
How to balance the budget-that was the question. There were two
general means that could be employed: increase revenue, or reduce expenditures. Woodring saw no real choice, because it was evident that the tax
burden was already more than most Kansans could bear. This left the other
alternative-reduction of state expenditures. Since state appropriations were
less than $10 million a year, there did not appear to be much fat that could
be trimmed o.ff.88 Nevertheless, Woodring was determined to succeed, and
shortly after taking office, he instituted an austerity program unlike any that
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the Sunflower State had ever seen. By eliminating a number of state jobs,
by forcing certain institutions to use surplus funds, and by postponing construction, repairs, and improvements at state colleges and universities, Woodring succeeded in saving the state $900,000 during his first year in office. This
record pleased but did not satisfy him; thus, he announced his intention to
cut expenditures by $2 million during his second year in office. He hoped
to do this by reducing salaries and drastically cutting operating expenses at
state institutions. In the early spring of 1932 the Governor announced that
he was voluntarily reducing his $5,000 salary by 10 percent, and he asked all
other state employees to do the same. After he used a "big stick," all the
personnel in departments under his control quickly complied, and they in
turn were followed by paid members of state boards and commissions. The
last holdouts were elected Republican officials. While there was no legal
way that the Governor could reduce their salaries, he succeeded in getting
them to fall into line by indicating that he would make a campaign issue out
of their refusal to cooperate in his economy program.89
State penal institutions also contributed to the economy drive by cutting
expenses, but higher education made the biggest sacrifice. The Kansas Board
of Regents reduced the budgets of the five state schools more than $900,000
by cutting faculty salaries 10 percent, reducing extension work, closing certain departments, not filling faculty vacancies, postponing building programs,
and doing minimum repair work. Through such means during his second
year in office, Woodring succeeded in saving the state $2 million and, consequently, in balancing the budget.90 Unfortunately, cutbacks of institutional
funds had adverse effects on the programs and facilities of nearly all institutions-especially those of higher education. Public-school children did,
however, receive a break from the state when Woodring convinced the State
Schoolbook Commission, which was already under fire as a result of the
legislative investigations, to reduce the price of schoolbooks by 25 percent.91
As Governor, Woodring took a very active interest in the National
Guard, but he was very pleased that he never had to call on it for other
than disaster duty. It was his interest in the Guard that led to the organization of the 35th Division. This division had not become a reality, because
ever since 1918 the three states designated to form the unit-Kansas, Nebraska, and Missouri-had been unable to agree on a Division Commander.
With Woodring leading the way, a Commander was agreed upon, the division was completely reorganized, and it subsequently became one of the
most effective National Guard divisions.92 The Governor's interest in the
Guard and the American Legion helped to keep him abreast of military and
national-defense developments-matters in which he was soon to become
deeply involved.
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The headaches, heartaches, and pressures of being Governor were tremendous; but Woodring did not mind, for he enjoyed his new position. He
loved the give-and-take of politics as well as the sense of importance and
power that came with the post. But politics also brought at least one major
change in his personality, and that was a diminishing ability to forgive and
forget. Perhaps it was the nature of the job which made him increasingly
hostile to those people who crossed swords with him.93 At the same time
that he began to display intolerance and vindictiveness toward those who
would not play ball with him, he was developing a deep sense of obligation
toward those who assisted and supported him. The Governor increasingly
became a man who believed that when he did someone a favor, that person
should return the favor whenever he was in a position to do so. The person
who failed to reciprocate was no friend of Harry Woodring's. This was a
reaction that he was to continue to have throughout his political career.94
In most ways Woodring remained the same. This was certainly true of
the high moral standards that he both maintained and demanded of those
who worked in his administration. Although he no longer attended church
regularly, he continued to exhibit the precepts of Christian morality that his
family had instilled in him. He appeared to have especially strong feelings
about drinking. As he put it, "Being Kansas born, I naturally believe in
prohibition and in the strictest possible enforcement of it." Whether this
statement represented political expediency or a true feeling is uncertain, but
while there may be some room for doubt concerning his moral view on the
use of alcohol, there is no question of his abhorrence for and intolerance of
anyone who drank to excess. Just as repulsive to him as the drunk was the
man who could not do his job. Consequently, he did not tolerate incompetency in any position, and he did not hesitate to remove or call for the removal of any man, regardless of his background, who was not doing his job.95
Woodring worked hard at being Governor, frequently putting in ten or
more hours a day, six days a week, at his office; but he also enjoyed his
leisure. After a hard day at the office, the nattily dressed bachelor would
hop into his new 12-cylinder black Cadillac (the first 12-cylinder car in the
state) and head for the governor's mansion, a three-story, Victorian style
house of brick and terra cotta. Since it had thirty-two rooms, it was more
than big enough for Harry and Lida, so they frequently invited old friends
to come to Topeka and spend several days with them.96 When company was
present, the evening would usually be spent in consuming a home-cooked
meal and playing bridge. If there were no houseguests, Harry liked to go to
a movie, a concert, or, occasionally, a party. Although the bachelor Governor
enjoyed a full and active social life, he was by no means a man about town.
If the Governor wished to engage in some physical activity, he went to

56

the executive stable, saddled up "Governor," and went for a short ride.
Being a competent horseman, he frequently took a ride in the morning and
evening; however, except for his riding, he received very little exercise. He
gave up tennis and hoped to begin playing golf; but the latter never caught
his fancy, so he abandoned it. Woodring maintained his interests in sports,
but as a spectator rather than as a participant. Every year he traveled to
several horse shows as well as to the Kentucky Derby. Football increasingly
caught his attention, and he became quite interested in the gridiron fortunes
of Washburn University in Topeka.97
Being Governor required considerable travel-an aspect of the job that
Woodring thoroughly enjoyed. Any Governor is highly sought-after as a
speaker, and he was no exception. During his term in office he traveled to
nearly every county in the state, speaking before professional meetings,
church groups, veterans organizations, agricultural clubs, and scores of other
service and civic organizations. His position also required out-of-state travel
to such places as French Lick, Indiana, and Richmond, Virginia, for governors' conferences; to New York City to see Henry Doherty; and to Washington, D.C., to confer with various officials on federal-state matters. But the
out-of-state place that the Governor visited more than any other was one
that few people had yet heard of-Hyde Park, New York.
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4
The Governor Plays Politics

While Governor Woodring's duties kept him extremely busy, they did not
prevent him from playing politics. The governorship carried with it many
official responsibilities which entailed obligations to the entire state and all
its citizens. Because he was a Democratic Governor, however, Woodring
also had a number of unofficial duties and obligations to his political party.
As the Governor of Kansas, he was traditionally recognized as the titular
head of his party, but whether or not he was to become the true leader of
that party remained to be seen. That Woodring should emerge as Democratic leader of Kansas in early 1931 was only natural in light of several
factors: he was the man most responsible for the creation of the present state
organization, feeble though it may have been; he held the highest elective
post in the state; and he was the only Democrat to hold a statewide elective
office. Under these circumstances, Kansas Democrats expected him to provide the party with leadership, and he did not disappoint them.
As soon as the 1931 legislative session ended, Woodring set out to build
a strong party organization. His first and most effective means to that end
was the appointment of Guy Helvering as head of the Highway Department. The wearing of two hats, those of Highway Director and State
Democratic Chairman, enabled Helvering to utilize patronage to build the
state's largest agency into an effective arm of the state Democratic party.
With regular contributions, which many called assessments, coming into the
campaign fund from those individuals appointed by Helvering, the party
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was soon on a sound financial basis.1 Although there was no doubt that Guy
Helvering was the guiding genius of the Democratic organization, he and
Woodring worked closely as a team, and the Governor was clearly the captain. Political opponents were to shout time and again that Helvering was
running the party and the state; however, responsible newsmen and those
close to the Governor maintained, and still maintain, that Woodring was his
own man. The Governor relied heavily on the advice of his State Chairman
and good friend, but they frequently disagreed over issues, and when they
did, there was never a question as to who the decision maker was.2
While Helvering was concerned with exerting greater political strength
within the state, Woodring became increasingly interested in wielding influence on the national scene. The latter idea does not seem so outlandish
when one realizes that at that time only three of the seventeen states west of
Missouri had more electoral votes or sent more delegates to the Democratic
National Convention than Kansas did; only California, Texas, and Oklahoma exerted more power.8 This meant that the Sunflower State could
provide valuable Wes tern support to any individual seeking the Democratic
presidential nomination in 1932. In addition to realizing that his state could
play a major role in the making of a nominee, Woodring knew the importance of supporting the right man at an early date. Such a course held
certain dangers, for if he backed a particular candidate who fell along the
way, he would be out in the political cold; however, the other extreme of
waiting and climbing on the bandwagon offered little in return, since a
presidential candidate seldom rewards a Johnny-come-lately.
Early in 1931, after careful consideration, Woodring made a fateful decision. He would support Governor Franklin D. Roosevelt of New York
as the Democratic nominee for President. This was a gamble, because
Roosevelt was maintaining that he was not candidate.4 At that particular
time the man considered by many to be the Democratic front runner was
Governor Albert C. Ritchie of Maryland. Other prominent names that were
being mentioned were Roosevelt; the 1928 nominee, Al Smith; the Speaker
of the House, John Nance Garner of Texas; industrialist Owen D. Young;
Governors William M. ("Alfalfa Bill") Murray of Oklahoma and George
White of Ohio; Chicago businessman Melvin A. Traylor; and several favorite sons.11 Just who would survive or who would emerge and ultimately win
the nomination was a big question mark in the spring of 1931.
Woodring's interest in and support of Roosevelt for the nomination
actually went back to 1929, when he had begun to follow with interest the
activities of the newly elected Chief Executive of the Empire State. Although
the Neodesha banker had never met Roosevelt, he became convinced that the
New York Governor would make a good president. Soon he was telling his
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Democratic friends and former servicemen that Roosevelt should be the
party's nominee in 1932.6 After his election in 1930, Woodring busied himself with legislative matters, but less than a month after the 1931 legislative
session ended, he publicly predicted that Roosevelt would be "the next
Democratic presidential candidate-(at least as far as Kansas is concerned)."7
This 13 April 1931 statement made Woodring one of the first public figures
to come out openly for FDR; thus, he became one of the original Roosevelt
supporters. FDR was pleased when he heard of this unsolicited support, and
he immediately asked Woodring to visit him in New York. Less than two
weeks later, on 29 April, Woodring, who had gone East to see Henry
Doherty concerning gas rates, traveled to Hyde Park to be FDR's dinner
guest.8 This meeting marked the beginning of a long and warm relationship.
At such encounters Roosevelt was at his best, and Woodring left Hyde Park
more convinced than ever that he was backing the right man.9 Almost immediately the newspapers were speculating that the prospective presidential
nominee was looking for a "strong Middle West Democrat for a running
mate" and that Woodring "could well be that man."10 Upon his return to
Topeka, Woodring refused to comment on the possibility that he might
be the vice-presidential nominee, but he continued to sing the praises of the
New York Governor.U
In early June the two Governors met again, this time at the annual
governors' conference at French Lick, Indiana, where Woodring addressed
the opening session on matters of taxation. In private they talked about the
political situation, but in rather vague terms, since Roosevelt was still not an
active candidate.12 In July, FDR sent James A. Farley, his good friend and
New York Democratic State Party Chairman, on an eighteen-state tour to
sound out and gain support for his nomination. In Topeka, Woodring and
Helvering welcomed Farley with open arms and promised their political and
financial support to the Roosevelt cause. Farley thanked them for their
pledge, and told them to sit tight.13 Five months later, Woodring, Hclvering,
and Carl Rice accepted an invitation to spend the weekend at Hyde Park,
and so in early December the three Kansans headed East.
The trio went first to Washington, D.C., where the Governor had been
asked to address the National Women's Democratic Club. Before that
group, on 11 December 1931, Woodring gave his famous "Grandsons of the
Wild Jackass" speech, which brought him much favorable publicity and thus
did much to lay the basis for national recognition.14 The following day
the Kansans joined one of Woodring's old army friends, Captain Floyd
Parks, to attend the Army-Navy football game, and afterward they went to
Hyde Park. The most important result of this conference with Roosevelt
and Farley was Woodring's promise to see that the state convention pledge
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all twenty of its delegate votes to the New York Governor.1 5 Six weeks later,
on 23 January 1932, Roosevelt declared that he was a candidate, and in the
months that followed, Roosevelt, Woodring, Farley, and Helvering were in
frequent contact regarding Kansas support at the Democratic National
Convention.16
Fulfilling his pledge to Roosevelt to deliver all twenty convention votes
was not to be an easy task for Woodring, since there was little support
among Kansas Democrats for the New York aristocrat. Opposition to Roosevelt was based on geography, his wealth, and the fact that he was considered
a wet. As 1932 dawned, John Nance Garner appeared to be the front runner
among Democrats in the Sunflower State. Not far behind was former Secretary of War Newton Baker. On down the line came Al Smith, Roosevelt,
Ritchie, Murray, and Traylor.17 Woodring's task was further complicated
by the fact that Jouett Shouse, his friend and fellow Kansan who was chairman of the National Democratic Executive Committee, was aligned with
the National Democratic Chairman, John J. Raskob, in opposition to Roosevelt. Shouse and Raskob hoped to see Smith get the nomination. To help
achieve that goal, Shouse hoped to become Permanent Chairman at the
national convention; however, to qualify for that position he had to be a
delegate, and this meant that the Kansas state convention would determine
whether or not he would be eligible for the convention post.18
Rumblings were first heard in Kansas Democratic circles in February
and March, when Woodring and Helvering sent word to all county central
committees that they should endorse Roosevelt; if that were impossible, they
should at least send uninstructed delegates to the state convention in May.
Many Democrats fell into line, and a number found that when they did not,
"the Woodring faction had to run the steam roller over its opponents."19
Despite such tactics a large number of anti-Roosevelt delegates were chosen
for the state gathering. Nevertheless, Woodring remained optimistic that he
could deliver the votes as promised. In late April, after a serious setback in
the Massachusetts primary, a somewhat alarmed Roosevelt wrote to Woodring, expressing hope that he would "have the Kansas delegation instructed
because ... the minority opposition will claim that they own or can control
any and every uninstructed delegation."20 The actions to be taken by the
state convention were of growing importance to the national picture.
As Kansas Democrats began to gather in Lawrence for their May 16
meeting there was no doubt that a bitter fight would ensue if Woodring
tried to push "down the throats" of the anti-Roosevelt forces a resolution
endorsing the New York Governor. While most of the 1,760 delegates apparently felt that Woodring had the strength to secure the endorsement, they
believed that his doing so would badly split the party.21 In spite of such a
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prospect, Woodring's commitment to Roosevelt remained firm, and he made
it clear that he intended to "rise or fall" on that issue. He was, however,
willing to make one concession in the interest of party harmony, and that
was to accept Jouett Shouse as a delegate-at-large to the national convention.22
In the stormy sessions that followed, the convention took a strong stand
for prohibition; reelected Dudley Doolittle, an anti-Roosevelt man, as national committeeman, but only after he made a speech supporting the New
Yorker; selected sixteen delegates with one vote each and eight delegates-atlarge with a half vote each to send to the Democratic National Convention;
and instructed the delegation to cast all its votes for Roosevelt. It was the
last two actions that caused all the difficulty. Opposition first appeared when
it came time to approve the eight delegates-at-large, all of whom had been
personally appointed by Governor Woodring (among the eight were Woodring, Helvering, and Shouse). The anti-Roosevelt forces tried to block
adoption of the slate, but in a voice vote, Convention Chairman Guy
Helvering ruled in favor of the Woodring choices. The same voices of protest were again raised upon the introduction of the resolution instructing the
delegates to vote for Roosevelt, but after considerable arguing and namecalling, the resolution was adopted.23 Why the New York Times called it
"one of the stormiest political conventions Kansas has seen since the old
Populist days" 24 can be understood from the colorful account of a reporter
on the scene :
The selection of delegates came after a day of the wildest jockeying and
fighting in the history of the party in this state. . . . So loud and long were the
protests over being "steam-rolled" by the Woodring administration forces, it appeared for a time that a riot squad would be necessary to adjourn the morning
session. Harmony prevailed until Chairman Guy T. Helvering called the meeting to order. Then the storm broke and the "dove of peace" flew to Missouri or
Oklahoma and was not in evidence again so long as a Democratic delegate remained in town.211
Woodring and Helvering had fulfilled their pledge to Roosevelt, but they
had done so at the cost of unity in the state party.
With the Kansas convention out of the way, Woodring now looked
forward to the Democratic National Convention, which was scheduled to
open in Chicago on 27 June. Early that month Farley contacted Woodring
and asked him to serve as one of FDR's floor managers; thus, the chairman
of the Kansas delegation took on an additional responsibility. Since he had
never attended a national political convention before, Woodring traveled to
Chicago in mid June and observed the Republicans renominate Herbert
Hoover and Charles Curtis, a Kansan. He wanted to familiarize himself
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with the convention hall and to receive some instructions from Farley concerning his upcoming duties. 26
As the opening session of the Democratic Convention neared, three
important battles were shaping up: who would be Permanent Chairman of
the convention; what stand would the platform take on prohibition; and
who would be the party's nominee. Woodring arrived in Chicago several
days before the convention began in order to meet with Farley, Louis Howe,
and other Roosevelt strategists.27 While the search for delegates continued,
the Roosevelt masterminds, Farley and Howe, centered their attention on
the problem of selecting the Permanent Chairman. That contest would pit
Al Smith's choice, Jouett Shouse, against FDR's choice, Senator Thomas J.
Walsh of Montana. Since this would be the first test of strength between
the pro- and anti-Roosevelt forces, it would be of great significance, because
a victory for either faction was bound to have a big psychological impact on
the convention delegates.28
The Shouse-Walsh fight put Woodring in something of a dilemma,
because Shouse was a personal friend who had helped him to secure the
gubernatorial nomination just two years before. On the other hand, the
Kansas Governor believed that election of Shouse as Permanent Chairman
"would result in the defeat of Roosevelt for the nomination."29 Most Kansas
delegates also had mixed emotions about the Shouse situation, a number
feeling that they should vote for him for "old time's sake."30 Woodring
searched for a way out of a difficult situation. A partial solution was found
when the delegation decided not to abide by the unit rule in the vote on
Shouse. What worried Woodring most about Shouse's becoming chairman
was that he would attack Roosevelt in his keynote address, thereby hurting
the New Yorker's cause. To prevent that from happening, Woodring, on
the day before the convention opened, offered Shouse a deal: Kansas would
cast all its twenty votes for Shouse if he would assure Woodring that if he
were elected chairman, he would not attack Roosevelt in his speech to the convention. The incensed Shouse rejected the offer by telling Woodring to "Go
to Hell."31 Consequently, the Governor got out his "steam roller." In a
closed session on the opening night of the convention, the Kansas delegation,
with Shouse absent, voted to cast 13½ votes for Walsh and 6½ for Shouse.
The following day the convention cast its votes, and Walsh was elected 626to-528. Woodring made no secret of his position as he proudly proclaimed,
"I voted for Walsh."32 A number of Kansas Democrats were riled by
Woodring's refusal to back Shouse, some because they felt that he was being
disloyal, and others because they felt that the action would further stir the
feud that had begun at the state convention.38
On 29 June the members of the Kansas delegation again crossed swords,
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this time over the plank in the platform calling for the repeal of the Eighteenth Amendment. On the issue of prohibition, Woodring was free to take
any position he wanted, because Roosevelt was maintaining a position of
neutrality .34 In line with his past position, Woodring took a strong stand
against the repeal of prohibition, even though he fully expected the convention to support repeal. Although he frequently stated that he felt the
Kansas delegation should vote dry, because that would express the majority
sentiment of the state, he exerted no pressure on the delegates to do so.
Subsequently, the Kansas delegates voted 12-to-8 against repeal, but they
were out of step with the rest of the convention, which voted in favor of
repeal 935-to-214.35
During the convention, Woodring was not only busy with the problems
facing the Kansas delegation, but was also deeply involved in working for
the Roosevelt cause. As a member of the Roosevelt strategy board, he met
with Farley, Howe, and a dozen other strategists twice each day in order to
evaluate the situation and update plans.86 Countless hours were also spent in
trying to win the support of uncommitted delegates and in convincing others
not to panic but to sit firm if Roosevelt did not win on the first few ballots.
On the afternoon of 30 June the convention finally got down to its
primary task of selecting the presidential nominee. During the next twelve
hours, Roosevelt, Smith, Garner, Baker, Ritchie, and five others were nominated and seconded with all the hoopla and fanfare that the enthusiastic
Democrats could muster. Because of Woodring's work at the convention
and his friendship with Roosevelt, the strategy board gave him the honor of
making one of the half dozen nominating speeches. Picked to represent the
Midwest, the Kansas Governor spoke on the plight of the farmer, called for
economic stability and social justice for rural Americans, and gave assurance
that the "New Commoner" could provide the leadership necessary for the
"rehabilitation of agriculture."87 The hastily written but well-delivered
speech impressed both those in the hall and those listening at home.38 John
W. Davis, the 1924 Democratic presidential nominee, who was a delegate
from New York, called it "the most sensible speech that has been made in
this convention."89
Finally, at four o'clock on the morning of July first, the balloting began.
The convention was operating under the two-thirds rule, since a maneuver
by the Roosevelt forces to bring about its repeal had caused such an uproar
that they were forced to back down. 40 This meant that 7(56 votes were
needed to win the nomination. When the roll call on the first ballot reached
Kansas, Woodring proudly cast the state's twenty votes for Roosevelt. But
not enough other state delegations followed suit, and the first ballot ended
with Roosevelt getting only 6(56 votes. Although this put him well ahead of
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his two closest competitors-Smith with 201 and Garner with 90-he still
needed a hundred more votes.
On the second ballot, FDR picked up a mere ten votes as all forces held
firm.41 At this point, with a deadlocked convention a possibility, spokesmen
for Governor Ritchie approached Woodring and offered him the vicepresidency if he would switch the Kansas delegation to the Ritchie camp on
the third ballot. Ritchie hoped that the defection of several Roosevelt delegations to him at that particular time would cause a number of convention
delegates to panic and jump on a "Ritchie Bandwagon." Although Woodring liked and respected Ritchie, his loyalty to Roosevelt and his conviction
that the Ritchie plan was unlikely to get anywhere caused him to reject the
offer.42 After the third ballot, which was almost a carbon copy of the second,
the convention adjourned until that evening.
During the day, Farley, working through Congressman Sam Rayburn
of Texas, offered the vice-presidency to John Garner in return for the release
of the California and Texas delegations. Garner accepted, and when California switched its votes on the fourth ballot, the Roosevelt opposition
crumbled, and the New York Governor received 945 votes and the nomination.43 On the following day, Garner received the second spot on the ticket
by acclamation. Woodring was somewhat disappointed by the RooseveltGarner deal, because in the past year he had frequently been mentioned as
a vice-presidential possibility, and even in the early days of the convention
he had been one of a dozen men frequently mentioned for the spot.44 He
had even gone so far as to suggest the possibility to Farley, who immediately
rejected the proposition.411 However, any disappointment that he may have
felt over the selection of Garner was probably overshadowed by his joy over
the nomination of FDR.
Woodring emerged from the Chicago convention with a prestige and
respect that he had not expected. According to the Kansas City Star, "A
new national Democratic leader has arisen on the political horizon of Kansas.''46 While the Topeka Daily Capital said, "Whether one likes it or not
the fact remains that Woodring made a place for himself among the national
Democratic leaders for the part he played both on the convention floor and
on the hoard of strategy.''47 There was no question that the Kansas Governor had played an important role in the nomination of Roosevelt. He had
given not only moral, verbal, and political support hut financial assistance
as well. When Farley had first visited Kansas in July 1931, he had appealed
to Woodring and Helvering for monetary support, and they had been able
to respond readily, because their control of the state organization had enabled them to channel party funds where they desired. During the convention, Farley again approached the Kansans with a plea to help replenish the
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nearly exhausted Roosevelt funds. The Woodring-Helvering organization
had accumulated a rather sizable war chest to be used for the Governor's
reelection campaign, but Woodring heeded the request and turned over a
large sum of money. These contributions came at times when the Roosevelt
organization was in great financial need, and FDR and Farley were never
to forget that fact.48
Several weeks after the convention, Woodring wrote to Roosevelt and
explained the importance of having a concrete proposal for farm relief if he
were to carry Kansas or any other farm state. At that time Roosevelt, who
had already decided to travel West in quest of farm votes, decided that, in
view of his friendship with Woodring and the importance of Kansas as a
farm state, he would make his views on farm policy known in a speech at
Topeka.49 On 14 September, Woodring sat on a platform with a host of
leading Democrats, including John Nance Garner, as Roosevelt gave one of
his major campaign addresses. Roosevelt's speech, which included a number
of ideas from Woodring, promised a reorganization of the Department of
Agriculture, along with tax relief and easy credit for farmers, and it hinted
at a kind of voluntary domestic allotment plan to handle the surplus problem.60 After the speech Roosevelt openly acknowledged Woodring's assistance, saying, "He [Woodring] has been of very great assistance to me,
because I have felt-I think very rightly-that he understands the whole
agricultural problem of the country about as well as anybody in the United
States."61 While in Topeka, FDR was the personal guest of Woodring, who
took him to the State Fair, showed him around town, and honored him with
a state dinner at the executive mansion. This visit left no doubt about the
respect and warm friendship that existed between the two men.52
For the remainder of the 1932 presidential campaign, Woodring was a
leader of the Roosevelt forces in the Midwest, and since he was a Democratic
Governor in a normally Republican state, his words continued to carry considerable weight with Farley, Howe, and other party strategists. Although
Woodring was deeply concerned with the presidential campaign, his participation and his role in it were practically nil, because he was seeking reelection, and therefore had a contest of his own to conduct.
In looking at Woodring's gubernatorial record in the fall of 1932, one could
find many positive accomplishments. He had been quite successful in getting his legislative program enacted: he had lowered taxes, balanced the
budget, found markets for stripper oil, and brought about reductions in utility rates in most Kansas towns. He had some other factors that would aid
in a bid for reelection. These included a growing national reputation; con-
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John Nance Garner and Franklin D. Roosevelt, with Governor Harry H . Woodring (left to
right), on their 1932 campaign visit to Topeka.

Harry H. Woodring being
sworn in as Assistant Secretary
of War by Assistant Chief
Clerk Frank Hoadley, April
1933; Secretary of War George
H. Dern on the left, and Chief
of Staff Douglas MacArthur on
the right.

President Franklin D. Roosevelt signing the proclamation establishing the government of the
Commonwealth of the Philippines; standing, left to right: Secretary of State Cordell Hull,
Chief of Staff Malin Craig, and Acting Secretary of War Harry H. Woodring.

trol of an effective state party organization; the opportunity to use his position to obtain publicity; a reputation as a hard-working, competent, yet
likable individual.
With such an array of assets, it would seem that reelection would not
be difficult; however, the path to a second term was strewn with obstacles.
First, there was considerable bitterness and division within the Democratic
party. This anger stemmed from various factors, such as Woodring's refusal
to heed the requests of Jonathan Davis and Donald Muir for a special legislative session, his "steam roller" tactics in getting the Roosevelt endorsement
through the state convention, and his refusal to support Shouse at the national convention. Second, the Republican split of 1930 was rapidly healing
as the party began to rally behind the candidacy of the affable and capable
Alf M. Landon. Furthermore, the Republicans could now attack Woodring's record as he had attacked theirs two years before. The third obstacle
was the old bugaboo of the last election, the candidacy of John R. Brinkley.
Finally, there was the deepening Depression, with its accompanying suffering and growing discontent. To the citizens of the Sunflower State, "the
bottom of the cycle was only too evident when corn became cheaper to burn
than coal and a barrel of crude oil cost less than five gallons of purified
drinking water." 53 Economically, things were much worse than they had
been two years before.
From the time that Woodring entered the governorship in January 1931
there had never seemed to be any doubt that he would seek reelection.
Although he was in office more than a year before he officially made his
intentions known, he continually acted like a candidate and made no effort
to refute those who said he would run again. In the fall of 1931 it appeared
that the bad blood developing between Harry Woodring and Jonathan Davis
over the calling of a special session would lead to a fight in the 1932 primary
election.54 In early December, however, another critic of Woodring, Donald
Muir, announced that he would seek the Democratic nomination for Governor. This pleased Woodring, because Muir and Davis appealed to the same
group of disgruntled party members; should they both enter the primary,
the Governor's opposition would be badly divided. Things did not work out
that way, because in late December, Davis, who was a widower, remarried,
and for the next few months his interest was in his new bride rather than in
the governorship. Davis's temporary loss of interest in politics caused his
supporters to rally behind Muir.55
The 1932 Democratic primary was to be the young crowd-old crowd
contest of 1930 all over again, except that Muir rather than Bowman was
the leader of the opposition. Although Woodring waited until Friday, 13
May 1932, to file for candidacy (he considered Friday the thirteenth to be
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a lucky day), he and Muir started campaigning months before that time.
The two Democrats took opposite views on nearly every major issue, thus
giving the voters a clear-cut choice. Whereas Woodring favored the income
tax and tax limitation amendments, Muir opposed them both, claiming that
more economy rather than more taxation was the way to solve the state's
economic ills.116 On the matter of forcing reductions in utility rates, Muir
attacked the Governor for " 'persecuting' that great and good man, Henry
L. Doherty."117 Muir also lashed out at the power and influence of Guy
Helvering, being especially critical of his practice of assessing state employees 5 percent of their salaries for political purposes. Both Woodring and
Helvering openly acknowledged that "voluntary contributions" were being
collected, but they maintained that it was better to finance a campaign with
a large number of small donations than with a few large gifts from persons
or corporations who would expect something in return. They also pointed
out that in collecting funds as they were, they were merely following a
precedent established years before by the Republicans. Muir likewise criticized the work of the Woodring "steam roller" at the state convention and
the abandoning of Shouse at Chicago. While the Democratic challenger
continually lashed out at Woodring, the latter did not do the same to his
opponent, because he was afraid that such action might antagonize the Muir
supporters and ultimately drive them to Brinkley.118
Muir conducted a vigorous campaign, traveling around the state making
numerous personal appearances, and using the radio extensively. Woodring,
on the other hand, exerted little effort in the primary. He did not hit the
campaign trail; instead he remained in Topeka and utilized the radio as his
major weapon.119 In early July he initiated a daily radio program. Each day
at 12:20 P.M., when businessmen and farmers were supposedly home for dinner, the strains of Woodring's campaign theme song, "Let Me Call You
Sweetheart," would usher in a thirty-minute program entitled "Under the
State House Dome." While the purpose of the privately financed broadcasts
originating from the Governor's office was ostensibly to keep Kansans informed on state affairs, Woodring used them primarily as a campaign tool.60
As the primary contest progressed, the Governor acknowledged that he
was not campaigning very hard. He justified his inaction by saying the
people were fed up with politics and were not interested in hearing a lot of
campaign rhetoric.61 Actually, Woodring saw no reason to spend valuable
time and money on a contest that he was sure he would win. He had defeated the old crowd two years before, and since then his organization had
been greatly strengthened, while theirs had grown weaker. Another Democrat, Walter Eggers of Bird City, was campaigning for the nomination in
western Kansas, but he was doing it more as a lark, and no one took him
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seriously. All in all, the primary was an extremely dull affair, and in the
voting on 2 August, Woodring won a clear and decisive victory over Muir,
91,037-to-42,786.62 With the primary out of the way, the Governor prepared
to square off against his two opponents in the general election, Alf M.
Landon and John R. Brinkley.
The August primary that witnessed Woodring triumph also saw Republican Alf M. Landon win a clear-cut victory over his conservative opponent, Lacey Simpson. Two years before, no one would have expected Landon
to emerge as a gubernatorial candidate, for it was in the 1930 primary, when
he was Republican State Chairman, that his candidate, Governor Clyde
M. Reed, had been defeated. At that point it had appeared that Landon was
"politically dead," because there did not seem to be much demand for "a
politician who could not win renomination for his governor." 63 Early in
1931, when friends suggested that he seek the governorship, Landon expressed no desire to do so. This attitude extended into the spring and was
in part attributable to his belief that "Woodring has given pretty general
satisfaction and I am afraid will be a hard man to beat."64
In the months that followed, more and more representatives of the
progressive wing of the Republican party began to put Landon forth as a
possible nominee. By fall, Landon, who was continually calling for party
unity, sounded more and more like a candidate, and on 20 January 1932 he
finally announced that he would seek the nomination. Several days later the
conservatives put forth their candidate, Lacey Simpson, a farmer from McPherson. No major issue divided the two men; both were for efficiency,
economy, economic recovery, lower taxes, and an oil tariff. Although the
two candidates conducted a vigorous campaign, they failed to create any
enthusiasm among the voters. Landon, however, was successful in convincing a number of conservative leaders that he was the man who could best
unite the party; consequently, he handily defeated Simpson, 160,345-to59,326.65 The man from Independence had won the nomination, and he had
done so without splitting the party.
In late August, when Landon and Woodring were preparing their
strategy for the campaign ahead, their attention was not centered so much
on each other as it was on the independent candidate, John Brinkley. Less
than three months after his defeat in the 1930 gubernatorial contest, Brinkley,
who had continued broadcasting over KFKB pending the outcome of his
suspension appeal, sold his station and relocated at Del Rio, Texas. Securing
authority from Mexican officials, he built a powerful 50,000-watt transmitter
right across the Rio Grande· River at Villa Acuna; and in March 1931 he
began to broadcast over station XER. He soon had thousands of listeners
throughout the Middle Western states, including Kansas. Although Brink-
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ley spent considerable time in Texas, he maintained his legal residence in
Kansas, which made him eligible to hold public office in that state.
From the time of his November 1930 defeat, Brinkley never left any
doubt that he would run again in 1932. Throughout 1931 Brinkleyism was
quite evident in Kansas as hundreds of Brinkley Platform Clubs, Brinkley
Good Government Clubs, and Brinkley Cowboy and Cowgirl Ranch Clubs
sang the praises of the goat-gland doctor and everything that he stood for.
An official newspaper, Publicity, which was edited by Elmer J. Garner of
Wichita, kept the supporters informed of the activities of their illustrious
leader and presented a biased account of what was happening in state politics. Occasionally "Doc" would address a Brinkley rally, and when he did,
there was always a large gathering-one such event at Milford in February
1931 drew a crowd estimated at twenty thousand.66
In January 1932 Brinkley made his formal announcement of candidacy.
He explained that he was taking such action not so much because he wanted
to but because it was his duty to come to the aid of his fellow Kansans. As
an independent candidate, he was not subject to the primary; consequently,
he was able to get a jump on the opposition. On 4 June he came out with
a twenty-five-point platform that promised something for everyone: free
schoolbooks, medical care for the poor, aid to the aged, more and better
roads, a state hospital for Negroes, and an artificial lake for every county.
To top it all off, he would do all this and more while still providing economy
in government. He never really explained how he would accomplish this
fantastic feat, and his trusting followers never asked. Brinkley also continued
to play his old role of the martyr as he continually reminded his listeners how
he had been persecuted by Kansas authorities.67 When the campaign began
in earnest in September of 1932, Brinkley had a large statewide following,
and this time his name would be on the ballot; thus, there was no question
that he was a power to be reckoned with.
Woodring's strategy for the general-election campaign was quite simple:
he would stand on his record of the past two years, fight for the income tax
and tax limitation amendments, and promise to provide the same sound
leadership in the future that he had in the past. Beyond that, he decided to
wait and see what course the opposition followed. In late August the Democratic State Committee, meeting in Topeka, reelected Guy Helvering as
State Chairman and adopted a platform calling for reorganization of state
and county government (so as to effect economy by avoiding duplication of
efforts), passage of the two tax amendments, cheaper textbooks, curbing of
public utilities, continuation of the highway program, development of industry, and the placing of public welfare on a high plane. The platform,
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which was drawn up by Woodring, Helvering, and Rice, was more an endorsement of past actions than a "promise of things to come."68
Woodring was now ready to try to accomplish what no previous
Democratic Governor of Kansas had been able to do-get reelected. On 12
September he opened his second campaign, as he had his first, with a speech
in Ottawa. In this keynote address he touched on the issues that he was to
dwell on throughout the contest. Economy and lower taxes received the most
attention. He pointed out that his program to reduce expenditures had been
so successful that "for the first time in history, the governor of Kansas spent
less than the amount appropriated by the legislature." He told how he had
saved the state $1 million dollars during his first year in office and would
save it $2 million during the second. Such savings, Woodring maintained,
had made it possible to reduce the state levy, but the tax burden was still
"intolerable," and relief could be provided only by the passage of the proposed tax amendments which would distribute the burden in an equitable
manner. He called attention to the reductions in utility rates that had already
been brought about, and he vowed to continue his fight against the Doherty
interests. He also cited accomplishments in highway surfacing and in aid to
crippled children. In closing, he chided the Republicans for refusing to support the tax limitation amendment, and he critized the independent candidate who "promises of free this and free that" and then says he will reduce
taxes.69
By the middle of September the three gubernatorial candidates were
campaigning in earnest. The contrasting personalities and styles of Woodring, Landon, and Brinkley made for a most interesting contest. Woodring,
accompanied by his driver, a county chairman, and one or two people from
state headquarters, usually traveled from town to town in the Governor's
black 12-cylinder Cadillac. Upon arrival, the Governors' companions would
start passing out "Win with Woodring" windshield stickers, campaign buttons, and thimbles as the jovial, smiling candidate would walk down the
main street, shaking hands, patting backs, and kissing babies. This was the
part of campaigning that he liked most: he enjoyed meeting the people, and
they seemed to enjoy meeting him. Returning to the town square, he would
mount a platform and give one of his rousing political speeches. Then he
would be off to the next town; and this sequence would usually be repeated
four or five times a day.70
If W oodring's pace seemed hectic, it was nothing compared to that of
Landon, who generally visited from eight to ten towns daily. Arriving in
town with little or no fanfare, the shy, retiring Republican would stroll the
streets, exchanging pleasantries with everyone he met. His warm, folksy
manner impressed those he stopped to chat with, but Alf never seemed to
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enjoy this aspect of campaigning as much as his Democratic counterpart did.
When it came to making a speech, Landon was at his worst; he was no
public speaker. But while he may have stumbled through his speech in a low
monotone, his points were well taken, and he left no doubts about his position on a particular issue.71
The most aloof, yet the most exciting and colorful of the three candidates, was Brinkley. Displaying a flair for political showmanship the likes
of which had never been seen, the independent candidate attracted some of
the largest crowds in the political history of Kansas-frequently between ten
thousand and fifteen thousand people. Everyone knew when Brinkley was
coming to town, because station XER had been announcing it almost hourly
the week before. Not only did they know he was coming, but they knew
when he arrived, because the event was heralded by a mighty blast on the
"five-mile horn" located atop "Ammunition Train No. 1," a wildly painted
truck with a sound system and speaker's platform, which was used to carry
his entourage. Brinkley then arrived in one of his airplanes or in his custombuilt 16-cylinder Cadillac. After several songs, including a rendition by the
cowboy singing star Roy Faulkner of Brinkley's theme, "He's the Man," the
red-bearded demagogue would appear and say a few prayers, reiterate his
numerous promises, and lambaste his opponents and their respective parties.
After his speech, he would quickly disappear; he never ventured into a
crowd or walked the streets greeting people.72 A New York Times editorial
cited an account in which a reporter called Brinkley a man "without personal
contact with the common people, a man of mystery."73 This aloofness was
probably the result of his fear that he might be the victim of an assassin's
bullet.74 In terms of activity, his pace compared to that of Woodring, for he
visited four or five towns daily. While his newspaper advertising was about
the same as that of his opponents, his billboard advertising was considerably
more, and his radio time was several times greater, because he was able to
utilize his own station at no cost.
Until the campaign was well under way, Woodring aimed his attack
primarily at Brinkley. This decision was based in part on his desire to keep
the discontent vote from going to the rabble-rousing redhead, but the major
reason seems to have been that anger over certain statements made by Brinkley caused him to turn the contest into a personal feud. The memories of
the 1930 campaign had planted the seeds of hate. When Brinkley called
Woodring a dog; referred to Thurman Hill, Democratic member of the
P.S.C., as" 'a pup'-presumably the son of the dog"; and criticized the Chief
Executive for buying new silverware for the governor's mansion when Kansans were going hungry, Woodring became furious and began to retaliate.
He accused Brinkley of opposing the income tax amendment because he
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"probably has one million dollars worth of bonds and securities put away"
on which he did not have to pay tax under the current laws. The Governor
also claimed that in spite of the "Doctor's" tremendous property holdings,
he did not pay a cent of real-estate taxes. The two men argued continually
over such matters, as well as over the question of whether the state should
provide free schoolbooks.711 Unfortunately, the angry personal exchanges that
took place did nothing to shed light on the major issues.
Not all the Woodring-Brinkley charges and countercharges were over
petty matters, for on 21 October the Governor exploded a major bombshell.
In a speech at Pittsburg he presented "evidence" to back up his previous
allegations that Brinkley's campaign was receiving financial support from
Henry L. Doherty, who was determined to bring about Woodring's defeat
because of his fight over gas rates. After pointing out that Doherty had purchased a major interest in the Kansas City Journal-Post the year before in
order to fight him and the Kansas City Star-a fact already known by most
Kansans-Woodring claimed that Doherty had put an "experienced politician" in charge of an operation to channel funds from a mysterious account,
J-329, to the Journal-Post and to the Wichita Beacon for Brinkley advertising
that was designed "to destroy the confidence of the people in my administration." More than $75,000 had been spent for such purposes. Woodring
claimed to have the sworn testimony of eye witnesses and photostatic copies
to back up every statement. He also threatened to turn the evidence over to
the proper authorities for legal action-although he never did so.76 Both
Brinkley and Doherty denied the specific charges hut not the general allegations; moreover, they were unwilling to file libel suits against the Governor. Throughout the rest of the campaign, Brinkley attacked Woodring's
rate war on Doherty and defended the Cities Service Company. The revelation of the Brinkley-Doherty connection appears to have helped Woodring
and hurt Brinkley, for after that time the Governor, who had been running
well behind the other two candidates, gained ground while Brinkley
slipped.77 Brinkley's declining support in late October was also due to the
activities of the Republicans, who had decided to concentrate on him until
the last two weeks of the campaign and then turn on Woodring.78 To offset
the effects of Brinkley's newspaper, Publicity, the Republicans utilized one
of their own, The Pink Rag. The Rag, a sort of political underground paper,
was especially vicious in its attacks on Brinkley.79 Landon also lashed out at
Brinkley, and as the campaign entered the home stretch, the effects of the
Republican and Democratic barrages began to take their toll.
Until the last two weeks of the campaign, Landon generally avoided
direct attacks on Woodring; instead he addressed himself to issues-pledging
lower taxes and economy, criticizing Helvering's operation of the Highway
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Department, and questioning Woodring's stand on prohibition.80 Since
Woodring supported the first two matters, he only had to address himself to
the latter two. He met the criticism of Helvering's conduct with the fact
that in the previous year Kansas had surfaced more roads than any other
state and had still cut its operating cost by $250,000. Concerning Landon's
charges that Helvering had gathered party funds through 5 percent assessments on state employees, the Governor merely asked if Landon himself had
not done the same thing when he was State Chairman.81 Landon did not
reply. With reference to prohibition, Landon charged the Governor with
being "wet in Albany and dry in Kansas," but Woodring proclaimed his
allegiance to the drys and denounced the national Democratic party's stand
on repeal of the Eighteenth Amendment. Although the wet-dry question
arose several times, it did not become a real issue in the state election.82
Not all of Woodring's challenges came from the other candidates and
their followers. One of his major problems came from Kansas public-school
teachers. The trouble stemmed from the Governor's support of the tax limitation amendment, which would have prevented the levying of a general
property tax in excess of 2 percent of the assessed property valuation. Schoolteachers and school officials opposed this, because the levy of many school
districts already exceeded that rate and therefore, if the limit were imposed,
a major source of school revenue would be taken away.83 In early October,
Frank L. Pinet, secertary of the Kansas State Teachers Association, writing
in the organization's magazine, The Kansas Teacher, called for the defeat of
the amendment and of Woc,dring himself, because the Governor had shown
"no sympathy for the schools of Kansas." 84 Woodring criticized Pinet for
involving the association in partisan politics, and he argued that while the
schools might suffer initially, in the long run they would benefit from the
new, sound tax policies. Kansas teachers were not impressed, and they continued to fight the proposal and its sponsor. On election eve, thousands of
school children, following their teachers' instructions, distributed doorknob
pamphlets urging people not to support Woodring or the tax limitation
amendment.85 Another source of difficulty came from a member of the
Governor's own party. The old troublemaker Jonathan Davis, his extended
honeymoon over, turned on Woodring, joined the Brinkley forces, and urged
other Democrats to do likewise. How many of the old guard he carried with
him is unknown, but there is no question that his defection hurt Woodring
to some extent.86
The last two weeks of the campaign saw the Republicans launch a fullscale attack on the Governor.87 Jesse Greenleaf, Republican member of the
P.S.C., claimed that Woodring's attack on Doherty had actually prevented
lower gas rates in Kansas, because the P.S.C. was about to negotiate reduc-
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tions when the Governor intervened in the hope of furthering his own political career.BB Landon's campaign manager, Frank Carlson, again brought up
the prohibition question by claiming that "Woodring wants to appear wet
outside of Kansas and dry inside of this state."B9 Landon, too, unloaded his
guns on the Governor, questioning his claims about economy, reduction of
taxes, and reduction of utility rates. According to Landon, Woodring was
"the greatest little claimer Kansas has had in a long time."90 Woodring
struck back by charging that the Republican candidate was using "halftruths and distortions." 91 Their bitter exchanges in the last week of the
contest were of a political nature and led to no personal antagonism between
the two men. 92 In closing his campaign at Leavenworth on 7 November,
Woodring merely reiterated what he had done during the past two years
and then asked the voters to choose between his accomplishments and the
promises of his opponents. Having taken his fight to each of the state's 105
counties, a tired and non-too-confident Harry Woodring returned to Neodesha to await the election.
Kansas political forecasters were a little more bold in 1932 than they had
been two years before. Nearly all of them picked Landon to win, but they
were divided about fifty-fifty on whether Woodring or Brinkley would come
in second. There was general agreement, however, that Woodring had been
rapidly gaining support in the last two weeks of the contest.93 That final
surge brought Woodring close to victory, but not close enough, for Landon
took an early lead and never relinquished it. Final tabulations showed
Landon gathering 278,581 votes to Woodring's 272,944 and Brinkley's
244,607.94 The Kansas precedent of never reelecting a Democratic Governor
was still intact.
Why had Woodring failed? Why was it that in spite of a fine record,
an effective state organization, and vigorous campaigning, he had not been
reelected? Before answering these questions, it should be noted how extremely close the election was. In a contest that saw eight hundred thousand
votes cast, less than six thousand separated the winner and the runner-up.
Had less than one-half of one percent of those voting cast their ballot for
Woodring instead of Landon or Brinkley, the victory would have gone the
other way. What had kept the Governor from getting the small number of
additional votes that could have changed the outcome? There were a number of crucial factors. First, and most important, was the fact that the Republicans were reunited. This was especially important, because Kansas
was a Republican state. Second, Woodring had antagonized many members
of his own party by his refusal to call a special session of the legislature, as
Jonathan Davis had asked him to do, and by his actions at the 1932 state and
national Democratic conventions. The defection of Davis and some of his
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followers to Brinkley also hurt. Third, by tying himself firmly to the tax
limitation amendment, which also went down to defeat, the Governor frightened and antagonized Kansas schoolteachers, who fought him vigorously.
Fourth, the Brinkley vote, which took votes from both of the regular party
candidates, appears to have hurt Woodring more than it hurt Landon.95
Finally, Woodring was unable to get the farm vote. While he sympathized
with the plight of the farmers, he did not know what to do about it. Believing that agricultural relief should be a federal responsibility, he had done
nothing; thus, he could not appeal to the rural voter. The relative importance of each of these factors in the outcome of the election is uncertain, but
together they spelled defeat.
Although Woodring had been rebuffed on 8 November 1932, it had been a
very good day for Democrats throughout the nation. In Kansas they had
had one of their most successful election days ever, as they returned George
McGill to the United States Senate, sent three men to Congress, and elected
sixty representatives and seventeen senators to the state legislature.96 The big
story of that day, however, and the one most pleasing to Woodring, was the
presidential victory of his friend Franklin D. Roosevelt. Carrying forty-two
states, including Kansas, Roosevelt rolled up an impressive 472-to-59 margin
in the electoral college, thus becoming the thirty-second President of the
United States.
While his defeat by Landon was disheartening, Woodring was less upset
than one would have expected. With his friend FDR headed for the White
House, Woodring knew he was in a good position to share some of the fruits
of the presidential victory, and that is exactly what he expected to do. After
all, he had been one of the "original" Roosevelt supporters, had channeled
funds into the FDR coffers at several critical periods, and had worked hard
at Chicago to help the New Yorker win the nomination. He was, therefore,
confident that Roosevelt and Farley would reward him accordingly. A more
retiring person would have sat back and waited to see what position would
be offered, but not Woodring. He did not want just any job; he wanted to
be Secretary of Agriculture, and he set out to obtain the position.
Whether Woodring really wanted the Agriculture post or whether he
sought it because he felt it was the job that he was most likely to get is uncertain. His only real qualification for the position was the fact that he was
Governor of one of the most important agricultural states. Except for lowering taxes, he had, as Governor, made no real effort to aid the farmer; moreover, he had made no specific proposals about how to cope with the problem
of farm surpluses or the resulting low prices.97 Only after FDR's nomination
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did Woodring begin to think seriously about the farm problem. Perhaps it
was Roosevelt's September 14 statement that Woodring understood the problem of agriculture as well as anyone else in the country that boosted the
Kansan's ego and motivated him to seek the Agriculture post.
Less than two weeks after W oodring's defeat, his friends and supporters
began to conduct a letter-writing campaign to solicit support from politicians,
newspapermen, and agricultural organizations for having the Governor appointed as Secretary of Agriculture.98 On 5 December, Woodring and
Helvering, who also expected to be duly rewarded for his support of FDR,
traveled to Warm Springs, Georgia, to discuss the farm problem with the
President-elect. Although Woodring publicly termed the conference "eminently satisfactory," he privately felt that he had not had adequate time to
present his views. Therefore, on 27 December he wrote to Roosevelt, criticizing the various Voluntary Domestic Allotment Plan proposals; presenting
the barest outline of his relief program, which would make "the tariff effective on farm products"; and requesting "at least an entire evening's discussion" of his proposals. The requested meeting was set for 12 January 1933.99
Before Woodring traveled to Hyde Park, he had to fulfill his final
obligations to the state of Kansas by formally turning over the reins of
government to his successor. That task was accomplished on Alf Landon's
inauguration day, 9 January 1933. At the swearing-in ceremony, Woodring
made his farewell address. After citing the achievements of the past two
years and praising Landon, his "neighbor and friend for years," he closed by
stating that he left the office "with the feeling that I have given my state the
very best that was mine."100 While many Kansans were undoubtedly happy
to see him go, a large number probably held views similar to those of the
Topeka columnist Charles H. Sessions and the Emporia journalist William
Allen White. Sessions wrote, "If it falls to the Democrats ever to elect another governor of Kansas we hope they will show the good sense to elect
Harry Woodring."101 Although White had supported Landon in the election, he paid an editorial tribute to Woodring by sayings:
Governor Woodring should not be lost to public life in this state and in this
country. He is a man of exceptional qualities of heart and mind. He is as honest
as daylight. He is clear-visioned and courageous. The Democratic president
looking over the West for a cabinet officer can find no man better fitted for the
honor and for the hard work required of a cabinet-head than Governor Harry
Woodring of Kansas. Kansas is as proud of Harry Woodring as though he had
overcome the handicap of his Democracy in a Republican state.102
After Landon's inauguration, Woodring and Helvering headed for New
York, where they spent the entire afternoon of 12 January discussing the
farm problem with Roosevelt. At that meeting, as he had done at Warm
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Springs and in his letter, Woodring voiced violent opposition to the Voluntary Domestic Allotment Plan, emphasizing that he was opposed to restricting production as long as people at home and abroad were going hungry.
His solution was to "return to America her foreign [agricultural] markets"
by establishing "a program of debenture credit on foreign sales and to exchange agricultural products with foreign nations." 103 Roosevelt listened
with interest to these ideas, but he was not yet ready to commit himself to a
farm program or to a man to head it. What promises, if any, were made
concerning a job in the new administration are unknown, but that Woodring
was confident of receiving a good position seems evident from the fact that
a week later he completed arrangements to lease a large apartment at the
Mayflower Hotel in Washington. 104
In late January, Woodring returned to Kansas and continued a personal
letter-writing campaign to people close to Roosevelt, asking that they urge
appointment of him as Secretary of Agriculture.105 In a letter to Louis
Howe, one of FDR's oldest and closest advisers, Woodring boldly proclaimed:
I want to be Secretary of Agriculture. . . . As to future political aspect and
success-we must depend on our real friends. One cannot be elected President
without first being nominated. One cannot be nominated only by work of loyal
friends. Gov. R. was not nominated by the Wallaces, Peakes [sic], Murphys, Ed.
O'Neals, Tabors and such bandwagon Roosevelt Republicans. But by Woodrings,
Helverings, Parleys and Howes. 106

The point was clear-he had done something for Roosevelt; now the favor
should be returned.
Towards the end of January, reports began to circulate in Washington
that Henry A. Wallace of Iowa, . an advocate of the Voluntary Domestic
Allotment Plan, might be named as the new Secretary of Agriculture. These
reports were unsettling to Woodring, but when Roosevelt wrote on 1 February and assured him that no decision would be made on the appointment
until just prior to the inauguration, the Kansan's hopes received a boost.107
Both Howe and Farley were Woodring supporters; but this meant little, for
when it came to making cabinet selections, Roosevelt had a mind of his own.
As he remarked to the press and to his close advisers, "I. regard the cabinet
as peculiarly my own official family to be named only by me."108
During the second week of February the President-elect decided to offer
the Agriculture post to Wallace. After some hesitation the Iowan accepted,
and on 22 February the formal announcement was made.109 The decision to
give the position to Wallace rather than to Woodring was a reflection of
Roosevelt's policy views rather than a personal matter. He had come to the
conclusion that Voluntary Domestic Allotment rather than restoration of
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world markets offered the best hope for the American agricultural dilemma;
thus, he chose Wallace. Although Woodring was not aware of it, he had
been given serious consideration for the post of Secretary of War, but in the
end Roosevelt decided to appoint former Utah Governor George H. Dern to
that position.U 0
Woodring was quite upset when he did not get the cabinet position that
he had hoped for, but Farley reminded him that many fine positions were
still to be filled and assured him that he would not be forgotten . However,
when Inauguration Day arrived, Woodring's future was still undecided. A
few days later he was tentatively offered the position of Treasurer of the
United States, which would have meant that his signature would have
appeared on every piece of United States paper money; but Woodring rejected this idea, because he did not desire what was primarily a clerical job.
In the days that followed, there was considerable speculation that he would
be named either Governor-General of the Philippines or Comptroller of
Currency, but no such offers were forthcoming. 111
Finally, in late March, Farley approached Woodring about an appointment as Assistant Secretary of War. Woodring's first reaction was one of
disappointment; with the domestic and world situation being what it was at
that time, the War Department did not sound like a very exciting place to
be.11 2 There were, however, some factors that made the job appealing to
Woodring: his military service had been a very pleasant experience, and he
had been quite impressed by the caliber of leaders that he had come into
contact with; there would also be considerable opportunity for travel.113
Furthermore, he had taken an active role in the affairs of the National Guard
and of the American Legion-organizations that were vitally concerned with
national defense. The new position would give him the opportunity to do
something concrete to provide for that defense. He also realized that if he
turned this job down, he had no way of knowing what the next offer might
be. The position would at least put him in the "Little Cabinet," and it
would give him an opportunity to be in a policy-making position. When
Woodring hesitated, Farley suggested that he go and talk the matter over
with Secretary of War Dern before making his decision. After discussing
the nature of his duties with the affable Dern, Woodring decided to take the
post.11 4 On 30 March he informed the President of his acceptance, and on
the following day his name was submitted to the Senate for confirmation.
Since there was no opposition, the appointment was quickly approved, and
on 6 April 1933, with Secretary Dern and the Army Chief of Staff, Gen.
Douglas MacArthur, at his side, Harry H. Woodring took the oath that
made him the Assistant Secretary of War.1111 A new and controversial career
was. about to begin.
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5
Assistant Secretary of War

Washington, D.C., was bustling with activity in the spring of 1933 when
Harry Woodring assumed his new position as Assistant Secretary of War.
There was action throughout the city as the forces of President Franklin D.
Roosevelt launched a full-scale attack on the worst depression the country
had ever experienced. The eyes of the nation were focused on "FDR" as he
pushed through Congress an unbelievable array of legislation-the New Deal
was marching in. Bills establishing a host of new agencies, such as the
Federal Emergency Relief Administration, Civilian Conservation Corps,
Agricultural Adjustment Administration, National Recovery Administration, and the Tennessee Valley Authority, sailed through the legislative
branch; and before long, an array of alphabetical designations, such as
FERA, CCC, NRA, AAA, and TVA., had become an important part of
America's vocabulary. As the citizens grew increasingly aware of the many
new agencies and their activities, they also became familiar with the creators
and administrators of those programs. Such names as Frances Perkins,
Harold Ickes, Henry Wallace, Harry Hopkins, Raymond Moley, and Rexford Tugwell were soon known to most Americans.1
·
As the New Deal advanced, most governmental departments, such as
Treasury, Labor, Interior, Agriculture, and Commerce, saw a rapid growth
in their activities, obligations, expenditures, and personnel.2 However, not
all departments were experiencing across-the-board expansion; several, most
notably the War and Navy departments, saw their responsibilities increased,
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but at the same time they experienced reductions in budgets and manpower.
With th.e Roosevelt administration engrossed in matters of relief, recovery,
and reform, there was little time and even less money for defense. Consequently, the military services, especially the Army, felt the full impact of the
nation's economic collapse. That the leaders of the military establishment
were able to tolerate such a state of affairs so graciously was primarily a result of the years of military neglect that they had witnessed and experienced.8
There is much validity to the adage that in peacetime "we Americans
treat our Army like a mangy old dog."4 Many times in the history of the
United States the Army has been permitted to deteriorate to a dangerously
low level of effectiveness, but at no time were negligence of and indifference to it greater than during the two decades following World War 1.5
The 1920s saw Army strength dip to a low of 135,000 officers and men
( only 35,000 more than the limit imposed on Germany to keep her militarily
impotent). Furthermore, the force was not only lacking in manpower, but
in equipment and training as well.6 Dwight Davis, who served as Calvin
Coolidge's Secretary of War from 1925 to 1929, referred to the early 1920s as
"those discouraging years of curtailment of activities, reductions, demotions
and disinterestedness on the part of the public."7 Although the situation was
bad under Presidents Harding and Coolidge, it became even worse under
President Hoover, who, when the Depression hit, came to the conclusion
that the best place to start reducing government expenditures was the Army.
Apathy and economy so decimated the United States war machine in the late
1920s and early 1930s that it soon reached the lowest degree of effectiveness
that it had known since before the war. According to the 1933 Annual
Report of the Chief of Staff, the United States Army ranked seventeenth
among the standing armies of the world.8 Such was the state of military
affairs when the Roosevelt administration assumed the reins of government.
Although the Republican Chief Executives of the 1920s must bear much of
the blame for the decline of the military, the responsibility is not theirs
alone, because they reflected the attitudes of both Congress and the American
public.9
When Woodring entered the War Department in the spring of 1933, it
was organized in accordance with the provisions of the National Defense
Act of 1920. Heading the organization was the Secretary of War, who was
directly responsible to the President for raising and training the Army.
Additional military responsibilities included providing for the defense of the
insular possessions and the coast of the continental United States, and the
developing of new weapons and material. The position also carried with it
certain nonmilitary functions, such as the maintenance and operation of the
Panama Canal; administration of the government of the Philippines, Puerto
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Rico, and the Canal Zone; development of inland waterways and adminisstration of the Inland Waterways Corporation; formulation and execution of
flood-control measures; and the maintenance and administration of the
United States Military Academy.10
To fill the number one post at the War Department, Roosevelt appointed
former Utah Governor George H. Dern. This was not a particularly wise
choice, because the affable, soft-spoken Dern had no knowledge of and little
interest in the Army. Born near Hooper, Nebraska, in 1872, the strapping
young farm boy had gone to the University of Nebraska, where he captained
the football team. In 1895 he left college and moved with his family to Utah,
where his father became a part owner of a small gold-mining company.
Starting out as a bookkeeper, young Dern rose in the ranks, eventually becoming manager of the Mercur Gold Mining Company, one of the largest
in the state. During these years Dern made several major contributions to
metallurgical processing-most notably the creation of a vacuum slime filtration process and, in conjunction with Theodore P. Holt, the development
of the world-famous Holt-Dern ore-reduction system. In 1914 the thenwealthy and well-known metallurgist ventured into politics, being elected a
State Senator. Ten years in the legislature enabled him to learn the ropes of
state government, and in 1924 he ran for, and was elected, Governor, a post
that he held for eight years. As a progressive Democrat, Dern gained national prominence by sponsoring Workman's Compensation: and Public
Utilities acts, by instituting tax reforms, and by leading a successful fight to
gain recognition of the principle that the water of streams belongs to the
states and not to the federal government. In 1931 he became a strong Roosevelt supporter, and as a reward he received the War post rather than the
Interior position which he had coveted.11
Initially, Dem's appointment created little enthusiasm among military
leaders, many of whom considered him a pacifist, but they soon warmed up
to him.12 Unfortunately the new Secretary was able to offer little leadership
to the Army during his tenure. His failure stemmed in part from his lack
of familiarity with the military and his lack of interest in the activities of
the War Department, but the major problem was his deteriorating health.
Already failing when he accepted the job, the health of the sixty-one-year-old
Secretary became progressively worse with each passing year. High blood
pressure and a weak heart sapped more and more of his energy, and as a
result, he was frequently away from his office for weeks at a time. Almost
from the day that he took office there were rumors that his condition would
force him to resign, but he refused to do so, and the warm-hearted Roosevelt
could not bring himself to ask for his resignation. Consequently, the War
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Department lumbered through Roosevelt's first term with a sick man at the
helm.13
One step below the Secretary in the departmental hierarchy was the
Assistant Secretary of War. The Assistant, who, like his immediate superior,
was a civilian, had as his primary responsibility the procurement of all military supplies. His additional major duties included the development of plans
and procedures to insure that industry would be able to produce the supplies
needed in war time (industrial mobilization), the sale and disposal of surplus supplies, the purchase and sale of military real estate, and the settlement
of claims by and against the Army. Furthermore, when the Secretary was
absent, the Assistant became the acting head of the department, with all the
authority and responsibility that the number one job entailed. 14 With Dem's
health being what it was, Woodring frequently found himself carrying the
Secretary's burdens as well as his own.
The third-ranking member of the War Department was the Chief of
Staff. This post, which was filled by a professional soldier, was, next to that
of Commander in Chief, the highest-ranking military position in the United
States Army. In addition to serving as the Secretary's immediate adviser on
all military matters, the Chief of Staff was responsible for planning and
executing the Army's plans for national defense. To assist him in this
enormous task he had an Assistant Chief of Staff, General Staff, Special
Staff, and numerous other advisory and administrative personnel.1 11
Occupying the position of Chief of Staff when Woodring arrived at the
War Department was one of the most able military leaders the United States
had ever produced, Gen. Douglas MacArthur. He graduated from West
Point in 1903 and then, as a junior officer, served as a military aide to his
famous father, Gen. Arthur MacArthur, and to President Theodore Roosevelt. According to Secretary of War Newton D. Baker, he had emerged
from World War I as "the greatest American field commander produced by
the war."16 When the conflict was over, MacArthur returned to West Point,
where, as the youngest superintendent in the history of the academy, he instituted a number of far-reaching changes in the instructional and physicaltraining programs. In 1925 his military genius was further recognized when
he became the youngest Major General in the Army. Because MacArthur's
fame continued to spread, it came as no surprise when, in November 1930,
President Hoover appointed him Chief of Staff.17 During his long military
career, MacArthur had come to realize the importance of getting along with
his superiors; thus, it was not unusual that he developed a warm and smooth
relationship with Secretary Dern and with Assistant Secretary Woodring.18
To those promilitary advocates in the nation's capital who hoped that
the coming of Roosevelt would bring better times for the United States
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Army, the early days of the New Deal brought a rude awakening. Shortly
after taking office, the new President shocked them by urging a $144 million
cut in Army appropriations, the forced retirement of four thousand officers,
and a twelve-thousand-man reduction in enlisted strength. An immediate
outcry from the War Department, along with severe criticism from a number of influential newspapers and patriotic organizations, ultimately resulted
in the restoration of some of the proposed cuts. Nevertheless, the 1934 budget
provided a mere $227 million for military purposes-down more than $52
million from the year before, and the lowest outlay since before the war.19
Although Secretary Dern was forced to reduce Army expenditures not
just to the bone but "into the bone," he did all that he could to cut spending
in the civilian side of the department, so that the military forces, which
General MacArthur maintained were already "below the point of safety,"
would not suffer further.20 Such efforts, however, achieved only limited
success. While the austerity programs did not lead to a reduction of military
personnel, as had originally been feared, they did result in a virtual halt in
the development of weapons and equipment, the curtailment of training
exercises, the continued use of inadequate and obsolete equipment, and reductions in the activities of the Reserve Officers Training Corps (ROTC)
and the National Guard.21 By the mid 1930s the United States Army was
nearing an all-time low in terms of national favor, funds, and effectiveness.22
While the Army suffered considerably under the impact of the Great
Depression, it paradoxically benefited from it via the creation of the Civilian
Conservation Corps (CCC). In an effort to help provide economic relief and
at the same time preserve the nation's natural resources, Congress, at the
President's urging, created the CCC in April 1933. The new program, under
the direction of Robert Fechner, started as a joint operation of the Departments of Labor, Interior, Agriculture, and War. Initially the Army had the
responsibility of enrolling, supplying, and providing very limited supervision
over the conservation activities of more than 350,000 young men located in
more than thirteen hundred CCC camps throughout the country. When it
soon became evident, however, that the civilian departments were unable to
carry out their responsibilities, the mammoth task was almost completely
turned over to the Army, even though Fechner remained the director of the
program.23 Consequently, in June of 1933 the War Department turned its
attention from the military army to the newly created civilian army. Few
officials, military or civilian, were more involved in the CCC than was the
Assistant Secretary of War. Purchasing or leasing the land for the camps
and providing the necessary food, clothing, blankets, and personal supplies
for more than one-third of a million men was no easy task; but Woodring,
who spent most of his first eight months in office dealing with CCC matters,
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proved to be an able administrator, so the massive logistical demands were
met successfully .24
Toward the end of 1933 the Regular Army personnel who had carried
on the bulk of the CCC supervision began to be replaced by specially trained
civilian personnel, so that the venture lost a great deal of the military air
that it had previously possessed. Whether the CCC activities of 1933 and
early 1934 helped or hindered the Army was, and continues to be, a source
of considerable speculation. Some War Department officials, including
Woodring, tended to emphasize the assets of the program. Those individuals
pointed to such benefits as the leadership training that it provided for junior
officers and the experience that it provided in mobilizing a moderately large
number of men. Others connected with the military, such as Secretary Dern,
complained that the CCC took thousands of officers and key enlisted personnel out of the Regular Army, thereby making it useless in the event that
it was immediately needed. There was one point on which all those associated with the War Department agreed: the virtual halt of military training
and the utilization of reserve war supplies such as clothing, boots, and
blankets could have dire consequences in time of emergency.25 There was
no question that the CCC was a mixed blessing as far as the Army was
concerned.
Just as the War Department received some benefits from the CCC, it
did likewise from projects of the Public Works Administration (PWA) and
the Works Progress Administration (WPA). Between 1933 and 1938 more
than $250 million was spent on work-relief projects that provided the Army
with sorely needed facilities and supplies.26 Through the PWA and the
WPA the Army received such things as hospitals, gymnasiums, ammunition,
motor vehicles, aircraft, and new housing for officers and enlisted personnel.
While the primary purpose behind such projects was to provide work for
the unemployed (pump-priming projects), they did serve to provide the
Army with buildings, equipment, and ammunition that, in all likelihood,
it would not otherwise have received.
The year 1933 was busy yet relatively uneventful as far as Assistant
Secretary Woodring's official activities were concerned; however, in the
social realm, an event took place that was to have a profound effect on his
subsequent personal and political careers. On 25 July 1933 the forty-sixyear-old Kansan's life as a bachelor came to an end when he married Helen
Coolidge, the beautiful and talented daughter of Democratic Senator
Marcus A. Coolidge of Massachusetts. Helen, whose father had made a
modest fortune in the machine-tool business before entering the Senate in
1931, had all the advantages that wealth and social standing could provide.
Born in Fitchburg, Massachusetts, in 1906, she had received a fine education
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at the Mary C. Wheeler School in Providence, Rhode Island, and the Bradford Academy in her home state. While showing exceptional talent both as
a writer and as a painter, she preferred to pursue a career in the latter; thus,
she went to Boston and studied at the Howard Walker School of Fine Art.
When her father took his seat in the Senate in 1931, Helen moved to Washington-a place that she found most agreeable. Her fame as an artist quickly
spread throughout the capital city, and before long, she was sketching and
painting portraits of many of her father's colleagues. Being gifted, attractive,
and very personable, she inevitably acquired a large circle of friends and an
equally large number of suitors: Helen Coolidge was soon one of the most
sought-after young ladies on the Washington social scene.27
Since she was the daughter of a Democratic Senator, it was only natural
that Helen soon found herself caught up in the activities of the National
Women's Democratic Club, and it was through that organization that she
first met her husband-to-be. On 11 December 1931 she attended a meeting
of the club, at which she heard an address by the Governor of Kansas, Harry
Woodring. At a reception afterwards, national Democratic leader Jouett
Shouse introduced her to him. Woodring was immediately impressed with
her grace and charm, and he promised to call on her the next time he was in
W ashington.28
Six months later, in May 1932, Woodring fulfilled his pledge by stopping
off in Washington to spend a few days in the company of Miss Coolidge.
On that visit something happened to Harry Woodring that had never happened before-he fell in love. Before departing, he asked her to marry him,
but she was unwilling to take such an important step after a courtship of
only a few days. The two agreed to keep in touch with one another, and in
the following months they corresponded regularly. In January 1933, when
Woodring moved to Washington, they 'began to see each other regularly,
and soon she began to feel for him what he had felt for her. Therefore, in
June, when he proposed a second time, she accepted. Six weeks later the
couple were married in an elaborate ceremony at the Coolidge residence in
Fitchburg, and after a honeymoon in Europe the newlyweds took up residence at the Mayflower Hotel.29
Because of Helen's charm and grace and Harry's personality and position, the W oodrings soon became one of the most prominent couples in the
nation's capital. They were continually entertaining, and being entertained
by, cabinet members, congressmen, generals, ambassadors, and foreign dignitaries. Their active social life was instrumental in their acquisition of
numerous friends in the administration, on the Hill, at the War Department,
and among members of the news media. Official Washington tended to look
upon the W oodrings as the perfect couple-a view that especially seemed to
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be held by FDR.30 There can be no doubt that Helen Woodring was a major
asset to her husband and his career; her importance was to become more
evident as the decade rolled on.
Although Woodring's first eight months at the War Department were
relatively quiet, routine, and noncontroversial, such a state of affairs was not
destined to continue. The year 1934 opened with a bang, and before the end
of January the Assistant Secretary of War was one of the most controversial
men in Washington. Harry's troubles began when his article entitled "The
American Army Stands Ready" appeared in the 6 January issue of liberty
Magazine. In this story he claimed that the Army was "the only branch of
the government ... organized and available not only to defend our territory,
but also to cope with social and economic problems in an emergency." He
then proposed that the activities of the Civilian Conservation Corps be expanded and placed under the control of the military. If this were done, the
Army could organize the CCC men, the World War veterans, and the people
on relief "into a system of economic storm troops that could support the
government's efforts to smash the depression." 31
To propose such action and to use a phrase like "economic storm troops"
at that particular time was quite unfortunate, because the country was
becoming increasingly alarmed over reports from Europe concerning the
actions of Adolf Hitler's and Benito Mussolini's "storm troopers/'32 In an
immediate reaction against the article the White House was flooded with
letters and telegrams demanding that the President remove Woodring at
once.33 Typical of the messages received was one from the noted historian
Charles A. Beard, who called the article "the first fascist threat from the War
Department." Beard warned Roosevelt that such threats "spread distrust of
your intentions and your administration." He concluded by asking FDR
"to wash your hands of the fascist doctrine and to remove Woodring within
fifteen minutes."34
In the days that followed, the demands for removal grew in number
and intensity. On 24 January a letter signed by some two hundred educators
from thirty Eastern colleges and universities was made public in New York.
It demanded that Assistant Secretary Woodring "be forced to resign his
public office" because his proposals were "not even a thinly veiled advocacy
of the German Nazi's dictatorship methods." The signers expressed a fear
that if such an attitude prevailed in the War Department, it meant that the
country was being prepared for "such an abuse of powers as is intolerable to
contemplate." Two days after the letter was released, it and the controversy
with which it dealt were brought up on the Senate floor by Senator Thomas
Schall of Minnesota; however, they occasioned no debate or discussion.311
Still, the demands for W oodring's removal flowed into the White House.
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When the controversy first arose, the President tried to ignore the matter, but by early February the whole affair had reached such proportions that
he asked his Press Secretary, Steve Early, to contact Woodring and straighten
the matter out. In the meantime, Roosevelt made it clear that it was his
steadfast policy to maintain civilian, not military, control over the CCC
camps. When a reporter asked the President if he cared to comment on
Woodring's article, he answered in the negative, and then added, "I have
been very careful not to read it." In this way he kept from becoming involved. Steve Early, in whose lap the problem now lay, privately criticized
Woodring for saying things that gave the impression that the policies of the
War Department were at odds with those of the President. Woodring explained to Early and then to Roosevelt that he felt that the whole matter
was not as serious as the press and some critics of the administration had
made it appear. He maintained that the criticism was due to the placing of
a literal interpretation on the term "economic storm troops." According to
the Assistant Secretary, "I used this term as a figure of speech just as many
people currently refer to the recovery efforts of the government as a war
against depression." This explanation apparently satisfied the President, for
he did no more than warn the Assistant Secretary to be more careful in the
future. The press was also satisfied with W oodring's latest statement, and
by mid February the whole matter had been dropped.36
The controversy over the CCC article did several things for the Assistant
Secretary of War. First, it made him a nationally known figure. Unfortunately, however, the image that he first cast was not a good one, and for
years a number of Americans would continue to remember him only as a
man with "fascist" ideas. Second, it indicated that it would take a real
blunder on Woodring's part to bring the wrath of the President down on
him. Receiving only a reprimand probably made the Assistant Secretary feel
that he was relatively free to say what he wished. Third, neither Roosevelt
nor Woodring was stampeded into action when a vocal section of the electorate became inflamed. This was evident from the fact that neither man
considered the public's demand for resignation as a solution to the problem.
It would seem that all the furor over the article should have taught the outspoken Kansan to be more careful about what he said, but the next six years
were to show that it did not.
While those individuals who were upset over the CCC article were still
clamoring for Woodring's scalp, a series of events occurred that was to place
the Assistant Secretary in even hotter water. His new problems surfaced on
6 February, when the District of Columbia grand jury began to investigate
"irregularities in the awarding of army contracts," specifically those relating
to the procurement of motor vehicles and aircraft and to the disposal of
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surplus materials. On the same day that the grand jury convened, Secretary
Dern and President Roosevelt publicly called for a complete investigation in
order to determine whether lobbyists or Army officials were involved in any
"wrongdoing" in the awarding of contracts.
The announcement of the grand-jury probe came as no real surprise in
light of recent rumors floating around the capital that favoritism had become
the determining factor in the awarding of millions of dollars worth of Army
contracts for trucks, cars, and motorcycles. The contracts in question had
been granted in conjunction with two PWA grants that the War Department had received in late 1933; one was for $10 million to be used for motor
vehicles, while the other, for $7.5 million, was to be used for aircraft and
aircraft equipment. No sooner had the first contracts been let in December
1933, than disappointed bidders began to voice complaints that the awards
were unfair because they had been unduly influenced by lobbyists. This
questioning of the manner in which the War Department obtained its equipment immediately brought Woodring into the picture, because, as Assistant
Secretary of War, he was the individual directly responsible for the procurement and disposal of all army equipment and supplies, including aircraft.
War Department officials were not surprised by the grand-jury inquiry,
because they had helped to initiate it. Woodring and Secretary Dern had
first heard the rumors concerning contracts in late 1933, and in January 1934
the Secretary asked the Attorney General to investigate the matter. One
month later the Justice Department made its findings known to Dern, who
in turn made them available to the District Attorney of the District of
Columbia. One of the things brought out by the Attorney General's investigation was that the activities of Joseph Silverman, Jr., a New York trader
in army surplus goods, were "questionable"; thus, on 5 February, Woodring
issued an order barring Silverman from doing further business with the War
Department until the grand jury's investigation had been completed. That
announcement, which was followed by the President's call for a full inquiry,
immediately led to numerous rumors that the District Attorney's probe
would reveal a "major scandal" in connection with the awarding of contracts.37
The grand-jury investigation, billed as United States v. Silverman and
others, opened on 6 February, with Woodring being the first to testify. In
the next three weeks nearly forty witnesses-including Frederick H. Payne,
Assistant Secretary of War under President Hoover; Chief of Staff MacArthur; Maj. Gen. Hugh A. Drum, the Assistant Chief of Staff; Ralph T.
O'Neil, a former National Commander of the American Legion; and representatives from a number of firms that manufactured automobiles and aircraft-testified in regard to an "alleged conspiracy to defraud the War De-
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partment." Although the inquiry started as an examination into the manner
in which contracts for motor vehicles had been awarded, it quickly turned
to charges that civilian lobbyists were selling their services to industrial firms
on the grounds that they could influence the awarding of Army contracts.
Inquiry was also made into the way in which surplus Army property was
being disposed of. Since each of the areas under scrutiny was Woodring's
responsibility, it is not surprising that his personal integrity soon became the
object of much speculation, and in most cases the implication was that he
personally was involved in some form of graft. Since the testimony before
the grand jury was secret, there was room for a great deal of guessing about
what was being revealed and what the consequence would be.38
The probe was only a few days old when Woodring became "a real
storm center in the nation's capital," and rumors abounded that he was on
his way out.30 At the same time, newspapers carried stories that Woodring
was not getting along well with Secretary Dern or with General MacArthur.
Washington columnists Drew Pearson and Robert S. Allen, whose syndicated column "Washington Merry-Go-Round" appeared in more than 250
daily newspapers, claimed that MacArthur was actively trying to force the
Assistant Secretary out of the War Department.4-0 The New York Daily
News did not directly accuse Woodring of any wrongdoing, but it might as
well have done so, for it told of the contract controversy and then called
Kansas the "center of a group of PWA fund chiseling politicians."41 The
one thing common to nearly all the early stories on the grand-jury investigation was the implication that Woodring was engaged in some wrongdoing.
At this point, Harry Woodring's future did not look too promising. Although annoyed by what he called "unfair criticism and insinuations made
against me," Woodring made no public statements concerning his guilt or
innocence. 42 Privately, though, he expressed his firm conviction that when
the "investigations of the War Department activities now underway are
completed, my actions and efforts will be fully j ustified." 48
As the grand-jury investigation progressed, the story of the alleged conspiracy unfolded. The central figure was Joseph H. Silverman, Jr., a New
York exporter who for many years had been buying army surplus supplies,
primarily clothing, and selling them abroad. Because of his frequent contact
with the War Department, Silverman eventually came to be on good terms
with many of its top officials. When Woodring moved into his new apartment at the Mayflower Hotel in 1933, his neighbor happened to be Silverman.
Since they were neighbors and came into frequent contact with each other
by virtue of their positions, the two men naturally came to be on friendly
terms and were frequently seen with each other. The relationship was further strengthened when the surplus dealer secured the legal services of Ralph
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T. ("Dyke") O'Neil, a Topeka attorney who was a long-time friend of
Woodring's and was past National Commander of the American Legion. 44
In late 1933 Silverman and several of his close associates supposedly
began to use both their acquaintanceship with Woodring and O'Neil's longtime friendship with him as ploys in an "influence peddling" scheme. The
Silverman interests approached several automobile and aviation firms and
offered to represent them at the War Department. For a rather large retainer fee and a 15 percent kickback on the business obtained, they promised
to use their "inside influence" to see that their clients received favorable
contracts. This would supposedly be accomplished by securing changes in
specifications that would assure acceptance of their bid. The impression
given to the firms that were approached was that Silverman and O'Neil
would be able to use their influence with the Assistant Secretary in order to
get the necessary changes in contracts.4:l'i Of this plan O'Neil had no
knowledge.
In preparing his case for the grand jury, District Attorney Leslie C.
Garnett discovered that Woodring had previously changed some specifications for motor vehicles; therefore, he wished to ascertain if the changes had
been made to give advantage to certain contractors. In testifying before the
grand jury, the Assistant Secretary denied, as did O'Neil, any knowledge of
the Silverman scheme, but he did admit that he had made a change on the
specifications of Army trucks to be purchased under the PWA motorization
grant. That change, he explained, which substituted a "full force lubrication
system" for the more dated "splash system," was made in order to assure
that the contracts would be let on a competitive basis-a practice that had
not previously been followed, even though a law requiring "competitive
bidding" had been on the books since 1926. In justifying the contract
changes, Woodring pointed out that during the Hoover administration 80
percent of the trucks bought by the Army had been purchased from the
Chevrolet Motor Company, because Chevrolet was the only truck manufacturer using the splash lubrication system called for in the Army's specifications. Since it was the only company to bid for the trucks, it had always
received the contract. A desire to get the most up-to-date lubrication system
for Army vehicles, and at the same time to obey the law, had led Woodring
to make the change in specifications. Such action enabled a number of new
firms to bid on the trucks, and when Chevrolet, which had enjoyed a virtual
monopoly for years, lost the contract, it pointed to Woodring and cried conspiracy. Its complaints set in motion the investigation into the Army's
contracting procedures.t6
After hearing testimony on the Silverman scheme and the letting of
contracts, the grand jury turned to the question of disposal of surplus mate-
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rials. This segment of the investigation revealed that shortly after Woodring
assumed the War Department post he had agreed to continue the policy of
his predecessor that had prohibited the Army from repurchasing supplies
that it had previously sold as surplus. In order to implement this policy, the
War Department's contracts for sales of surplus materials contained a clause
prohibiting the buyer from selling the items in the United States. In July
1933 Woodring, faced with the problem of clothing more than three hundred
thousand CCC workers, suspended for one year the "no repurchase" provision as applied to underwear, so that he could repurchase the sorely needed
items from Joseph Silverman. While the repurchase price for the seven
hundred thousand sets of underwear was nearly double what Silverman had
originally paid for them, it was still $750,000 less than the items would have
cost had they been purchased new. Woodring, who appeared before the
grand jury on three separate occasions, openly admitted that his change in
policy had enabled the New York surplus dealer to make a handsome profit,
but he justified his action primarily on the grounds that it had saved American taxpayers three-quarters of a million dollars.47
While the inquiry into disposal of surplus materials did not indicate
any legal wrongdoing on Woodring's part, it did reveal several instances of
poor judgment. Shortly after he came to office in early 1933, Woodring had
declared large numbers of blankets, shoes, and underwear as surplus and
had ordered that they be disposed of. Although several military advisers
warned that such declarations were seriously reducing reserve stocks that the
Army might ultimately need, Woodring failed to heed their advice. With
the rapid growth of the CCC in mid 1933, many of the disposed-of items
were in short supply-a situation for which the Assistant Secretary was rightfully criticized. In another instance he made arrangements to swap army
saddles and bridles for the sorely needed underwear that Silverman had;
however, that deal had been halted by Chief of Staff MacArthur, who
claimed that the horse gear was just as essential to the Army as was the
undcrclothing.48
On 26 and 27 February the grand jury heard Woodring as the final witness, and then it began to deliberate over the testimony. For the next two
weeks the newspapers speculated about the number of indictments that would
be returned. On the morning of 12 March, District Attorney Garnett indicated
that a decision was near and that he was confident that at least three persons
would be indicted. Later that day, however, Garnett received a jolt when
the jurists voted 15-to-8 against returning any indictments. That Woodring
may have shown some poor judgment in disposing of certain property and
that certain lobbyists had shown indiscretions in some of their dealings were
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of no real consequence to the jury, for no individual involved in the contract
controversy had engaged in any sort of illegal activity.
When news of the grand jury's action reached an obviously happy but
somewhat subdued Woodring, he indicated that he was "exceedingly gratified" but not surprised by the findings. He then broke his long period of
official silence by issuing a prepared statement denying reports that there
was any conflict between himself and Secretary Dern or General MacArthur
and indicating that, as the chief procurement officer for the Army, he had
merely carried out his responsibilities in accordance with the law. He closed
by indicating that in the future he would, "in spite of complaints, insinuations and sniping by special selfish interests," continue to safeguard the
American taxpayer. Secretary Dern was especially pleased with the jury's
decision, hailing it as "a complete vindication of the war department." That
evening, scores of Woodring's friends called on him to offer their congratulations on the turn of events, but he did not feel much like celebrating.49
Even though he had just weathered one investigation, he was currently the
central figure in another: a congressional inquiry into the awarding of aircraft contracts.
In early 1934 Congress, caught up in an unprecedented "investigation
mania," thoroughly examined dozens of governmental agencies and their
activities. The War Department was caught in this onslaught as more than
a score of investigating bodies probed into such activities as appropriations,
air-mail operations, the status of the Air Corps, alleged profits of the munitions industry, and procurement practices.M This last inquiry was the one
that most directly involved Assistant Secretary Woodring. Although the
investigation was technically undertaken by the House Mill'tary Affairs
Committee, chaired by Congressman John J. McSwain of South Carolina,
the actual work was done by the Rogers Committee, the eight-man Subcommittee on Aviation headed by Congressman William N. Rogers of New
Hampshire. On 9 February 1934, three days after the grand-jury investigation of the War Department opened, the Rogers Committee began secret
hearings to determine how the Army intended to spend the $7.5 million
PWA aircraft grant. In the days that followed, testimony by Woodring;
Maj. Gen. Benjamin D. Foulois, Chief of the Air Corps; Brig. Gen. Oscar
Westover, Assistant Chief of the Air Corps; Brig. Gen. Henry C. Pratt, Chief
of the Material Division; and other military officials revealed that between
1926-when the Aircraft Procurement Act went into effect-and 1933 more
than 92 percent of all Army aircraft had been secured by "negotiated bids"
rather than by "competitive bids." Under the negotiated-contract system the
Air Corps tested any plane made available to it by a manufacturer. If it felt
that the craft was satisfactory, it would then negotiate a contract with the
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producer for the number of aircraft desired. This procedure meant that a
handful of top Air Corps officials, especially the Chief of the Air Corps, could
and in fact did decide which company or companies received aircraft contracts-a condition looked upon quite favorably by Air Corps leaders and by
the manufacturers who received the negotiated contracts.51
All went well until late 1933, when Assistant Secretary Woodring
decided to implement the section of the Procurement Act requiring that
military airplanes be purchased by competitive bidding. Under the new
system the Army would seek bids for a plane meeting certain minimum
performance requirements. After service tests a contract would be given to
the lowest bidder whose craft met the announced standards. Such a move
was vigorously opposed by most Air Corps officials, who contended that the
new system would not provide as good a plane as did the old system. They
argued that in order to get more than one bid on a particular aircraft, it
would be necessary to lower the specification requirements, thereby giving
the Army an inferior plane to what it could have if it was permitted to secure
what it considered to be the best plane regardless of cost.52 In spite of pressures from within the War Department, Woodring, in December 1933, threw
open to competitive bidding the planes that were to be purchased with the
$7.5 million PWA grant. 53
That the disgruntled military men had considerable influence on Capitol
Hill became evident to Woodring on 9 February 1934, when he appeared
before the Rogers Committee. At that time Congressmen W. Frank James
of Michigan and Paul J. Kvale of Minnesota attacked Woodring, asking
whether or not he had lowered the performance requirements of new airplanes in order to broaden the competition. Congressman James expressed
alarm over reports reaching him that although the performance requirements
for a recently advertised military aircraft had originally left the office of
Chief of the Air Corps Foulois calling for a minimum speed of 235 miles
per hour, a cruising range of 500 miles, and a ceiling of 27,800 feet, when the
bids went out of the War Department, they called for a minimum speed of
176 miles per hour, a range of 400 miles, and an 18,700-foot ceiling. "What I
am anxious to know," said James. "is whether the Chief of Air Corps'
recommendations were changed by the General Staff, your office, or anyone
else." "Absolutely not," replied Woodring, who went on to explain that the
only change that he had made was to provide for competitive bidding; he
had not changed any specifications. Congressman Kvale then voiced support for negotiated bidding and expressed his fear that the policy instituted
by Woodring would result in the procurement of slower and inferior aircraft
for the Air Corps.54
With the question of changes in specifications still unanswered, the
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Rogers Committee turned its attention to charges that aircraft firms were
making extravagant profits on the sale of military airplanes. On this issue,
Woodring came to the defense of the Army and the manufacturers by showing that while the average profit from 1926 through 1933 had been 19.8 percent, the figure had dropped to 8.9 percent in the past three years. The latter
figure seemed quite reasonable to Woodring, but to several of the Congressmen it seemed quite high. 55
The secret hearings of the Subcommittee on Aviation in early February
actually raised more questions than they answered, thus casting a shadow of
suspicion over the Army's procurement system and its chief administrator,
Harry Woodring. Subsequently, on 27 February, John McSwain, Chairman
of the House Military Affairs Committee, who was upset because his subcommittee's efforts to investigate procurement practices were being frustrated
by "evasions" on the part of certain witnesses, introduced a resolution calling
for a full-scale inquiry into "charges of profiteering and irregularities involving the expenditure of public funds for national defense." Three days later
the House passed the measure that gave the Rogers Subcommittee $10,000 for
expenses, authority to subpoena witnesses, and the power to force private
businesses and governmental agencies to make their books and records available to members of the committee.56
On 7 March the Rogers group, with its greatly expanded investigative
powers, launched a full-scale probe of the procurement practices of the Army.
As its leadoff witness it called Harry Woodring. The first topic that the
committee considered was a recently released transcript of the 1935 Army
appropriations hearings, which contained a statement by General Foulois
indicating that specifications for airplanes to be purchased with PWA funds
had been "changed in the office of the assistant secretary of war." When
asked about this, Woodring acknowledged, as he had several weeks before,
that he had had difficulties with Foulois and other War Department officials
in instituting the new bidding system, but he strongly denied making any
changes. To clarify the matter, the committee immediately sent for Foulois,
who denied making the alleged statement and then hedged by stating that if
he had said it, he had not meant it.57 What Foulois left unsaid was that in
order to carry out the program of competitive bidding that was demanded
of his office, he had to reduce the specification requirements.118
After Foulois had finished, Woodring returned to explain exactly how
his newly instituted policy worked. First, the War Department publicly
advertised for bids for planes with certain specifications and performance
capabilities. Companies were then given eight to twelve months to develop
such a craft. Any American firm could enter the competition, the only requirement being that its bid had to be accompanied by a sample airplane
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that had been completed and was ready to fly. After extensive tests by the
Air Corps to determine whether the plane could meet the requirements, the
bids would be opened, and the company with the lowest per-unit offer would
receive the contract. To those committee members who expressed a fear that
such a policy would prevent the purchase of more efficient craft which would
usually cost more, Woodring explained that the solution to that problem
would be to raise performance requirements rather than to eliminate competitive bidding.59
In the days that followed Woodring's testimony, Foulois, MacArthur,
and other War Department personnel revealed that Woodring had almost
single-handedly instituted competitive bidding for aircraft and motor vehicles and that he was in the process of extending the policy to nearly all
Army purchases. The members of the committee were favorably impressed
by the smooth-talking Assistant Secretary, and on 17 March they indicated
their belief that he was "above reproach in handling airplane bids." 60 That
good news, which came just five days after the grand-jury "vindication,"
was followed by more of the same in early May, when the Rogers Committee adopted a report that praised Woodring for his successful attempt to
institute competitive bidding for airplanes. It further maintained that while
the Assistant Secretary's actions were "required and fully justified," the
actions of General Foulois were "in clear violation of existing law."61 This
favorable report did much to offset the earlier bad publicity that Woodring
had received. As far as he was concerned, the procurement controversy was
over, and he had fared quite well. Both the grand-jury and the congressional
investigations started by casting doubts upon his administrative ability and
his integrity; yet, they terminated by not only vindicating him but also by
convincing the public, Congress, and the President that he was an able and
honest public official whose procurement policy benefited both the Army
and the taxpayer.
In the latter half of 1934 Woodring further improved the aircraftprocurement policy by providing an evaluation method that placed a "premium upon improvement in performance." This meant that each plane
tested by the Air Corps would be awarded bonus points on the basis of a
pretermined method of evaluation that was known to the bidder beforehand;
ultimately the contract would go to the manufacturer who produced the plane
with the highest evaluation. This change, which rewarded performance
above the minimum requirements, served as a major incentive for firms to
produce aircraft of the finest quality possible. In addition to upgrading the
quality of the aircraft, the policy also served as a stimulus to the nation's
aircraft industry, in that any company that could produce a plane realized
that it now had a chance to win a contract; it was no longer a question of
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having to know the right people. 62 The subsequent increase in the number
of aircraft firms after 1935 was to be of incalculable value in the early days
of World War II, for they were to carry the production burden until new
facilities could be provided.
By the late 1930s competitive bidding was being used in the procurement
of trucks, tanks, small arms, electronic equipment, and hundreds of other
military items. The impact of competitive bidding on each of those products
was the same as on aircraft: higher quality, lower cost, and more producers.63 There can be little doubt that Woodring's policy was successful,
for it has continued to serve as the basis for Army procurement right down
to the present. That the United States Army had such fine equipment to
fight with in Europe, the Pacific, Korea, and Vietnam was in no small
measure due to the efforts of Harry Woodring.
Although he devoted considerable time and energy to procurement
matters, they did not constitute the only area of activity or accomplishment
for Woodring. As Assistant Secretary of War, he played a key role in the
development of the Air Corps. His close connection with that branch of the
Army began on 7 June 1933, when President Roosevelt, as part of an economy
move, abolished the post of Assistant Secretary of War for Air and transferred its duties to the Assistant Secretary.64 Woodring gladly accepted his
new responsibilities and then worked ceaselessly to develop air strength. His
air-mindedness was quite evident. He loved to travel by air, and his frequent
use of military aircraft to go to and from speaking engagements was looked
upon with satisfaction by those military men who saw bigger things ahead
for air power. Through extensive reading and by continually asking questions, Woodring soon gained an extensive knowledge of aircraft and aeronautics.611 On one occasion the somewhat surprised J. E. Schaefer, head of
the Stearman Aircraft Company, commended Woodring on his "remarkably
clear understanding of the technical details incident to aircraft development
and aircraft procurement."66
It was in his first year at the War Department that the somewhat reluctant Woodring approved the developmental order for an experimental
four-engine bomber, which came to be known as the B-17, or Flying Fortress.67 Woodring later recalled the event:
Back early in 1933 I had only been sitting for a short time as Asst. Sec'y
of War and in walked Gen'l Foulois, Col. Conger Pratt ..• and two or
three others-all in to my office and laid down some very extensive blue
prints and with much conversation and finesse in explaining-covering
the first development order for my signature on a four-motored fortress.
The order called for the expenditure of millions in the final development-an experiment they as~ured me--well I was scared to death to
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sign. But after several days of talk-and several private consultations
with Conger Pratt-in whom I had much confidence as to Air Corps
matters-I nervously signed. 68

Approval of the B-17 experimental order was about the only real contact
that Woodring was to have with that aircraft as Assistant Secretary, but, as
will be seen, it was to present him with numerous problems after he became
Secretary of War.
Woodring was interested in the quantity, as well as the quality, of aircraft; thus, in 1934 he, General MacArthur, and General Foulois directed
the formulation of plans for a 2,300-plane "Army Air Service 'second to none
in quality of planes, pilots and morale.' " 69 Unfortunately, Congress would
not go along with the plan, and authorized air strength remained at 1,800
planes. During the next two years, however, he continued to drum up support for a larger Air Corps; and in 1936 he took his case to Congress, where
he argued that the number of planes should be increased to 4,000, because
"should an emergency arise, this number would undoubtedly be needed.''
"It is believed, therefore," he continued, "that the interests of national defense, as well as those of national economy, warrant the upper limit in the
number of airplanes being left somewhat flexible rather than fixed. However, ... the number 4,000 does not seem immoderate." 70 Although Congress did not feel that such a large force was needed, it did increase the
strength from 1,800 to 2,320 planes. The Army and Navy Journal recognized
Woodring's role in the expansion by noting that he was "actively helping to
put wings on the Army .''71
As Assistant Secretary of War, Woodring also had a hand in establishing
the General Headquarters Air Force (GHQAF), the first real step toward
the establishment of an independent Air Corps. Calls for an Air Force
separate from the Army went back to the days of World War I, but opposition from within Congress and the military establishment blocked such
action; therefore, until well into the 1930s, Air Corps personnel and aircraft
were under the control of the area commanders of the Army Corps. Cries
for more autonomy for the Air Corps swelled when the 1934 "Air-Mail
Fiasco" brought home to Congress and the entire nation the need for reorganization, better aircraft, and more thorough training. 72 The President
agreed that the first step in upgrading the Air Corps was reorganization, so
on 1 March 1935 the GHQAF was established. The GHQAF, which was
commanded by Brig. Gen. Frank W. Andrews and was directly responsible
to the General Staff, had under its control all tactical air-combat units and
thus could be trained and commanded as a homogeneous force "capable of
operating in cooperation with the ground forces in battle or on independent
aviation missions." 73
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The air arm of the Army now had an independence and a unity that it
had lacked heretofore. While a completely independent Air Force was still
more than a decade away, the first big step toward that end had been taken.
Woodring had enthusiastically supported the new concept, and he and General MacArthur were instrumental in working out many of the details of the
new organization.74 This was the last major project that the two men were
to work on, however, because on 1 September 1935 MacArthur stepped down
as Chief of Staff and was replaced by Gen. Malin Craig. Woodring and
MacArthur had worked well together and had developed a great respect
and admiration for one another. 711
Harry Woodring was proud of the role that he had played as Assistant
Secretary of War in the growth and development of army air power, and he
had every right to be so. His contributions in aircraft procurement methods,
in the development of the B-17, in increasing the air strength, in the creation
and organization of GHQAF, and in serving as a spokesman for air power
-all served to mark him as a true friend of the Air Corps. Yet, as will be
seen, this man, as Secretary of War, was to be frequently and bitterly
denounced as being anti-Air Force.
During the years that Woodring filled the number two spot at the War
Depanment, another of his primary responsibilities was to serve as a publicrelations man for the Army. In this capacity he traveled throughout the
country, delivering scores of speeches to veterans organizations, patriotic
groups, and any other gathering that was interested in the Army or in
national defense. In these addresses, in which he told what the military was
doing, what it planned to do, and what it needed to do, he nearly always
focused on one or the other of his two favorite themes: preparedness and
patriotism. He maintained that the best way to avoid war was for the United
States to be so strong militarily that no nation would dare attack it. As the
1930s rolled on and the power of Hitler and Mussolini grew, and as more
nations throughout the world came under arms, Woodring placed even
more emphasis on adequate national defense as the best way to avoid a
foreign war .76
As Europe rearmed, there began to appear throughout the United States
numerous antiwar societies which advocated drastic reductions of armaments. Some members of these groups went so far as to pledge that if the
country became involved in war, they would refuse to bear arms. Woodring
became one of the most outspoken opponents of such groups. Crying out
against the threats of "radical organizations" and the "enemy boring from
within," he warned Americans that they could not "stand by and watch our
great country stripped of its means of defense, ready to be sacrificed on the
altar of aggression.m 7 When the National Peace Conference, a gathering of
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thirty-five antiwar societies, met in Washington in 1936, Woodring did not
keep silent. He denounced the motives for the conference, and he questioned
the loyalty of its participants by saying, "Defense of one's country is the first
essential of true patriotism." Such statements were welcomed by conservative
groups like the American Legion, but they were bitterly attacked by extreme
liberals. The Nation, which billed itself as "The leading Liberal Weekly
since 1865," called the Woodring attacks "a fascist assault on virtually all the
church, labor, pacifist and student groups of the nation." 78 Such criticism
did not bother the Assistant Secretary; it only made him more vehement in
his condemnation of those "subversive influences opposing adequate military
and naval preparedness."79 Run-ins with various antiwar groups kept Woodring in the news in 1934 and 1935, but they did not place him at the center
of any real controversy as the CCC article and procurement investigations
had done.
The years that Woodring served as Assistant Secretary of War were
especially good ones as far as his personal life was concerned. His marriage
to Helen was a most happy one, providing him with a contentment that he
had never known. To the happiness of marriage were soon added the joys
of fatherhood, with the birth of a son, Marcus Coolidge, on 19 June 1934,
followed by that of a daughter, Melissa, on 21 June 1935, and another son,
Cooper Coolidge, on 10 February 1937. There was no prouder father in all
of Washington, and in the years that followed, Woodring always found time
in his busy schedule for his family. The year of Melissa's birth saw the
family move to His Lordship's Kindness, a sprawling two-story brick mansion in Prince George County, Maryland; and the next year saw them taking
up residence at Woodlawn, a spacious estate near Mount Vernon. These
beautiful homes and their surrounding gave Woodring an adequate opportunity to engage in his favorite pastimes: gardening and collecting antiques.80
Whereas late 1934 and 1935 were relatively quiet, routine, and noncontroversial so far as Woodring's activities in the War Department were concerned, the situation changed in early 1936, when he became involved in a
dispute over the removal of Maj. Gen. Johnson Hagood. The difficulties
began in December 1935, when the General, who had a reputation for saying
exactly what he thought, was called before a House Appropriations subcommittee to testify about certain War Department appropriations. At that
time the subcommittee chairman, Thomas L. Blanton of Texas, assured
Hagood that anything he would say would be kept secret. In the candid discussion that followed, the General made several flippant remarks about the
WPA, one of FDR's most notable work-relief programs. Speaking of the
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previous year, Hagood said, "I got a lot of stage money from the WPA. I
call it stage money because you can pass it around but you cannot get anything out of it in the end." Two months later, on 10 February 1936, the
"secret" hearings were released to the press, and Hagood's charges of "stage
money" appeared in headlines across the country-a situation that proved
quite embarrassing to Hagood and to the Roosevelt administration.81
Two weeks after Hagood's testimony was made public he was relieved
as Commander of the Eighth Corps Area, and he was ordered to proceed
from his base at San Antonio to his home in South Carolina "to await
orders." Just where the Hagood removal order originated was not then, and
still is not, clear; however, there was no doubt in the mind of Congressman
Blanton that Assistant Secretary of War Woodring was the man most responsible for the "damnable, infamous, dirty and inexcusable" outrage.82 In
a fit of anger, Congressman Blanton took the floor of the House and called
for the impeachment of Woodring, Secretary of War Dern, and Chief of
Staff Craig; but it was the Assistant Secretary, "the man who has attempted
to spank a great major general," that he castigated most vehemently. In the
course of his tirade Blanton warned: "Harry Woodring, you are not going
to get away with it! You have started something that you are not going to
carry through, because I am going to give you the scrap of your life." He
then ended with a threat: "Harry Woodring, ... you had better withdraw
this damnable, unjust order to Johnson Hagood, because I am after you."83
In spite of a strong desire to strike back at Blanton, Woodring maintained his composure and remained silent. This uncharacteristic action in
all likelihood stemmed from a request by President Roosevelt that Woodring
refrain from saying or doing anything that would further stir things up.
Both the administration and the War Department had hoped that the
Hagood affair would fade away, but such was not to be the case, as Congressman Blanton and Senator James Byrnes of South Carolina continued to press
for withdrawal of the removal order. Finally, in late March, the President,
mindful that it was an election year, moved to end the controversy. He
personally met with Hagood on 22 March and 11 April, and after the second
meeting he announced that he was restoring Hagood to active duty as Commander of the Sixth Corps Area.84 With Hagood and his supporters interpreting this action as a vindication, the dispute vanished as quickly as it had
appeared, and Harry Woodring gave a sigh of relief. The Assistant Secretary
had successfully weathered this controversy just as he had the ones over the
CCC article, the grand-jury investigation, the Rogers Committee inquiry,
and the encounters with various antiwar groups. Those experiences were
extremely valuable to Woodring, because they helped teach him to face,

101

accept, and cope with the kinds of problems, pressures, and criticisms that he
would later encounter in an even more crucial government post.
During the years that Harry Woodring served as Assistant Secretary of War,
he was involved in a number of controversies that made enemies for him
among Congressmen, cabinet officials, churchmen, educators, antiwar leaders,
and liberal journalists; however, he had also succeeded in projecting a favorable image to many people in Washington and throughout the country. He
impressed many Congressmen as being a young, energetic, and forceful man
who had done a masterful job of instituting a competitive purchasing system
in the Army.85 He also won the confidence of many individuals in the War
Department; among professional military men he was generally liked and
respected. Both Chief of Staff MacArthur and his successor, General Craig,
thought very highly of Woodring and developed a very close relationship
with him.86 President Roosevelt, although embarrassed by some of the
Assistant Secretary's verbal blunders, still had confidence in him, because
the former Kansas Governor had proved to be a very able administrator who
could carry out his responsibilities efficiently.87 Woodring had also won
support among members of such powerful organizations as the American
Legion, Daughters of the American Revolution, the Reserve Officers Association, and other patriotically oriented groups that looked with favor upon
his speeches on preparedness and patriotism.
In the summer of 1936 Harry Woodring could look over the previous
forty-nine years with real pride: he had come a long way from Elk City.
His success as a banker, Governor, and "Little Cabinet" member revealed
that he was a man of administrative ability and political skill. Experience
had prepared him for bigger and better things, and all he needed now was
the opportunity. That opportunity was just around the corner.
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6
Mr. Secretary

On 27 August 1936 Secretary of War George H. Dern died at Walter Reed
Army Hospital after a lengthy illness. Five days later, after impressive ceremonies in Washington, he was buried at Salt Lake City, Utah. No sooner
had Secretary Dem's death been announced than politicians and newspapermen began to speculate about who would be chosen to take his place. Those
mentioned most frequently as possible successors were Frank Murphy, Commissioner to the Philippines ; Governor Paul V. McNutt of Indiana; Fiorello
H. LaGuardia, Mayor of New York City; and Presidential Secretary Stephen
Early. Assistant Secretary of War Harry Woodring's name was occasionally
mentioned, but he was not considered a prime contender for the job. Most
political observers expected a replacement to be named within a few days
and expected Woodring to remain as Assistant Secretary; however, when
the early weeks of September had passed, and the President had failed to
announce who would fill the position, it came to be felt that perhaps no
selection would be made until after the upcoming presidential election.1 In
the meantime, Woodring, who had automatically become Acting Secretary
upon Dem's death, continued to fill both the number one and the number
two spots in the War Department-as he had during most of the previous
three and one-half years. By mid September, President Roosevelt seemed
quite satisfied with the existing arrangement and had apparently decided not
to fill the post in the immediate future.2
In late September the President, who was in the midst of a vigorous
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campaign for reelection, traveled to his home at Hyde Park, New York, for
a few days of relaxation. On Friday, 25 September, he received a message
from the Executive Clerk at the White House, calling attention to a letter
that had just been received from Attorney General Homer S. Cummings.
The letter informed the President of a law that provided that a cabinet position must be filled within thirty days of a vacancy; therefore, it would be
necessary to appoint a Secretary of War no later than the following day.
Having given little or no consideration to such an appointment, yet being
faced with the necessity of fulfilling a statutory requirement, Roosevelt decided to appoint Woodring.3
From his home on the Hudson the President immediately wired Woodring, informing him that, since he could not legally remain Acting Secretary
for longer than thirty days, he was announcing his "temporary selection" as
Secretary. Roosevelt concluded the notification by saying, "I know you will
understand my reason for making this a temporary designation." 4 From _
Washington the obviously happy Woodring quickly replied, expressing his
thanks for the appointment and saying, "I fully understand and approve the
temporary designation. My wish ... has been that you would take only
such action which gave paramount consideration to your best interests for
November." 5
There seemed to be no doubt that the appointment would be temporary.
Roosevelt made that point clear to Woodring, and he wanted it made equally
clear to the press.6 The official announcement from Hyde Park said that the
appointment was "temporarily filling the vacancy" left by the death of Secretary Dern, and it emphasized that the law required that the vacancy be filled.
When reporters asked for clarification of the statement, especially the "temporarily filling the vacancy" phrase, White House officials declined to give
one. The wording of the announcement was therefore taken to mean that
Woodring would be only a "temporary" Secretary of War, with a "permament" Secretary being named sometime in the future, in all likelihood after
the election.7 Harry H. Woodring was now the Secretary of War, but for
how long was anyone's guess.
By designating Woodring to serve "temporarily," Roosevelt accomplished three politically advantageous feats. First, he gave cabinet recognition
to the home state of Republican presidential nominee Alfred Landon just six
weeks before the election. Second, he could hold out the secretaryship for
possible political advantage in the presidential campaign. Third, he gained
campaign support by putting a World War veteran and American Legionnaire into the New Deal cabinet for the first time.8
The reaction to the announcement of 25 September was mixed, as is the
case with nearly all cabinet appointments. For the most part, Woodring's
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promotion to the top spot was looked upon with gratification in official and
military circles. 9 Within the President's official family the reaction was generally favorable, the only exceptions being Secretary of the Interior Harold
Ickes, WP A Administrator Harry Hopkins, and Press Secretary Steve
Early.10 Professional military men were pleased, because it put into office a
man whom they knew they could get along with, one who was familiar with
the problems and needs of the War Department.11 In most cases, editorial
reaction was in line with that of the Cleveland Plain Dealer, which applauded the selection and said that "Secretary Woodring seems to have what
it needs in the war office."12
The most violent opposition to the appointment of Woodring came
from the two-million-member American League against War and Fascism.
The national chairman of the league wrote to Roosevelt, criticizing the
choice of Woodring because the record showed that "he is a militarist."
Many local chapters of the organization also voiced opposition toward the
"militarist who prates peace and urges war preparation." One letter expressed fear of the new Secretary because of his "obvious desire for the militarization of our whole system of government." It was apparent that the
members of the league remembered well the CCC article that Woodring
had written back in 1934.13 Opposition also came from people who were
against war and in favor of disarmament. The Christian Century expressed
disappointment that the President had selected a man that could "hardly be
expected to cooperate with groups interested in promoting disarmament."14
John Flynn, writing in the New Republic, called Woodring "the leader of
the jingoes" and expressed fear that he might try to establish a conscript
army as Hitler had done.111 Criticism also came from more moderate quarters. The Cincinnati Enquirer, in an editorial, claimed that the new Secretary represented "the professional point of view of the army ... [ and] a
different type of mind is needed in the position."16 On the whole, opposition
was not as strong as it might have been, because the appointment was generally looked upon as temporary.
Throughout the fall of 1936 Woodring continued to function as both the
Assistant Secretary and the Secretary of War. In spite of such a burden, he
still found considerable time to work for an administration victory in the
November election. The Secretary had good reasons for devoting so much
time to the Roosevelt campaign. First, if the President was not reelected, he
would certainly lose his job. Second, if he proved to be a real asset to the
party cause and the President was returned to office, perhaps his "temporary"
appointment would be made permanent. Consequently, Woodring worked
long and hard for a Roosevelt victory in 1936. The Secretary's political labors
started in May, when the President sought his assistance in mapping out the
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strategy for the Kansas campaign. Kansas was considered to be an important
state, because it was felt that Governor Landon would probably be the nominee of the Republican party. Because of Woodring's familiarity with Landon's political strengths and weaknesses, he was able to give much valuable
assistance in planning the course of the Democratic campaign.17
Woodring also put his oratorical skills to good use. In early September
he hit the campaign trail, praising Roosevelt and lauding the many accomplishments of the past three and one-half years. The smooth-spoken, aggressive Kansan was one of the first administration figures to take Roosevelt's
record to the electorate. In mid September the New York Times observed
that except for Secretary of Labor Frances Perkins, "Mr. Woodring is the
only other high member of President Roosevelt's official family to take up
the cudgels for the administration." 18 Throughout September and October,
Woodring continued to travel around the country, urging the reelection of
Roosevelt. Although personally on good terms with Governor Landon,
Woodring did not hesitate to attack him politically. He scoffed at Landon's
fiscal record as Governor, and he said that the Republican nominee was offering the American people "a second-hand New Deal at second-hand prices."19
Wherever Woodring spoke, he was enthusiastically received by large crowds,
and both local and state party leaders praised him for the "excellent,"
"wonderful," and "outstanding" speeches that he made. These reports
reached the Democratic National Committee and then the White House,
where the fine job that Woodring was doing was noted with pleasure.20 The
new Acting Secretary of War also assisted the party financially by contributing $2,050 to the campaign fund, one of the larger contributions of
that year.21
As Woodring labored on behalf of the Democratic cause in the fall of
1936, he did so with no assurance that it would be personally profitable, even
in the event of victory. In a letter of 9 October to General MacArthur he
expressed confidence that FDR would be reelected, but concerning his own
future he said:
No member of the Cabinet has any license to expect a tour of duty in the
New Cabinet. I shall be very happy to continue in the service, of course,
but my plans are not based on that assurance. New elections bring new
obligations and the President's Cabinet is so thoroughly his own personal
family of advisers that I would not and am not permitting even a suggestion to be made on my behalf.22
One matter that W dodring urged upon the party strategists was the need
"to take an advanced stand on the peace issue." He felt that there was a
strong sentiment for peace in the West and that, in light of recent events in
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Europe, the "peace issue" could bring much support.23 His pleas made little
headway with party leaders, because at that time the administration was
preoccupied with relief and recovery, not peace. Feeling that this was important, Woodring took up the issue and tried to assure the voters that President
Roosevelt was " 'a man who hates war with every fiber of his soul' and who
is devoting his life to keeping America at peace." 24 In spite of Woodring's
efforts, peace never became an issue in 1936.
In November, Roosevelt was reelected by a landslide, and his administration prepared for another four years in office. The question now arose as
to whether the President would make Woodring's temporary appointment
permanent or whether he would appoint someone else to fill the post. For
six months, from November 1936 to April 1937, Roosevelt did neither: he
merely let the matter ride. During that period the status of Secretary Woodring was always in doubt, and as a result, rumors concerning the War post
continually filled the air. One day rumor had Woodring being retained in
the cabinet; the next day, on his way out. Journalists, relying on "impeccable
sources," predicted time and again what the President would do and when,
but the dates came and went, and still nothing happened.211
At the time of the temporary appointment, FDR gave the impression
that he would replace Woodring after the election, but in the weeks that
followed the Democratic sweep he made no move to do so. Apparently
Roosevelt's failure to act stemmed from certain factors that served to complicate his earlier decision. The fine job that Woodring was doing as Secretary of War, as well as the excellent job that he had done campaigning for
the administration, certainly caused the President to have second thoughts
about replacing him; however, the primary reason for not appointing a new
Secretary was probably the mounting pressure, from many sources, to retain
Woodring. The temporary Secretary had gained many friends since coming
to Washington, and now they came to his aid.
The strongest pressure for retaining him came from military circles.
The Army and Navy /ournal, a sort of "unofficial" organ of the military
services, continually urged that the appointment be made permanent. Such
action, it said, "would be greeted with acclaim by the Army." The /ournal
continually praised Woodring, claiming that he was an "extremely efficient
Assistant Secretary," who displayed "high qualities of administration" and
ran the War Department in a "most capable manner."26 Other militaryoriented publications, such as the Army-Navy Register, the Reserve Officer,
and Army Ordnance, also voiced editorial support for Woodring.27 Some
pressure was aimed more directly at the President: Lt. Col. Frank Lowe,
National President of the Reserve Officers Association, wrote to Roosevelt:
"I do not believe it would be too extravagant to say that every officer ... of
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the Army would be very much pleased to see Mr. Woodring so rewarded,"
that is, by making him the permanent Secretary.28 Edgar H. Taber, Executive Officer of the National Association of Regulars, informed the President
that his organization had received "quite a number of letters from servicemen expressing the hope that our present Secretary of War be reappointed
to office."29
The retention of Woodring was also supported by certain individuals,
both military and nonmilitary, whose influence was considerable. The Chief
of Staff, Gen. Malin Craig, wanted Woodring to be retained in the top spot
because Woodring got along so well with him and the General Staff.30
Gen. John J. Pershing, who, although long retired, was still looked to for
advice by many top military men, said: "I do not see why F.D.R. should
not continue Woodring ... he would be better than some man who thought
he knew it all." 31 Postmaster General James Farley, whose advice the President often heeded, continually urged that the appointment be made permanent. From the House of Representatives came support from Congressman
Lister Hill, one of the most influential members of the Military Affairs
Committee. On 28 December 1936 Hill wrote to Roosevelt, stating that he
had had the opportunity to observe Woodring's work more closely than anyone else in Congress, and he felt that Woodring had done an outstanding
job. Hill then recommended, in the strongest terms, that the President retain
Secretary Woodring in his present position.32 This was a key recommendation, for it seemed to indicate to Roosevelt that his temporary Secretary
had the confidence and support of the House Military Affairs Committee.
Throughout November and December the President failed to decide
what he should do about Woodring and the War post: he continually
wavered between retention and removal. In mid November, Press Secretary
Steve Early told the editor of the Army and Navy /ournal that Woodring
would · not be reappointed.38 About this time, moreover, Steve Early and
Harry Hopkins, apparently on their own initiative, approached Jesse Jones,
head of the Reconstruction Finance Corporation, and asked if he would be
interested in becoming Secretary of War. When Jones replied that he would
not, they dropped the matter.a. As 1936 drew to a close, Woodring's status
was as uncertain as ever, but the newspapers continued to indicate that he
was on his way out.811 On 23 December, Roosevelt told Secretary Ickes that
while he personally thought Woodring was a "nice fellow," he was not going
to retain him as Secretary of War. 86 In spite of such indications from Roosevelt that he would remove Woodring, week after week passed, and still he
did nothing. In mid January 1937 there appeared the first public indications
that Woodring might be retained in the cabinet. On 20 January the New
York Times reported that Woodring's status was still in doubt, but added,
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"There is no certainty that he will be replaced." The following day the same
newspaper reported that, except for the possible departure of Farley, no
changes were expected in the cabinet and that Roosevelt's second term would
probably end "with his 'official family' composed as at present."37
As the early months of 1937 slipped by, Secretary Woodring continued
to run things at the War Department, and President Roosevelt, who was
involved in his fight for court reform, was content to let him do so. While
this "temporary arrangement" was working satisfactorily, it could not go on
indefinitely, because Woodring had been appointed when Congress was not
in session and had therefore not been approved by the Senate. This meant
that unless a nomination for Secretary of War was submitted during the
present session, Woodring's appointment would expire when the Senate
adjourned, thus leaving the position vacant. Such a situation made it mandatory that Roosevelt make some sort of decision about Woodring.
At a White House conference on 19 April 1937, Roosevelt told James
Farley that although it was going to be an unpleasant task to perform, he
definitely was going to remove Woodring. The President explained that
since he had made it clear at the time of the appointment that it would be
only temporary, the Secretary would not be surprised by the action. To this,
Farley replied: "General Malin Craig was in to see me about H arry; the
Army thinks very highly of him. . . . I think Harry is doing a good job
and deserves an appointment to prove his fitness for the job."38 One week
later, for reasons known only to himself, President Roosevelt decided to
reappoint Woodring as Secretary of War, and on 27 April he sent the nomination to the Senate. The Military Affairs Committee, having no objection
to the appointee, reported favorably on the nomination, and on 6 May the
Senate confirmed the appointment without debate or objection.89 At last
Harry Woodring was Secretary of War in his own right; the axe that Roosevelt had been holding over his head for the past six months had been removed.
The President now faced the problem of finding an Assistant Secretary to
take Woodring's old job; however, he chose not to deal with that matter for
several months.
Just why the President decided to keep Woodring in the cabinet will
never be known, but perhaps a contemporary evaluation of the situation by
the nationally known news columnist and radio commentator Boake Carter
can give an insight. On 27 April, the day that Woodring's name went to the
Senate for confirmation, Carter told his radio listeners:
The President did the nation a good turn; the Army got a good break; and the
little clique of "discredit-Woodring" boys pretty high up in the Administration
looked not a little foolish this evening, after the President sent the nomination of
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Harry H. Woodring for a regular cabinet term as Secretary of War, to the Senate.
. . . It is pleasing to discover that the President was not impressed by those close
about him who sought to set his hand against one who has turned out to be one
of the most able of his cabinet and one of the most able and earnest peacetime secretaries of war America has ever had. For a long time, he has been more than
simply a figurehead, but on the contrary, an active secretary, who desires to take
an earnest interest in his job and not simply rest content to be another shopwindow ornament. He has, to his credit, the cleanup of the procurement and
supplies smell in the Army of a few years back; an active, rather than simply an
academic interest in the Army's Air Corps; the author of plans and methods looking to promoting methods and means of building up stock piles of reserves for
industry in case of war. He thinks not in terms of how devilish a death-dealing
instrument the Army can be made, but rather of what use it can be put to preserve peace. He will listen to generals, some hide-bound with tradition, and will
listen just as willingly to a lowly lieutenant. Pomposity and gold braid do not
impress him any more than juvenile irresponsibility. The Army should be tickled
that it has this sort of man as boss, and the country that it has this kind of individual as a War Secretary. One hopes that he will wear as well in the future as
he has in the past.40

When Harry Woodring became the United States Secretary of War, few
people knew or cared what he thought about war, peace, the size and makeup of the Army, and its role in national defense. Such ideas, concepts, and
principles are important, for they go together to form an individual's "military philosophy." To understand how Woodring looked upon and tried to
solve the many problems facing him, especially ones such as military readiness, rearmament, and neutrality, it is essential to know something of the
"Woodring military philosophy," for it contained the principles that were to
guide his actions during the years that he headed the War Department.
Woodring was different from most earlier Secretaries of War in that his
military philosophy was fairly well fixed before he became Secretary. His
Army experience, his American Legion activities, his work with the National
Guard as Governor, and his three and one-half years as Assistant Secretary
of War had caused him to think considerably about the Army and national
defense. His having had years to develop his philosophy was beneficial to
Woodring, because it made him more sure of himself and gave him confidence that the direction in which he was leading the War Department was
the proper one. His outlook was that of both an idealist and a realist. He
was an idealist in that he sincerely believed in and hoped for such things as
an understanding among people everywhere, cooperation among nations,
and world peace. On the other hand, he was a realist in that he did not see
the possibility of such things becoming a reality in the near future. Wood-
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ring felt that with world conditions as they were in the thirties, it would
take more than hope and understanding to ensure peace. 41
During the years that Woodring served in the War Department, he was
charged with being "a militarist," "one of the most warlike officials in
Washington," and "the leader of the jingoes."42 Such descriptions caused
many Americans to picture the Kansan as a "warmonger," when nothing
could have been further from the truth; for if there was one thing that he
wanted more than anything else, it was for the United States to remain at
peace. Shortly after Woodring became Secretary a journalist asked him
what he considered to be the most important requirement for a competent
Secretary of War, and without hesitation he replied, "A profound respect for
peace." 43 His obsession with this issue was based on his fear that participation in another war would prove disastrous to both victor and vanquished;
thus, since United States involvement in another major conflict would lead
to the destruction of the nation, he considered it necessary to do everything
possible to avoid war.44 In his first speech as Secretary of War, Woodring
pledged: "I shall dedicate my efforts to peace."45 He did. For nearly four
years he warned against, and took action that he felt would prevent involvement in, a foreign war. He was so determined to keep out of war that he
ultimately was forced out of office because he would not go along with a
policy that he felt might pull the nation into a European conflict. Woodring
was a man of peace and was recognized by many as such. The Washington
Times Herald editorially praised the Secretary of War because "Woodring
speaks the language of the people-Peace." Columnist Ernest Lindley referred to him as "a persistent opponent of foreign adventure," and political
analyst Ray Tucker called him one of only two "peace-minded men in
Roosevelt's Cabinet."46
Nearly all Americans agreed with Secretary Woodring that peace was
desirable, but when it came to deciding how to maintain that peace, many
could not agree with him. Woodring felt that the best way to avoid war was
to provide an "adequate national defense which would act as a powerful
deterrent against aggression on our shores." He continually stated that peace
without security was impossible and that the best security was a military force
of sufficient size and strength to keep any nation from even considering an
attack. According to him, "peace and security go hand in hand," and the
former could not be obtained without the latter.47 His strong belief in preparedness as the way to ensure peace caused him to come into conflict with
those groups and individuals who felt that a strengthening of defenses would
be apt to provoke war. Believing that the idea that "preparedness causes
war" was a great misconception, Woodring lashed out at anyone who spoke
against proposals to strengthen the military forces. Those who urged a de-
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crease in the size and strength of the Army and the Navy were warned of
the "folly [to which] a pacifist policy like this leads." On numerous occasions
the Secretary warned his countrymen of what had happened to countries,
including the United States in 1917, that found themselves forced into a war
when they were woefully unprepared: the result was a loss of life and money
far beyond what might otherwise have been; therefore, the nation should
never follow such a "foolhardy policy." 48 Woodring was firmly convinced
that failure to prepare "would be to ignore all past history and openly invite
the possibility of a future national conflagration.''49
When critics occasionally expressed fears about growing military influence in Washington, Woodring reminded them that the Army had no voice
in making laws, shaping foreign policy, or deciding whether or not the
nation should go to war. He stated time and again that the Army "sought
only to serve, never to dominate the country." 50 Many of the individuals
who feared increased military strength were worried about the world arms
race that was under way in the mid thirties. They were especially alarmed
by Woodring's continuous demands for increased preparedness, because they
felt that he was urging the United States to join that contest. That such was
not the case the Secretary of War made clear in his Annual Report for 1937:
"I certainly do not recommend that the United States join in this feverish
arms race. . . . However, I do think as insurance against attack we should
further strengthen our armed forces.''51
While Woodring was a strong advocate of preparedness, he did not feel
that the country should arm itself beyond its ability to pay, and he spoke
proudly of the fact that in 1937 the cost of the United States military establishment was only 32 percent of the national budget.112 To understand this
seeming paradox of a desire for stronger defense, on the one hand, and a
relatively small defense expenditure and no participation in the arms race,
on the other, it is essential to understand Woodring's ideas about the size,
make-up, and role of the United States Army.
As Woodring conceived it, the peacetime Army should be a moderatesized force capable initially of protecting the continental United States,
Panama, and Hawaii, yet still able to serve as a nucleus for the raising, training, and equipping of such additional troops as might be needed in an
emergency.53 He favored an Army of quality, not quantity. He never advocated a large military force; in fact, he praised the American Legion because
it had made no "fantastic recommendations for a huge standing army.''54
Woodring maintained that the size of the Army was relatively unimportant
and that it should be a matter for Congress to determine; he was more interested in providing the military force with the best of equipment and
training. 1111 Furthermore, he believed that a moderate-sized standing army
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would be sufficient, because its function would be strictly defensive. In speech
after speech he reiterated his belief in the long-standing national policy that
contemplated the use of American armed forces only for defensive purposes.
As he put it: "The kind of Army we have in mind would be of no use as
an expeditionary force such as was sent to Europe in the World War. It is
designed purely and simply to defend our own territory." 56
When Secretary Woodring or other top members of the administration
talked of defending the country, they were not thinking of just the continental United States, but of the Western Hemisphere. From 1937 to 1940,
plans for the Army were made in accordance with the concept of hemisphere
defense that was adopted by the Roosevelt administration.57 During this
period President Roosevelt thought solely in terms of defense of the Americas. For example, when War Department officials in late 1939 presented
plans to provide reserves necessary to equip a large expeditionary force for
possible use in Europe, the President refused them, saying: "Whatever
happens, we won't send troops abroad. We need only think of defending
this hemisphere." 58
Although the Secretary did not consider that the size of the Regular
Army was of great importance, he did feel that it should be organized so
that it could be expanded rapidly. This would require a well-trained standing force, which could serve as the basis for new units to be made up primarily of personnel from the National Guard and the Organized Reserves.
Since a large Army, if it were to be created in time of need, would have to
be supplied, Woodring considered supply preparedness vital to the Army's
ability to expand. His answer to the supply problem was not to be found in
large stockpiles of arms and ammunition, which would deteriorate and become obsolete with age. Instead, his solution was to educate and prepare
industry in time of peace for its responsibilities in time of war .59 This idea
was incorporated in the Industrial Mobilization Plan which Woodring
labored to perfect, first as Assistant Secretary and later as Secretary.
While Woodring considered military preparedness essential to keeping
the peace, there was another factor that he considered to be almost as important. He believed that the American people and all government officials
should conduct themselves in such a way as not to incite war or involve the
country in one. This, Woodring held, could be done in two ways: by legislation and by moral rearmament.60 According to him, the legislative means
to avoid war were to take the profits out of war and to assure that neutrality
was maintained. Since he felt as he did, it is not surprising that from 1936
to 1939 Woodring congratulated Congress on passage of the Neutrality Acts
and praised its efforts to take the profits out of war. 61 He favored such legislation, because he thought that it could play a major role in keeping the
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country from being drawn into war. Woodring thought that if another
European war came, there would be demands within the United States for
the benefits that would come from the war trade, as well as cries for the
preservation of neutral and international rights. He warned Americans to
avoid the mistakes of 1914-1917 and to avoid getting involved in a European
conflict again, because "the temporary profits of war and the protection of a
national vanity are not worth the horrors of war." The Secretary maintained
that if Americans wanted to trade with countries at war or to travel on their
ships, then they should do so at their own risks. He went even further when
he claimed that if war came to Europe, isolation might be thrust upon the
United States as the only alternative to becoming involved. Should this
happen, he said, he was confident that the American people would accept it
and "make this additional sacrifice for the sake of peace."62 After war came
to Europe in 1939, he changed his views to some extent, indicating that
because the social, moral, and economic consequences of the war could not
be avoided, the country could not "retreat tortoise-like" within its borders.
He continued, however, to maintain that it was possible to insulate the
country from Europe militarily. Woodring was an isolationist only in that
he wished to keep the nation isolated from war. On other matters he was an
internationalist; thus, he continuously advocated increased foreign trade and
urged international cooperation to solve some of the world's social and
economic problems.63
Whereas Woodring viewed adequate military defense and proper legislation as essential to the ensuring of peace, he also felt that the nation needed
"something more." That something was "Moral Rearmament." Included in
this concept was an understanding of one another; recognition of each other's
rights; tolerance of other's habits, customs, and religious views; development
of a spirit of justice and self-control; and "more of the spirit of brotherly
love." 64 The Secretary of War believed that "Moral Rearmament is a great,
tremendous influence for good, and it ought to be encouraged." Furthermore, "it is because the war to end selfishness has never been fought that the
war to end wars has never been won." Although Secretary Woodring felt
that this concept had great merit, he considered it more in terms of a hope
for the future.611 He still believed that a well-trained Army and proper
legislation were the hopes for the peace of the present.
In addition to the ideas that made up the "Woodring military philosophy," there was a principle that the Secretary always followed, even though
it sometimes meant going against his own philosophy. The principle was
that military men, not civilian leaders, should make decisions on matters that
were primarily military in nature. When Secretary Woodring was forced
from his post in 1940, the Baltimore Sun said, "It cannot be recalled that Mr.
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Woodring has ever opposed any of the purely military suggestions of his
chiefs of staff.'>e6 That Woodring was proud of this fact was quite evident
in a letter that he wrote five years after leaving office:
I have that feeling that I was right in the Office of Secretary of War in following
and leaving the military decisions to the General Staff and would like to ... [ see
vindicated] that principle of National Defense rather than the Civilian Commander-in-Chief idea knowing more than professional military strategists who
made it a life study and profession.67

Although Woodring was a "yes man" when it came to what he considered to be strictly military matters, he certainly was not when it came to
decisions in the political-military area, and that is where the bulk of his decisions lay. From the time that he became "permanent" Secretary of War in
1937, the outspoken Woodring made it clear to the President, the cabinet,
members of Congress, and other officials that he had a mind of his own.
Several ideas and concepts, then, made up Woodring's military philosophy and served as guidelines for his policy decisions: (1) the country must
remain at peace at all cost except aggression; (2) an adequate defense is the
best way to avoid war; (3) the government is not and should not be militarily oriented, and thus it should not have a large standing Army or enter
into the arms race; (4) the Army is to be used strictly for defensive purposes;
(5) while the size of the standing Army is relatively insignificant, it is
essential that it be adequately equipped and trained and that it be capable of
rapid expansion; (6) proper legislation can be a key factor in keeping the
country out of war; (7) only military isolation is desirable; (8) on economic
and social matters the country should cooperate with foreign nations; (9)
moral rearmament is the hope for the peace of the future; and (10) military
decisions should be made by military men. The effects of this philosophy
were quite evident in the policies of the War Department from 1936 to 1940.
When Harry Woodring became Secretary of War in 1936, there were at
work throughout the nation certain forces that served to make his job more
difficult than it might otherwise have been: those forces were isolationism
and the Depression. The former began to appear after World War I, when
the United States attempted to turn its back on Europe. Rejection of the
League of Nations and refusal to join the World Court were indicative of
the growing feeling that the United States should not become involved in
European affairs. Throughout the twenties and early thirties, isolationism
became the accepted policy of the President, Congress, and the majority of
the American people. This sentiment was further strengthened in the mid
thirties, when the Nye Investigating Committee and certain historians, such
as Walter Millis and Charles Beard, succeeded in convincing the American
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people that the United States had entered World War I in order to provide
for and safeguard the financial interests of a few bankers and munition
makers. Feeling that the mistakes of the past could be avoided by legislative
means, Congress responded by passing a series of neutrality acts, which it
felt would ensure that the country would not again be drawn into war.
These acts prohibited the exportation of arms, ammunition, and other war
commodities to belligerents; forbad the extension of loans and credit to warring nations; and made it unlawful for Americans to travel on ships of
belligerent nations.
With the passage of the neutrality legislation there developed a complacent feeling that the chance of being involved in a foreign war had been
virtually eliminated; therefore, prior to 1939, Congress and the American
people showed little or no interest in the War Department or its military
activities. Even those individuals who were concerned about the nation's
defenses paid little attention to the Army, because they considered the Navy
to be the bulwark against aggression. Woodring found such complacency
difficult to combat.
The Great Depression also contributed to the difficulties of the Secretary
of War. Since Roosevelt, Congress, and the public were still primarily concerned with economic recovery as late as 1938, they had little time for or
interest in national defense and foreign affairs. Even if the interest had been
there, the funds were not. With little concern over defense and with an
administration economy drive under way, it was not surprising that the
Army experienced severe budgetary problems. After all, if government expenditures had to be cut in some areas, what better place to do so than in the
War Department? Roosevelt himself had exemplified this feeling upon entering the presidency, when he had urged Congress to cut the Army's budget
by $144 million.68 Furthermore, it was no secret that Roosevelt, a former
Assistant Secretary of the Navy, had a pro-Navy outlook; thus, when he
found it necessary to request additional defense funds, it was the Navy, not
the Army, that received first priority. With the President, Congress, and
most Americans in an isolationist mood and with government spending
being slashed, Secretary Woodring faced a real challenge in securing the
appropriations and legislation that were necessary in order to strengthen the
United States Army. This, however, was to be just one of many problems
that Harry Woodring was to face in his four years as Secretary of War.
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7
Working for Military Readiness

When Harry Woodring became Secretary of War in the fall of 1936, he
found himself in charge of a small, ill-equipped, and poorly trained Army.
Well aware of the existing deficiencies, the new Secretary immediately set
out to rectify them. His goal was to prepare a military force that could
successfully meet any challenge from the outside world.
The basis of the United States military program at that time was the
National Defense Act of 1920.1 That act provided for a voluntary citizen
Army to be composed of three echelons: the Regular Army, with an authorized strength of 280,000 enlisted men and 18,000 officers; the National Guard,
of approximately 430,000 men; and the Organized Reserve, of about 540,000.2
In the years following the passage of the act, the apathetic Congress never
did appropriate funds necessary to implement it and the strength that was
provided for never came close to the authorized figure. In 1936 the Regular
Army numbered 147,000 enlisted men and 12,000 officers-about half of the
minimum number set forth in the 1920 Defense Act. The year before (1935),
Congress had appropriated funds to provide for 165,000 enlisted men, but
President Roosevelt had released enough money for only 147,000.3 At the
same time the National Guard numbered 189,000, rather than the 430,000
called for; and the Organized Reserve was even worse off, for instead of a
force of half a million men, it contained less than 120,000, all of whom were
officers. For a nation of 130 million people, the United States military establishment was quite small; its 159,000-man Regular Army placed it in seven-
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teenth place among the world's standing anrues-m a virtual tie with
Portugal!
Although the Army was small, its size did not bother Secretary Woodring. Just before he became Secretary, Congress had appropriated funds to
provide for 165,000 enlisted men and 14,000 officers by mid 1937, and Woodring felt that under the world conditions prevailing at that time, such a
figure would be quite adequate.11 Although he was not concerned with the
size of the Army, he was quite concerned with its efficiency. He desired a
well trained and fully equipped force that would be ready to move into
action immediately.
Military men generally acknowledge that an army's readiness can be
judged by examining the speed and quality of its mobilization, the quality
and condition of its equipment and armaments, and the state of training of
all its ranks.6 Unfortunately, in 1936 the United States Army was woefully
inadequate in all three areas.
That the Army would be unable to mobilize quickly and efficiently was
a fact that the General Staff was well aware of.7 When Woodring became
Secretary, the basis for mobilization was the 1933 Mobilization Plan. This
plan envisioned the raising and training of an army of more than one million
men within three months of mobilization day (M-Day) , a two-million-man
force six months after M-Day (M+6), and an army of four and one-half
million men twelve months after M-Day (M + 12) .8 The plan, which included personnel and supply requirements, had come under fire almost as
soon as it had gone into effect. As a new and inexperienced Assistant
Secretary of War, Woodring had given his approval to the proposal a few
weeks after taking office in 1933, but as he became knowledgeable in the
problems of military supply, he soon came to the conclusion that the plan
was impractical and could not be carried out.9 However, Woodring could
not convince Secretary Dern of the need for a new mobilization plan, and
General MacArthur felt there were more pressing problems facing the Army.
Thus, with a lack of impetus from the top, no change was forthcoming. In
1936 the new Chief of Staff, Gen. Malin Craig, whose "greatest concern was
the lack of realism in military war plans,"10 ordered a study on the feasibility
of the 1933 Mobilization Plan. After securing reports and evaluations of the
plan from commanders at all echelons, the Assistant Chiefs of Staff for Personnel (G-1) and Supply (G-4) concluded that the manpower-procurement
rate of the plan was "questionable of attainment and that for this rate the
supply demands are doubtful of fulfillment."11 In October of that same year
the Planning Branch, Office of the Assistant Secretary of War, completed a
detailed survey of procurement possibilities under the present plan. Their
conclusion was that the supply requirements could not possibly be met.12
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As far as the speed and efficiency of mobilization were concerned, the Army
was not a ready force, but that was just one of several difficulties.
In the quantity and quality of equipment and arms the Army was also
lacking. Animal-drawn vehicles and field artillery were still being used
extensively, and the War Department continued to maintain that "mounted
troops are of great value in certain situations and some horse-drawn light
artillery can probably be advantageously used."13 Furthermore, outdated
weapons were the rule rather than the exception. The 1903 bolt-action
Springfield rifle was still the basic weapon of the infantry. A new semiautomatic rifle, the Garand 30-cal. M-1, had just been approved as a replacement for the Springfield, but none of them had been issued to the troops.
The Browning automatic rifle was being used as a light machine gun, and
the World War-vintage heavy Browning machine gun had to function as an
antitank gun. Tanks and other self-propelled mechanized weapons were in
pitifully short supply, as was ammunition for all classes of small arms and
artillery. George Fielding Eliot, perhaps the most widely read American
military analyst of the 1930s, concluded that "the condition of the Army as
to armament and equipment is far from satisfactory; this is by all odds its
worst deficiency."14
Unfortunately, many individuals, including numerous Congressmen, did
not feel that the Army was lacking in necessary equipment. They pointed
to the large surplus of arms, ammunition, and other supplies from World
War I that were stored in Army depots throughout the country, and said
that those stocks would be sufficient to equip the Regular Army as well as
the one-million-man force to be mobilized in the first three months after
M-Day. Furthermore, they contended that if war came and the surpluses
were not sufficient for a large reserve force, and shortages did develop, the
solution would be simple: the items could be secured from commercial
sources.15 Such thinking was deficient in several respects. First of all, it
failed to take into consideration the rapid changes being made in military
technology, organization, and tactics-all of which served to make many
items in the surplus stockpiles virtually worthless in another war. Second,
items such as ammunition for small arms and artillery, which had been in
storage for over sixteen years, were beginning to deteriorate rapidly, thereby
making their reliability questionable. Third, commercial production could
not convert to military production overnight. If advance planning were not
undertaken, it would take considerable time for commercial sources to begin
production of items desired by the military.
Another deficiency of the Army at this time was the poor state of training at all levels. That this problem existed and should be corrected was
acknowledged by General Craig in his Annual Report for 1936, when he
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stated that "greater emphasis is necessary on the training of basic units in
maneuver and combat exercises."16 The shortcomings of the Army training
program stemmed primarily from the great dispersion of troops, the shortages of funds and equipment, and the lack of time due to the necessity of
performing nonmilitary functions. When Secretary Woodring became head
of the War Department, the Army was spread from the Philippines to
Puerto Rico, from China to the Canal Zone, and across the United States in
more than one hundred and fifty posts and stations. Because of such dispersion, it simply was not feasible, tactically or financially, to bring together
a sizable number of units for large-scale maneuvers.17 Moreover, the training
of individuals as well as small units was seriously curtailed during the
Depression years, because tight budgetary restrictions permitted the use of
only a minimum amount of ammunition and other expendable items that
were essential for effective training.18 A shortage of equipment often served
to limit the value of training, because only a relatively few individuals could
use or work on the actual piece of equipment that they would be utilizing in
case of war. A perfect example of this is the fact that as late as 1938 the
eighteen National Guard tank companies throughout the country had but
one tank each for training purposes.19
Another deterrent to training was that many personnel were required
to expend all their time and energy on nonmilitary jobs, thus leaving little
or no time for military activities. Such functions as care, maintenance, and
operation of the Panama Canal; care and improvement of harbors and waterways; responsibilities in the Civilian Conservation Corps; care of national
cemeteries; and operation of the Military Academy, along with research and
development work and a multitude of other civilian-type tasks, were fulltime jobs performed by Regular Army personnel.26 It was not possible to
pull such personnel from their jobs to participate in consolidated field exercises. Even when the time and equipment were available, the training was
often impractical and unrealistic. As one soldier put it, "There is too much
tendency in the 'field' to take everything along from the barracks . . . including the pool table" and then "too much effort, time and expense is devoted to 'polishing' this and that that should be used to much more advantage
in tactical training."21 There was no question that the training of the United
States Army in the mid thirties was deficient in both quantity and quality.
No one was more aware of the Army's lack of readiness than Secretary
Woodring, but knowing what needed to be done and getting it done were
two different things. The basic reason for the Army's lack of readiness was
the failure of Congress to provide sufficient funds; however, Congress reflected the mood of the nation. Because of the isolationist sentiment that
prevailed throughout the country during the two decades after World War
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I, the War Department had not submitted budget requests that it considered
sufficient to provide an adequate military force. Instead it merely asked
Congress for what it thought it could get. Even then the Army's modest
requests were usually slashed to the bone by the President's representatives,
the Bureau of the Budget. During these years the bureau rarely called on
the War Department to justify the requests it made, but cut those carefully
prepared requests on its own judgment. Congress, seeing no threat of war,
was generally content to accept the bureau's recommendations.22 Any individual-dvilian or military-who advocated or endorsed increased expenditures for defense was immediately labeled a "jingo" or a "warmonger"; thus,
Congressmen found it politically advantageous to avoid defense questions.
With the President looking for areas in which to cut expenditures, and with
Congress and its constituents bent on isolationism, Woodring considered
that the chances of receiving increased appropriations were almost nil.
Therefore, he set out to increase the Army's readiness with means available
to him at that time.
The first problem that the new Secretary turned to was mobilization.
A major step toward realistic planning for mobilization had come late in
1935, when Gen. Malin Craig replaced General MacArthur as Army Chief
of Staff. Craig was an extremely capable person who possessed a fine but
unheralded military record. Craig, who had graduated from West Point in
1898, had gained valuable combat and administrative experience in the
Spanish-American War, the Chinese Relief Expedition, the Philippine Insurrection, and on the Mexican border before serving in the American
Expeditionary Force as Chief of Staff of both the Fourth Division and the
First Army Corps. In 1925 he became Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, and
after he had completed several assignments as an Army Corps Commander, President Roosevelt appointed him Chief of Staff.23 The soft-spoken
Craig was a man of action rather than words. Since he did not possess a
dynamic, forceful personality, his numerous accomplishments were generally
not associated with his name. According to the authors of one of the best
studies ever made of military mobilizations, "The profound influence which
General Craig during his tour as Chief of Staff had on preparing the Army
of the United States for World War II has never been widely known or
appreciated except by the professional soldiers who were closely associated
with him during those years."M
Since mobilization requires the recruiting, training, and supplying of
the Army, the War Department's 1933 Mobilization Plan had two basic
schemes: one for recruitment and training, and another for supply. However, by late 1936 it was apparent to officials in the War Department that the
1933 plan was not satisfactory, for it called for too much too soon after
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M-Day.25 Under the initiative and guidance of Secretary Woodring and
Chief of Staff Craig there emerged more realistic mobilization plans in the
form of the 1936 revision of the Industrial Mobilization Plan and the radically new Protective Mobilization Plan. It was the former that Woodring
was to deal with first.
An army cannot merely be recruited and trained; it must also be fed,
clothed, equipped, and armed. Realizing the importance of supplying a
large military force in time of war, the National Defense Act of 1920 gave
to the Assistant Secretary of War not only the responsibility of current Army
procurement but also the task of preparing plans for the mobilization of
American industry in the event of war. During the 1920s the War Department virtually ignored the formulation of plans for industrial mobilization,
but in the 1930s it attempted to work out such a scheme. The solution arrived
at was embodied in the 1930 Industrial Mobilization Plan and in revisions
of it in 1933, 1936, and 1939. The 1930 plan provided for the creation of four
superagencies to handle industrial mobilization: Director of War Industry,
Administrator of Labor, Director of Public Relations, and Director of Selective Service. Although the key agency was that of War Industry, which
would handle requirements, priorities, and facilities, it was equal to, but not
superior to, the others. Coordination of the four agencies was placed in the
hands of the President. In 1933 the original plan was revised, and another
agency and two independent commissions were added; but the scheme remained essentially the same.26 Although Assistant Secretary Woodring
approved the revision, he soon came to feel that it was too ambitious and thus
unrealistic. Consequently, he ordered his staff to begin major revisions of it.
As Assistant Secretary of War and later as Secretary, Harry Woodring
was quite interested in the Industrial Mobilization Plan, and he devoted a
great deal of time and energy to improving it.27 Woodring continually
emphasized the need for "supply preparedness," as he called it. To him this
concept meant providing adequate reserve stocks for immediate military
needs as well as plans for the rapid mobilization of industries for wartime
production. Secretary Woodring indicated his firm belief in the importance
of industrial mobilization to military efficiency when he said: "The best
general in the world cannot defend his country without troops-the best
troops in the world cannot defend their countries without supplies; and supplies cannot be provided without thoroughly efficient preparation and suitable control machinery."28
In 1936 the War Department issued a revised Industrial Mobilization
Plan. It was ironical that it received its final approval in September from
Acting Secretary of War Woodring, who, as Assistant Secretary, had done
so much to bring about the new plan. This plan differed from earlier ones
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in several respects. First, since it dealt solely with matters of industrial
mobilization, the selective-service and public-relations provisions of the earlier
plans were deleted. Second, the War Resources Administration, which was
the new name for the old War Industries Board, was to be established at the
outset of war by an executive order, rather than by congressional legislation.
Third, when war appeared imminent, the Army-Navy Munitions Board was
to assume the functions of the War Resources Administration until that
agency was able to undertake its duties. 29 Fourth, the plan showed a greater
degree of coordination and harmony between the War and Navy departments than had any previous attempts at cooperative planning. In light of
the serious conflicts that had previously characterized joint Army-Navy
mobilization planning, this was quite an accomplishment, and one that
Secretary Woodring was quite proud of.30
For a multitude of reasons the 1936 Industrial Mobilization Plan immediately came under attack: Gen. Hugh Johnson, of NRA fame, claimed
that the plan was too detailed and thus inflexible; Bernard Baruch insisted
that its provisions should be implemented by civilian experts rather than the
military; Secretary of State Cordell Hull felt that controls over exports encroached upon his authority; and numerous political analysts and journalists
claimed that the plan provided for excessive regimentation. By 1938 even
the War Department was forced to conclude that it contained certain deficiencies, which it hoped to remedy in the next revision of it. In spite of
some shortcomings, the plan at least showed an awareness of the complexities
of industrial mobilization, and it presented the most sophisticated approach
ever designed to meet those complexities. Even a critic like General Johnson
concluded that the plan was "a necessary and a very valuable piece of work."31
When Harry Woodring assumed the position of Secretary of War in
September 1936, he did not immediately leave behind the problems of planning for procurement and mobilization, for he continued to serve as Assistant
Secretary. Not until July 1937, when Louis A. Johnson became the new
Assistant Secretary, did Woodring give up his dual role. This meant that
during his first ten months as Secretary of War, Woodring was still in charge
of planning for industrial mobilization. In fact, it was during the period when
he was filling both posts that he laid the groundwork for cooperation between the War Department and private industry that later proved to be of
such value in the production of certain military items. He did this by pressuring Congress to pass a bill that would enable the War Department to
sell, loan, or give to private contractors and firms the drawings, plans, and
samples of equipment to be manufactured for the Army in time of war.
The bill was designed to familiarize manufacturers with items not directly
related to peacetime production, especially items for ordnance and for

123

chemical warfare.32 Congress, seeing the value of such a program, passed
the measure with no opposition. Although this legislation did not go so far
as to provide small-scale "educational orders," whereby limited production
of certain items would be undertaken, it did give to many industries a better
appreciation of what might be involved if they had to convert from civilian
to military production.33 While tremendous progress was to be made in the
realm of planning for industrial mobilization after July 1937, it was to come
under the leadership of Assistant Secretary Louis Johnson. Unfortunately,
Woodring, because of the years he spent as Assistant Secretary, found it extremely difficult to divorce himself from his old post, and, as will be seen,
his tendency to advise and guide his new Assistant Secretary was to cause
considerable friction between the two and was to seriously affect the operations of the War Department.84
As important as Woodring's contributions were to industrial mobilization, they were small in comparison with his contributions to military
mobilization. On 8 December 1936 Secretary Woodring initiated a major
revision of the Army's plans for military mobilization. On that day he sent
the Chief of Staff a memorandum calling attention to the fact that in the
first several months of a war the supply requirements for the initial onemillion-man force called for in the 1933 Mobilization Plan could not possibly
be met. In that case, Woodring contended, it would be useless and wasteful
to try to achieve the unrealistic objectives of the plan; what were needed
were goals that could be attained_. The present mobilization plan provided
for the formation of a very large force in a short period of time, and Woodring, General Craig, and the entire General Staff knew that it was just a
paper plan, which in reality could not be carried out. The Secretary then
suggested that the General Staff consider the "advisability and need for two
separate and distinct plans. One, a paper plan based on the Staff's present
manpower mobilization tables . . . and a second, based on what I term a
'defensive policy' plan calling for a speedy mobilization of a much smaller
force for which material can be supplied." What Woodring wanted was a
plan that could actually be fulfilled; thus, he favored a scheme that called
for mobilization of a much smaller force. He believed that to create such a
force and make it effective would require that it be fully trained and completely supplied in peacetime, so that it would be immediately available at
the outbreak of war.3"
The Secretary's directive was all the prodding that General Craig needed
to begin work on a new, realistic plan for mobilization. On 16 December
he directed the General Staff to begin development of the Protective Mobilization Plan, or PMP. The guidelines presented were quite brief: "The
Protective Mobilization Plan will provide for the mobilization of a moderate
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but balanced force for the protection of the Continental United States including Hawaii and Panama. The size and character of the force should be
such as to permit its being speedily and properly armed and equipped."
General Craig closed by emphasizing the importance of the plan, and he
asked that it be completed as quickly as possible.36
It took the War Department two years to complete the PMP. It was
written in sections, and as each section was completed in enough detail to
be useful, it was published. Thus, the PMP appeared in a handful of installments between February 1937 and December 1938. As a result of the piecemeal release and publication of the plan and its further revisions, it soon
became commonplace to read or hear about the 1937 PMP, the 1938 PMP,
or the 1939 PMP, when in reality they were all a part of, or a revision of,
the same plan.37
The PMP introduced a new concept in basic planning for mobilization.
According to mobilization experts Marvin Kreidberg and Merton Henry,
"The Protective Mobilization Plans were not only the first mobilization
plans to be based completely on realism but were also the first plans which
successfully achieved real succinctness and simplicity without the sacrifice of
coherence."38 Whereas the earlier plans of 1928 and 1933 had provided for
the mobilization of a million-man force three months after mobilization
began, the PMP placed reliance on a much smaller but better-equipped and
highly trained Army to furnish immediate protection. In the event that
additional forces were necessary, the plan called for well-defined steps of
expansion which were designed to enable proper equipping and training of
new recruits. Under the old plans the order for mobilization brought one
million men into the Army at once, whether they were needed or not; but
the PMP could mobilize the number necessary to meet the need. The first
echelon of defense under the PMP was to be a 400,000-man Initial Protective Force (IPF). This force, which was to include units of the Regular
Army and the National Guard, was to be completely ready for combat within
one month after M-Day. If it was apparent that the IPF would not be
sufficient, a Protective Mobilization Force of more than 700,000 men would
then be mobilized. The plan called for this second contingent of troops to
be ready eight months after M-Day. In the event that still more troops were
needed, the PMP provided for a minimum increase of 150,000 men monthly
until a four-million-man force was achieved. The primary weakness of the
PMP was that it failed to provide a balanced military force. The Army was
to be made up almost solely of infantry; the air force and armored force
were virtually ignored. Lack of balance is evident from the fact that the plan
provided for only one armored division in a four-million-man force. 89
Compared to the earlier plans, which called for mobilizing a million
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men in three months, the PMP seemed to be a step backward; but the goals
of the earlier plans could not possibly have been attained, whereas those of
the PMP could be. When it is realized that it took the United States fourteen months to put one million men in fighting trim during World War I,
the PMP appears more impressive.40 The plan had its logistical and tactical
shortcomings, but in comparison to previous mobilization plans it marked a
real step forward. Secretary Woodring was the first to admit that the plan
was not perfect, but he did maintain that there was every reason to believe
that it was "feasible and will meet our national defense requirements."u
While the PMP was being prepared in 1937 and 1938 there was little
that Secretary Woodring could do to implement even its first phases, because Congress did not intend to provide funds for a plan that was not yet
fully developed. In the meantime Woodring tried in other ways to improve
the Army's readiness. In December of 1936 he issued his first annual report
as Secretary of War. It indicated a general satisfaction with conditions in
the War Department and in the Army. The recommendations made were
extremely modest, the most significant being (1) an increase in National
Guard strength from 189,000 to 210,000; (2) two weeks of annual training
for 30,000 Reserve Officers, instead of the present 20,000; and (3) the establishment of an enlisted reserve of 150,000 men.42 Woodring felt that such
modest demands could certainly be met. The Washington Herald stated
that the recommendations embraced "a program of minimum requirements,"
which, even if adopted, would still leave the nation "perilously weak."48 An
editorial in the Washington Evening Star maintained that "Congress is not
likely to find any of these proposals unreasonable" and recommended that
they be given favorable consideration.44 When the Bureau of the Budget
reviewed the increases for the new proposals, they were denied, and, as
usual, the Secretary of War was not asked to appear before the bureau or the
Congressional Appropriations Committee to justify his budget requests. In
the end, Congress performed as it had in the past decade and a half and
provided only enough funds to increase the National Guard by 3,000, instead
of 20,000; and to give two weeks of training to an additional 2,000 reserve
officers, instead of the requested 10,000; and it included no provision for an
enlisted reserve.45
In spite of his good intentions, Woodring's contributions to improve the
Army's readiness were virtually nil in his first full year as Secretary of War.
His ineffectiveness stemmed from several factors. First, his dual responsibility as both Secretary and Assistant Secretary, which lasted until July 1937,
forced him to divide his time and energy between the two positions. Second,
the uncertainty as to whether or not he would be made permanent Secretary
caused him to "go easy" so as to not antagonize the President. Third, with

126

the PMP still in preparation and its needs uncertain, he could not yet take
steps to implement it. Although he did not bring about any major advancements in the Army during that first year, the Secretary used the period to
win the confidence of the President, Congress, and the Army. As a 6 November 1937 editorial in the Army and Navy fournal indicated:
Only a Secretary of War could discharge competently these numerous important
and responsible duties who has the fullest confidence of the President, and Mr.
Woodring has that. Only a Secretary of War could build as Mr. Woodring has
built who has the confidence of Congress, and the Secretary has that. We are
moved to recite these facts ... because a year has passed since the responsibility
for administering the affairs of the War Department devolved on him. That year
has shown his ability and capacity and understanding in connection with national
and particularly military needs. These qualities necessarily have earned for him
the sincere respect and devotion of the forces which, under the President, he
directs.46
By the end of 1937 Secretary Woodring was examining the Army more
closely than before. This scrutiny resulted from his growing concern over
the breakdown of peace throughout the world. Japanese aggression against
China, Civil War in Spain, and the growing strength of Hitler and Mussolini caused him to be more critical in his examination of the United States
military machine than he had been the year before. In his Annual Report,
which was released in December 1937, Woodring warned the President that
although the Army was more efficient than it had ever been in peacetime, it
was "relatively weaker, compared with armies of other great countries, than
it was a year ago." The loss in relative strength resulted from the other
countries' strengthening of their military forces at a more rapid rate than
the United States. Even though Woodring concluded that "at present our
Regular Army . . . is too small to accomplish efficiently the task for which
it is responsible," he did not ask for a sizable increase; he requested only an
additional 7,000 enlisted men and 2,300 officers. He again urged that an
enlisted reserve program be established, but this time in much stronger
terms than the year before. After warning the President that the nation
would be "at a distinct disadvantage during the mobilization period of a
major war if we lack trained men to fill key positions in the ranks," he asked
that a start be made toward the creation of a 150,000-man enlisted reserve.47
With one exception Woodring's recommendations in his Annual Report
for 1937 were similar to those of the previous year. That exception pertained to his request concerning the quantity and quality of military equipment. Woodring stated, as he was to do repeatedly, that while he did not
consider the size of the Army extremely important, he believed that the
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equipment it had was of the utmost importance. He emphasized the need
to reequip the Army "with the latest and best in transportation, means of
communication, and weapons." He also emphasized both that the best
equipment should be procured and that sufficient quantities should be provided. Although he stressed the importance of and deficiencies in equipment,
he urged that a rather conservative approach be used in correcting the shortcoming. He said that he did not want the country to get involved in the
arms race, but he did want it to "accelerate" the program for reequipping
the Army.48 Woodring's extremely conservative requests in terms of manpower and equipment reveal one of his major shortcomings as Secretary of
War: he continually failed to ask and actively push for what he really
believed was necessary in order to create a first-class army. That he was well
aware of the deficiencies of the military can be seen in his Annual Reports,
but when it came to making recommendations, he fell into the old War
Department rut of asking for what he thought he could get rather than
what was really needed. For this he can be justifiably criticized.
By the time that Secretary Woodring issued his 1937 Report, events in
Europe had caused President Roosevelt to conclude that it was time to examine the defense needs of the nation very closely. In December and early
January the President indicated that he would ask Congress to appropriate
a large amount for defense needs.49 With FDR's growing interest in defense
matters, the Secretary of War and the War Department became increasingly
optimistic about getting the funds to strengthen the land forces significantly;
thus, it was a rather confident Harry Woodring who traveled to the White
House on 20 January 1938 to discuss the Army's needs. At that conference,
FDR informed Woodring that the Navy, not the Army, was to be the
primary beneficiary of his new defense program. A highly distraught
Woodring pleaded with the President to give the Army more consideration,
and he warned that to ignore the ground forces, as was being done, was a
grave mistake. His pleas fell on deaf ears as Roosevelt stuck to his earlier
decision. A few days later, Woodring wrote Roosevelt, again asking that
the defense program place more emphasis on Army needs, which were
"truly justified under the present world situation." He then recommended
that an additional $30 million be made available to improve the Army's state
of readiness.r;o Woodring felt that if Congress was going to appropriate a
vast sum for defense, then the Army should have its fair share. The President, feeling that the needs of the Navy should have first priority, chose to
take lightly the advice of his Secretary of War; and in his budget message
on 28 January he asked Congress for only $17 million to strengthen the
Army. In looking back at this request a few years later, Roosevelt said,
"With respect to the Army, I included only those items which had been
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recommended by the War Department as immediately necessary. It was obviously impossible to do everything at once, and these were the first steps."G1
While Woodring was generally displeased with the President's 1938 defense program, he was especially resentful of Roosevelt's failure to strengthen
the Army Air Corps. Feeling that the Navy was being built up at the
expense of the Air Corps, he went to Roosevelt in February 1938 and asked
that one hundred planes earmarked for the Navy be given to the Army
instead. The pro-Navy Roosevelt listened attentively, but was not persuaded,
and the defense program favoring the Navy remained unchanged.112
Although Secretary Woodring did not succeed in securing a large share
of the defense appropriations for fiscal year 1939, he was successful in bringing about one of his most sought-after goals-an enlisted reserve, or, as it
came to be called, the Regular Army Reserve. When the first National
Defense Act was passed in 1916, it had included provisions for a reserve of
enlisted men; however, after World War I the provision was rescinded
because of the large number of veterans that could be called in case of
emergency.Ga During the 1920s and 1930s the Citizens Military Training
Corps and the ROTC provided a supply of officers that could be tapped in
time of war, but there was no program to provide experienced enlisted
personnel in such an emergency. From the time that he came into office,
Secretary Woodring continually stressed the need for a 150,000-man enlisted
reserve; finally, in January 1938, he succeeded in winning the President's
support for such a program, but for only a 75,000-man force.114 Next, Woodring set out to sell the idea · to Congress. He indicated to the House and
Senate Military Affairs committees that if the Regular Army was called to
active duty, it would be forced to take the field with units that were small,
depleted, and understrength. Such a dangerous situation could be corrected
either by a sizable increase in Regular Army strength or by the establishment
of an enlisted reserve. For reasons of economy, Woodring recommended
that the latter course be taken.G 5 Congress agreed, and in April 1938 it
passed the necessary legislation.
The Army Reserve Act provided for the enlistment in the Regular
Army Reserve of former Regular Army enlisted men who had returned to
civilian life. Since they had previously been trained, no further training was
considered necessary. As an inducement to sign up, each reservist was paid
$24 a year, and in return he simply had to keep the Army informed of his
present address; no weekly or annual training of any kind was required.
The Reservists could be called to active duty "only in case of emergency
declared by the President." If called, they would receive a bonus of $3 for
each month in the Reserves, the total not to exceed $150. An age limit of
thirty-five was also established.116 Plans called for the 75,000-man force to be
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raised over a period of four years, with the cost running $450,000 the first
year and increasing by a like amount annually until it leveled off at $1.8 million after the fourth year. The Regular Army Reserve did not in any way
replace or affect any of the reserve forces, such as the National Guard, that
were already in existence. Its sole purpose, according to the Senate Military
Affairs Committee, was "to bolster the Regular Army so that it can better
perform its vital tasks of defense in the first stages of an emergency."57
From the time that he became Secretary of War in the fall of 1936 until
March 1938, Woodring, while showing a definite interest in increased Army
readiness, did not appear alarmed or overconcerned about the shortcomings
that he knew existed. As late as February 1938 he indicated that he considered the nation's new defense program modest but adequate.118 One
month later, when Hitler annexed Austria, Secretary Woodring publicly
announced that the United States Army was better prepared than at any
time in its history for "whatever happens."59 Apparently, however, he was
not as confident as his public utterances indicated, for after the Anschluss he
ordered a detailed study to determine the requirements for properly arming
and equipping the IPF. While that study was under way he worked hard
to convince Congress of the immediate need for an additional two thousand
officers for the Regular Army.60 Congress responded in early April by
approving the Secretary's request, and two weeks later the Army Reserve
Act, for which Woodring had worked so hard, was passed. Such activities
of the Secretary of War were evidently making a favorable impression on
the public mind, because in June 1938 Woodring fared very well when the
Gallup Poll asked the question: "Do you think the following cabinet members have done a good or poor job in office?" While less than half of those
interviewed expressed an opinion on Secretary Woodring, of those that did,
five of every six said that he was doing a good job; thus, the conclusion of
the pollsters was that "although there is little that peacetime Secretaries of
Navy and War can do to win public attention, today's survey shows that
[Secretary of Navy] Swanson and Woodring have substantial approval for
their work." 61
In July 1938 the War Department revealed that a careful study showed
that there was an immediate and urgent shortage of critical items of equipment for the IPF. To supply those items would cost $142 million.62 In the
weeks that followed, Secretary Woodring and other officials of the War
Department tried to educate Congress and the public on the importance and
needs of the IPF. Time and again they pointed out that although the quality
of the equipment that the units had was good, the quantity was insufficient.
Warnings of the consequences of the shortages went unheeded by Congress
and the nation, who were convinced that they could avoid another war.
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Then in September 1938 came the Munich Crisis, followed by Hitler's
success at the Munich Conference; and at last the United States was suddenly interested in its Army. The events of September caused Congress and
the American people to realize that they had ignored their military establishment long enough and that further delay in upgrading it would be extremely
dangerous. At the time that this new crisis atmosphere developed, the IPF
was so short of modern arms that had it become involved in combat, it could
not possibly have been an effective fighting force. Whereas the PMP called
for a minimum of 227,000 semiautomatic rifles, only 12,500 were on hand;
of the called-for 1,500 M2-7Smm guns, only 141 were available. The story
was the same for other new weapons: 60mm mortars-3,750 required, 1 on
hand; 105mm howitzers-55 required, 0 on hand; light tanks-244 required,
36 on hand; medium tanks-1,100 required, 319 on hand.63 General Craig
was quite concerned about these shortages, but he was even more alarmed
by the fact that "most of these items require in excess of one year to produce." This meant that if the shortages were to be overcome by 1940, it
would be necessary to act at once.64
In November 1938, six weeks after Munich, Secretary Woodring released
his third Annual Rep<>rt. Pessimistically he pointed out that in spite of recent
advances, the Army still contained certain "deficiencies in organization,
equipment, and personnel which must be corrected before we can be assured
of maintenance of a military force fully adequate for our defensive needs."
He set as his number one priority the perfection of the 400,000-man IPF. To
accomplish that goal he stressed the need for additional equipment and
training. Woodring emphasized that the IPF was all important because "if
they fail in their protective mission the fate of the reinforcing citizens' armies
is sealed." The report also emphasized the importance of properly equipping
the forces that would follow the IPF into the field. His conclusion was that
there was little need for additional personnel but a great need for additional
equipment and training.611
Hitler's victory at Munich so impressed Roosevelt that he quickly
reached the conclusion that the time had come for the United States to begin
rearming extensively. Woodring, therefore, spent November and December
working on the President's new rearmament program, which placed heavy
emphasis on a greatly expanded Army Air Corps.66 While considerable
attention was given to the air program, other matters of Army readiness
were not ignored. On S January 1939 Secretary Woodring presented to the
President the War Department's recommendations for carrying out the rearmament program and increasing the readiness of existing forces. Because
of the recent events abroad, Roosevelt was anxious to strengthen the Army,
and therefore he was very receptive to the War Department's proposals.67
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On 12 January the President sent his budget message to Congress, asking
that it appropriate $450 million for the "new needs of the Army." While the
bulk of the funds requested was to go for increasing air strength, $110 million
were to be used for " 'critical items' of equipment which would be needed
immediately in time of emergency, and which cannot be obtained from any
source within the time and quantity desired." 68 There was no mention of
an increase in the Army's manpower. Pleased as Woodring was with the
proposed budget, he indicated to the President that there was still reason to
be pessimistic, because "while the measures suggested will materially forward the readiness of the Army, nevertheless a serious deficiency of great
import to both Army and Navy will still exist after these measures are
accomplished."69 Furthermore, he was pessimistic because there was no certainty that Congress would grant everything that the President requested.
Beginning in mid January 1939, Secretary Woodring made several
appearances before the House and Senate Military Affairs committees as
well as the Senate and House Subcommittees on Appropriations. Before
each committee he emphasized the same thing: "Our main problem, however, is to assure the complete equipment in critical items of our existing
Regular Army and National Guard units and the organization of the initial
protective force into a force fully capable of shouldering its heavy burden."70
In the committee hearings, Woodring was usually drawn into a discussion
of future as well as present needs of the Army. These discussions saw him
and other War Department officials follow the long-standing practice of
asking for what they thought they could get rather than what was needed.
Woodring told the committeemen that it would be desirable if -supplies for
the 720,000-man PMF would be made available, but funds for that purpose
were not being requested at that time. 71 Recommendations for additional
personnel also indicated the War Department's tendency to ask for half a
loaf. Woodring informed the Senate Military Affairs Committee that the
"War Department has carefully excluded urgent personnel requirements....
We prefer at this time to invest such money as is appropriated in materiel."72 At the same time that such statements were being made by the
Secretary of War, the Chief of Staff was expressing alarm because "we
urgently need to have always available 5 complete divisions" but at present
"we do not have a single division."73 In spite of the Army's awareness of
this shortcoming, no additional troops were requested, and, furthermore, it
was made clear that no such request would be made. All military representatives who might conceivably be called to testify before one of the congressional committees were informed by the Chief of Staff that in accordance
with "presidential views," no additional increases in ground forces had been
requested and that such a position should be maintained by anyone testifying
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on behalf of the War Department. The memorandum containing this information also contained advice on how to reply to the investigators' questions about the number of ground forces to be provided if and when such
an increase should be permitted. The answer to be given was 1,800 officers
and 23,000 enlisted men.74 This information was brought out in most of
the hearings.
While members of Congress were debating on how far they should go
in implementing the President's 1939 defense program, their minds were
made up for them by Adolf Hitler, who on 13 March sent his troops into
Slovakia, thus completing the takeover of Czechoslovakia. This act marked
the failure of the Munich Agreement and showed the world that Hitler was
indeed a dangerous man who could not be trusted. Congress, at last convinced of the need for stronger defenses, was now willing to listen to the
suggestions and recommendations of the President, the Secretary of War,
and members of the General Staff. During the next three months, Woodring
made numerous trips to the Hill to testify before various committees concerning the need for aircraft, training, and "critical items." In one appearance before a House Subcommittee on Appropriations he indicated that he
considered the President's proposals "exceedingly conservative and modest"
and believed that failure to implement any one of them would endanger the
nation's security. He concluded his testimony by saying, "As Secretary of
War, I would be sadly remiss in my duty to the American people were I to
advise or countenance the reduction of one iota of any item in the President's
program."711
The jittery Congress did not require much convincing, and in April,
May, and June 1939 it passed Army Appropriations Bills for $549 million,
including $180 million for new aircraft and $110 million for critical items.
It also approved an increase of 2,050 Regular Army officers and authorized
an increase in enlisted strength from 165,000 to 210,000 by June of 1940.76
Woodring was pleased with these legislative victories which marked the
biggest military outlays since World War I. It was at about this time that
the President expressed himself as "thoroughly satisfied with the administration he [Woodring] has given to the War Department, and particularly
the manner in which he assisted . . . in fashioning the Army Expansion
Bill and facilitating its passage through Congress."77
Because of the new appropriations, Secretary Woodring was now able
to carry out some of the programs that he had long been advocating. One
of the first problem areas he was to deal with was that of large-scale Army
maneuvers. Although the military had long recognized the importance of
these exercises in giving valuable experience to all personnel from field grade
officers down to privates, the economy drive of the 1930s had virtually elim-
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inated such training. Woodring was especially concerned over the matter of
training, because the continual loss from active duty of war-experienced
personnel meant that more and more individuals without combat experience
were coming into command positions. This factor, he claimed, made largescale training very important, especially in the United States, "where limited
forces, limited facilities and limited funds do not permit those massive
peacetime manoeuvres and field exercises which characterize the instructional
activities of great armies in other parts of the world." 78 In early 1939, with
Congress in a mood to spend money for national defense, Woodring asked
for $20 million to expand the Army's training program. Included in this
request were funds to conduct the "biggest army maneuvers since 1918."
When Congress granted the full amount requested for training, the maneuvers were assured.
Subsequently, in August 1939, Regular Army and National Guard units
of the First United States Army gathered at Plattsburg, New York, under
their Commander, Gen. Hugh A. Drum, for two weeks of war games. With
more than 52,000 men participating, this was the largest peacetime military
exercise in the nation's history. When the games opened, General Drum
expressed doubts as to the effectiveness of the First Army, claiming that the
forces assembled were not an army " 'but a collection of individual units,
partially equipped and woefully short' in most of the elements which go to
make an army."79 The two-weeks' exercise did nothing to change his mind,
and in a very pointed critique, Drum stressed the "inexperience" of the
troops assembled and called the state of affairs that he found "deplorable
and inexcusable." The New York Times took the statements of General
Drum and other Army observers and used them for a front-page story that
told of the '"Deplorable' Lack of Training Especially Evident in [the]
National Guard" and came to the conclusion that "Neither It Nor [the]
Regulars [Are] Fit for War."80 At first, Woodring was quite upset over
General Drum's revelations, because he felt that they reflected on him as
Secretary of War. Soon, however, he came to feel that what Drum had done
was a good thing, because the exposure of the Army's lack of training and
equipment would help make the public mind more receptive to the adoption
of recommendations that he had been making for the past several years.81
The summer of 1939 also brought a new era in Army-Navy strategic
planning. Prior to that time the War Plans Division of the General Sta.ff
had drawn up plans that envisioned a future war with a single nation.
These plans were called "color plans," because each possible enemy was
designated as a color: thus, War Plan Brown was for war with Germany;
War Plan Orange, for Japan; and so forth. The need for more realistic war
plans and closer coordination between the two major armed services had
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long been recognized, but it was not until 30 June 1939 that the Joint ArmyNavy Board approved, in general, a new series of basic war plans.82 The
plans, which were known as Rainbow Plans, envisioned waging a war
against several foes in more than one area at the same time. The June
decision was limited to an outline of the plans; it actually took several years
to develop the details.83 Woodring appears to have taken no part in the
preparation of the Rainbow Plans. In part, this was probably because he
considered them to be of a strictly military nature and therefore not a matter
on which he could advise or guide the Joint Army-Navy Board. Another
limiting factor was an order of 5 July 1939 from President Roosevelt to the
effect that in the future the Joint Board would report directly to him as
Commander in Chief.84 From that time on, the Secretary of War was
usually bypassed when it came to the strategic planning of the Joint ArmyNavy Board.
Along with the Army's gains of the summer of 1939 there came a loss.
That loss was the retirement of Gen. Malin Craig as Chief of Staff. Although
his retirement from active duty was scheduled for 1 September, the stress
and strain of the past several years caused him to take terminal leave on 30
June. Considering the strong isolationist and anti-military sentiment that
prevailed throughout the country in the mid thirties, General Craig had done
an outstanding job in increasing the strength and efficiency of the United
States Army, and, most important of all, he had given the Army a realistic
mobilization plan.85 Perhaps the best evaluation of Craig and his contributions to the Army was that given by the noted American military historian
Russell F. Weigley, who said, "It is questionable whether any soldier did
more than he to make possible American military accomplishments in World
War 11."86 When his accomplishments are compared with those of his successor, Gen. George C. Marshall, they seem to be quite small, but when
compared with what had been accomplished in the previous fifteen years,
they appear to be very substantial. No one hated to see Craig leave more
than did Woodring. From the time that Woodring came to the War Department in 1933, these two men had become the best of friends; and later, as
Secretary of War and Chief of Staff, they had cooperated to a degree rarely
found in military or civilian circles. Woodring, who looked with deep
affection upon the General as his "right arm," stated that the relationship he
enjoyed with Craig was that of "a brother, and frequently that of a father
and son."87
In addition to marking Craig's departure from the War Department,
August 1939 was to mark the beginning of a new era as far as the United
States Army's importance, influence, and significance on the national scene
were concerned. With war in Europe appearing imminent, the War Depart-
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ment introduced plans for enlarging and equipping a military force that
would be more powerful than any that had ever been contemplated in
peacetime.88 When war finally broke out in early September, interest in the
country's defenses became greater than ever. It was at that time that Congress began to scrutinize, as never before, the state of the Army's readiness,
and Secretary Woodring and the War Department were, consequently, to
emerge as centers of attention and activity. Since August marked the beginning of a new era for the Army, it offers a convenient breaking point for
examining W oodring's efforts, up to that point, to improve the Army's
readiness.
There seems to be no doubt that the American military machine was
much stronger in August 1939 than it had been when Woodring took control
of it in September 1936. While it is true that events abroad were in large
part responsible for Congress's willingness to strengthen the Army, that situation should not obscure the fact that Woodring, who had the confidence of
the President, Congress, and the military, played an important role in securing passage of legislation upgrading the armed forces. In size, planning,
training, and equipment the United States Army was better prepared and
stronger in August 1939 than it had been at any time since 1919. Whereas
in September 1936 there were 147,000 enlisted men and 12,000 officers in the
Regular Army, there were 175,000 and 13,200 respectively in August of 1939.
More important than these actual strengths was the fact that Congress had
just appropriated funds to raise the "authorized strength" of the Army to
210,000 enlisted men and 16,700 officers by June of 1940.89 Since the Secretary
had not actively pushed for such increases in manpower, he can be given
little credit for them, but the increases were nevertheless on the way.
In the realm of planning for mobilization, Woodring had played a major
role in developing a sensible, workable scheme to provide an adequate protective force and necessary reserves. The Protective Mobilization Plan, with
its provisions for an Initial Protective Force and a Protective Mobilization
Force, was quite sound; the only problem was that Congress had not seen
fit to appropriate the funds that were necessary to implement it. A start,
however, had been made in the spring of 1939, when Congress appropriated
$110 million for "critical items" and $20 million for training the Initial Protective Force. In addition, Woodring had assisted in the formation of the
Regular Army Reserve; had helped to make plans for the largest peacetime
military maneuvers; had supervised a major revision of the Industrial Mobilization Plan; had championed the testing and adoption of new weapons,
including the Garand semiautomatic rifle; and had contributed significantly
to strengthening the defenses of Hawaii and the Panama Canal.
In spite of the progress that had been made, however, the Army was
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still woefully unprepared to meet any military emergency. Numerically it
was far weaker than the army of any other major power, and because of
rapid military expansion abroad, it was relatively weaker than it had been
several years before. General Craig, in his final report as Chief of Staff, reported that as of 30 June 1939, the Army "was short much of its critical
armament and equipment. . . . There were deficiencies in personnel. . . .
And there was a serious shortage in immediate war reserves." The result of
these deficiencies was: "We have not now a single complete division of the
Regular Army [available for instant dispatch to troubled areas]. We have
four partial divisions and five brigades in various stages of completion; and
only a few special units available." This meant that in the summer of 1939
the United States Army did not have one complete division ready for immediate action.90 Although Secretary Woodring had accomplished much,
there remained a great deal to do, and the road to success was full of military, political, and personal obstacles. It was a combination of the latter two
that was to create his greatest problems.
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8
Politics Disrupts
the War Department

Throughout its history, both in peace and in war, the United States has
been a nation firmly committed to the principle of civilian control of the
military. This tenet stems from the belief that "in a democracy all basic
policy, including military policy, is made by officials responsible to the people
with whom sovereignty ultimately rests."1 While this principle has held true
since colonial times, the American attitude toward the military establishment
has continually fluctuated. During periods of war the American people have
tended to look upon the military with trust, respect, and appreciation; however, in times of peace a fear of military usurpation and tyranny has caused
them to look upon the Army with suspicion and distrust. The widespread
fear of the militarization of American society has created an "antimilitary
tradition."2 The public attitude toward the American military establishment
has therefore generally been one of admiration and support in time of war,
and one of scorn and apprehension in time of peace.
The United States Army has always been expected to provide the nation
with adequate security against hostile forces but, at the same time, not be so
strong as to present a threat to the society that created it.3 Such attitudes
have placed the American military man in a difficult position, for while his
fellow countrymen expect him to defend and, if necessary, die for his country, they also consider him a potential threat to their cherished ideal of
civilian control of the government. Out of all this has emerged a widespread
belief that the military establishment is a necessary evil. Fear and distrust
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of American military leaders have caused them to be isolated from other
elements of society, so that they have become "a conscious and coherent
group within but largely apart from the larger governmental structure. Such
a group ... has its own distinctive entrance and tenure procedures, its own
salary system, its own traditions and group attitudes, its own sensitivity and
code of privacy."4 Because of their isolation, military leaders have rarely
taken an interest in public affairs and have usually found it expedient to
avoid expressing opinions on political matters. However, the officers at the
highest echelons have frequently found that they could not avoid becoming
embroiled in politics, because they were working under civilians whose decisions were based to a large extent on political considerations. Accustomed
to a promotion system based on merit and loyalty, and working within an
organization in which the same regulations apply to everyone, the military
men have often found it difficult to understand the ways of their politically
oriented superiors.
As Harry Woodring soon discovered, carrying out the responsibilities of the
Secretary of War was no easy task. The position was a complex and difficult
one, not only because of the magnitude of its functions and responsibilities,
but also because it placed a politically appointed civilian in charge of an
establishment staffed by professional military men. To succeed in the post
it was necessary to please and accommodate a politically elected Commander
in Chief, on the one hand, and the leaders of the military establishment on
the other. As President Roosevelt's representative, Woodring stood for
civilian control of the Army; but since the Secretary of War was responsible
for the military defense of the nation, he had to represent and attempt to
carry out the recommendations of his military advisers. He was in reality a
politician doing a military job. In a nation committed to the idea of civilian
control of the military, it was extremely difficult to represent and please both
those who desired a stronger Army and those who feared the increased influence of the military. In an attempt to please both the civilian and the
military, Woodring was forced to walk on the fence that divided the two.
To fall or even lean too far to one side always brought the wrath of the
other. When he urged Congress and the President to strengthen the nation's
Army, he was called a militarist or a warmonger; and when he called for
less than the General Staff recommended, military men criticized him for
failing to provide an adequate defense. To satisfy completely his superior
and his subordinates at the same time was an extremely difficult, if not an
impossible, task.
One consequence of having a politically elected Commander in Chief
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and a politically appointed Secretary of War is that politics comes to play a
key role in the decisions, policies, and actions of the War Department. Both
President Roosevelt and Secretary Woodring realized that they had the responsibility of providing an adequate military defense, but they also realized
that in pursuing that end, they must not do anything to antagonize or
frighten Congress or the public, without whose support nothing could be
accomplished. In running the War Department, Secretary Woodring had
to deal extensively with the President, Congress, the cabinet, and the General Staff. Since the first three of these were politically oriented, it was not
surprising that politics came to have a major influence on Woodring's operation of the War Department and eventually came to disrupt its activities.
To understand the effects of politics on Secretary Woodring and the War
Department, it is necessary to examine his relationships with President
Roosevelt, his military advisers, Congress, the Assistant Secretary of War,
and those individuals who made up Roosevelt's inner circle of friends.
The personal relationship between Harry Woodring and Franklin D.
Roosevelt was an extremely close one from the time they first met in 1931
until the latter's death in 1945.11 Woodring had the highest respect and
admiration for FDR, and he did not hesitate to say so both publicly and
privately. Roosevelt was very fond of Woodring, and treasured his friendship. The fact that Woodring was to remain Secretary of War as long as he
did was in large part due to his close personal relationship with the President.6 But while they were always on the best of terms personally, Roosevelt
and Woodring were frequently at odds over official matters. Disagreements
usually stemmed from the fact that although Woodring was nominally Secretary of War, President Roosevelt always wanted to be, and to a great
extent was, his own Secretary of War. The President accomplished this by
personal intervention and by delegating tasks to his own personal representatives who were outside of the chain of command.7 According to Roosevelt's friend Edward J. Flynn, a Democratic leader, "The Boss either
appoints four men to do the job of one or one man to do the job of four."
He then added that none of the four would know what the others were
doing nor would the one man know "the scope of his authority." 8 The New
York Herald Tribune expressed it more succinctly when it said, "The role
of a true executive, functioning through able subordinates possessing both
power and responsibility, has never appealed to him [Roosevelt]."9
President Roosevelt's desire to run his own show frequently caused
difficulty in the War Department, because the Secretary "had his own ideas
and he worked hard at putting them through."10 Woodring was always
willing to listen to the other side of an issue, but once he came to a conclusion as to which policy, principle, or line of action to follow, he stuck to
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it with the utmost tenacity.11 He liked to tell others what to do, but he was
often resentful of another's telling him what to do, even if that other person
happened to be his boss, the President of the United States. When he and
Roosevelt disagreed on a matter, Woodring would use all his knowledge
and oratorical skill to win Roosevelt over; and if the decision was not what
Woodring felt it should be, he would often delay in carrying out the
President's wishes.
As time passed and Europe headed closer to war, their disagreements
over important policies became more frequent, and Roosevelt, in spite of his
high personal regard for Woodring, began to consider replacing him. The
President, however, was not willing simply to dismiss his Secretary of War;
he wished to ease him out of the War Department by offering him another
lucrative position.12 When their disagreements over official matters got to
the place where they irritated the President, he began to ignore Woodring,
turning to others, both within and outside the War Department. Even when
FDR was ignoring Woodring as Secretary of War, he continued to maintain
a close personal relationship with him. Although the two men frequently
clashed over governmental policies, they never let such disputes interfere
with their admiration, respect, and fondness for one another.18
Harmonious as Woodring's personal associations with his superior were,
his relationships with his military advisers were even better. The close association between Woodring and Chief of Staff Craig was well known; on
numerous occasions it was the topic of editorials and news stories.14 General
Craig had a great respect for Woodring, going so far as to say that during
the period that he, Craig, was Chief of Staff, Woodring had not "made a
single mistake as Secretary."111 Woodring's relations with Craig's successor,
Gen. George C. Marshall, were also very amiable.16 The General Staff and
the heads of the several Service Branches and Combat Arms, as well as the
members of their staffs, appear to have felt that Woodring understood their
problems and based his decisions on a sincere desire to do what was best for
the Army .17 Another factor that endeared the Secretary to the military
leaders was his policy of not interfering in what he considered to be strictly
military matters. According to the Army and Navy /ournal, "Woodring's
relations with the military portions of his department have been marked
with great consideration and sympathetic understanding. Between him and
General Craig ... there has existed a most cordial relationship and effective
cooperation for the good of the military service."18 Perhaps the best expression of Woodring's relationship with the military appeared in a Kansas City
Star editorial written after he had been forced from the cabinet: "He had
strong support from the military men, who found in the secretary an able
business executive, and an open-minded, intelligent and fair department head.
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Plenty of testimony to this effect has come from high military sources."19
The relationship between Woodring and his top military advisers was definitely one of mutual respect and admiration.
In the late thirties, as the threat of Hitler grew larger and larger, the
United States turned increasingly to the question of national defense. When
this began to happen, Woodring found his relationship with Congress becoming increasingly important. He spent hundreds of hours before the
House and Senate Military Affairs committees, made numerous appearances
before the War Department Subcommittee of the House Committee on
Appropriations, and wrote scores of letters to congressional committees and
individual Congressmen, informing them of the Army's needs. He frequently recommended legislation to overcome certain shortcomings, then
did all that he could to convince Congress to provide the authorization and
the necessary appropriations. In his appearances before the committees, the
calm, smooth-talking Secretary usually impressed his listeners with his extensive knowledge of the Army, the Air Corps, the War Department, and
national defense.
After war broke out in Europe in the fall of 1939, Woodring adopted
a policy of "direct dealing" with the congressional leaders who were responsible for Army authorizations and appropriations. This policy, which
consisted of monthly conferences between War Department officials and key
House and Senate committeemen, was initiated because Woodring wished
"to maintain closer contact between the Department and Congress." At these
meetings, Woodring and his military advisers explained what was needed,
what was being done, and what the Congress could and should do to assist
the Army. 20 One of the major consequences of these meetings was the
appearance of a close rapport between Woodring and key members of Congress. This relationship frequently paid big dividends to the Army, such as
it did in early 1939 when Woodring gave the Congressmen a chance to
observe the highly secret work in radar that the Army was undertaking at
the Signal Corps Laboratories at Fort Monmouth, New Jersey; and they
responded by providing an additional but unexplained $150,000, which was
used for radar research.21
Secretary Woodring was highly regarded and respected by a number of
important members of the House and the Senate Military Affairs committees. In the House committee, Chairman Andrew J. May, Dow Harter, John
Sparkman, and Charles I. Faddis thought very highly of Woodring and
were among his most loyal supporters.22 Faddis, one of the most influential
members of the committee, was later to say of Woodring, "He was of the
utmost assistance to us in our efforts to bring our military affairs up to
date."23 In the Senate Military Affairs Committee, numerous individuals,
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both Democrats and Republicans, voiced their confidence in Secretary Woodring. In the fall of 1939 Senator Robert Reynolds of North Carolina told
his fellow committeemen, "I have a good deal of confidence in the Secretary,
and want the benefit of his advice."24 At about the same time Senator Josh
Lee of Oklahoma, in a committee hearing at which Woodring was testifying,
said: "I desire to compliment the present Secretary of War for what he has
done in increasing our defense, which I think is due in large part to his
efforts."25 Republican Senator Styles Bridges of New Hampshire, who, as a
member of the Military Affairs Committee and the War Department Subcommittee on Appropriations, had considerable opportunity to see Woodring
in action, stated on the Senate floor that he found the Secretary "to be an
able, capable, conscientious executive and member of the Cabinet."26 Other
important members of the Senate Military Affairs Committee who had confidence in Woodring and considered him to be a strong Secretary of War
were Senators Edwin Johnson of Colorado, Lister Hill of Alabama, Bennett
Clark of Missouri, and Gerald Nye of North Dakota. The Army and Navy
/ournal summed up Woodring's relationship with the legislative branch by
saying, "He has so conducted himself with Congress that he has had little
difficulty getting his recommendations adopted."27
That Woodring enjoyed a fine relationship with Congress, especially
with the more conservative members whose views he best reflected, was evident in a number of ways. First, his recommendations concerning legislation
were usually accepted and acted upon. Second, although the discussions in
the committee hearings often became heated on both sides, Woodring was
never treated in a rude or disrespectful manner. Third, while numerous
Congressmen praised him publicly and privately for the job that he was
doing, they rarely criticized him. It is doubtful that Woodring could have
enjoyed a better working relationship with Congress than he did. This was
not to say, however, that he always got what he wanted from Congress. In
fact, when it came to appropriations, his meager requests for the War
Department were usually slashed even further by the Bureau of the Budget
and the Congress, both of whom were heavily influenced by the strong
isolationist and antimilitary attitudes of the thirties.28
From an examination of Secretary Woodring's personal relationship
with President Roosevelt, his associations with military leaders, and his dealings with Congress, one might suppose that he experienced a minimum of
political difficulties in running the War Department. Nothing could be further from the truth, for the feuds that Woodring had with his Assistant
Secretary, Louis A. Johnson, and a few members of Roosevelt's "inner circle"
were of such magnitude and caused so much trouble that they more than
offset the gains brought about by his smooth relationships with the President,
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the military, and Congress. A knowledge and an understanding of Woodring's feuds are of utmost importance in understanding this period. Robert
Sherwood, author of Roosevelt and Hopkins, put it best when he said, "History will achieve no complete understanding of Franklin Roosevelt's Administration without knowledge of the intramural feuds which so frequently beset
it. (I do not believe that even history will ever be able to understand why
he tolerated them to the extent that he did.)"29
After the confirmation of Woodring as Secretary of War in May 1937, the
question arose of who would be appointed to fill the post of Assistant Secretary. The names most frequently mentioned for the position were those of
two former National Commanders of the American Legion, Louis A. Johnson and J. Ray Murphy. Both men had hoped to get the position of Secretary,
and both were greatly disappointed when it was given to Woodring. Johnson
was then offered the job of Assistant Secretary, but he turned it down because he did not wish to be in a position where he was a subordinate to
Woodring. Murphy was also offered the position, and he likewise turned
it down. The President then began a search for a "strictly businessman" to
fill the post.so
On 7 June, Roosevelt asked Woodring what he thought of William I.
Westervelt, vice-president of Sears, Roebuck and Company, as a possibility
for Assistant Secretary.s1 Four days later, Woodring reported back that he
would be in favor of the appointment; however, the appointment was never
made, because in the meantime Louis Johnson had changed his mind and
agreed to accept the position.s2 From the time of his initial refusal, Johnson
had been under pressure from James Farley and a few high-ranking American Legion officials to change his mind and accept the number two spot.83
Johnson was hesitant, but he finally agreed to accept the post; his reason for
doing so was based on an alleged promise made to him concerning the
secretaryship. A knowledge of that alleged promise is extremely important
if one is to understand Johnson's actions once he assumed the office of
Assistant Secretary.
According to one version of the story, while Johnson was being pressured to accept the job, James Farley called Senator Matthew M. Neely of
West Virginia, a friend of Johnson's, and asked him to urge Johnson to take
the job. According to Neely, Farley said, "You can tell Louis I think within
three or four months he will be made Secretary if he will take the post."s4
Neely passed this information on to Johnson, who then made his decision.
Whether correctly or not, Johnson interpreted this as a promise from the
President that he would soon be promoted to the top spot. Johnson made no
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effort to keep the promise a secret, for "almost in the same breath with which
he took office ..• he informed intimates that he had been appointed for the
express purpose of replacing Woodring in a few months."811 On numerous
occasions Johnson stated that he had been promised the secretaryship. Sometimes he claimed that Roosevelt made the promise, but most of the time he
said that Farley had made it on the President's behalf. However, Roosevelt
did not recall such a promise, and Farley denied having made any such
pledge.86 Farley termed Johnson's story "absolutely untrue" and told the
President that if there was any question about it, he should bring Johnson and
himself face to face and ask if such a promise had been made. Roosevelt,
wishing to avoid an embarrassing situation, never brought about the confrontation.87 Whether a promise was actually made is not so important as
the fact that Johnson believed, or at least claimed to believe, that he would
soon be named to replace Woodring as Secretary of War.
Following a cabinet meeting on Friday, 11 June 1937, the President told
Woodring that Johnson had agreed to accept the job of Assistant Secretary,
and he asked if Woodring had any objections. When the Secretary replied
in the negative, the President said that the announcement would be given to
the press.38 Just whom Woodring supported is unclear, because on the day
of the cabinet meeting, he sent two letters to the President concerning the
appointment. In one he indicated that he considered William Westervelt
"admirably fitted and qualified as to business ability to be Assistant Secretary
of War." In a second letter he stated, "I desire to recommend for your consideration the name of the Honorable Louis A. Johnson ... for appointment
as Assistant Secretary of War."89 It is likely that the letter on Johnson was
a mere formality and that it was written after the appointment had been
determined. One reason for believing that is was written after the RooseveltWoodring meeting is that it seems unlikely that Roosevelt, who was his
own boss when it came to appointing key officials, would so readily have
accepted W oodring's recommendation.40
In deciding on Johnson, FDR followed his time-tested practice of putting "into the same office or job men who differed from each other in
temperament and viewpoint."41 Roosevelt knew that when opposites were
placed in the top positions in a department or were put in charge of a major
project, their inability to agree or get along insured that "no single view, no
single man could achieve undue significance or influence."42 The result was
that major problems could and did end in Roosevelt's lap---exactly where he
wanted them. The cabinet members knew that because Roosevelt felt that
there were benefits to be gained from departmental quarrels, he was not
always anxious to end them.43 For that reason, Roosevelt gave Ickes and
Hopkins control over public works, gave Ickes and Wallace control over
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conservation and power, placed Sumner Welles in the State Department to
offset Cordell Hull, and placed Johnson in the War Department to counterbalance Woodring. 44
On 15 June 1937 President Roosevelt sent Johnson's name to the Senate
for confirmation. Approval was quickly given, and on 29 June he took office.
Johnson had been born and reared in Roanoke, Virginia, but after graduating from the University of Virginia Law School in 1912, he went to
Clarksburg, West Virginia, to set up practice. He soon entered palitics, and
by 1917 he was Democratic floor leader of the West Virginia House of Delegates and was considering running for Governor. During World War I
Johnson entered the Army, and after receiving a commission, he served in
Europe as a captain in the 80th Infantry Division. After being discharged,
he returned to his law practice; he also became an active member of the
American Legion and was elected National Commander in 1932. In 1936
the staunch Democrat organized the Veterans Division of the Democratic
National Committee, and within a year he was rewarded for his palitical
labors with the past of Assistant Secretary of War.411
Johnson, who was very energetic and ambitious, set out to supplant
Woodring, whom he considered unfit to be Secretary of War.46 He immediately "set himself to running the War Department, acting very much like a
No. 2 man who had been made No. 1 in all but title."47 Johnson believed
that the procurement and economic-mobilization responsibilities conferred
upon the Assistant Secretary of War by the National Defense Act of 1920
made him respansible to the Congress and to the Chief Executive, thus
making him entirely independent of the authority of the Secretary of War.48
Such an interpretation, along with the assumption that he would soon be
elevated to the top spot, led him to feel that he was entitled to direct access
to the President on matters concerning his own office. He also began to
present defense programs and estimates publicly without even consulting his
chief, Secretary Woodring. To the outspoken Johnson the chain of command
meant nothing. Shortly after taking office, Johnson started the practice of
announcing that on a certain date he was going to be appointed Secretary of
War. When the announced day came and nothing happened, he would wait
a few weeks or months, then do the same thing again.49 According to Woodring, Johnson was soon spending "most of his waking hours in trying to
replace me as Secretary of War."110
Predictably, Johnson's attitude and conduct soon created difficulties, and
with the passage of time the animosity between him and Woodring grew
increasingly bitter. At first the two disagreed only over major matters such
as selective service, the impartance of heavy bombers, and the strength of the
Air Corps. But before long they began to bicker and quibble over less im-
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portant things, and then they progressed to the place where they argued over
everything, no matter how insignificant. Eventually the feud got to the place
where the two men merely ignored each other.51
Evidence of the Woodring-Johnson feud was apparent as early as
January 1938. In that month the State Department requested that the Army
send six bombers to Buenos Aires, Argentina, on a good-will flight to help
that country celebrate the inauguration of its new President. Woodring
disapproved of the idea and was prepared to block it. A journalist who
wrote for various South American newspapers and who knew the situation
in the War Department took the idea to the Assistant Secretary. Johnson
liked the idea and took it directly to President Roosevelt, who approved it
and instructed Woodring to send the bombers.112 The flight was made, and
it received favorable world-wide publicity, with Woodring receiving most of
the credit for ordering the flight to be made-a fact that greatly angered
Johnson.
The difficult position in which the Woodring-Johnson feud placed the
military leaders can be seen in an incident that took place when the flight to
Argentina was under consideration. After Johnson had received the idea of
the flight, but before he went to the President, he told' General Craig what
he was going to do, adding, "Don't tell the Secretary." Craig immediately
replied that the Secretary was his chief and that it was his duty to keep him
informed of what was taking place. The General then indicated that if he
had one quality, it was that of loyalty. Finally Craig asked Johnson, if he
were Secretary, what he would think of an Assistant and a Chief of Staff
who kept things from him. Johnson did not reply. 118 Such was the situation
in the War Department.
Both Secretary Woodring and General Craig were bothered and upset
by Johnson's intrigues, but neither was willing to do anything about them.
Woodring, who was politically unsure of himself because he did not know
what FDR had promised to Johnson, approached Craig in November 1938,
asking him to go to the President and explain the condition of the War
Department as a result of Johnson's conduct. Craig refused; he did not feel
that it was his place to go, since the dispute involved the civilian rather than
the military leadership. The Secretary then asked his close friend John C.
O'Laughlin, owner and publisher of the Army and Navy Journal, to see the
President on the matter. O'Laughlin refused, because he felt that Roosevelt
would resent an outsider telling him about one of his own departments. The
publisher did, however, discuss the matter with Press Secretary Steve Early.
Early said that he already knew about the situation in the War Department,
adding that "if Woodring had any guts he would ask the President to relieve
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him or Johnson."" Woodring was unwilling to take such action, and
Roosevelt continued to tolerate the unfortunate situation.
Woodring began to wonder if Roosevelt's tolerance of Johnson's insubordination indicated that Johnson was indeed to replace him. The first
few times that the Assistant Secretary informed General Craig that he,
Johnson, was about to be named Secretary, Craig passed the information on
to Woodring, who naturally became apprehensive, because he didn't know
whether Johnson had made up the story or whether he had actually been so
informed. Eventually, after several false alarms, Woodring learned to ignore
the announcements. Another of Johnson's irritating practices was to plant
in the newspapers information that was favorable to him but detrimental to
Woodring.1111
By the fall of 1939 the War Department, according to one cabinet
member, was "making a holy show of itself with Woodring and Johnson
each trying to outsmart the other." The situation became so bad that on
September 8 Woodring went to see Edwin M. Watson, Roosevelt's Military
Aide and Secretary. Woodring complained that "Johnson was running away
with the War Department." Watson agreed that the matter ought to be
straightened out and that one man ought to be in control; but he did not
offer to make such a suggestion to the President, and so Woodring dropped
the matter.116 His failure to take the problem directly to Roosevelt stemmed
from a number of factors. First, since his influence with the President was
on the wane, he did not feel that he was in a strong enough position to
approach FDR on the matter. As the world situation grew worse in the late
thirties, the views of Roosevelt and Woodring on how to provide adequate
national security became more divergent. The result was that, as time passed,
so did Woodring's influence, and with it went his strong support from the
President.117 Second, Roosevelt's growing reliance on Louis Johnson led
Woodring to feel that if he asked the President to make a choice between
the two, FDR might choose Johnson.118 The Secretary, unfortunately, did
not know that when Roosevelt had been told by James Farley that Johnson
expected to be named Secretary, he had replied, "I wouldn't name Louis
under any circumstances."119 Woodring felt that Roosevelt, knowing the
situation in the War Department, could take action to correct the situation
if he so desired, but apparently he did not wish to do so.
By the time that war broke out in Europe in the fall of 1939, the
Woodring-Johnson feud was public knowledge, for newspapers and magazines were printing stories about the bitter quarrel. Typical was a Time
magazine account of the relations between the two officials: "Only when
absolutely necessary do they speak to each other. When official business
requires them to communicate, they do so in writing or through harried
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subordinates. Mr. Johnson despises Mr. Woodring. Mr. Woodring distrusts
and despises Mr. Johnson, who for 27 months has gunned for Mr. Woodring's job."60 At about the same time the New York Times reported that
apparently a group of New Dealers close to the President felt that the rivalry
between Woodring and Johnson "for domination within the War Department had reached a point where the President would have to exert his
authority." 61 Still the President, who was willing to ignore or sweep "embarrassing administrative problems under the rug," did nothing.62
The unfortunate aspect of the feud between the Secretary and the Assistant Secretary was the disruptive effect that it had on the War Department
and, consequently, on military preparedness. The continual bickering and
fighting at the top became so bad that the military leaders often did not
know who was running the department.68 One example of how the feuding
between the two men affected efficiency was an incident that took place in
January 1938. While Johnson was out of town on a trip, Woodring rewrote
the procedures by which certain aircraft parts should be purchased. Johnson,
upon his return, did not approve of Woodring's changes and halted all transactions concerning the parts until the dispute could be settled. In a few weeks
the two antagonists agreed to a compromise, and purchasing resumed; but, in
the meantime, valuable procurement time had been lost.64
The Woodring-Johnson feud placed Chief of Staff Craig in an especially
difficult position. Craig's plight was described by one contemporary as being
that of a man "sitting on the fence between these two gentlemen. If he followed the Secretary's instructions he would be in bad odor with the Assistant
Secretary, who was quite powerful. If he followed the lead of Mr. Johnson,
Mr. Woodring would have him called to account. It was an impossible and
tragic situation."611 It was in large part due to this state of affairs that General
Craig left his position as Chief of Staff in June 1939 instead of in September.66 General Marshall, Craig's successor, found himself in the same difficult position, but, like Craig, he never deserted Secretary Woodring. As
Marshall later told Johnson, "Mr. Woodring was Secretary of War and I
owed loyalty to him."67 In 1951 Marshall recalled that working under
Woodring and Johnson had been "the most miserable experience of my life."
As he described it, "I had to be Chief of Staff to a Secretary . . . and his
first assistant who weren't speaking to each other. They not only didn't
make any secret of how they hated and despised each other, they ran to the
President behind each other's back."68
The feud did more than cause difficulty for the Chief of Staff; it also
caused partiality among the generals at the War Department. Those military leaders working closest with the Secretary of War usually became
"Woodring men," while those working closest with the Assistant Secretary
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became "Johnson men." Because of this division, relations between the military leaders became increasingly strained, and the work of the General Staff
became more difficult. 69 The effects of this division upon the department
were later recalled by Brig. Gen. William Ritchie, who served as Woodring's
aide and pilot from 1935 to 1938. As he remembered it, Johnson frequently
pointed out to top members of the Secretary of War's staff
that they would do well to pay more attention to his policies since he would soon
be Boss and calling the shots. Of this Mr. Woodring was fully aware.
It soon became evident in all echelons of the War Department that Mr.
Johnson was the aggressor in this top-level feuding and was continually attempting to undermine the Secretary of War's announced policies, especially when he
would be away on business trips or a vacation. Mr. Woodring could never afford
to miss a Cabinet meeting, since Mr. Johnson would then sit in as Acting Secretary of War. This situation reached a point where I would have to accompany
the Woodrings, even on vacation trips, so as to have a plane stand_ing by to fly
him immediately to Washington should his Administrative Assistant give him a
hurry call. This situation presented a poor spectacle for the military to see the
civilian heads of the War Department engaged in political and personal feuding
to the overall detriment of the efficiency and image of the entire Department.70

In order to gain a better understanding of the interworkings of the War
Department during this period, a close examination will be made of the
numerous factors that served to influence one major decision. That decision
concerned naming a replacement for Chief of Staff Malin Craig. This example is appropriate in that it deals with one of the most important decisions
of the period; it also gives a better understanding of the distrust and lack of
cooperation that often characterized relationships both within the War Department and between the War Department and the President. In two respects this example is atypical. First, it was one of the few times that Woodring and Johnson agreed on a matter. Second, the decision that was made
was an excellent one, and it ultimately benefited the Army and the nation.
As will be seen in later chapters, the strained relationship that existed between
the War Department and the White House was to result in some decisions
that did not serve the best interests of the nation.
Although General Craig was expected to remain as Chief of Staff until
September 1939, Woodring had started to think about a replacement for him
as early as March 1937. At that time the Secretary asked Gen. Douglas
MacArthur, former Chief of Staff, if he would like to return to his old post
after Craig's retirement. When MacArthur indicated that he would not consider such an offer under any circumstances, Woodring dropped the matter
and never mentioned it to him again.71 In the months that followed, there
was a great deal of speculation, especially among military men, as to who
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would be the next Chief of Staff. The name most frequently mentioned was
that of Maj. Gen. Hugh A. Drum, who had expected to receive the post in
1935 but had been disappointed when Roosevelt surprisingly named General
Craig to the position.72 For reasons that are unclear, Woodring showed little
enthusiasm over the possibility of Drum's being appointed, and he began to
look for another candidate.73
In the spring of 1938 Maj. Gen. Stanley Embick, Deputy Chief of Staff,
told Woodring of a brigadier general named George C. Marshall, who
might be Chief of Staff material. Embick asked that Marshall be brought
to Washington so that his work could be closely observed. After Woodring
agreed, Marshall was made head of the War Plans Division of the General
Staff.74 The fifty-eight-year-old graduate of the Virginia Military Institute
did an excellent job in his new position, and both Woodring and Craig were
greatly impressed; however, they hesitated to mp}{e Marshall Deputy Chief
of Staff, because he was only a brigadier general and they feared that a
number of senior officers might resent taking orders from him.76 One individual who was not hesitant about advancing Marshall was Assistant Secretary Johnson.
Johnson, who had met Marshall before the latter came to Washington,
was greatly impressed by him and actively worked for his appointment as
Chief of Staff.76 In fact, it was Johnson who was responsible for Marshall's
being made Deputy Chief of Staff. In October 1938 Woodring was out of
Washington, and Johnson was Acting Secretary on the day that the War
Council was to meet. Although the Deputy Chief of Staff usually attended
such meetings, the position was vacant at that time, General Embick having
taken a new command. Before the meeting started, Johnson asked General
Craig to appoint General Marshall as Deputy Chief. When Craig tried to
side-step the issue by replying that the matter would be worked out, Johnson
informed him that there would be no War Council meeting until his, Johnson's, wishes were carried out. Craig left the office for a few minutes, after
which he returned, and told Johnson that the orders had been issued. 77
Although Woodring was unhappy at the manner in which the appointment
was made, he did not complain, because he was glad to see Marshall in that
spot.
In spite of the confidence that Woodring had in Marshall, he was still
hesitant to support his appointment as Chief of Staff. Woodring considered
the matter of seniority to be quite important, and he was concerned about a
possible morale problem should the rule of seniority be ignored. For this
reason he leaned, perfunctorily, in the direction of Major General Drum as
late as the fall of 1938. Marshall was thirty-fourth in seniority, but a rule
that no one could be appointed Chief of Staff who could not serve out a full
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four-year term before the mandatory retirement age of sixty-four made him
the fifth-ranking eligible.78
In November, Roosevelt introduced his new air-rearmament programa program that Woodring and Craig were less than enthusiastic about because of its tendency to ignore the land forces. Such an attitude placed the
two men on unfavorable terms with the White House in late 1938 and early
1939. By January 1939 Woodring, apparently alienated by the pressure being
exerted by and on behalf of Drum, appeared to have overcome his earlier
concerns on the question of seniority and was willing to support Marshall
as the new Chief of Staff; nevertheless, the strained relationship with the
President kept him and Craig from making such a recommendation for fear
that their support would prejudice Marshall's chances.79 Woodring and
Craig recalled that when in 1935 Secretary Dern had made a recommendation as to who should be named Chief of Staff, Roosevelt had rejected it.
Woodring therefore decided that he would not recommend anyone unless
the President specifically asked him to do so.80 This decision was based not
only on what had happened in 1935 but also on the fact that the President
had made it increasingly clear that because he regarded the Chief of Staff as
his personal adviser, "he alone would pick the officer that appealed to him
personally."81
During this period, Johnson continued to push for the appointment of
Marshall. This was one of the very few instances in which Woodring and
Johnson were in agreement, but at that time they were so at odds and their
means of communication were so disrupted that neither was certain of the
other's position. General Marshall knew their views, but he was not anxious
that they be publicized for fear that either Woodring or Johnson might drop
his support if he knew that the other was supporting him. As Marshall described it, "Johnson wanted me for Chief of Staff, but I didn't want Woodring
to know he was for me. Craig was for me, but I wanted it kept from the
President. Woodring was for me, but I didn't want the others to know."62
The suspicion, distrust, and ill will that prevailed among the personalities
involved in selecting the Chief of Staff reveal that the personal relationships
both within the War Department and between the War Department and the
Commander in Chief were far from smooth. The President, the Secretary
of War, the Assistant Secretary of War, and the Chief of Staff were anything
but a team.
During the first week of April 1939 Roosevelt sent for the records of the
outstanding General Officers, so that he could consult them before choosing
the next Chief of Staff. At that time Woodring broke his earlier silence and
recommended General Marshall. 83 Whether he did this on his own or
whether he was asked by the President to give his opinion is unknown; nor
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do we know how forceful his recommendation was. According to Woodring, "I threatened to resign unless he took General Marshall, my nominee."84 In the light of his own standing with the President at that time, it
seems highly unlikely that he would have made such a bold move.
On Sunday, 23 April, Roosevelt called Marshall to the White House
and informed him that he was to be the new Chief of Staff. Marshall was
the first one to know; the President had not yet told anyone else, including
the Secretary of War, of his selection. Just why Roosevelt chose him will
never be known for certain, but Marshall felt that favorable words from
Woodring and from FDR's close friend Harry Hopkins were primary
factors.811 That Marshall considered Woodring's role to be very important is
evident from a personal letter that he wrote to Woodring on 28 April 1939:
My Dear Mr. Secretary:
I got away so hurriedly yesterday that I had little to say to you in appreciation
of your action in nominating me to the President for the job of Chief of Staff.
The fact that you selected me is the great compliment to my career, but I am
more grateful to you for the very special effort you saw fit to evoke in order to
bring about my final selection by the President.86
What weight Woodring's recommendation might have had will never be
known, but it would seem that the realization that the Secretary of War and
the Chief of Staff had to work together would have caused Roosevelt to give
W oodring's views at least some consideration.
In addition to Woodring's constant dealings with the President, military
leaders, Congressmen, and the Assistant Secretary of War, he was in constant contact with his fellow cabinet members. With some, such as Secretary
of State Cordell Hull, Secretary of the Navy Claude Swanson, and Postmaster
General James Farley, he got along very well. With others, such as Secretary of Labor Frances Perkins, Secretary of Agriculture Henry Wallace,
Secretary of Commerce Daniel Roper, and Attorney General Homer Cummings, his association was quite satisfactory. Unfortunately, Woodring's
relationship with a group of New Dealers in the cabinet and on the White
House staff was not much better than his relationship with Louis Johnson.
The leader of that group was Secretary of the Interior Harold Ickes. The feeling between Woodring and Ickes was one of mutual hostility, and from the
day that Woodring came into the cabinet until the time he was forced out,
Ickes headed an anti-Woodring group that worked almost continually for
his removal. In speaking of the efforts to bring about Woodring's removal,
Ickes was to say, "I doubt whether any comparable pressure has ever been
put on the President in a personal matter."87
In his efforts to force Woodring from the cabinet, Ickes enlisted the aid
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of any individual in Roosevelt's inner circle who did not care for the Secretary of War and wished to see him go. Included in this group at one time
or another were Henry Morgenthau, Jr., Secretary of the Treasury; Harry
Hopkins, a presidential adviser and later Secretary of Commerce; Sumner
Welles, Assistant Secretary of State; Thomas Corcoran, a presidential adviser; Edwin M. Watson, a military aide and adviser to the President; and
Steve Early, the President's Press Secretary.88 Members of this "White
House clique," as Woodring and his close friends referred to the group, did
not work as a unit, but they were united in a common goal, which was to
get a new Secretary of War. Louis Johnson was aware of the clique, and he
hoped that it would achieve its goal. But he was not associated with it,
because most members of the group held no higher opinion of him than they
did of Woodring.
The antagonism between Woodring and Ickes had started in 1933 when
Woodring wrote a letter to Ickes, criticizing him for the way in which he
was handling certain matters pertaining to public works. After the angry
Ickes wrote a strong reply to Woodring, telling him to mind his own business, the battle was on. Several more disputes in the next few years further
heightened the hostility between the two. Ickes made no secret of this
antagonism; thus, when Woodring was being considered to fill the vacancy
created by the death of George Dern, Ickes voiced his disapproval, because
he considered Woodring "distinctly second or third caliber material." When
the appointment was made, Ickes did not hide his disappointment, and a
few days later said about the new Secretary of War: "He struts about with
inflated chest more sure of himself and more disagreeable and dictatorial
than any man I have met in the Government. He is a damned little upstart
with no background and no imagination."89 It was clear what Ickes thought
of W oodring.90 While W oodring's dislike of the Secretary of the Interior
was considerable, he was not so open in saying so.
The first attempt to force Woodring out came in the late summer of
1937, when Ickes confidentially informed a writer for the Washington Evening Star that Woodring was on his way out and that he would he sent to
the Philippines as High Commissioner.91 It was hoped that the rumor
would make it easier for the President to take such action, since everyone
concerned would be more or less expecting it. Woodring's denials that he
was leaving the War Department failed to quell the rumors; they did not
die until Roosevelt emphatically declared that Woodring would remain.92
At this time the Secretary of War and the President still saw eye to eye, and
things in the War Department were running smoothly; consequently,
Roosevelt had no serious thoughts of replacing Woodring. That the War
Secretary was satisfied with his present position became evident in the spring
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of 1938, when, with a rather strong senatorial boom developing for him in
Kansas, he punctured the balloon by saying, "I am perfectly happy and completely absorbed in my present work."93
In the fall of 1938, however, Roosevelt's ideas on having Woodring
remain as Secretary of War had begun to change, for by that time the two
men were disagreeing on certain defense matters.94 The prospect of a new
Secretary of War now became more and more appealing. Although Roosevelt would have liked to see Woodring go, he could not bring himself to
force him out. FDR was an extremely soft individual when it came to dealing with personal friends; he wanted to be liked, and he did not wish to do
anything that might endanger a long friendship. 95 As one contemporary
journalist said, "Firing associates is not one of Roosevelt's strong points."96
Since the President could not bring himself to fire Woodring or ask for his
resignation, he hoped to offer him an attractive post, such as an ambassadorship, so that he would willingly step down from his cabinet post. FDR
thought that such offers would either be accepted or that they would at least
cause Woodring to realize that he was not wanted in his present position
and thus would bring about his resignation.97
Roosevelt's strategy did not work on Woodring for a number of reasons.
First, Woodring did not want to leave Washington. He and Helen led a
dazzling life as they set the social pace for the Roosevelt administration. It
is doubtful whether any couple in the nation's capital had more friends, did
more entertaining, or were entertained more than the Woodrings. They
both enjoyed such a life, and they did not relish the thought of giving it up.
Furthermore, because the Secretary had three small children, he was somewhat reluctant to move to a foreign country.98 Second, Woodring considered
himself a fighter. If there was anything he did not like, it was a quitter. To
resign when the going got rough at the War Department would be the same
as quitting, and therefore it was unthinkable. Third, Woodring liked his
job; he truly enjoyed all the power, pageantry, and publicity that came with
his cabinet post. Fourth, he liked action, and he liked a real challenge. As
time passed and the nation began to rearm, his job at the War Department
became increasingly important and difficult, and the challenge made him
more determined than ever to remain at his post. For all these reasons
Woodring refused to resign.99
The first time that President Roosevelt actually indicated a desire to
ease Woodring out of the cabinet was on 24 December 1938, when he told
Louis Johnson that he was going to see if Woodring would be acceptable to
Canada as the United States Minister. This idea was part of a larger plan
to reshuffie the cabinet. Under the contemplated scheme, which the President had started to formulate in early December when Attorney General
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Homer Cummings resigned, Frank Murphy, Governor of Michigan, would
be named Attorney General; Woodring would be sent to Canada; and Johnson would be made Secretary of War.100 Then, after a short period, Johnson
would be sent to the Philippines as High Commissioner, Murphy would be
transferred to the War Department, and Solicitor General Robert Jackson
would be made Attorney General. The reason that Jackson was not made
Attorney General immediately was that he was a New Yorker, and another
New Yorker, Harry Hopkins, had just been named to the cabinet; with two
other members of the cabinet from the Empire State, the President feared a
public reaction against the lack of geographical balance in the cabinet. When
Ickes and Roosevelt discussed this plan on 29 December, Ickes voiced his
wholehearted approval, especially for the moves in the War Department,
since both Woodring and Assistant Secretary Johnson had "created an unpleasant situation by lining up generals on each side and openly fighting for
the place."101
The first phase of the President's plan went into effect on 30 December,
when he appointed Murphy as Attorney General. Then the scheme ran into
difficulty, for when Roosevelt offered Woodring the Canadian post, he
turned it down. With Woodring's rejection of the position in Canada,
FDR's reshuffling plan came to a halt, since the President was unwilling to
force him from office. When Roosevelt's close associates asked him why he
did not remove Woodring, he replied that such a move would be politically
unwise, because it might result in a loss of the Kansas delegation at the 1940
Democratic convention. Since Roosevelt made such statements even before
he was apparently considering a third term, it would seem that he was using
the Kansas delegation as an cxcuse.102
At the same time that he turned down the offer of the Canadian post,
Woodring told the President that there was one job that he would be interested in-Ambassador to England. At the time such an appointment
seemed out of the question, because Roosevelt was pleased with the work of
Ambassador Joseph P. Kennedy. Furthermore, it was doubtful whether
Woodring could afford the post, because Kennedy was forced to spend
$70,000 a year from his own pocket, and Woodring did not have that kind
of money.103 Secretary Ickes contended that Woodring's father-in-law, Senator Coolidge, had agreed to put up half a million dollars to finance the
post, but in reality the figure was $5,000 ( a good example of Ickes's tendency
to exaggerate).104 That Woodring had an interest in the London job was
made evident in a letter of 20 June 1939 to his friend M. M. Levant. At that
time he indicated his satisfaction with his present job, but he added that "if
the Ambassadorship to the Court of St. James were offered me, it would be
quite a temptation, as it would be quite an experience for a country Kansas
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boy." 105 A short time later, however, he denied having any such interest. In
a trans-Atlantic phone conversation with Woodring, Ambassador Kennedy
revealed a desire to leave his post, saying, "Anything you can do to get me
home is what I want." Woodring stated that he did not want the job, but
that he wanted to remain in his present position until 1941.106 Nevertheless,
throughout the summer of 1939 Woodring continued to be mentioned as
being under consideration for a diplomatic post in Ottawa or London.
On 30 August 1939 Harlan Miller of the Washington Post indicated
that Woodring might be induced to take the Canadian position, "but a war
crisis involving us might keep him at his present post."107 Two days later
that crisis came when Germany attacked Poland. Any chance that Woodring would voluntarily resign was now gone, for he had always wanted to
be at the center of action, and after 1 September 1939 the War Department
was such a place. With the outbreak of war in Europe putting new pres-sures on the military, Roosevelt again toyed with the idea of removing
Woodring. Attorney General Murphy, who had come into the cabinet with
the understanding that he would soon be named Secretary of War, was getting anxious to make the change, and in early September he asked Ickes to
discuss the matter with the President. At that time Roosevelt assured Ickes
that Woodring was on his way out; however, the weeks slipped by, and still
nothing happened.108
Up to this time, Roosevelt's refusal to replace Woodring was due to his
reluctance to remove an old friend and possibly to his desire to ensure the
support of the Kansas delegation at the next Democratic convention; but
after war broke out in Europe, there arose another consideration that made
him reluctant to act. That consideration was expressed by columnist Ernest
K. Lindley, who said: "By his [Woodring's] spunky stand for a cautious
foreign policy he has won many new friends. Any attempt to force him out
almost certainly would provoke the open charge that it was because of his
wholehearted opposition to dangerous entanglements in the current European war."109 Woodring, by making strong pledges of noninvolvement, was
becoming a well-known spokesman for those individuals who advocated nonintervention at any cost except in the case of aggression against the United
States. To remove the Secretary of War would appear to be an attack on the
isolationists, and Woodring could well become a rallying point for their
cause.U° For this reason Roosevelt was more reluctant than ever to act.
In November, Ickes went to the President and asked that something be
done about the situation in the War Department, where the feuding was
becoming a "public scandal." Ickes then offered his advice on how to get
rid of Woodring. As he later explained it, "My plan was to build up in
Woodring's mind the idea that Dublin was a very important and critical
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post now on account of the war, that the President wanted a strong man
there, and that this job might lead to an even better one." When Roosevelt
indicated that he did not think such a plan would convince Woodring to
leave, Ickes said, "I think you ought to tell him that he has the choice of
Dublin or Kansas." When FDR said nothing, Ickes added, "You just can't
do that sort of thing, can you, Mr. President." "No, Harold, I can't," replied
Roosevelt."111 As 1939 came to an end, the President still wanted a new
Secretary of War, but "being one who was forever putting off anything
distasteful," he would not replace Woodring.112
During the early part of 1940 Roosevelt continued his efforts to ease
Woodring out. In January, when he learned that William Phillips, United
States Ambassador to Italy, was planning to resign, he offered the job to
Woodring, who thanked him for the offer but politely declined it. After this
incident, Drew Pearson and Robert Allen concluded that "apparently it's
going to take more than a sugar-coated hint to dislodge the Secretary of
War."118
At about this time, Ickes, who now seemed to be obsessed with the idea
of removing Woodring, suggested to Roosevelt that he make Woodring
Ambassador to France and that he appoint the present ambassador, William
Bullitt, as Secretary of War. The President rejected the idea by maintaining
that Bullitt was so popular with the French officials and people that he could
not possibly make such a change.114 In February and March, Woodring's
name was again mentioned as a possible replacement for Kennedy in London, but Roosevelt persuaded Kennedy to remain at his post, so that possibility faded.m Up to this time, all efforts to persuade Woodring to leave
his post had failed, and one Washington columnist concluded that Woodring's "defense of his post against all assaults has been a tactical masterpiece
which probably will be studied by military men for decades."116
After rejection of his plans to send Woodring to Ireland or France,
Ickes continued to ponder the question of how to remove him, and in May
1940 he came up with what he called a "brilliant idea" to accomplish his
goal. On May 17, a few hours before a regularly scheduled cabinet meeting,
Ickes explained his latest plan to the President. At the meeting that afternoon he intended to say in effect: "Mr. President, when you selected us as
members of your Cabinet, the world was at peace ... [but] conditions have
so radically changed that I think it is only fair that all of us should resign
and leave you free either to revamp your present Cabinet ... or to constitute
an entirely new one." Ickes would then offer his resignation, and when the
other cabinet members followed suit, the President could accept the resignations of those men he wanted out and refuse those of anyone he wished
to retain. Ickes told Roosevelt what he planned to do, because he felt that
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if the President did not know about it, he might, in his surprise, say something that would make it more difficult to get rid of Woodring. Although
the plan was aimed specifically at Woodring, Ickes did not say so to the
President. After Ickes made his scheme known, Roosevelt said, "Why, I
couldn't do that, Harold. Some of the members of the Cabinet might think
that I don't want them." Feeling that lckes's proposal would place him in
an awkward and difficult position, the President turned it down and then
added, "It isn't necessary anyhow, because I am going to ask Woodring's
resignation." Ickes, who had heard that story before, laughed impolitely
and said, "Mr. President, you will never do it." To this, Roosevelt replied,
"You don't know what I can do when I make up my mind."117 More than
a month later Roosevelt finally did what many intimates were convinced
that he could never do-force Woodring from office. The factors that finally
caused the President to act will be examined in chapter 10.
There can be no doubt that the activities of Johnson, Ickes, and the New
Deal clique did much to hamper Woodring's effectiveness as Secretary of
War. With an assistant doing everything he could to undermine his superior,
there soon developed distrust and confusion throughout the War Department. As a result, overall efficiency suffered. The continual efforts of Ickes
and the occasional help of Murphy and Morgenthau in the attempt to replace Woodring indicate that the teamwork and cooperation of the cabinet
left something to be desired. Woodring's influence was also undercut by
Roosevelt's frequent statements to various officials that he was going to remove him. Such comments indicated to those men around the President
that he lacked confidence in his Secretary of War. All of these factors caused
Woodring's years as Secretary to be one continuous battle to stay in office.
Much of the time and energy that he was forced to use just to keep his job
could have been more effectively used in working for the good of the Army.
With all the time spent feuding, it was amazing that Woodring was able to
accomplish as much as he did. One can only speculate as to what he might
have accomplished had those feuds been avoided.
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9
Problems of Rearmament

It is impossible to determine exactly when United States rearmament got
under way. According to President Roosevelt, his requests of 28 January
1938 for increased armaments "were but the beginning of a vast program of
rearmament."1 That $45 million proposal, however, was aimed primarily
at strengthening the Navy, only $17 million being requested for the Army.
The Navy's rearmament program was undertaken before that of the Army
for several reasons: first, it was generally felt that the Navy would, in all
likelihood, be the first force to meet an enemy; second, a longer period of
time would be needed to increase materially the size of the fleet; third, President Roosevelt had a great personal interest in the Navy and its activities.2
While rearmament was a somewhat gradual process, 14 November 1938
stands out as the most important date in the rearmament of the United
States Army or, more specifically, of the Army Air Corps. Upset by Hitler's
success at the Munich Conference and alarmed by reports of the growing
military might of Germany and Italy, Roosevelt decided to expand drastically the nation's air strength. On 14 November the President called his top
civilian and military advisers, with the exception of Secretary of War Woodring, who was on leave, to the White House, in order to reveal his intention
to provide a 10,000-plane air force and to establish a productive capacity of
10,000 planes per year. Thus began the rearmament program of the United
States Army.8 Before seeing what actually occurred at the November 1938
conference, the consequences of that meeting, and the role that Woodring
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played in the new program, it will be valuable to examine Woodring's record
and views on air power and the Air Corps prior to the fall of 1938.
As has already been seen, Harry Woodring, as Assistant Secretary of
War, had taken a deep and sincere interest in the growth and development
of the Air Corps. He had used every possible opportunity to inform the
public of the "urgent necessity for additional aircraft," and in 1936 he had
played a major role in getting Congress to increase the Army's air strength
from 1,800 to 2,320 aircraft.4 During his first year as Secretary, Woodring
continued to emphasize the Air Corps, but he did so, not because he considered it more important than the ground forces, but because he felt it was
more deficient and therefore should receive more attention; what he desired
was a well-balanced military force. As he told a nationwide radio audience
in the summer of 1937: "I have stressed the aviation element of our national
defense, not because I regard it of paramount importance. All branches of
our defense forces are important. If war unhappily comes to America we
must defend ourselves on the sea, on the land, and in the air. A failure in
any element might prove fatal." 11
Woodring foresaw a bright future for military aircraft as an auxiliary
to ground forces rather than as an independent weapon. He believed that
emphasis should be placed on fighter planes and light and medium bombers
that could be used in close support of ground troops or for attacking enemy
ships that approached the nation's shores. He looked upon the Army as a
strictly defensive force, and the airplane as a defensive weapon. He felt that
long-range bombers were "aggressive" rather than "defensive" weapons and
therefore had no real place in the Army Air Corps.6 Such thinking was in
line with that of General Craig and most of the General Staff.7 There were,
however, a few military men, such as Gen. Frank Andrews, commander of
GHQ Air Force, and Col. Hugh Knerr, his chief of staff, who felt that heavy
bombers such as the B-17 were essential for an adequate defense and that they
should make up a major percentage of the Air Corps's aircraft.8
In addition to his idea of how airplanes should be used militarily, there
was another and perhaps more important reason that Woodring favored
light and medium bombers over the heavy types-that reason was cost. Until
1939 the funds available to the Army for the purchase of planes were quite
small, and Woodring felt that it was better to purchase two twin-engine
bombers than one four-engine model. According to Col. James H. Bums,
Executive Assistant to the Assistant Secretary of War, Woodring "was interested in numbers only and ... any arrangement made towards gain in
number of planes would undoubtedly be approved by the Secretary."9 General Arnold expressed the same idea when he said, "The superiority of one
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B-17 to two B-l0's was a mystery which Secretary Woodring ... never
understood."10
Secretary Woodring's reluctance to order heavy bombers can be better
understood when the cost of them is compared to that of two-engine
bombers. For example, in June 1937 the Army ordered more than one hundred twin-engine B-16 bombers at a cost of $65,000 per plane. One month
later the War Department let a contract for thirteen Flying Fortresses at a
total cost of $3.7 million, or nearly $280,000 per plane.11 Therefore, the Army
could buy four B-16's for the same amount that it would pay for one B-17.
The cost of a new four-engine bomber was extremely high because of the
excessive cost of "tooling up" and training skilled production personnel.
Until the planes were ordered in fairly large quantities, the cost remained
excessively high.12 With less than $37 million to spend on aircraft for the
entire year, Woodring understandably favored the much cheaper light and
medium bombers.
Woodring's desire for a larger number of planes was also conditioned
by his realization that modern aircraft could not be quickly produced.18
Since construction of planes necessarily took considerable time, he believed
that it was necessary to have a peacetime Air Force that would approximate
rather closely the wartime requirements. According to Woodring: "In a
major war our air arm would probably be engaged almost immediately on
the opening of hostilities. Therefore, it is desirable that it be practically on a
war footing in time of peace."14 If the limited appropriations were used on
expensive heavy bombers, the 2,320-plane force that was considered essential
for the nation's defense could never become a reality.
In June of 1937 Woodring, for the reasons stated above, opposed the
purchase of anything but twin-engine bombers for the upcoming fiscal year.
In the face of constant pressure, he did retreat and order thirteen Flying
Fortresses.111 Woodring's refusal to provide more heavy bombers was bitterly
criticized by Assistant Secretary Johnson and a small group of military men
who had great faith in the B-17. This group looked forward with anxiety
to the aircraft-procurement program for fiscal year 1939. It was in early 1938,
when the new air program was under consideration, that Woodring and
Johnson first clashed over the make-up of the Air Corps. The controversy
emerged at a meeting in which Woodring presented the General Staff's
proposal for 1939. After going over the plan, which provided for only twelve
B-17's, Woodring concluded by saying, "That will be the plan." When
Johnson began to raise an objection, Woodring said, "We all know you are
opposed to it." "Yes I am opposed to it," replied Johnson, who then asked
if General Andrews could express his views. The request was granted, and
Andrews made a plea for a larger number of heavy bombers; but when
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The cabinet in 1938 (clockwise from the President): President Roosevelt, Morgenthau,
(Treasury), Cummings (Attorney General) , Swanson (Navy), Wallace (Agriculture) , Perkins
(Labor), Vice-President Garner, Roper (Commerce), Ickes (Interior), Farley (Postmaster
General), Woodring (War), Hull (State).

Former Secretary of War Patrick J. Hurley, Secretary of War Harry H. Woodring, President
Franklin D. Roosevelt, Brig. Gen. Albert L. Cox, and Assistant Secretary of War Louis A.
Johnson viewing the Army Day Parade in Washington, D.C., 6 April 1938.

Helen and Harry Woodring leaving for Europe on their honeymoon, July 1933.

Andrews had finished, Woodring pointed to the plan before him and stated:
"This is still the program." Determined to have the last word, Johnson replied: "With all due respect to your office, there is a statutory responsibility
involved. This is not the program until the Commander in Chief approves
it."16 Then, before Woodring could submit the program to the President,
Johnson took it to the White House and expressed his disapproval. Johnson urged Roosevelt to place more emphasis on the Air Corps and to increase
the number of heavy bombers. At that particular time, Roosevelt, who was
not prepared to support the expensive program that Johnson was advocating,
accepted the proposal made by Secretary Woodring. The new program
called for the building of enough planes in the next three years to bring the
Air Corps to its authorized strength of 2,320.17
In order to implement the War Department's new aircraft program, in
the spring of 1938 Congress appropriated $37 million for the purchase of 450
new planes. Shortly thereafter, however, Secretary Woodring began to feel
that the number of planes in the Air Corps should be increased at a more
rapid rate than the approved program called for. 18 He decided that the best
way to bring about such an increase was to stop purchasing heavy bombers
and to use the money to buy a greater number of light and medium bombers;
thus, in June he halted the purchase of three heavy bombers and ordered
that the money be used toward the purchase of medium bombers.19 On '19
July, Woodring went even farther and sent a memorandum to Maj. Gen.
Oscar Westover, Chief of the Air Corps, informing him that "estimates for
bombers in fiscal year 1940 (must) be restricted to light, medium and attack
types.''20 This order did not greatly bother General Westover, who "was in
favor of large bombers in limited numbers ... [ and] a large number of
smaller bombers for close-in support of the Army."21
In September 1938 two events occurred that ultimately led to major
changes in the program of the Army Air Corps. On 21 September, General
Westover was killed in a plane crash, and the Assistant Chief of the Air
Corps, Brig. Gen. Henry H. ("Hap") Arnold, was named Acting Chief
until the President could make a permanent appointment. White House
aides Steve Early and Edwin Watson urged Roosevelt to appoint the GHQ
Commander, Gen. Frank Andrews. Both Woodring and Craig opposed the
appointment of Andrews because of the great emphasis that he placed on
heavy bombers. They favored General Arnold because of his more moderate
views on that subject. Arnold, although he was a firm believer in the value
of the heavy bomber, tended to favor a balanced air force. When some of
Andrew's supporters began to spread rumors that Arnold was irresponsible,
unreliable, and an alcoholic, Woodring and Craig came to his defense, assuring the President that there was no truth to such reports and maintaining
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that Arnold deserved the post. Roosevelt ultimately followed their recommendation, and on 2.9 September he named Arnold as Chief of the Air
Corps.22
The second important event of September 1938 was the Munich Conference, at which Hitler received the Sudeten area of Czechoslovakia. The
United States Ambassador to France, William Bullitt, immediately returned
home and reported to President Roosevelt that Hitler's success was in large
part due to French fears of the German Air Force. The conversation with
Bullitt, along with similar reports from other officials in Europe, alarmed
Roosevelt, causing him to examine more closely the size and make-up of the
United States Air Corps.23 Consequently, October 1938 was to become a key
month in the history of Army aviation. Throughout that month the President and the War Department were preoccupied with the question of what
role aviation should play in the United States defense system.
During this crucial period, Secretary Woodring was frequently away
from his Washington office, making speeches on behalf of Democratic congressional candidates. Two political tours-the first lasting from 7 to 12
October, and the second from 20 October to 2 November-were made in
response to a request from President Roosevelt that Woodring serve as an
administration spokesman in support of key party candidates. Woodring
looked upon his selection as an honor, and he was glad to be of service to
the President and the party. His campaigning took him to nine states, where
he made a dozen major speeches praising the Roosevelt administration and
urging the election of Democratic congressional candidates.24 Roosevelt's
decision to send Woodring on these trips was probably twofold. First, since
no other cabinet member possessed more oratorical skill or was a more
effective campaigner than Woodring, the President knew that he was sending a man whose speeches would be a credit to the administration and
would be beneficial to the candidates. Second, the President, who undoubtedly was giving thought to expansion of the Air Corps, apparently decided
that it would be a good time to have the Secretary of War out of town. It
was no secret that Woodring favored a balanced military machine, whereas
Assistant Secretary Johnson desired a large, powerful Air Corps; thus,
Roosevelt knew that it would be easier to gain the War Department's
approval of his expansion program if Johnson, rather than Woodring, were
in charge.211
Before departing on his October political tours, Secretary Woodring
took care of one matter that he had been turning over in his mind for a
month. On 2 September the President had shown him a confidential letter
from Hugh R. Wilson, Ambassador in Berlin, in which he discussed the
potential of German air power.26 In that letter, Wilson warned that anyone
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who thought "that France, England, and the United States, especially the
United States, held at least a small margin of superiority in the air over
Germany" was badly mistaken, because "the facts are that Germany ... has
produced an air arm second to none in numbers and quality of first-line
fighting airplanes." 27 Because Hitler's success at Munich had convinced
Woodring of the validity of Wilson's claim, in early October he asked General Arnold to prepare a plan for expanding the Air Corps by 4,000 planes,
thereby creating a force of 6,320 planes. By 19 October, General Arnold had
completed the plan and had submitted it to the Secretary's office; however,
Woodring was on his political sojourn and did not see it until he returned
to his duties in mid November.28
In mid October, President Roosevelt began to speak out on the need for
a larger air force. Then on 25 October he called Acting Secretary Johnson
to the White House and informed him of his desire to expand greatly the
Air Corps and aircraft production facilities. Roosevelt told Johnson that he
was placing him in charge of a three-man committee, which would include
Assistant Secretary of the Navy Charles Edison and the Deputy Administrator of the WP A, Aubrey Williams, to report on ways to increase the
production of military aircraft. 29 Since the President did not indicate how
much expansion he had in mind, the committee had to use its own judgment
about what constituted a major expansion. Three days after the committee
was appointed, it submitted a preliminary plan, which provided for the production of 31,000 planes within two years and an annual capacity of 20,000
planes thereafter. Under this plan the existing aircraft industry would increase its production from 2,600 to 11,000 aircraft, and the government would
build its own plants to provide the other 20,000. The cost of expanding the
facilities and actually producing the planes was estimated at $855 million.80
As the President's interest in expanding the Air Corps became apparent
in late October, General Arnold drew up a program that represented the
views of the Air Corps. On 10 November, Arnold submitted his program to
Acting Secretary Johnson. Arnold's primary recommendation was "that at
this time, the objective of the Army Air Corps be set at 7,000 planes ... and
an annual production capacity of 10,000 planes, all to be achieved in two
years."31 This plan was not nearly as ambitious as the one put forth by the
President's civilian leaders. Which scheme Roosevelt would support was
anyone's guess.
On the second weekend in November, President Roosevelt notified a
number of key civilian and military leaders of a meeting to be held at the
White House on Monday afternoon, 14 November. Present at that allimportant conference were Henry Morgenthau, Jr., Secretary of the Treasury; Louis Johnson, the Acting Secretary of War; Harry Hopkins, WPA
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Administrator; Robert Jackson, the Solicitor General; Herman Oliphant,
General Counsel of the Treasury; Gen. Malin Craig, Chief of Staff; Gen.
George Marshall, Deputy Chief of Staff; Gen. Henry Arnold, Chief of the
Air Corps; Col. James Burns, the Executive Assistant to the Assistant Secretary of War; Col. Edwin Watson, the President's Military Aide; and Capt.
Daniel Callahan, the President's Naval Aide.82
At that conference, Roosevelt, to the surprise of nearly everyone in the
room, came out in favor of a large air force. According to General Arnold,
the President said that a new regiment of field artillery, a new barracks, or
new machine tools in an ordnance arsenal "would not scare Hitler one
blankety-blank bit. What he wanted was airplanes! Airplanes were the war
implements that would have an influence on Hitler's activities!"33 The
President then told the group that he figured that if he would ask Congress
for 20,000 planes and a production capacity of 24,000, he would probably get
10,000 planes and a production capacity of the same amount. He indicated
that he expected the program to be filled in two years, with commercial
plants and seven new government plants producing the planes. The President, who did all of the talking, closed by asking Assistant Secretary Johnson
to draw up detailed plans and recommendations for carrying out his proposals. Johnson indicated that he would have the plans ready by the end of
the week.34 Thus ended one of the most important conferences in United
States military history. According to General Arnold, the meeting was significant because at that time the Army Air Corps received its Magna Carta.35
Where was Secretary of War Woodring when this significant rearmament conference took place? He was a few miles away at his Washington
residence, completely unaware that such a meeting was being held. Less than
two weeks before, Woodring had returned from his strenuous political tours,
after which he had submitted a report to Roosevelt, telling him of his recent
activities and giving an estimate of the political situation in the states that he
had visited.36 Having reported to the President, the Secretary of War, exhausted from the hard campaigning, took a two-weeks' leave so that he could
rest and spend some time with his family.37 During this vacation, Assistant
Secretary Johnson continued to function as Acting Secretary.
There are several reasons that might explain why Woodring was not
informed of the conference on 14 November. First, the President did not
want him there because he knew that Woodring would probably object to
a program that emphasized the Air Corps and ignored land forces. Furthermore, Roosevelt knew Assistant Secretary Johnson's views on air power, and
he felt that Johnson would support the type of program that he, the President,
had in mind. A second explanation might be that Roosevelt did not feel
that it was necessary to bother with Secretary Woodring, because expansion
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of the Air Corps was primarily a matter of aircraft procurement, and therefore was the responsibility of the Assistant Secretary rather than the Secretary. Even if this were the case, however, the Secretary should still have
been included. If the President had wanted Woodring there, he could have
had him, because the Secretary was only ten minutes away from the White
House. That Roosevelt did not want Woodring to attend the conference
seems evident from the fact that the two men met at an Armistice Day party
on Friday, 11 November, and the President did not mention the upcoming
meeting. 38
Louis Johnson's reasons for not informing the Secretary are quite understandable. Neither Johnson nor anyone else scheduled to attend the conference had any idea of what the President would say, and therefore he had
no idea that it would be so important. Johnson had been in frequent contact
with the President during Woodring's absence, and he saw nothing unusual
about being called to the White House on November fourteenth. While it
is likely that if Johnson had known what the President had in mind, he
would not have wanted Woodring there and might not have told him, the
fact remains that he did not know what to expect. General Craig was in the
same position as Johnson, in that he had no idea that the meeting would be
of such importance and therefore saw no reason for interrupting the Secretary's vacation. In the final analysis it appears that Woodring was not at the
conference because President Roosevelt did not want him there, and that his
reason for not wanting him there was a fear that the Secretary might oppose
his rearmament program.
The meeting of 14 November was highly important, because it was the first
time that the President rather than the War Department advocated immediate rearmament. That the Chief Executive supported the movement was
important, because he had an influence over Congress that was not possessed
by the War Department. President Roosevelt's desire to strengthen significantly the nation's defense system gave Assistant Secretary Johnson and
military leaders renewed vigor and enthusiasm, for they now had a man
who could make their rearmament plans become realities.
While the professional military men were pleased with the President's
willingness to take a big step toward rearmament, they were bothered by the
emphasis that he placed on aircraft. The consensus of military leaders was
that a well-balanced force was needed. Although the President had specifically asked for airplanes, Johnson and the General Staff, sensing presidential
support for a major strengthening of the Army, began to prepare plans that
incorporated the concept of a balanced military force. 39 The day after the
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White House conference, Johnson asked Craig to supply a detailed two-year
program that would provide a 10,000-plane Air Corps, furnish "sufficient
stocks of essential supplies to equip and maintain the Protective Mobilization
Plan Army," and help to prepare industry for expansion to meet the needs
of full mobilization. Although the President had indicated that he expected
the cost of the plane program to be approximately $500 million, Johnson
failed to mention any such limitation when he requested a detailed plan.40
Johnson's memorandum requesting a plan for a balanced force was
welcomed by Chief of Staff Craig, who just three weeks before had informed
the Bureau of the Budget that "the defense of this country ... ultimately
rests with the ground troops, and to ignore this component is to ignore the
lessons of history. We need a further increase in air power, but the deplorable situation of our ground army ... demands more immediate attention." 41
Essentially the same view was held by Deputy Chief of Staff Marshall, who,
according to General Arnold, "needed plenty of indoctrination about the air
facts of life."42 General Craig immediately set his subordinates to work on
preparing the plan requested by Johnson, but it was not completed until
late November.
While the rearmament plans were being prepared, all coordination and
planning both within the War Department and between the department
and the White House were carried on through Assistant Secretary Johnson
instead of Secretary Woodring. During this period the head of the War
Department was virtually ignored. Columnists Drew Pearson and Robert
Allen were fairly accurate when they wrote on 1 December: "Secretary
Woodring hasn't been consulted on any phase of the defense program. All
he knows is what he reads in the paper. Johnson has been Roosevelt's righthand man in national defense."48 The intimacy that developed between
Roosevelt and Johnson apparently stemmed from their mutual enthusiasm
over a large air force. Since early 1938 Johnson had been advocating a 10,000-'
plane Air Corps that would rely to a great extent on heavy bombers.44
Therefore, in the fall of 1938, when Roosevelt decided to build a large air
force, it was not surprising that he turned to his energetic, aggressive Assistant Secretary of War. In October and November the two men became quite
close, and Johnson was a frequent visitor at the White House. This relationship soon gave renewed vigor to the old rumors that Johnson was about to
replace Woodring.45 These were difficult days for the Secretary of War. His
status was uncertain, and he had no idea from day to day whether Roosevelt
intended to keep him.46 Furthermore, he was frustrated ·by the realization
that if the President chose to work around him, there was nothing he could
do about it; he simply had to wait and see what would happen.
Woodring was not the only War Department official to be snubbed in
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this period, for Chief of Staff Craig was also receiving the cold shoulder
from the Commander in Chief. The only information and advice that Craig
and the General Staff were asked to provide were those of a technical nature.
Most military leaders considered the President's 1O,000-plane program to be
"fantastic," and they were reluctant to support it because it placed so much
emphasis on the Air Corps.47 Because of such views, military men were
seldom included in the President's discussions of rearmament plans.48
If the Secretary of War, the Chief of Staff, and the General Staff were
largely ignored, who, then, besides Louis Johnson, was helping Roosevelt
formulate rearmament plans? The bulk of the advice was coming from
three men who had no military background. These "militarists pro tern"
were Thomas Corcoran, a presidential adviser; Harry Hopkins, WPA Administrator; and Aubrey Williams, Deputy Administrator of the WPA.49
The growing influence of these "ex officio strategists" was upsetting to professional military men, whose advice was not sought. According to one
widely read source, during this period General Craig "has peeved in silence,
loath to admit in public that he knows little more about the administration's ideas for remaking the Army than ordinary newspaper readers."110
Throughout November, Craig remained silent as the President continued to
consult men like Hopkins and Johnson first, and military men last. By early
December he could no longer control his frustration, and during an inter\iiew with a reporter, he blurted out that "Hopkins and Aubrey Williams
(Hopkins' assistant) are running the defense show."111 When accounts of
Craig's statement and the story behind it were published, he denied that
there were any difficulties between the administration and the War Department.112 Craig's contradiction only served to center more attention on the
controversy, and in the weeks that followed, the role of the New Dealers
and Louis Johnson received more publicity than ever.113
The first of December 1938 marked the beginning of a temporary decline in Johnson's influence with the President and the start of an increase
in Woodring's influence. On that day Johnson sent to the President the
rearmament plan that had been called for two weeks before. Included were
items of $1,289 million for an air program, $421 million for supplies to equip
the Protective Mobilization Force, and $122 million for industrial preparedness.64 Roosevelt immediately called in Johnson, General Craig, and several
other military advisers and sharply criticized them for reading too much into
the November 14 conference. The angry President chided the group as he
noted that he had asked for 10,000 planes at a cost of about $500 million, but
instead was presented a $1,800 million plan for strengthening air and land
forces as well as for helping to prepare industry for mobilization. Roosevelt
then emphasized that he did not feel that he could ask Congress for more
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than $500 million for rearmament and that it would be necessary to come
up with a program that cost that amount. 55
In spite of the statements made to Johnson at the December 1 meeting,
President Roosevelt, in the weeks that followed, became less and less enthusiastic about his 10,000-plane program, until, early in January 1939, he
virtually abandoned it. His decision to revamp his original program was in
all likelihood due to the poor manner in which Congress and the nation
reacted to his proposals. Following the November 14 conference, Johnson,
with the President's approval, spoke openly of the need for a large and
powerful air arm. A bitter reaction to such statements came from many
sources. Senator Bennett Clark of Missouri, one of Woodring's best friends,
criticized Johnson's rearmament proposals, saying that such moves would be
"covers" for a pump-priming program. Other Senators, such as George
Norris, Gerald Nye, David Walsh, and William Borah, expressed similar
views.116 A number of newspapers and magazines also voiced disapproval of
establishing such a large air arm. Roosevelt had probably encouraged and
approved Johnson's speeches in order to test the public reaction, and when
that reaction appeared to be unfavorable, he decided to ease up on his aircraft program.11
Thus, from 1 December on, the President moved away from the idea
of a large Air Corps and toward the concept of a more balanced armed
force. In doing this, he also turned back toward Secretary Woodring, General Craig, and the members of the General Staff who had always urged a
proper balance between air and ground forces. By mid December, Woodring was once more in control at the War Department and was working
closely with the President in preparing a rearmament program.118 Roosevelt
ultimately gave in to the pressures and advice for balance, agreeing to allot
$200 million for the Protective Mobilization Force and $300 million for the
Air Corps. Of the latter amount, $120 million was to provide additional
personnel and air-base facilities, and $180 million was to purchase aircraft.119
The details of the revised air program were set forth in January 1939 in the
so-called Woodring Plan-a plan that provided for an Air Corps of between
5,500 and 6,000 planes.60 The basis for the program was the plan that Woodring had asked General Arnold to prepare in October. On 11 January 1939
Secretary Woodring, who had been conferring with the President regularly
on the defense program, directed General Arnold to prepare legislation to
provide for a 6,000-plane Air Corps.61 The number was subsequently reduced to 5,500, and the President approved that figure. On the following
day, 12 January, Roosevelt asked Congress to appropriate $300 million for
the Air Corps. That amount, he said, "should provide a minimum increase

170

of 3,000 planes, but it is hoped that orders placed on such a large scale will
materially reduce the unit cost and actually provide many more planes."62
In the weeks that followed, the Secretary worked hard to make the
Woodring Plan become a reality. On 17 January he went before the House
Military Affairs Committee and requested 3,032 additional planes, which,
with those previously authorized, would provide a 5,500-plane force by mid
1941.63 Two weeks later, however, Woodring, having changed his ideas
somewhat, wrote to Andrew J. May, chairman of the committee, and called
his attention to the fact that procurement of a large number of planes would
reduce unit cost, thereby permitting the purchase of more planes than the
proposed bill authorized. The Secretary therefore suggested "that the committee give consideration to the removal of the limit on airplane strength, so
that a greater number of planes may be procured than now contemplated
by the War Department."64 When the House ignored the recommendation
and authorized a force of 5,500 planes, Woodring wrote a letter to Morris
Sheppard, who was chairman of the Senate Military Affairs Committee, requesting that no limit be established. The Senate committee decided to
compromise between the lower figure set by the House and the absence of a
set amount, which was requested by Woodring, and it placed the number
at 6,000 planes. The House agreed to the revised figure, and on 26 April
the President signed the legislation, which fixed the authorized limit of the
Army Air Corps at 6,000 planes.65 The new figure was far short of the
amount originally desired by the President, but when one remembers that
until the new legislation was passed, the authorized strength of the Air Force
was 2,320 aircraft and the actual strength was about 1,700, the figure of 6,000
is quite impressive.
Throughout 1939 Woodring's and Johnson's influence at the White
House rose and fell as the President turned first to one and then to the other.
From January through April it was Woodring who held the upper hand;
but after the Army Appropriations Bill was passed in late April, the President began again to turn to Johnson.66 In May and June the warmth that
- had characterized the Johnson-Roosevelt relationship during the previous
November reappeared, and Woodring again found himself on the outside.
On 5 July the President moved to weaken Woodring's position even further.
On that day he issued an executive order making the Joint Army and Navy
Board and the Army and Navy Munitions Board directly responsible to
himself. This meant that on numerous defense matters the Assistant Secretaries of War and the Navy and the Military Chiefs of both services could
now go directly to the Chief Executive.67 Whether this action was designed
to bring about more efficiency or to provide an easy means of working
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around the Secretary of War is uncertain, but there is no doubt that it made
it easier for the President to by-pass Woodring.
On 3 August, Secretary Woodring, his wife, and his three small children
left on a two-week's trip to Panama. Although he planned to inspect the
canal and its defense system, the trip was primarily a vacation.68 In Woodring's absence, Acting Secretary of War Johnson attended the cabinet meeting on 4 August. At that time Johnson requested and received the President's
approval for establishing a board of civilians to review the Industrial Mobilization Plan and make recommendations to the Assistant Secretary of War
on how to improve it.69 The new six-man body, which was called the War
Resources Board, had as its chairman Edward R. Stettinius, Jr., Chairman
of the Board of United States Steel Corporation. The majority of the board
members were associated with big business. That Johnson had more in mind
for the newly created board than reviewing the Industrial Mobilization Plan
became apparent on 9 August, when, in announcing the creation of the
board, he said, "In the event of an international emergency the board . . .
would become an executive agency of the government with broad powers in
many ways similar to those exercised by the War Industries Board of World
War days."76 In the days that followed, Johnson reiterated that view time
and again. 71
In late August the War Resources Board submitted to the President a
report stating what it felt its function should be in the event of war. The
board declared that it disapproved of the idea for a superagency, and it reaffirmed the authority of the President to coordinate its administration and
make important decisions; however, it then proceeded to assign itself extensive economic responsibilities. Such action indicated that the board members were still thinking along the lines of an all-powerful board similar to
the one operated by Bernard Baruch during the First World War.72 The
President was displeased with the board's report, because he did not like the
idea of granting such broad economic authority to anyone except himself.
In discussing the proposals of the War Resources Board with administrative
adviser Louis Brownlow, Roosevelt said: "If I were to set up a scheme such
as recommended by this report, turning over the sole administration of the
economy of the country ... to a single war administrator-even though he
were appointed by me-I would simply be abdicating the presidency to some
other person."73
Woodring, who found out about the creation of the board while en
route to Panama, was quite angry that it had been set up during his absence.
He was especially upset because Johnson had not mentioned the matter to
him before his departure. At the cabinet meeting on 7 September, Woodring
openly expressed his displeasure at the manner in which the board had been
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established. He added that although he had been back at his office for more
than two weeks, Stettinius still had not been in to see him. 74 It was not
until 21 September that the War Resources Board finally met with Secretary
Woodring.
Angered by Johnson's move to establish the board during his absence,
Woodring began to search for a chance to discredit his Assistant Secretary;
such an opportunity soon presented itself. During the cabinet meeting of 26
September, Woodring called the President's attention to the foreword that
Johnson had written for Leo M. Cherne's recently published book, Adjusting
Your Business to War.75 Woodring expressed considerable dissatisfaction
over the fact that the Assistant Secretary of War had written the foreword,
thus causing many individuals to consider the book to be semiofficial. The
result was that headlines such as "U.S. to Regiment All People in Case
Nation Goes to War" greeted its publication.'1'6 After Woodring's blast,
Secretary of Labor Perkins joined in, likewise attacking Johnson's endorsement of the book.77 The President said little at the time, but at the press
conference that followed the meeting, he fired two shots at Johnson. First,
when asked whether or not Cherne's book had the endorsement of the
administration, Roosevelt replied that there was no book on the Army, the
Navy, or any military subject that had the imprimatur of his administration.
He further added that 90 percent of the books written on such matters were
written by people who knew less than nothing about the subject. Then he
fired a second shot at Johnson by announcing that the War Resources Board
would be disbanded. He said that after the board had submitted its report
to him in about ten days, its work would be completed. When the press
conference ended, Woodring, who had been in attendance, completed the
spanking of Johnson by telling the reporters that the board had never been
intended to be a permanent body. He then said, "The War Department is
not setting up any permanent war boards and war machinery and I hope
we never will."78
Roosevelt's statement at the news conference on 26 September left no
doubt that Johnson's influence was once more on the wane. Consequently,
the press immediately began to speculate that Roosevelt would, as he had in
the past, turn back to Secretary Woodring.79 This time, however, the President turned to his Secretary of the Treasury, Henry Morgenthau, Jr. Roosevelt's reasons for this decision and the consequences of that decision will be
seen in the following chapters.
The contributions of Secretary of War Woodring to the United States rearmament program prior to the outbreak of World War II are difficult to
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evaluate. The 1939 rearmament activities definitely bore the Woodring stamp
of a balance between the expansion of land and of air forces. Furthermore,
it was the 6,000-plane Woodring Plan that Congress finally approved. It
must be remembered, however, that Roosevelt turned to Woodring and the
General Staff and accepted their program only after Congress and the public
indicated that they did not wish to support the 10,000-plane scheme favored
by himself and Assistant Secretary Johnson.
Years later, Woodring was to be bitterly criticized by politicians, journalists, and historians for hindering the development of the Army Air Corps
during this critical period. Such critics maintained that if Johnson's proposals had been adopted, the United States military machine would have
been much better prepared for World War II. While such statements may
be true, they fail to put Secretary W oodring's actions in the proper historical
perspective. First, it should be remembered that his views on the proper
balance between land and air forces were essentially the same as those of the
General Staff (including Generals Craig and Marshall), Congress, and the
public at large. Second, even if Woodring had favored the 10,000-plane
program, it is highly unlikely that Congress would have approved it. Third,
the critics fail to point out the financial limitations placed on Woodring.
Funds were extremely tight, and he had to distribute them in an equitable
manner; thus, to have channeled nearly all expansion funds into the Air
Corps, as the President originally had hoped to do, would have been an unsound and irresponsible act. Finally, those who condemn Woodring usually
ignore the advances made by the Air Corps during his tenure as Secretary.
When he assumed the post in 1937, the Corps had an authorized strength of
2,320 aircraft and an actual strength of 1,329. Just two years later, however,
it had grown to an authorized strength of 6,000 and an actual strength of
3,102.80 While international events certainly account for some of that growth,
a great deal of credit must be given to Secretary Woodring, who determined
how aircraft appropriations were actually utilized. Although Woodring
cannot be called a major advocate of air power, neither does he deserve the
anti-Air Corps label that has so frequently been attached to his name.
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10
Problems of Neutrality, 1936--1939

Numerous accounts have been written about the United States and neutrality
in the 1930s, in which detailed information has been presented on isolationism, neutrality legislation, and efforts to keep the United States out of a
foreign conflict. Nearly all such accounts are similar, in that they tend to
look upon the problems of neutrality as the concern of only the President
and the State Department. So much emphasis has been placed on the efforts
of President Roosevelt and Secretary of State Cordell Hull to handle problems relating to neutrality that there has been a tendency to forget that other
top administration officials were also vitally concerned with those matters.
One such person was Secretary of War Woodring.
Woodring would have preferred to avoid questions relating to neutrality,
because he felt that keeping the country out of war was the "primary concern
of the State Department and the Chief Executive," not of the War Department.1 Although he would have liked to avoid such problems, he could not.
As Secretary of War, he soon discovered not only that neutrality was of great
interest to him, but also that he could do much to see that it was or was not
maintained.
Woodring's influence on neutrality was of both an informal and a formal nature. His informal influence stemmed in part from the fact that he
was head of the United States War Department. By virtue of that position,
his every statement concerning the Army, national defense, and foreign
policy was looked upon as being representative of administration policy or
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indicative of what that policy might be in the future. A belligerent or
offensive statement by such a key member of the executive branch could
have a serious effect on the thinking or actions of certain foreign nations,
and consequently it could endanger the neutrality of the United States.
Another informal influence over neutrality was W oodring's role as a cabinet
member. That position gave him ready access to the President; generally he
consulted with FDR two or three times every week. That the breakdown
of neutrality could ultimately result in the nation's going to war was a fact
that Woodring was well aware of, and if there was anything he wanted to
avoid, it was war. Therefore, in his capacity as a presidential adviser, he always cautioned against any action that might endanger American neutrality.
Formally, Woodring was able to influence the maintenance of neutrality
because the Neutrality Act of 1935 made the Secretary of War a member of
the National Munitions Control Board-a body whose purpose was to license
and supervise all shipments of arms to foreign countries. As a board member, Woodring had a major voice in determining which war items could or
could not be shipped to foreign nations. The Secretary of War had always
had the primary responsibility for making decisions about what military
supplies were to be sold abroad, but the neutrality legislation of the 1930s
made that post more important than it had ever been, especially in regard
to maintaining neutrality.
The major problem of neutrality faced by Secretary Woodring centered on the
question of selling government arms, ammunition, and implements of war to
foreign governments. This had been a problem for Woodring even before he
became Secretary, because as Assistant Secretary of War he had been asked
by Secretary Dern to recommend what policy the War Department should
follow in regard to foreign sales.2 In preparing his recommendations,
Woodring relied on several valuable precedents. A 1920 act had authorized
the Secretary of War "to sell to any state or foreign government with which
the United States is at peace at the time of the passage of this Act, upon such
terms as he may deem expedient, any materiel, supplies, or equipment pertaining to the military establishment ... which are not needed for military
purposes."3 However, in April 1923 President Harding had established the
policy that the government would not sell war equipment to any foreign
power. This was done, he said, "to make sure that none of our surplus
equipment is employed in encouraging warfare any place in the world."
Seven years later, that policy was modified by President Hoover to permit
the sale of surplus aircraft and aircraft parts, provided that such sales did not
reveal any military secrets and provided that they were approved by the
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State Department. This decision was motivated primarily by a desire to
enhance foreign trade. 4 Based on these precedents, Woodring developed a
new policy on foreign sales in August of 1933. According to Woodring, it
was to be "the policy of this government to refrain from disposing of arms,
ammunitions, and implements of war in possession of this government to
foreign powers or to persons who might be presumed to be about to transfer
them to foreign powers."5 This was to be the War Department's contribution to the maintenance of world peace.
Although the War Department refused to sell arms and ammunition
abroad, it was not concerned over the sale of such items by United States
civilian firms, except when military secrets were involved. The Army not
only had no objection to the foreign sale of implements of war made by
American manufacturers, it actually encouraged such activity, because this
stimulated a number of key war industries. As Woodring explained it,
"Such action is considered to enhance the interests of national defense by
encouraging the maintenance of facilities for supply in the event of an
emergency."6
Before 1935 all requests by civilians to export arms and ammunition
were handled by the State Department, but they required prior approval
from the War Department. When an export request was received, it was
forwarded to the Secretary of War, who then informed the Undersecretary
of State if there was any objection, on the grounds of "military secrecy,'' to
the exportation of the articles mentioned. If the Secretary of War objected,
the State Department denied the request; if he had no objection, the request
was approved. The identity of the manufacturer making the request or the
identity of the country destined to receive the item made no difference in
the decisions of the Secretary of War; the test was strictly one of military
secrecy.7 Such a policy explains why, on 23 October 1933, Secretary Dern
approved a request from the Boeing Airplane Company to export B-9 airplanes to Japan, while at the same time he turned down a request to send
P-26's to Germany. 8
In August of 1935 Congress passed the Neutrality Act, which provided
that in the event of war between two or more nations, the President would
proclaim such a fact; and from that time on, it would be unlawful to export
arms, ammunitions, or implements of war to the belligerent nations. The
act also made it unlawful to export any war supply without a federal license.
To implement this latter provision, Congress established the National Munitions Control Board, which was made up of the Secretary of State, who
served as chairman, and the Secretaries of War, the Navy, the Treasury, and
Commerce. The board was to supervise and control, through a registration
and licensing system, the manufacture, importation, and exportation of all
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arms and ammunition. 9 The agency created for carrying out the responsibilities of the Munitions Board was the Office of Arms and Munitions Control-an adjunct of the State Department. The functions of the Control
Office were basically clerical, since the licensing procedure was clearly spelled
out in federal statutes. 10
In spite of the legislative restrictions placed on it, the Munitions Control
Board evolved into an increasingly important body, and with the possible
exception of Secretary Hull, Secretary Woodring was to emerge as its most
important and influential member. The importance of the board stemmed
from the fact that its regulations provided that licenses to export arms could
not be issued when doing so would violate the Espionage Act of 1917.11
This law provided that anyone who turned over to a foreign government or
to an individual in a foreign country or to any person not entitled to receive
it any "blue print, plan, map, model, instrument, appliance, or note relating
to the national defense ... shall be punished by a fine ... or by imprisonment ... or both."12 This meant that the maintenance of military secrets
was the major reason for refusing to grant a license for the exportation of
implements of war; furthermore, it was the responsibility of the Secretary
of War to make the final decision about whether or not a specific item was
a military secret.13 Thus Secretary Woodring could determine whether or
not a particular foreign government would receive a certain type of aircraft,
arm, or ordnance item.14 While the Secretary always consulted the General
Staff's G-2 and the Chiefs of the various Technical Services in deciding
whether or not an item should be classified as a military secret, he was in
no way bound to follow their recommendations. Under the guise of military
secrecy, Woodring could, if he so chose, veto the foreign sale of any item
that fell in the category of arms, ammunition, or implements of war. As
will be seen, however, Woodring used his Munitions Board powers in an
impartial and neutral manner, and he ran into difficulty with his superior
only when he refused to follow such a policy.
The experience that Woodring gained as Assistant Secretary on matters
relating to foreign sales was utilized almost as soon as he assumed the
secretaryship. In October 1936 the British' Air Attache in Washington called
on Woodring and inquired whether it might be possible for the British
government to purchase military planes from American manufacturers.15
Woodring, feeling that British orders would help the sagging United States
aircraft industry, favored such sales, provided that the models to be turned
over were more than a year old.16 For the past several years the War Department had followed the policy that no American firm selling planes to the
Army could sell similar planes to a foreign government until one year after
delivery of the second production plane. It was felt that since experimental
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A dinner honoring James A. Farley, 1937; seated (left to right): Vice-President John Nance
Garner, President Franklin D. Roosevelt, and Farley; standing: Henry Wallace, Harry Woodring, Cordell Hull, Daniel Roper, Henry Morgenthau, Jr.

Secretary of War Harry H. Woodring and Chief of Staff George C. Marshall arriving at the
White House for a defense conference, 30 May 1940.

The Woodring family making its farewell visit to the White House, 26 June 1940 (left to
right): Marcus, Harry, Melissa, Helen, and Cooper Woodring.

and testing work had been completed and production was well under way
by the time the second production plane was received, the United States Air
Corps would have the aircraft a full two years ahead of any other country.
Some Air Corps leaders, feeling that the release period of one year was too
long, wanted to reduce it to six months; but Woodring refused to go along
with such a change.17 The Navy's policy on release of aircraft for export
was based on what it called "national defense interests." Since such a phrase
could be interpreted in many ways, it meant that the Navy had no set time
limit; consequently, some planes were released in six months, while others
were held for years.18
When the British expressed an interest in buying American-built military aircraft in October 1936, Woodring asked the President to decide on a
uniform policy with regard to release; thus, on 11 November, Roosevelt met
with Secretary Woodring, Secretary of the Navy Swanson, Acting Secretary
of State R. Walton Moore, and Solicitor General Stanley Reed for that purpose. After hearing Woodring and Swanson explain the policies of their
departments with regard to the release of aircraft, the President decided that
the policy of the War Department should be used by both military services.
Although Roosevelt agreed that all Air Corps planes should be considered
military secrets for one year, and therefore not eligible for release, he did
request that a study be made to see if, in the future, the time limit might
be reduced.19 In late November, Britain temporarily abandoned the idea of
purchasing American-built planes, and so, for the time being, the release
policy slipped back into a position of relative unimportance.
As Secretary of War, Harry Woodring was determined to ensure that
all military secrets, especially those relating to aircraft, remain the sole property of the United States government. Woodring, feeling that since Congress
had not authorized an Air Corps of quantity, it was essential that it be one
of quality, always attempted to provide the Corps with the latest and most
efficient planes available.20 Occasionally, his determination to protect aircraft
secrets became a source of difficulty. Such was the case in October 1936,
when Eugene L. Vidal, the Director of Air Commerce, publicly criticized
Woodring for refusing to permit representatives from a Latin American airtransport company to visit factories at which Army planes were being produced.21 With regard to this restrictive visitation policy, as with his refusal
to cut the aircraft release period to six months, Woodring was guided by his
determination to safeguard American aircraft secrets.
In mid 1936 civil war broke out in Spain, and a few weeks later a
number of American airplane manufacturers asked the State Department if
they could export planes to Spain, since the Neutrality Act did not impose an
embargo in case of civil war. William Phillips, the Acting Secretary of State,
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informed the manufacturers that sales to Spain "would not follow the spirit
of the Government's policy." This "moral embargo" was accepted without
question until December.22 In that month, Robert Cuse, a New Jersey scrap
dealer, applied for a license to sell $2.777 million worth of airplanes, airplane
engines, and airplane parts to the Spanish government. Since there was no
legal prohibition against such sales, the Office of Arms and Munitions Control was forced to issue the export license. The government was widely
criticized for issuing the license, but the President explained that nothing
else could be done, for although Cuse's action was unpatriotic, it was legal.
Criticism then shifted to the Army, when it was revealed that most of the
engines to be exported had been sold to Cuse by the War Department in
January 1936. Secretary Woodring defended the Army by pointing out that
the engines had been sold as surplus because they had already been overhauled three times and would have been unsafe to place in a plane again.
He also pointed out that the sale had been completed months before the
Spanish Civil War had begun.23
In early January 1937 Congress passed a resolution to expand the armsembargo provision of the Neutrality Act to civil wars, but before the legislation went into effect on 8 January, Cuse was able to export six planes and
one engine.24 Although the furor over the Cuse matter quickly subsided,
Woodring was determined that such a thing should not happen again.
Therefore, in early March he directed that steps be taken to ensure that in
the future, surplus arms, ammWlition, and implements of war were to be sold
only to citizens of the United States and "then only under a contract specifying that such articles will not be resold, transferred, or mortgaged to any
foreign government or power and provided further that such materiel or
equipment will not be shipped outside the United States." In the event of
resale the same provisions had to be adhered to by the new owner.211 These
principles were incorporated in Army regulations in the spring of 1937, and
for the next three years they were implemented without being questioned.
Eventually, however, those regulations were to become a major source of
controversy between Secretary Woodring and President Roosevelt.
On 1 May 1937 the President signed the 1937 Neutrality Act, which
provided the nation with permanent neutrality legislation, the 1935 and 1936
acts having been only temporary. On the same day that the new legislation went into effect, President Roosevelt expanded the list of arms, ammunitions, and implements of war to be included in an embargo. Most of
the items added were gases and '. explosives. The recommendation for
expanding the list had come from the Munitions Control Board, but their
decision on it had not been a Wlanimous one.26 Woodring had voiced
opposition to expanding the list on the grounds that a number of the articles
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and materials to be added were not designed or intended for military purposes. The Secretary of War maintained that restrictions should be placed
only on the exportation of items that were definitely for military use. He
feared that if the line were not drawn somewhere, the United States might
eventually come to define contraband as broadly as Britain had during the
World War. In opposing expansion of the embargo list, Woodring stood
alone-the board voting 4 to 1 in favor of the new items.27
That Woodring did not wish to stand in the way of exports unless they
had a definite military advantage to the recipient can be seen by examining
his position in the helium controversy of 1937-1938. On 6 May 1937 the
German dirigible Hindenburg, which was using highly inflammable hydrogen, exploded and crashed as it was landing at Lakehurst, New Jersey, after
a trans-Atlantic flight. A few days later the German Zeppelin Company,
desiring to utilize a safer noninflammable gas, contacted Secretary of Interior
Ickes and inquired whether it could purchase helium from the United
States for a second dirigible then under construction. Ickes was consulted
because the production and sale of helium was under the control of the
Bureau of Mines, which was within the Interior Department.28
At a cabinet meeting on 14 May, Ickes informed those who were present
of the German request. The cabinet members had mixed emotions concerning the possible sale. With the Hindenburg tragedy still fresh in their
minds, they tended to look with favor on such a sale for humanitarian
reasons, but at the same time they did not wish to sell helium to a foreign
government that might use it for military purposes. In order to examine the
matter more closely and then make a policy recommendation, the President
appointed an ad hoc committee composed of the Secretaries of State, War,
Navy, Interior, and Commerce.29 A week later the committee reported in
favor of exporting helium, provided that there were safeguards to ensure
that the gas was not used for military purposes.80 On this recommendation,
Woodring was in complete accord with the rest of the group.81 On 25 May
the President, who favored legislation permitting the foreign sale of helium,
submitted to key congressional committees the recommendations of his ad
hoc committee.82 Congress was impressed with the report and responded
by incorporating its ideas into the Helium Act. Under that measure, which
went into effect on 1 September, the Secretary of the Interior retained responsibility for the production and sale of helium, while export control was
given to both the National Munitions Control Board and the Secretary of
the Interior.88
In October the Zeppelin Company requested 17.5 million cubic feet of
helium for one year's operations. The Munitions Control Board quickly
gave its approval, and on 31 January 1938 the State Department issued an

181

export license. The only thing that now remained was for Secretary Ickes
to sell the helium. Ickes, however, refused to do so, because he feared Hitler's
intentions and did not want to do anything that might aid the German
military machine. Then, when the Germans invaded Austria on 12 March,
he was more determined than ever to refrain from selling the gas.84
Throughout the spring of 1938 a controversy raged over whether or not
Ickes should sell the helium to Germany. President Roosevelt and Secretary
Hull pressured him to do so, because the German government was becoming
increasingly irritated over the delay, and Roosevelt and Hull wanted to
maintain peaceful relations with the Reich.35 Ickes, however, refused to back
down. Woodring also urged that the sale be made, but he did so because
he saw no reason to discriminate against a nation merely because one disagreed with its policies. He maintained that since Congress had provided
for sale of the gas, any nation requesting it should receive it as long as such
action did not endanger the security of the United States. On 4 April and
again on 27 April, Woodring wrote to Ickes, urging him to make the sale.
Woodring argued that the United States should make the helium available
to Germany because of humanitarian reasons, and he assured him that the
amount to be sent was "not sufficiently great to represent jeopardy to the
National Defense."36 After the second letter, Woodring saw that he was
making no progress with Ickes, and realizing that under the law there was
no way of circumventing him, he gave up and stopped pursuing the matter.
During the spring and summer, Ickes continued to resist all pressures to
make the sale, and in September, after Hitler's success at Munich, those
pressures came to an end. In the years that followed, Ickes proudly told how
he had helped to curtail the military might of Nazi Germany by denying it
American helium.s 7 In reality, Ickes did no such thing, because the quantity
requested had been so small that it could not possibly have been of any real
military value.s 8
In January 1938 a series of events began that marked the beginning of the
breakdown of United States neutrality and brought about one of the most
controversial issues of the Roosevelt administration. On 16 January, French
Senator Amaury de la Grange, a long-time friend of Roosevelt's met with
the Chief Executive and asked if France could purchase one thousand planes
like those being used by the United States Air Corps.89 The President
pointed out that restrictions of the Neutrality Act would "hinder" French
procurement in the event of war, but he indicated a willingness to assist the
French all that he could. Upon leaving the White House, de la Grange
wrote: "The President will thus be completely in favor of all measures that
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the French Government might believe necessary to reinforce its air formations in time of peace and in time of war."40
France's Minister of Defense, Edouard Daladier, doubted whether
Roosevelt would be as helpful as de la Grange had indicated ; therefore, he
asked the American Ambassador, William Bullitt, to sound out the President
on the matter. In February, Bullitt and Daladier's representative, French
industrialist Jean Monnet, traveled to Washington in an effort to find out
how much support Roosevelt was willing to give France. When Bullitt and
Monnet met with the President, he told them of his efforts to repeal the
arms embargo and that if war should come before repeal, he would push
through such legislation immediately. The President then stated that in the
event that he could not bring about repeal of the embargo, he would get
around the legislation by sending planes from the United States to Canada,
whence they could be sent to France.41 Since both this meeting and the
earlier one, with de la Grange, were confidential, neither Secretary Hull nor
Secretary Woodring, nor any other top administrative official, knew what
Roosevelt had pledged.
A close examination of the American aircraft industry by French officials
revealed that it was barely superior to that of France and that the only
American-built plane that could meet their needs was the Curtiss-Wright
P-36. When Curtiss-Wright officials were approached by French representatives concerning a sale, they indicated that even if the War Department
released the aircraft for export, their limited production facilities would allow
no more than one hundred planes to be sent abroad prior to March 1939.
Although the number was quite small, Monnet favored making the purchase. A number of technicians in France's Air Ministry were hesitant about
buying the planes, because they doubted that the P-36 could stand up against
the newest German aircraft; thus, the French Minister for Air concluded
that the only way to settle the dispute was to have his leading test pilot,
Michael Detroyat, fly the plane and then recommend whether or not the
order should be placed.42
In early March 1938 the French requested permission for Detroyat to
make the flight, but the War Department, following the one-year release
policy approved by the President two years before, denied the request. The
department also pointed out that since the second production plane had not
yet been received, it would be at least a year before such a flight could be
made. Chief of the Air Corps Arnold, Chief of Staff Craig, and Secretary
Woodring all agreed that the request should be denied.48 On 10 March the
President, acting as Commander in Chief, directed the Chief of Staff to
permit Detroyat to fly the P-36. The flight, he said, should be limited to
twenty minutes and "should be conducted from some outlying field, with
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utmost secrecy." The President also directed that anything of a confidential
or secret nature should be removed from the plane before the flight.44 The
flight subsequently took place, and when Detroyat reported favorably upon
the plane's performance, France's Air Ministry placed an order for one
hundred export models of the P-36. The export models, with their name
changed to the Hawk 75-A, were essentially the same as those received by
the Army Air Corps except for the omission of secret instruments and
equipment such as the retractable landing gear.4 5
Nations other than France were interested in purchasing American-built
planes at this time, for in March, Britain sent an air mission to explore the
possibilities of making such purchases. When the British mission expressed
an interest in the B-18 and the War Department refused to permit a test
flight because it was still classified as a military secret, the President again
overruled his Army advisers and ordered that the British representatives be
permitted to make the flight. 46 Unimpressed with the B-18, the British did
not order any. However, in June they did place an order for four hundred
American-built military aircraft. The planes that were to be supplied, half
of which were bombers and half of which were pursuit planes, were no
longer classified as military secrets; therefore, there were no problems involved in selling them.47 Three months after this transaction the Munich
Conference took place, and thereafter the British preferred to develop their
own aircraft industry rather than to rely on the United States. The British
restricted their American purchases, because they feared that if they became
involved in a war with Germany, the Neutrality Act would come into effect
and cut off all the planes ordered. France, unlike Britain, was willing to
take that risk.48
On 25 October 1938, while President Roosevelt was in the midst of
making plans to expand the United States Air Corps, he met with Ambassador Bullitt, Secretary Morgenthau, and Jean Monnet to discuss the Nazi
menace. They discussed what the United States could do to augment
France's air strength. Roosevelt told the group that the American aircraft
industry could supply France with one thousand pursuit planes and one
thousand bombers. Since the French were especially short of bombers,
Monnet returned to France and urged Premier Daladier to place a large
order. Consequently, on 5 December, Daladier told his Defense Council
that there was "the possibility of receiving about 1,000 planes of the latest
model in use by the American Army. The American government has
formally promised delivery but it must be kept absolutely secret."49 After a
few days of budget juggling, it was decided that Monnet should head a mission to the United States with the funds and authority to purchase one
thousand modern aircraft.
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When the new French air rmss10n arrived in Washington in mid
December 1938, President Roosevelt, remembering the earlier opposition of
Woodring, Craig, and Arnold to French efforts to test the P-36, directed
Monnet to work through the Secretary of the Treasury. According to Secretary Morgenthau, Roosevelt directed them to his office because "he knew
the Treasury [Department] would take a less parochial view of national
policy in the sale of aircraft than either War or Navy." 50 The nominal
reason given by the President was that the Procurement Division of the
Treasury Department was experienced in large-scale purchases.51
Secretary Woodring was completely unaware of the presence of the
French mission until December 21, when Deputy Chief of Staff Marshall
informed him that General Arnold had been requested to grant permission
to the French officials to inspect the latest Army planes that were under
construction. At a cabinet meeting that afternoon, Morgenthau referred to,
but did not discuss, the presence of the Monnet mission. After the meeting,
Woodring, Morgenthau, and Acting Secretary of State Sumner Welles held
a long discussion.52 Saying that the French wanted to purchase a thousand
of the latest planes, Morgenthau proposed that the French aviation experts
be permitted to inspect and test three late models: the P-40, the Martin 166
bomber, and the B-12 Douglas bomber. Woodring immediately objected
to the proposal, claiming that it was unwise to show the mission any planes
that were under construction or ready to test. Furthermore, he added, the
War Department's policy, which the President himself had approved, prohibited the foreign sale of planes until a year after the second production
plane had been received. At this point, Roosevelt acknowledged that the
French request violated the established policy on sales, but he considered
France to be the nation's first line of defense and therefore expected every
effort to be made to supply it with the planes it desired. After Woodring
again expressed fear that French purchases would interfere with future
Army orders, the President wrote on a memorandum of Morgenthau's that
for "reasons of state" the French should be permitted to inspect and purchase
the planes, provided that procurement of them did not interfere with United
States orders. Woodring reluctantly replied that if that was what the
President wanted, he would see that it was done.118
The following morning, after discussing the President's directive with
his military advisers, Woodring was even less enthusiastic about carrying it
out. That afternoon he, General Marshall, and General Arnold went to see
Secretary Morgenthau. At that meeting, the Army officials reluctantly
agreed to release the P-40, because it was already in service and would be
eligible for foreign sale in a few months anyway. They did not, however,
want to reveal, let alone release, either the newly produced Martin bomber
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or the Douglas bomber, which was still under development. Woodring and
Arnold then argued that if the French were permitted to buy the one thousand planes that they desired, the orders could not be filled in less than
eighteen months, which meant that Army procurement would be hindered.
Morgenthau said that he intended to carry out the President's order whether
the War Department "liked it or not." Woodring replied that he, too,
would carry out the President's wishes, but he wanted Roosevelt "to know
all the facts and not be mixed in his reasoning" by the information that
Morgenthau was giving him.54 The meeting ended with Morgenthau renewing his pledge to aid the French but agreeing that for the time being
there would be no inspection of the secret bombers.55
One week later, on 29 December, Woodring wrote to Morgenthau,
informing him that the bombers would not be revealed until he was assured
of two things: first, that the French had the money to put on the "barrel
head" for the planes; second, that the orders would not interfere with future
Army orders. Morgenthau considered these demands an attempt by Woodring to place obstacles in the path of the French mission. Therefore, he
immediately wrote to the President and informed him, "I am unable to
proceed further in this matter as long as Secretary Woodring maintains his
present attitude." 56 On the following day, Morgenthau telephoned Woodring and expressed his displeasure with the demands being placed upon him.
He charged the Secretary of War with attempting to put him "on the spot
by writing a letter placing such limitations ... on the program of assistance
to the French." Woodring replied that he was under pressure from his military advisers not to release the bombers and that he was also afraid that
Congress would "raise hell" over their release. He then said, "All I wanted
to do, Henry, was simply to protect you in the matter." To this Morgenthau
replied, "I don't want to be protected.'>57 After an extended discussion, during which the Treasury Secretary mentioned the President's instruction of
21 December, Woodring finally agreed to let the French see the Martin, but
not the Douglas, bomber. Two days later Morgenthau informed the French
that although it had not been easy to arrange, the mission could inspect the
Martin 166. As he explained to Monnet, "The whole United States Army
is opposed to what I am doing and I am doing it secretly and I just cannot
continue ... forcing the United States Army to show planes which they
say they want for themselves."118
During the first two weeks of January 1939, while Morgenthau was on
vacation, the French undertook the aircraft inspections. In that period they
made a tentative decision to purchase one hundred additional export models
of the P-36 and sixty Martin 166 bombers, but they could make no decision
on the Douglas bomber, because it remained under wraps.119 When Morgen-
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thau returned to Washington and found that the War Department was still
procrastinating on the matter of the Douglas bomber, he proposed to the
President that all purchasing of planes for the United States government
be turned over to the Treasury Department. Morgenthau urged such action
because it would enable him to release any plane that he wanted to release.60
The President was unwilling to take such a drastic step, but Morgenthau's
protests over the War Department's opposition necessitated his taking some
action.
On 16 January 1939 Roosevelt summoned Secretary Woodring, Assistant
Secretary Johnson, Secretary Morgenthau, and William Bullitt, the United
States Ambassador to France, to the White House. Bullitt opened the meeting by stating that time was running out for France and that the United
States should give it all possible assistance. It was especially important, he
continued, that the Douglas bomber be made available. Woodring then
opposed inspection or release of the bomber because it had secret elements
and because it had been built partially with government funds. Its release,
he said, "might put the President in an embarrassing position." In the discussion that followed, Roosevelt indicated, but did not actually say, that he
favored the release of the plane. Finally, Assistant Secretary Johnson, whose
bluntness could occasionally be an asset, said to the President, "Do you mean,
sir, that you wish the Douglas light bomber released to the French government?" Roosevelt quickly replied, "I mean exactly that."61
The President had made his position clear, and Woodring could hold
back no longer. The Secretary directed Johnson to make sure that the War
Department cooperated 100 percent with the French air mission, and on
that note the meeting ended. A few hours later Johnson informed General
Arnold that the members of the French mission should be given access to
the Douglas bomber. On 19 January, Arnold telegraphed the military
authorities at Los Angeles and informed them that French representatives
would arrive the following day. Arnold's telegram concluded: "Authority
granted for them to inspect Douglas attack bomber less secret accessories, fly
in same, and open negotiations with Douglas Co. relative to purchase."62
On 20 January three members of the French mission, including the test pilot,
Paul Chemidlin, arrived at the Douglas plant in Los Angeles, and on the
following day they began to inspect the new aircraft.
"On January 23 all hell broke loose," according to General Arnold.68
On that day the Douglas bomber, with Chemidlin aboard, crashed in a Los
Angeles parking lot, killing the pilot and destroying a dozen cars. Miraculously, Chemidlin survived the crash and was taken to a nearby hospital. At
first the Douglas Company attempted to keep the Frenchman's presence on
the plane a secret by announcing that the survivor was a company mechanic
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named Smithins; however, reporters quickly learned the survivor's true
identity, and when confronted with the information, the Douglas officials
admitted that the French test pilot had been aboard the plane. 64 As the
Chemidlin story appeared in newspapers across the country, everyone began
to ask the same question. What was a member of the French air mission
doing on the experimental bomber?
The crash on 23 January was just what congressional isolationists needed
in order to attack the administration, because it was now public knowledge
that the executive branch was not being neutral but was assisting the French
by granting them special privileges. Isolationist Senator Bennett C. Clark
of Missouri had been informed of the presence and activities of the French
mission by Secretary Woodring prior to the crash, but he could not mention
it publicly without revealing the source of his information.1111 The secrecy
that surrounded the French mission prior to 23 January was so tight that
not only were newspapermen unaware of it, but even Secretary of State
Hull had no knowledge of its activities.66
Three days after the crash, at a secret hearing before the Senate Military
Affairs Committee, General Arnold, who had been testifying in regard to
Air Corps needs for the following year, was placed on the hot seat by Senator
Clark, who was quite upset that President Roosevelt had ignored the advice
of the War Department and had permitted the French to test the Douglas
bomber. During the course of the discussion, Clark turned from the subject
at hand and asked why a French aviation expert was on the secret bomber
that crashed. Arnold replied: "He was out there under the direction of the
Treasury Department, with a view of looking into possible purchase of airplanes by the French mission."67 The Air Corps Chief then explained that
while the visit was under the direction of the Treasury Department, the
actual authorization had come from the War Departm.ent.68 After asking
Arnold questions whose essence was "Does the Secretary of the Treasury run
the Air Corps?" and "Does he give orders about Air Corps procurement?,"69
Senator Clark asked that the committee call Secretary Morgenthau to appear
before it, so _that he might explain "what the Treasury Department had to
do with authorizing the disclosure to any government, however friendly, of
American military secrets.•>To
On the following day, 'lJ January, Morgenthau and Woodring testified
before the committee. Morgenthau told the group that the President had
desired that the French be given access to the Douglas bomber, and when
informed of this decision, the Secretary of War had directed General Arnold
to send the authorization for inspection. When Woodring was asked
whether the War Department had declined or discouraged the efforts to
make the secret plane available to the French, he tried to side-step the issue
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by saying that all considerations had been discussed. However, in the grueling questioning that followed, Woodring revealed that he and his military
advisers had opposed the plan.71
The testimony of Morgenthau and Woodring, which revealed that
President Roosevelt had been the man responsible for making the secret
bomber available to the French, caused considerable alarm among a number
of members of the Senate Military Affairs Committee; thus, they asked their
chairman, Morris Sheppard of Texas, to approach the President to get his
side of the story. After visiting Roosevelt, Sheppard reported back that
"there was absolutely nothing to worry about"; but one pessimistic member
stated that if the President was that convincing, then perhaps the entire
committee should go to talk to him. To this proposal Senator Sheppard replied, "That's just what you ought to do"-and that is exactly what they did. 72
On 31 January the entire Senate Military Affairs Committee went to the
White House for a private conference with President Roosevelt. At that
meeting, the President surprised and alarmed a number of Senators when,
after discussing the menace that Hitler presented to Europe and the world,
he said, "Our first line of defense is in France."73 He claimed that France
could not be permitted to fall, because if it did, England would be next;
and if England fell, Germany could then turn her attention to the world
sphere. "Therefore," he continued, "it is to our interest to do what we can
to help the French and British maintain their independence." The President
then vowed that he would send to the two nations anything and everything that they could pay for. When asked if such a policy was unneutral,
Roosevelt replied, "Yes it might be called that," but it was necessary, "because self-protection is part of the American policy."74 When asked who
had actually authorized the French mission to see the Douglas bomber, the
President answered :
You need not worry about who authorized that order.... I am frankly
hoping that the French will be able to get the fastest pursuit planes . • . and the
best bombers they can buy in this country. It is not a question of secrecy. We
have just one secret, and that is the question of a bombsight and that has not
been disclosed to the French and won't. And I hope to God they get the planes
and get them fast and get them over there in France. It may mean the saving of
our ,civilization.711
To the isolationist Senators present at the White House conference the
President's remarks were cause for real alarm. Instead of being convinced
that they should curtail their current investigation and support the sale of
planes to France, they felt that the President was pursuing a policy that was
unwise and dangerous. They considered it unwise because it would take

189

out of the country many airplanes and other valuable military supplies that
might ultimately be needed by the United States Army, and they considered
it dangerous because such sales might draw the country into a European
conflict, much as they had during World War 1.76
Although the Senators who attended the 31 January meeting had
pledged themselves to secrecy, that pledge was immediately broken by a
few isolationists who were convinced that the President's policy would lead
the nation into war. On 1 February the New York Times reported that
President Roosevelt had told the conferees "to regard France as the actual
frontier of America in an apparently inevitable showdown between democracies and dictatorships." 77 Immediately, there developed widespread criticism of what was called an extension of the American frontier to the Rhineland. The reaction to the President's alleged statement became so bitter that,
on 3 February, Roosevelt called a news conference and branded as a "deliberate lie" the claims that he had said anything to the effect that the Rhine
was the United States frontier.78
The isolationist Senators had forced the President to back down publicly
on his Rhine statement, but they were not through. Seeing an opportunity
to embarrass him, they continued their investigation of the Douglas-bomber
matter for another two weeks. During that period the Military Affairs
Committee, meeting in secret session, again called on Woodring, Morgenthau, Johnson, and a number of military leaders in order to rehash the entire
story of the French air mission.79 On 16 February the committee concluded
its investigation and began to release portions of the testimony. Two days
later the New York Times reported that the released transcripts revealed
that "President Roosevelt authorized the demonstration to the French air
mission of the Douglas 7-B attack bomber ... against the judgment and
over the protests of the War Department." 80 In the weeks that followed,
Roosevelt came under heavy attack for pursuing a foreign policy that was
anything but neutral.
·
In February and early March the Monnet Mission placed orders for 555
military planes, including one hundred Douglas and one hundred Martin
bombers.81 On 23 March the mission returned to France, and the controversy
surrounding its presence vanished as quickly as it had appeared.
As they concerned Secretary Woodring, the events surrounding the
French air mission are significant in that they reveal his determination to
ensure the superiority of United States defense and his desire to be neutral in
deed. He had opposed release of the Douglas bomber for two basic reasons.
First, he wanted to ensure that his country had the best military planes; therefore, he did not want to "give away" to any foreign nation America's latest
aircraft. Second, he wished to live up to the spirit of the neutrality legis-
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lation-something that he felt the President was not doing. Woodring did
not feel that, when it came to the inspection, sale, or release of arms, ammunition, or implements of war, the War Department was "empowered, per
se, to discriminate between friendly foreign governments," a friendly foreign
government being any nation not at war with the United States.82
Although he was more than willing to sell military aircraft to France,
Woodring felt that France had to be governed by the same rules and regulations that applied to all other nations. Therefore, he did not wish to show
members of the French mission any planes that were still classified as military secrets. Since such views ran counter to those of President Roosevelt,
Woodring was overruled. Even though the President was upset by Woodring's opposition to the release of the Douglas bomber to France, the publicity that surrounded the affair after the crash on 23 January made it impossible for him to dismiss his Secretary of War without bringing the wrath
of the isolationists down upon himself.83
Although Woodring did all that he could to be neutral in deed, he was
not neutral in thought. He was sympathetic toward the democratic nations
and critical of the fascist countries, and his expression of such views was to
cause him considerable difficulty in May 1938. Early in that month he used
a speech before the Chamber of Commerce of the United States to criticize,
and then warn, Germany, Italy, and Japan that if they continued their
present aggressive policies, the Democratic nations might be forced to go to
war to stop them. Woodring said: "At present the democracies are strongly
pacifistic. They have not always been so. If pressed too far a wave of indignation might sweep over them that would make it extremely difficult to
keep the peace."84 On the next day the press carried accounts of the address
under such headings as "War Secretary W ams Dictators to Beware" and
"Don't Push Democracies Too Far, Woodring Warns Germany, Italy, and
Japan." The controversy was under way. Press reaction was generally hostile, with the Secretary being criticized for "inflaming a bad situation" or
confusing "an international picture which is cloudy enough." 811 On the floor
of the House, Congressmen Roy Woodruff and Hamilton Fish condemned
the Secretary's action; even Congressman Sam D. Reynolds, a Woodring
supporter and the chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee, called the
address "ill-timed and ill-advised."86 Criticism of Woodring's speech was not
limited to the United States, however, for the German and Italian Foreign
Offices used their semiofficial mouthpieces, Diplomatische Korrespondenz
and Giornale d'Italia, to attack it; and on 14 May, Mussolini himself replied
to it by warning that in the event of war, the "totalitarian states will immediately form a bloc and march together to the end."87 As usual, President
Roosevelt made no comment throughout the controversy .88 Whether Secre-
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tary Woodring made the speech on his own or as a trial balloon for the
Chief Executive is uncertain, but one thing is clear: it got him into hot
water, and from that time on, he carefully avoided making public statements, pro or con, about any foreign government.89
Prior to the summer of 1939 Secretary Woodring encouraged foreign
nations to purchase American-produced planes, arms, and military equipment. Although he did not want the War Department to become a "purchasing adviser for foreign governments," he did want to see American war
industries expanded, and he felt that the best way to bring that about was by
increased foreign orders. For that reason he directed his department to do
all that it could to put foreign purchasers in touch with American producers.90 Representatives from nations throughout the world, from Australia
to Argentina and Belgium to Bolivia, were authorized to visit American aircraft factories, and Secretary Woodring approved the sale of any model plane
to any country requesting it, as long as it was no longer classified as a military
secret.91 However, when a secret was involved or when a request was made
to release a certain aircraft or other weapon before the date set for its release,
Woodring would refuse to back down.92 Only when the President overruled
him did the Secretary of War make an exception.
By the summer of 1939, because of the threat of war in Europe, the
United States government began to receive numerous requests, especially
from Britain and France, for airplanes and other war supplies. On 5 July
the President gave to the Army and Navy Munitions Board the task of
coordinating all foreign purchases. The board established a clearance committee, whose responsibility was to gather information on all foreign orders
and, after determining which orders could be filled, decide where to place
the orders so that they could best promote American arms and aircraft industries. The establishment of the clearance committee did two things. First,
it enabled foreign orders to be secured more quickly than ever before, since
the foreign governments no longer wasted time in establishing contacts and
negotiating with American producers. Second, orders were distributed to
producers in a manner best calculated to build up and strengthen war industries.93 For example, if one aircraft company had been receiving more
orders than it could possibly handle and another such company had been
idle because of insufficient orders, the clearance committee could send any
new orders for aircraft to the second plant, thereby ensuring that it would
have modern equipment and trained personnel, should an emergency arise
and rapid expansion be necessary.

In the early morning hours of 1 September 1939 Germany attacked Poland,
and withtin a few days all Europe was at war. Roosevelt responded, as
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required by the Neutrality Act, by applying an arms embargo on all the
belligerents; however, he then called Congress into special session and, on
21 September, asked for an immediate repeal of the embargo provision.
After six weeks of bitter debate his request was granted on 3 November, with
the requirement that all sales of arms, ammunition, and implements of war
had to be on a cash-and-carry basis.94 Secretary Woodring was pleased with
the repeal of the embargo, because he was becoming increasingly convinced
that the neutrality legislation contained certain shortcomings; thus, as early as
17 July he had written to the House Foreign Affairs Committee that "the arms
embargo provision does not actually advance the cause of neutrality and
may, under some conditions, serve to involve us in war rather than to accomplish its purpose of keeping us out." Therefore, he asked for its repeal.95
When repeal actually came, however, it meant something different to
Secretary Woodring than it did to President Roosevelt. To the former it
meant that the American arms and aircraft industries could grow and expand as a result of increased foreign orders and, therefore, be better equipped
to produce for the United States Army, should war come.96 The President,
on the other hand, saw repeal primarily as an opportunity to help Britain
and France arm so that they could successfully meet the Nazi menace.
With the repeal of the arms embargo there came a new flood of orders
from Britain and France for military aircraft and other implements of war;
thus, on 7 November, Britain established a purchasing commission to facilitate the procurement of American goods. At about the same time, France
set up a similar body, but after a few weeks the two groups agreed to merge
to form the Anglo-French Purchasing Commission. With a single purchasing commission, Britain and France no longer found themselves bidding
against each other for American war goods.97
By the end of November it was evident that the Clearance Committee
of the Army and Navy Munitions Board could not keep up with the work
imposed by the increased foreign orders. Therefore, on 6 December, Roosevelt created the President's Liaison Committee to handle all foreign orders.
Remembering the reluctance with which Woodring and Johnson had accepted the French air mission the year before, the President organized the
committee so that neither the Secretary nor the Assistant Secretary of
War had any control over foreign sales. The President chose Secretary of the
Treasury Morgenthau to serve as liaison between foreign purchasers and
American producers. In this position Morgenthau had a tremendous responsibility, because he not only had to see that Britain and France received
the implements of war that they so drastically needed, but he also had to see
that the United States rearmament program did not suffer as a result of the
foreign orders.98 This was a difficult task, and, as will be seen in chapter 12,

193

it was made even more difficult by increasing obstructionism on the part of
the Secretary of War.
Secretary of War Woodring was vitally interested in having the United
States maintain strict neutrality, because he believed that this was the only
way to avoid war. He was afraid that if the country followed a partisan
policy and aided the Allies, the ultimate result would be entrance into a war
on their side. Therefore, Woodring did everything that he could do to see
that the United States government, and especially the War Department,
followed a neutral policy when dealing with all foreign governments. An
examination of Woodring's actions in regard to the helium controversy, the
Spanish Civil War, the March 1938 French and British air missions, and the
December 1938 French air mission reveal his determination to see that all
nations were treated in a fair and equal manner. He tried to make neutrality
a reality.
Beginning in 1938 Woodring's desire to be entirely neutral came into
conflict with the views of President Roosevelt, who made no secret of his
desire to assist Britain and France. The President had come to feel that the
best way to avoid war was to help the European democracies defeat Germany, so that the United States would not have to become involved. The
Secretary of War, however, believed that the same ends could best be
achieved by not aligning with either side. Throughout 1938 and 1939 Roosevelt and Woodring increasingly came into conflict over the issue of neutrality, but the worst was yet to come. The first six months of 1940 were to
bring the controversy to a head and ultimately were to play a major role
in the removal of Woodring from the secretaryship in June 1940; but before
that was to transpire, Woodring was to make some additional contributions
to the strengthening of the United States Army.
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11
Toward an "Army in Being"

By midsummer of 1939 Secretary Woodring and his War Department advisers were generally satisfied with developments at home and abroad.
Congress had just increased the strength of the Army from 165,000 to 210,000,
had appropriated $110 million for "critical and essential war supplies," and
had approved an operating budget in excess of $500 million-the largest
amount of money ever made available to the Army during peacetime. Along
with these developments the possibility of war in Europe seemed to be declining. The growing optimism in government circles over events in Europe
was expressed in June by President Roosevelt when he said, "Last winter I
thought the chances of war were about three to two, but now they seem to
be even."1 Because of the relaxing of world tensions and because there were
no pressing problems facing him, Woodring decided to get away from
Washington; therefore, on 3 August he set sail with his family on a twoweek's visit to Panama. The trip was more than a vacation, for the Secretary
utilized it to inspect the canal and its defense system.2
When Woodring departed from the United States, the international
scene appeared relatively calm, but that condition soon changed. In mid
August, Germany succeeded in engineering a nonaggression pact with Russia. This agreement was of great significance to Hitler, because with it he
felt he could now attack Poland without fear of becoming involved in a war
on two fronts. Although the official announcement of the pact did not come
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until 21 August, President Roosevelt and the State Department learned of
its imminence on 16 August.3
On 17 August Acting Secretary of State Sumner Welles called Acting
Secretary of War Johnson, Acting Secretary of Navy Charles Edison, and a
few other officials from the State, War, and Navy departments together in
order to inform them of the impending Nazi-Soviet pact. At that time,
Welles told the group, "The European situation is now so bad that I think
we ought to be ready for the worst."4 Johnson immediately passed the information on to General Marshall, who ordered the General Staff to prepare
a detailed plan of action to be taken when war came.5 On 19 August, Woodring returned to Washington and assisted in the final preparation of the
War Department's recommendations. A few days later he sent Roosevelt a
memorandum recommending the measures that the Army felt should be
taken if and when war broke out in Europe. 6
The proposals were divided into two groups. First, there were "Immediate Action Measures," which the President could initiate without congressional action; these proposals were designed primarily to speed up
procurement. In the second category were "Measures Requiring Congressional Authorization or Appropriations." Included in the latter group were
recommendations that the authorized strength of the Regular Army be increased from 210,000 to 280,000 and that the strength of the National Guard
be raised from 190,000 to 280,000. It was also proposed that all necessary
equipment and a year's supply of munitions be provided for the Initial Protective Force and that certain "critical items" be procured to further implement the Protective Mobilization Plan. Additional aircraft and increased
training for National Guard units were also requested. In presenting these
proposals to the President, Woodring indicated that they were not mobilization steps but were measures necessary "to place the Regular Army and
the National Guard in a condition of preparedness suitable to the present
disturbed world situation."7 Since the measures suggested were to be taken
only in case of war and could be implemented only with presidential and
congressional support, it was uncertain whether they would ever be carried
out.
Having made the Army's desires known to the President, Woodring
turned his attention to the Panama Canal. Woodring's deep interest in the
canal was based on his firm conviction that it was "the vital link in our chain
of national defense."8 He believed that the canal was of such great importance because the defense of the continental United States rested on the ability
of the fleet to move quickly between the Atlantic and the Pacific oceans. If
the canal were to be closed, the nation's ability to defend itself would be
seriously jeopardized. Therefore, he considered protection of the canal to be

196

"of utmost importance to our national security." 9 This matter of canal
security was what led Woodring to embrace the concept of hemisphere defense. He admitted that he did not visualize hemisphere defense as a PanAmerican protective alliance, but as a United States defense measure. According to Woodring, "Any hostile air base established anywhere within
effective striking proximity of the Panama Canal would prove a vital threat
to that waterway-and, therefore, a threat to the very security of these United
States."10 Thus, he concluded that steps would have to be taken to ensure
that no such air bases were established.
From the time that he had become Secretary of War, Woodring had
continually stressed the importance of the canal and had urged that proper
measures be taken to provide for its defense. Such efforts finally paid off,
for in 1939 he was the person primarily responsible for getting Congress to
appropriate $30 million for air bases, harbor defenses, and antiaircraft guns
for the Canal Zone.11 That same year Woodring achieved a hollow victory
when Congress, heavily influenced by his testimony, authorized the construction of a third set of canal locks, but failed to appropriate the funds
necessary for constructing them.12
As war approached Europe in late August 1939, Woodring became quite
concerned over the safety of the canal. What he feared was not an air attack
but sabotage.13 He worried that a German, Japanese, or Italian crew might
destroy a ship inside a lock and thereby block the canal. Consequently, in
order to reduce the possibility of any such attempt at sabotage, Woodring
began on 28 August to advise canal authorities of the make-up, by nationality, of the crews of ships about to go through the canal.1 4 This led to
especially close observation of those ships having crewmen from the Axis
nations. Furthermore, on 19 August he directed that an Army guard be
placed on every ship going through the canal. It was hoped that the presence
of the military guards would discourage any attempts at sabotaging the ships
while they were in the canal.111
At a few minutes after three o'clock on the morning of 1 September
1939, Secretary Woodring was awakened by a phone call from President
Roosevelt, who informed him that Germany had just attacked Poland.16
Within thirty minutes, Woodring and Chief of Staff Marshall were at the
Secretary's office discussing what action had to be taken immediately. They
first notified the Military Commander of the Canal Zone to take extra precautions to ensure the safety of the canal. Next the Commanding Generals
of the nine Corps areas and the Hawaiian, Philippine, and Puerto Rican
departments were advised of Germany's attack and ordered to take any
necessary preca utions.17
The days immediately following the German attack were especially
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hectic for Woodring. Daily trips to the White House to confer with the
President, as well as numerous conferences with officials of the State, War,
and Navy departments, consumed most of his time. During this period a
problem that he devoted considerable attention to was the reinforcement of
the canal's defenses. By 10 September, Woodring had ordered several thousand troops to supplement the fifteen thousand that were already there, and
plans were made to raise the total strength to twenty-two thousand. In addition, more than thirty aircraft, all that could be spared at the time, were sent,
and arrangements were made to increase the air strength from one hundred
and fifty to three hundred planes as soon as possible.18
Increasing air and ground strength in the Canal Zone was a matter on
which Woodring could take direct action; however, two other things that he
wanted to do could be accomplished only by presidential order. The first
thing that he wanted was to have the control of the canal transferred from
the Civil Governor to the Military Commander, so that the latter could do
a better job of coordinating local defense matters. Consequently, on 5 September the President, acting upon Woodring's recommendation, issued an
executive order placing the military in charge of all activities in the Canal
Zone.19 Over this request there was no problem, but over Woodring's second
proposal a bitter controversy developed.
In a conference with the President on 1 September, Secretary Woodring
asked for authority to let the Army inspect every ship desiring to pass
through the canal. The purpose of the inspection was to see that no ship was
carrying explosives or other devices that could be used to destroy the canal
while it was passing through the locks. Woodring's proposal was bitterly
opposed by Undersecretary of State Sumner Welles, who argued that such
action might be interpreted by some nations as unjustified harassment and
thus might develop into a point of bitter controversy between the United
States and the offended nation. Woodring answered Welles's argument by
claiming that no nation would have a right to complain, since all ships,
regardless of the country from which they came, would be inspected. Furthermore, he added, any protests that might be received were a small price
to pay for the security that the inspections afforded the canal.20 Woodring's
arguments ultimately carried the day, and on 5 September the President
issued an order granting the Army the authority to make the inspections. 21
Defense of the Panama Canal was just one of many problems facing
Woodring in September of 1939. He had hoped that once war started in
Europe, the President would take action to implement the measures that the
General Staff had drawn up in August; but, much to his consternation, such
was not to be the case. The first setback for the War Department came on
the question of increases in troops. Both Woodring and General Marshall
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considered it essential that the authorized strength of the Regulary Army be
increased by 70,000, so as to bring the total figure to 280,000. As far as the
National Guard was concerned, they believed an increase from 190,000 to
280,000 was necessary. 22 The President, however, fearing public and political
reaction against such large increases, was unwilling to go along with these
requests. Consequently, on 8 September he proclaimed a "limited national
emergency" and issued an executive order which authorized a Regular Army
strength of 227,000, an increase of only 17,000. The same order provided for
the National Guard to add only 45,000 men, instead of the 90,000 that the
Army had asked for. 23 When Woodring privately expressed considerable
disappointment over the small increases that the President had granted,
Roosevelt told him that under the present conditions such increases were "all
the public would be ready to accept without undue excitement." The President did, however, assure Woodring and Marshall that more troops would
soon be authorized.24
Other steps taken by the President to meet the "limited national emergency" were just as feeble as the troop increases. A very modest $12 million
was made available for the purchase of additional motor vehicles, but virtually no additional funds were made available for "critical and essential"
war supplies or for additional training. The only other action taken by the
President that approached the recommendations submitted in August was
the provision for additional training for the National Guard.25
In spite of the President's refusal to provide, or even ask Congress for,
anywhere near what the Army had requested, Woodring and Marshall did
not give up hope, because by mid September they sensed that there was a
growing sentiment in Congress for adequate defense. Their optimism was
based on personal assessments as well as on reports from Maj. James McIntyre, the War Department's liaison officer with Congress. In a letter of
20 September to General Marshall, McIntyre stated that after sounding out
a number of Congressmen on defense matters, he had concluded: "Now is
the time to ask for everything the War Department needs. We will get it.
Let us strike while the iron is hot."26 With such encouragement the General
Staff prepared an $850-million supplemental armament program, which
embodied most of the measures that Woodring and the War Department
had previously requested the President to provide in case of war in Europe,
but that had not been implemented.27
In early October, Woodring presented the new plan to the President
and asked that it be implemented immediately. Roosevelt refused, claiming
that such vast military expenditures were completely out of the question. To
this, Woodring replied that the nation's defense needs would have to be
placed first, even if it meant violating the law by creating a financial deficit.
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Then he added, "Mr. President, I would rather be impeached for providing
the country with means of defense, than impeached in time of emergency
for failure to make such provision."28 In spite of such pleas, however, the
President refused to go along with the $850-million program recommended
by his Secretary of War and by his Chief of Staff. Finally, in late October,
when Roosevelt decided to ask Congress for a supplemental appropriation
for the Army, he requested only $120 million, or about 15 percent of the
amount that the War Department sought.29
Woodring was quite upset that the President had not seen fit to ask
Congress for the men and materiel that the Army considered essential in
order to provide properly for the national defense. The President felt that
the Army was asking for entirely too much, but Woodring considered the
requests both reasonable and necessary. Woodring was not one to seek what
was not needed, and he continually impressed that idea on his subordinates.
During the fall of 1939 he told the General Staff, "We must not take the
position of grabbing all we can just because the grabbing is good, but rather
ask for what we need to make the military establishment what it should
be."30 It was apparent that the Commander in Chief and the Secretary of
War had vastly different views of what the Army needed at that particular
time. The War Department had presented a program for increased military
readiness that it considered essential and that Woodring did not consider
excessive; but in October 1939 the President was not yet ready to accept such
a far-reaching program.
With no hope of getting more than $120 million in supplemental funds
for the current fiscal year, Woodring, in late October, turned his attention to
the Army program for fiscal year 1941. As the General Staff prepared its
recommendations, Woodring adopted and began to put into effect a plan to
bring about acceptance of them. Whereas the contents of the $850..million
program put forth in October had been known only to War Department
officials and to the President, the Secretary's new strategy was to give the
new plans as much publicity as possible. Woodring felt that by letting
Congress and the public know what the Army needed and how much it
would cost, he would be able to stimulate interest and support for the new
program.81
The first thing that the Secretary felt he had to do in order to sell the
new program was to convince people that he was a peace-loving man who
advocated strengthening the Army for defensive purposes only. Woodring
went a long way toward achieving that goal when he made a speech before
the National Guard Association on 27 October. In that address Woodring
started off by saying, "In all sincerity and in all honesty let me tell you there
is no man in public life today who is more determined than your Secretary
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of War that your sons and my sons shall not march forth to war!" He then
went on to claim that while the security of the United States did not demand
a military force larger than the peacetime strength provided by the National
Defense Act, it did, "demand the maintenance of an Army in being at all
times. This force must be fully, perfectly equipped and adequately trained
at all times."32
Woodring had hoped that his statement concerning an "Army in being"
would be the part of the speech that was remembered; however, it was his
phrase that American "sons shall not march forth to war" that was singled
out and widely publicized. The speech caused columnist Ernest Lindley to
write: "For those who believe that this war in Europe is not our war and
that we should keep out of it, no matter which side wins or loses, October
27 must be underlined." Lindley then proceeded to discuss the speech, after
which he reported that Woodring had vowed to his friends that "no American boys will be sent to fight on European soil so long as I am Secretary of
War."33 Nationwide news coverage, along with Lindley's column on the
speech of 27 October, convinced many Americans of Woodring's desire to
arm strictly for defensive purposes. The publicity also did much to endear
him to those individuals in Washington and throughout the country who
leaned toward an isolationist policy. Although the isolationists never counted
Woodring among their number and while he never considered himself one
of them, there is no doubt that they shared identical views when it came to
the question of American involvement in a foreign war. In fact, one of
Woodring's statements, "Every man and every dollar necessary for the defense of America, but not one man, not one dollar to fight the wars of other
nations," could well have served as the isolationists' creed.3" According to
Woodring, he was a noninterventionist-whose major goal was to stay out
of the war in Europe-and not an isolationist.35 Unfortunately, he was never
able to satisfactorily explain the difference between the two. While such a
distinction would have been difficult for anyone to explain, it was even more
so for Woodring because of his making common cause with such outright
isolationists as Senators Wheeler, Clark, and Nye.
Having convinced many Americans that any readiness program that he
might advocate would be solely for defense, Woodring was ready to set forth
the new program. By early November the Secretary of War, the Chief of
Staff, and the General Staff had decided on the broad outlines of the program, but the detailed plans still had to be worked out. At that point,
Woodring began to hold conferences with key members of both the House
Military Affairs Committee and the Appropriations subcommittee to explain
the Army's nceds. 36 He recommended that the Regular Army be increased
to 280,000 men, but he said that even more important than the number of
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troops was the need to provide them with proper training and equipment.
Woodring warned the Congressmen against authorizing a large force and
then failing to provide funds to supply and train it. He then went on to
explain that the two objectives that the Army hoped to achieve were a completely trained and equipped Initial Protective Force, and such organization,
training, and equipment as would be necessary to provide adequate hemispherical defense.37 When several Congressmen expressed concern about the
high cost of fulfilling the objectives, Woodring sharply replied, "It is time
that national defense shall be determined on the basis of our needs and not
on a dollar and cents basis."38 The House members with whom the Secretary talked seemed to be impressed with his views and reasoning, and they
indicated a willingness to support his upcoming requests. 39 To further enhance congressional understanding of the Army's needs, the War Department arranged for a total of eighteen members of both the Military Affairs
and the Appropriations committees of the Senate and House to make a
month-long inspection tour of military installations throughout the United
States and the Canal Zone.40 Most, but not all, of the Congressmen returned
from the trip convinced of the need to implement the recommendations of
the War Department.
The Secretary of War made the Army's objectives known not only to
Congressmen but to the public as well. Throughout November and December, Woodring utilized public speeches and press interviews to expound
on what the Army needed and hoped to get from the next Congress.41 He
made clear to the press his determination to have "1,000 percent perfection
in training, 1,000 percent perfection in equipment, motorized and mechanized, [ and] 1,000 percent in air provision," even if the cost were high.42
In mid November the General Staff completed detailed plans and
budget requests for Army expansion in the upcoming fiscal year. After
granting his approval, Woodring forwarded the recommendations to the
Bureau of the Budget and the President, so that they could be utilized in
preparing the annual budget message. In addition to operating expenses, the
program called for vast expenditures for "critical and essential" war supplies,
more arsenal and depot facilities, and additional training. The cost of the
entire package was a whopping $1,500 million. 43 The new proposals were
received by the President with no more enthusiasm than the supplemental
program that had been recommended a month before. Again the primary
objection was one of excessive cost. This time, however, Roosevelt chose not
to argue the question of military expenditures with his increasingly recalcitrant Secretary of War. Instead, he turned to advisers in the Bureau of the
Budget, and together they came to the conclusion that the request for critical
items, arsenals, depots, and additional training was unnecessary.44 Wood-
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ring's request for additional supplies and training had once agam been
rejected by the President.
In spite of this setback, Woodring still had hopes of rallying support for
the program of his department. He intended to do that by utilizing one of
the strongest propaganda devices at his disposal-the Annual Report of the
Secretary of War. That document, which was released on 27 December, was
short and concise. After quickly reviewing the progress made by the Army
in the past several years, Woodring revealed what he considered to be the
three most critical needs of the Army: First, the need to further strengthen
the defenses of the Panama Canal. Second, the need for a strong Air Corps.
Then he came to the third point, the one that he emphasized most: the need
for proper equipment and training. In regard to the last he stressed that
he was making no recommendation as to military strength, since that was a
decision for Congress to make. However, he did say that all American
fighting men
must be afforded complete equipment, clothing, supplies, subsistence, transportation, training, and instruction to prepare them for any eventuality presupposed
by any military exigency. Whatever ... the size of our Army . . . I must
urgently insist that that force ... be complete as to personnel, as to materiel, and
that it be 100 percent efficient as to training. Our Military Establishment must
be an "Army in being!"45
From this time on, Woodring always cited an "Army in being" as his
major goal.
Woodring hoped that a favorable public reaction to his report might
convince the President to change his mind and restore some of the requests
made by the Army, but such a reaction did not occur. The newspapers
carried accounts of the report on the back pages and failed to comment on
it in their editorials.46 The Secretary placed his final hopes in a nationwide
radio broadcast that he made on 31 December. At that time he explained
the proposed program for the Army, and he asked for congressional and
public support for it.47 Unfortunately, the broadcast received even less attention than his Annual Report. All of Woodring's efforts to create public
support for the program had failed-he simply could not convince President
Roosevelt of the need for additional funds. Therefore, in early January 1940,
when the President presented to Congress the proposed Army budget for
fiscal year 1941, he asked for only $853 million-or about 55 percent of what
the War Department had requested.48
Roosevelt's refusal to accept ·the War Department's program was in all
likelihood influenced by a strong nationwide sentiment that the United
States should avoid involvement in the European war at all cost. Going hand
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in hand with that sentiment was a widespread feeling that the larger the
armed forces, the more likely it was that the country would be drawn into
a war. For such reasons the President feared a public reaction against large
expenditures for the military. 49 Furthermore, there was considerable pressure from Republican Congressmen to hold down all government expenditures.50 Still another factor that influenced FDR's attitudes was the conduct
of the war in Europe. After Germany took Poland in late 1939, the fighting
in Europe came to a virtual halt, and the war assumed a "phony" character.
As the fear of the Nazi menace began to decline, so did the pressures for
materially strengthening the nation's defenses; thus, Roosevelt did not feel so
compelled to take action.
Regardless of the reason for the President's decision, the fact remained
that he had asked Congress for only about half as much money as the Army
had requested. Almost immediately, Woodring indicated that he considered
the proposed budget to be inadequate, but he did so in such a way as not to
sound insubordinate. On 16 January he appeared before the House Military
Affairs Committee, where he discussed the strengths and weaknesses of the
Army. At that time he maintained that the Army budget proposed by the
President was "a wise step toward the fulfillment of our objectives"; however, he added, "It does not provide for the deficiency of some $300,000,000
worth of critical ordnance and engineer items and a smaller amount of other
less critical munitions for the 3/4 million men in the Protective Mobilization
Plan."111 In late February the House opened its hearings on Army appropriations. General Marshall served as the primary spokesman for the War
Department, and he did a fine job of explaining the Army's needs.112 Unfortunately for the Army, the "phony war" had cooled the enthusiasm of a
number of Congressmen who, just a few months before, had been so willing
to strengthen the Army. Thus, on 4 April the House responded by cutting
the President's request from $853 million to $785 million.113 The measure
was then sent to the Senate for action, but before the measure could be considered, events in Europe were to cause a radical change in congressional
attitudes.
On 9 April 1940 the phony war came to an end as German troops
attacked Norway and Denmark. Suddenly many Americans who had not
previously shown an interest in national defense wanted to know what had
to be done to provide for adequate national security. At the same time a
large number of Congressmen began to ask, not how much a sound Army,
Air Corps, and Navy would cost, but how soon they could be provided.114
On 30 April the Senate, with a new sense of urgency, opened its hearings on
the Army appropriations bill.
Ten days after the Senate hearings opened, Germany attacked Belgium
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and Holland and then moved into France. With that attack, President
Roosevelt, who just the day before had received a memorandum from
Woodring asking for additional war materiel, decided that the time had
indeed come to materially strengthen the Army.55 After five days of hectic
conferences a plan was worked out, and on 16 May the President asked
Congress to grant the Army $546 million more than he had previously requested. The new funds, Roosevelt said, would be used "to procure the
essential equipment of all kinds for a larger and thoroughly rounded-out
Army." 56 Specifically, he asked for an increase in Regular Army strength
from 227,000 to 255,000 and for the equipment and munitions required for a
Protective Mobilization Force of 750,000 men.57 At last the President had
asked Congress for some of the important things that Woodring had been
advocating for the past eight months;58
By mid May, alarm over the German advance through the Low Countries made the Senate willing to go even further than the President had
suggested, and on 22 May it passed a $1,500 million Army Appropriations
Bill. The House responded to the new state of affairs by scrapping its bill
of 4 April and adopting the Senate version, and on 13 June the President
signed the bill into law.50 As large as the new appropriation bill had been,
it was evident even before its passage that it would not be sufficient. In fact,
President Roosevelt had no sooner made his defense speech on 16 May than
he realized the need for even further military spending. Therefore, during
the last week of May the President and General Marshall discussed the
Army's additional needs and what they would cost. Throughout May and
June, Woodring, for reasons to be discussed in the following chapter, was
again out of favor with the President and thus played virtually no role in
these crucial discussions. Consequently, during this time it was Marshall
who fought the War Department's battles at the White House.60 On 31
May, Roosevelt asked Congress for still another $700 million for the
Army. Again it responded with more than he requested, this time providing
$821 million.61 This measure-which became law on 25 June-along with
the June 13 measure, provided $2,300 million for the Army for fiscal year
1941. Included in these appropriations bills were the funds and the authorization to increase Army strength to 375,000 and to secure an additional 3,000
aircraft. At last the War Department had enough money to create an "Army
in being"; however, Woodring never got the opportunity to make that
dream become a reality, because on 19 June the President was to ask for, and
receive, his resignation.
Although Woodring spent a considerable amount of time from September 1939 to June 1940 seeking more money for the Army, there were
other ways in which he sought to provide increased military readiness. One
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matter to which he devoted considerable attention was that of the reorganization of combat units. For many years there had been talk in military circles of changing the organization of the infantry division. After the outbreak
of war in Europe, Woodring decided that the long-overdue change should
take place immediately. In mid September the Secretary, acting upon the
recommendation of the Chief of Staff, announced that the 22,000-man
"square" infantry division would be replaced by a 9,000-man "triangular"
division.62 It was felt that new weapons and mechanization would permit
such a reduction in manpower without a corresponding reduction in firepower. The new divisions also offered more command flexibility, since they
could be used en masse or as three separate, highly mobile combat teams.
Under the new organization, three new divisions were to be formed immediately and two more in the near future. This change in the infantry division
was just the beginning of a vast program of reorganization. According to
the Army and Navy /ournal of 21 October 1939, "The Army has plunged
into probably the greatest peacetime reorganization in its history ... sweeping changes are being made in nearly every arm and service."
The reorganization looked good on paper, but the Secretary of War and
the Chief of Staff were anxious to see how it would really work. Therefore,
in October they drafted a field-training program that called for extensive
exercises at the division and corps levels.63 Several months later, in February
and March 1940, the new infantry and cavalry divisions underwent considerable field training, and in April the first corps maneuvers since 1918 were
held. The following month seventy thousand men participated in the first
corps-versus-corps exercises in the history of the Army. These maneuvers
were valuable in that they showed the "triangular" division to be tactically
sound; they also revealed a serious need for more tanks as well as antitank
and antiaircraft guns at the corps level.64 The new organization had many
shortcomings, some of which would take years to overcome, but at least
Secretary Woodring had played a major role in getting this badly needed
reorganization under way.
Another problem that Woodring devoted considerable time to was that
of eliminating overage and physically unfit officers. He knew that many
older officers would be physically unable to carry out their responsibilities
should they ever be placed in a combat situation. This problem stemmed
from promotion stagnation, which became especially acute in the thirties
when a large number of officers who had entered the Army during World
War I could not be promoted because there were no openings at the next
higher rank. Since promotion was strictly on a seniority basis, it meant that
an officer could not be advanced to the next rank until all others with more
time in grade had been promoted. Consequently, it was not unusual to find
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a forty- or forty-five-year-old captain or a thirty- or thirty-five-year-old first
lieutenant. When this was the case, it frequently was not because the man
was incapable or inefficient but because there simply was no need for more
majors or captains. By the late thirties the prospect of remaining in the same
grade indefinitely was seriously affecting the morale of many young officers. 6 ~
To overcome the problem of officers who were overage or unfit, Secretary Woodring, in April 1939, initiated a "vitalization" program. The first
part of the program centered on the "Woodring Age-in-Grade Plan." This
scheme, which was originated and developed by the Secretary, called for
automatic promotion of an officer after a specific number of years in grade. 66
The plan was rejected by Congress, because it was set up in such a way that
many able-bodied officers under sixty years of age would be forced to retire. 67
After war broke out in the fall of 1939, Woodring urged that his plan be
reconsidered, since, he argued, it was more important than ever that younger
officers find their way into the upper ranks. When opposition appeared
again, he agreed to a new plan, which provided promotion based on total
length of service and grade and did not force the retirement of so many
officers. This measure was ultimately passed on 13 June 1940.68
The purpose of the second part of Woodring's "vitalization" program
was to eliminate those officers who were physically unfit. This was accomplished by administrative action in the spring of 1939. Rigorous physical
exams were given to all those in the grades of captain and above, and those
who failed the exams were then forced to resign or retire. 69 The "vitalization" program actually had little effect on the Army, because the rapid
expansion that began in mid 1940 eliminated the problem of promotion
stagnation, and the physically unfit were placed in positions where they
could still function. What the Secretary's program did was to pave the way
for the next step in promotions reform-a selective advancement system that
promoted a man on merit rather than seniority. Such a system was ultimately approved by Congress and was instituted in September 1940, several
months after Woodring had left Washington.70
In June of 1940 Harry Woodring was forced to resign as Secretary of War,
thus ending seven years of continual effort to provide increased military
readiness. Much progress had been made under his leadership, first as Assistant Secretary and then as Secretary, and the Army's future looked brighter
than ever. Although the strength of the Regular Army was only 257,000,
authorizations and appropriations had just been received to raise that figure
to 375,000. Funds had also been provided for "critical and essential" items
for a 750,000-man Protective Mobilization Force, and provision had been
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made to secure 3,000 planes above and beyond the 5,500 already on hand or
on order. The reorganization of combat units and a more effective training
program were also reasons for optimism.71 It appeared as if Woodring's
"Army in being" could, and soon would, become a reality.
The future looked bright, but what was the present status of the Army?
How adequate, how prepared, how ready was the United States Army to
defend the country when Woodring left office in June of 1940? Perhaps that
question could best be answered by Chief of Staff Marshall, who, in describing the state of the armed forces, wrote: "As an army we were ineffective.
Our equipment, modern at the conclusion of the World War, was now, in
a large measure, obsolescent. In fact, during the postwar period, continuous
paring of appropriations had reduced the Army virtually to the status of
that of a third-rate power."72 Several other observers shared the same view.
In late May, J. G. Norris, the military editor of the Washington Post, reported that recent testimony of ranking War Department officials revealed
the well-known fact that the Army "needed many war planes and pilots ...
(and) arms and equipment were sadly lacking in many categories."73 At
about the same time another Washington reporter wrote: "A gloomy view
is taken here of our readiness for war. Our Army is so small, so badly
equipped that one military leader asserts, 'I would even go to Munich to
get a year or more to prepare.' "74 There seems to be no doubt that in June
1940 the United States Army was far from being an effective military force.
Secretary of War Woodring had labored long and hard to receive the
funds necessary to make his "Army in being" a reality, but no sooner had
the money for it been secured than he was forced to leave his post. The large
appropriations needed to materially strengthen the Army had been sought by
Woodring for several years, and he had intensified those efforts after the
outbreak of war in Europe. However, prior to the spring of 1940 his pleas
to the President, Congress, and the public had gone largely unheeded. Finally, the German attacks on Norway, Denmark, the Low Countries, and
France did what Woodring had been unable to do: they convinced the
President and Congress that there should be no further delay in strengthening the Army. While it is true that the Army was quite weak in mid 1940,
it was not because Woodring had not made every effort to improve it. If the
President had followed the advice of his Secretary of War in the fall of 1939,
the country could have been well on its way to having an "Army in being"
in June of 1940; instead, it was just beginning.
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12
Obstructionism Brings Dismissal

When Britain and France declared war on Germany after the latter's attack
on Poland in September 1939, President Roosevelt issued a proclamation of
neutrality and then, as required by the Neutrality Act of 1937, imposed a
mandatory arms embargo on all belligerents. A few weeks later the President, who made no secret of his sympathy for the democratic nations and his
desire to aid them, called Congress into special session and asked that legislation be passed that would permit the United States to sell implements of
war "abroad." Although he said "abroad," it was clear that he meant to
Britain and France. On 3 November, after six weeks of bitter debate,
Congress scrapped the mandatory embargo provision of the Neutrality Act
and replaced it with a "cash and carry" policy. The United States could now
legally make war goods available to the Allies. Unfortunately, however, the
President and his Secretary of War had vastly different views as to the extent
of the aid that should be made available, and, as a consequence, friction
increased between the two men.
As early as January 1939 the President, who felt that the best policy was
to help provide Britain and France with the supplies that they needed to
defeat Germany, made it quite clear that he was willing to sell the Allies
anything that they requested as long as it did not violate the neutrality
legislation.1 By late December of that same year he had gone much further,
for he was then so determined to fulfill their requests for war supplies that
he was willing to do so even if it meant temporarily denying such goods to
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the United States Army.2 Since the President considered Britain and France
to be America's first line of defense, his first priority became aid to the Allies,
and his second became strengthening the forces of the United States. Secretary Woodring, on the other hand, was opposed to "frittering away" vital
war materials by sending them abroad. He felt that the American military
machine should be strengthened first, and then aid could be extended to the
Allies. 3 He was worried about the disastrous consequences should the United
States impair its military strength by sending war supplies to Britain and
France and should those nations then fall to Germany. 4 Consequently, he
continually advocated that the President reverse his priorities and place the
defense needs of the United States first.
It must be kept in mind that in 1940 there was no way of telling which
policy-aiding the allies or strengthening America's defenses-could best
provide for the nation's security. Roosevelt bet on his "Allies First" policy,
and time was to prove that he made the proper decision; thus, Roosevelt
became a hero. Woodring, however, advocated a "United States First" policy, and time was to indicate that such a policy might have been fatal to the
democratic cause throughout the world. While it is not the place of the
historian to speculate as to what might have happened, it is indeed interesting to consider what the present American attitude toward Roosevelt and
Woodring might be had Britain been unable to hold out against Germany
in 1940.
The story of Woodring's activities in the first six months of 1940 revolves
around his disagreements with the President over the questions of supplying
American aircraft to the Allies and of turning military surpluses over to
them. The disagreements between the two men became so great that Woodring not only failed to cooperate with Roosevelt, but even began to obstruct
his policies. As the Roosevelt-Woodring clashes increased in frequency and
intensity, the President turned more and more to Secretary of the Treasury
Henry Morgenthau to implement his policy of aiding the Allies.
After the 3 November 1939 change in the Neutrality Act had cleared the
way for the procurement of American-produced implements of war, both
Britain and France set up purchasing commissions in the United States.
When it soon became apparent that the two nations were bidding against
each other for the limited supply of war materials, they decided to merge
their operations. Thus, on 6 December 1939 the Joint Anglo-French Purchasing Commission was established. On that same day the President, upon
the recommendation of Secretary Morgenthau, established a special liaison
committee, whose function was to coordinate the placing of foreign orders
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with American firms in such a way that they would not interfere with the
United States rearmament program. The committee, which reported directly
to the President, was composed of three individuals. The Treasury Department's Director of Procurement was chairman, and the other members were
the Quartermaster General of the Army and the Paymaster General of the
Navy. 5 The President had deliberately kept Woodring and Johnson off the
committee and had made an official of the Treasury Department chairman,
so that Morgenthau, who firmly believed in aiding the Allies, would be able
to supervise its activities. 6
Woodring immediately objected to the establishment of the President's
liaison committee, because he disapproved of any foreign buying that conflicted, or might possibly conflict, with Army procurement.7 He also indicated to the President that he felt that the Army and Navy Munitions Board,
not the liaison committee, should decide what items should be sold abroad.
Assistant Secretary Johnson expressed the same view to the Commander in
Chief, who defended his action on the grounds that the Procurement Division of the Treasury was already experienced in large-scale purchases and
that over half of the foreign purchases were of nonmilitary, rather than
military, items.8
The most critical needs of the Allies in the winter of 1939-1940 were
military aircraft and aircraft engines. In late December, Arthur Purvis, head
of the Anglo-French purchasing commission, informed Morgenthau that a
large order would be placed in several months, but that in the meantime the
Allies wanted to secure as many military aircraft as they could.0 Officials of
the War and Treasury departments realized that it would be extremely
difficult to fill a large order, because production facilities were so limited and
because it would take a minimum of nine months to complete the necessary
expansion of war plants. Since the Allies wanted the planes as soon as possible and since American manufacturers could not meet the demands of the
Army Air Corps and still fill the foreign orders, some sort of priority system
had to be worked out. It was over that priority system that President
Roosevelt and Secretary Morgenthau, on the one hand, and Secretary Woodring, on the other, were to come into bitter conflict.
In early January of 1940 Morgenthau, who was by then virtually the
coordinator of the armament business and the foreign sale of military equipment, approached the President concerning the problems of aircraft production. Since American aircraft factories could not immediately provide
Britain and France with the number of planes they desired, Morgenthau
believed that every second one of the Army and Navy planes that were
currently under production should be given to them. The President was
unwilling to accept such a proposal, but he did agree to give the French
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twenty-five of the first eighty-one P-40's that the Army was scheduled to
receive prior to July. Roosevelt also expressed a desire to have an aircraft
industry that could quickly expand its production to thirty thousand planes
per year, and he and Morgenthau both agreed that Allied purchases could
and should be utilized in order to bring about such an expansion. 10
On 17 January, President Roosevelt called Secretaries Woodring and
Morgenthau and Generals Marshall and Arnold to the White House, where
he "emphasized the necessity for expediting delivery [of aircraft] to the
Allies." 11 The President's instructions were not in line with the ideas of War
Department officials who had been giving serious consideration to the difficulties that the American aircraft industry would have in filling domestic
and foreign orders. As early as 12 January, General Arnold had written to
Secretary Woodring concerning British and French proposals "to set aside
work now being done on Army airplanes to expedite foreign deliveries."
Arnold vigorously opposed such a course for three reasons: first, it would
delay the completion of the Air Corps Expansion Program; second, foreign
nations would receive airplanes superior to those of the United States Air
Corps; third, such action would antagonize and cause difficulty with Congress.12 Secretary Woodring was impressed with Arnold's arguments, especially the first two, and he was to use them repeatedly as reasons for opposing
a policy whereby planes produced for the Air Corps would be made available to the Allies.
The President's instructions of 17 January had little impact in late January and February, because the plane requests of the Allies were relatively
small. Then in early March the Anglo-French purchasing commission presented the liaison committee with the large aircraft order it had previously
promised to make. It called for ten thousand planes and twenty thousand
engines to be supplied by July 1941.13 The Allies naturally wanted the very
latest planes that could be produced, and Secretary Morgenthau supported
them on that matter. Therefore, Morgenthau and Purvis requested that the
War Department release the very latest in aircraft, aircraft engines, and
superchargers. Secretary Woodring, upon the advice of his military aides,
especially General Arnold, refused to release the items, because they were
still classified as "secret" and were therefore not eligible to be released. Some
of the items requested were not yet in production, and some were in production but had not yet been turned over to the Army.14
Woodring had no intention of releasing the items or of changing the
release policy so that they could be turned over. Twice in 1939 he had consented to changes in the policy on the release of aircraft. In the spring he
had agreed to reduce the time limit for release from one year to six months
after delivery of the second production plane. Then in the fall he had
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approved a new policy, which provided that "military aircraft will not be
released for export until they have become identified as production articles."
The 1939 changes made it easier for the Allies to receive more modern
planes, but they still ensured that foreign delivery of one type of aircraft or
aircraft engine would not be permitted until a later type was actually being
manufactured for the Air Corps.15 Now, in March of 1940, Woodring was
being asked to release to foreign nations airplanes that were more modern
than those possessed by his own Army-and that he was unwilling to do.
On 11 March word of the sale of twenty-five new P-40's to France and
of the War Department's opposition to releasing them appeared in Washington newspapers. Congressman Dow Harter, head of the Aviation Subcommittee of the Military Affairs Committee, immediately called for an inquiry
into the administration's policy on releasing planes for export. According to
Harter, the purpose of the hearing would be to determine whether purchases
by the Allies were hampering the United States Army's procurement of aircraft.16 Chairman Andrew May of the Military Affairs Committee decided
that the hearing would be conducted before the entire group, not just the
Aviation Subcommittee. Woodring was summoned to testify on the fourteenth, but he requested and was granted a delay until the twentieth. While
the House was preparing for its inquiry, Senator Robert La Follette, Jr., was
calling for the Senate to do the same.17
On 13 March the President, angered by public disclosure of conflict
between himself and the War Department over release of military aircraft,
called Secretary Woodring, Assistant Secretary Johnson, Secretary Morgenthau, General Arnold, and the newly appointed Secretary of the Navy,
Charles Edison, to the White . House.18 At that time Roosevelt informed
those who were present of the need for "cooperation and coordination concerning foreign sales of aircraft and accessories," and he made it quite clear
that he expected no more resistance from the War Department.19 He also
advised that care be used in answering questions before congressional committees, adding that he had not been pleased with the way in which War
Department witnesses had testified in the past. The President then turned
to Arnold and said that there were places where officers who did not "play
ball" might be sent-like Guam. After the meeting, General Arnold wrote,
"It was a party at which apparently the Secretary of War and the Chief of
Air Corps were to be spanked and were spanked."20 The meeting was
pleasing to Secretary Morgenthau, who was getting tired of the Army's
opposition to aiding the Allies. 21
The President had emphasized that he wanted to make it easier for
Britain and France to get American-built planes. Therefore, it was necessary
that the War Department come up with a new policy on the release .of air-
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craft. After the White House meeting on 13 March, Woodring asked Generals Marshall and Arnold to develop a plan that would satisfy the President
but not endanger the nation's security. Five days later, on 18 March, they
presented their recommendations. What they submitted was a list of all
planes currently being produced for the Army, and beside each item on the
list there was an indication of whether it should be retained or released. The
planes approved for foreign sale were selected in such a way as to ensure
that the United States Air Corps would always retain a better model.22
Woodring approved the plan in principle and asked that it be placed in a
form suitable for presentation to the President. This had to be done immediately, because Woodring had to get Roosevelt's approval prior to his
appearance before the House committee on the twentieth.
On the morning of 19 March, Secretary Woodring, General Marshall,
and General Arnold met in the Chief of Staff's office to discuss the release
policy that they would recommend to the President. During the course of
that conversation a new idea emerged, which was incorporated into the proposed plan. General Marshall indicated that he felt that the Army Air Corps
had more to gain than to lose if it permitted release of its reserve planes to
the Allies and subsequently received, in lieu of those craft, later models with
improved performance capabilities; this process was known as a "change
order" or a "delayed order." 23 Woodring agreed to such a delay in the delivery of reserve aircraft, but not to delays in the delivery of operational aircraft
or a small maintenance reserve. At the close of the meeting, Woodring summarized the decisions agreed upon:
1. No military secret or secret development should be divulged or released to
any foreign purchaser of military aircraft.
2. No American military plane would be released for foreign sale unless or until
a superior plane was actually in the process of manufacture for the War
Department.

3. The War Department would negotiate change orders on current contracts SO'
it could obtain refined models.
4. No delivery delays would be tolerated in operating requirement needs or in a
15% maintenance reserve, but delivery delays would be accepted on aircraft
scheduled for delivery over and above operational requirements plus a 15%
maintenance reserve.24
Since the last two provisions had just come out of the present meeting,
Secretary Woodring asked that the conferees, plus Assistant Secretary Johnson, meet at his office at seven o'clock that evening to make a final review of
the proposed policy before he took it to the President for his approval.
That evening, while Woodring and the others were on their way to the
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meeting, they heard radio newscasts reporting that at an afternoon news conference President Roosevelt had said that every type of American-built military plane would be released for foreign sale. The President's alleged statement caused considerable concern to the conferees, because it indicated a policy
that was quite different from the one that they were about to recommend?>
In order to determine exactly what the President had said, both a complete
transcript of the news conference and a ticker-tape press account were secured. Examination of those documents revealed that the radio reports had
been somewhat misleading. The matter of foreign sales had come up at the
news conference when a reporter had asked the President to clarify the administration's policy on releasing airplanes and armaments for foreign sale.
Roosevelt began by indicating that each case would have to be decided individually. He went on, however, to affirm the vital need for expanding the
nation's capacity for producing aircraft, and he added that this could be
achieved only with the help of foreign orders. The President also had stated
that as far as he was concerned, an airplane was no longer a military secret
once it was under production.26 The implication of such a statement was
that he would therefore have no objection to releasing any "secret" aircraft.
Roosevelt's statements, plus the fact that he made no mention of delayed
orders, seemed to indicate that he intended to release the latest military
planes with no strings attached.27
While those present at the evening meeting were discussing what the
President had really meant by his statements, Secretary Woodring received
a phone call from Roosevelt. The Chief Executive, who had been informed
of the move to get the stenographic notes of the press conference, told
Woodring that his afternoon statements outlined quite clearly the policy that
he intended to follow. Next he stated that if there was anyone who did not
go along with his program, he would take "drastic" action. Then he issued
a warning that he would consider any individual who appeared before the
House Military Affairs Committee on the question of release policy to be on
trial as far as any statements he might make. Before Woodring could question his superior or explain the new policy that was being prepared, the
President hung up.28 Woodring then informed the group of the President's
decision and voiced his dissatisfaction with it. General Arnold, although he
was disappointed, stated that since the Commander in Chief had made his
decision, there was nothing to do but implement it. For the next three hours,
Woodring, Johnson, Marshall, and Arnold argued, debated, and discussed a
new release policy. By 1 :00 A.M. they had come to agree on a plan that
would provide for the release of the latest planes but would assure the Air
Corps of receiving improved models at a later date.29 Before the meeting
adjourned, Woodring called Chairman May and asked if his appearance
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before the House Military Affairs Committee, scheduled for later that morning, could be postponed until 27 March. May consented to Woodring's
request.30
On the following day, General Marshall presented the new plan to the
President. Roosevelt gave it his tentative approval and told Marshall to place
it in final form. On 25 March, Woodring, Johnson, and Marshall took a
prepared statement on export policy to the White House and got the President's final acceptance of it.31 Woodring and his military advisers were not
pleased with the new policy, but it was what the President wanted, and
there was nothing that they could do about it. One contemporary report
described the Army's action on the release matter quite well when it said,
"Highest War Department officials swung around to the President's view on
selling latest model airplanes to the Allies when they discovered that on that
issue Mr. Roosevelt's mind was set and determined."32
In late March the Secretary of War set forth to defend the new release
policy before the House and the Senate Military Affairs committees. In
appearing before the House group on 27 March, Woodring explained that
the new policy would let the War Department defer the delivery of planes
already contracted so that manufacturers could fill their foreign orders. In
return, the producers had to agree to deliver a more refined model to the
Army at a later date. Such a system would thereby provide aircraft for the
Allies, assure the Army Air Corps of receiving planes that incorporated the
latest developments, and provide for the expansion of the American aircraft
industry. Another provision of the policy was that foreign nations receiving
the planes were required to furnish the Army with complete information on
the combat performance of the American-built planes so that their shortcomings could be corrected. In the questioning that followed, Woodring
assured the committee that the new scheme would not interfere with the
procurement of planes needed for the operational requirements of the Air
Corps. He also claimed that no secret devices had been or would be relcascd.88
In response to further questions concerning his acceptance of the new
policy, Woodring denied published reports that he had been opposed to it.
He claimed that the entire matter had been worked out with his advisers
and without coercion. At that point, Congressman Arthur Anderson asked,
"Is it true· that Secretary Morgenthau was responsible for this program?"
Before Woodring could reply, Chairman May intervened by rapping his
gavel and saying that he did not consider the question appropriate. At May's
request, Anderson withdrew the question.34 Thus Woodring was saved
from what could have been a very embarrassing situation. After Secretary
Woodring's appearance, Assistant Secretary Johnson and Chief of Staff
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Marshall further explained and defended the new plan. When the hearing
ended, Chairman May issued a public statement in which he said that the
testimony clarified all questions concerning the new policy on the release of
aircraft and that the Military Affairs Committee considered it to be quite
satisfactory .311
On the following day, Woodring appeared before the Senate Military
Affairs Committee, where he said essentially the same things that he had
said the day before. One new matter arose when he was asked whether the
new planes would be released only to Britain and France or to any nation.
To this, Woodring replied, "Any Government has the right to come here
and negotiate and purchase on a cash-and-carry basis. . . . [The War Department] will handle any country and every country on the same basis."36
In answering the question affirmatively, Woodring was saying the same
thing that the President had said several days before; 37 however, while
Woodring's answer was probably made in good faith, Roosevelt's sincerity
would be open to question. When Woodring had finished testifying, Johnson and Marshall also spoke in favor of the new policy. At the close of the
session the committee, by the narrow margin of 5-to-4, rejected a proposal to
conduct a formal investigation into the sale of military aircraft to Britain
and France.38
In spite of Secretary Woodring's attempts to give the impression that
the new release policy had not been a source of conflict, the press was well
aware of what had been going on. Typical of accounts appearing in news
magazines was that of the United States News, which said: "[The] breach
between President Roosevelt and his War Secretary is widening near to the
breaking point. Argument over the question of supplying latest model
planes to the Allies really is more bitter inside than has appeared on the
surface."39 Newspaper columnists Drew Pearson and Robert Allen wrote:
"Over the vital question of selling latest types of Army airplanes to the Allies,
Secretary of War Woodring was in such disagreement with his Chief that
there was a near break in the Cabinet."40 Publisher John C. O'Laughlin,
who was in frequent contact with Woodring during this period, reported to
General Pershing that a break had been avoided only because Woodring
"surrendered, and he did so in order to hold on to his job."41
At his meeting with the President on 25 March, Woodring had agreed
to accept the new release policy, and in the days that followed, he even
defended it before the House and the Senate Military Affairs committees.
However, he soon made it apparent that he did not intend to carry it out.
On 22 March, Woodring had refused to release for export a General Electric
supercharger that was currently being produced for the Army. Even after
the new policy had been declared to be in effect, he continued to deny its
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release. He also refused to sign the orders to release the latest American
aircraft for export to the Allies. Assistant Secretary Johnson urged Woodring to sign the releases, but the Secretary refused to do so.42
On 9 April, Secretary Morgenthau called Johnson and informed him
that the Anglo-French purchasing commission was anxious to complete aircraft contracts with the American manufacturers, but that they could not do
so until the War Department signed the necessary releases for the aircraft.
Johnson reported that there was nothing he could do. "I'm having all kinds
of trouble with Woodring," he said. He then informed Morgenthau that
Woodring not only refused to sign the releases, but that he was also threatening to reappear before the House Military Affairs Committee and tell
them that he had opposed the new release policy. To this Morgenthau
replied, "When the President gives me a job to do, if anybody puts any obstacles in my way I tell the President about it." Morgenthau then stated
that he was going to see Roosevelt on the matter, and he suggested that
Johnson do the same. Later that day both men informed the President of
the Secretary of War's refusal to cooperate. Roosevelt immediately called
Woodring and made it abundantly clear that he expected the planes to be
released at once. Consequently, the Secretary .yielded to the pressure and
released the planes. On the next day, arrangements were made to sell to the
Allies twenty-four hundred of the latest fighters and twenty-two hundred
new bombers. Several weeks later, American manufacturers began to turn
over to Britain and France planes that had been built for the United States
Air Corps.43
Secretary of War Woodring's efforts to keep the latest military aircraft
in the hands of the Air Corps, rather than turn them over to the Allies, were
paralleled by attempts to keep from selling or turning over surplus military
equipment to belligerent nations. On both matters Woodring was motivated
by a desire to retain for the United States Army all military items that he
considered to be necessary for defense of the nation.
One of many problems facing the War Department was that of disposing of "surplus military property." Prior to 1940 the problem was minimal,
because the limited Army budgets created problems of scarcity of supplies,
not problems of surplus. Occasionally, however, an Army inventory would
reveal that certain supplies and equipment, including arms and ammunition,
were in excess of Army needs and were therefore "surplus." When such a
situation occurred, it was not unusual for the surplus supplies to be sold to
a foreign government. The sales were usually made to Latin American
nations; this was done with the encouragement and expressed approval of
President Roosevelt, who saw the sales as a way of further implementing
his policy of hemisphere defense.44 While Woodring formally approved of
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such disposition of surplus, he did so reluctantly, because he felt that the
nation was so short of military equipment and supplies that none of it could
or should be disposed of. He believed that if war ever came to the United
States, every rifle, every mortar, and every artillery piece, regardless of age,
would be of value. 4 1>
After the Soviet Union had attacked Finland in November 1939, the
Finnish government requested permission to purchase arms, ammunition,
and other implements of war from American producers on a credit basis;
however, on 7 February the President decided not to extend such assistance.
Although Roosevelt had originally favored aid to the Finns, he yielded to the
pressure of Secretary of State Hull and Secretary Woodring, who opposed
such a move. Hull did not want to extend direct aid, because he feared the
reaction of congressional isolationists and believed that such action might
endanger United States neutrality. Woodring's opposition was based primarily on the belief that no military supplies could be diverted abroad without further weakening the nation's defenses.
Following the President's decision to deny Finland the funds to purchase war supplies from American manufacturers, consideration was given
to selling, or otherwise providing, surplus war materials to that nation. On
9 February, Roosevelt conferred with Secretaries Hull, Woodring, and
Edison on the feasibility of relinquishing surplus war materials to neutral
nations so they could in turn sell the items to Finland. Woodring opposed
the plan on two counts. First, he claimed that the Army had no surplus war
goods to dispose of. Second, since the purpose of the plan was to supply
war goods to Finland, it would be an unneutral act which could ultimately
lead to involvement in a foreign conflict. In spite of Woodring's pleas, the
President decided that the War Department would sell surplus artillery to
Sweden, which would in turn sell it to Finland. The President also directed
the Secretary of War to determine what other items of military surplus could
ultimately be made available. Within a few days, negotiations for the sale of
artillery were undertaken, but Finland fell to the Russians before the transaction could be completed.46
As a result of the meeting of 9 February, Secretary Woodring asked
General Marshall to have G-4, the Supply Division of the General Staff,
make a survey to determine what and how much ordnance equipment could
truly be declared surplus, so that it could be turned over to foreign governments. On 9 March the survey was completed, and two days later, Woodring
was asked to approve the sale price of a list of surplus ordnance materials
which would be eligible for sale to foreign governments. Included on the
list were 100,000 Enfield rifles, 11,000 machine guns, 237 three-inch mortars,
300 75-mm. guns, and a handful of other weapons in lesser quantities.47 All
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of the items listed had been Army property since World War I. Woodring
followed the President's explicit instructions and approved the disposition to
foreign nations; however, he did so very reluctantly, in part because he believed that the material could not be spared and in part because he felt that
the items might not go to neutral nations. His criticism of the means that
were being used in disposing of the goods is indicated by the following comment, which he appended to the memorandum asking for his approval of the
transaction:
I approve the above paper as a method of carrying out the policy determined
by higher authority for the sale of surplus property. But-I continue, as for several years, to absolutely disapprove of the sale of surplus United States Army
property. I insist, regardless of any higher authority direction, that if Army
surplus property is to be sold, it only be sold by this government to another
neutral government. 48

Woodring's fear that United States Army surplus property might go to
belligerent rather than to neutral nations led him to issue a departmental
order on 15 March which provided that "no surplus arms or ammunition
will be disposed of to any state or foreign government engaged in hostilities."
Before taking this action, Woodring had consulted with Secretary of State
Hull, who approved of Woodring's action. 49 Sooner or later that order was
certain to cause some difficulty, because its provisions were in direct conflict
with President Roosevelt's policy of extending aid to nations that were trying to halt Nazi aggression. During the first two months that the order was
in effect it caused no problems, because the question of disposing of surplus
property did not arise. No problem appeared, because in April, Germany
attacked and took control of Norway and Denmark so quickly that the
Roosevelt administration did not have time to consider making supplies
available to these countries. Consequently, in early May the surplus property that Woodring had released for foreign sale on 11 March was still in
Army warehouses.
Germany attacked the Low Countries on 10 May, and in the next few
days the rapid advance of Hitler's Army seemed to endanger all of Europe.
On the fifteenth of the month, Britain's new Prime Minister, Winston
Churchill, sent a message to Roosevelt, telling him of the British determination to meet the Nazi challenge and asking the President to "help us with
everything short of actually engaging armed forces." Specifically, Churchill
asked for forty or fifty "older destroyers," several hundred modern aircraft,
antiaircraft equipment, and ammunition.110
Upon receiving Churchill's message, Roosevelt consulted with Secretary
Morgenthau on the feasibility of filling the request. Roosevelt then directed
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Morgenthau to see what he could get the Army to release. Morgenthau first
asked the Chief of Staff and the Chief of the Air Corps if there would be
any objection to the immediate release of one hundred pursuit planes that
were about to be delivered. General Arnold vigorously opposed such a
move, claiming that it would set the development of the United States pursuit squadrons back six months. 51 Marshall concurred with Arnold, and on
17 May he wrote to Morgenthau: "I do not think we can afford to submit
ourselves to the delay and consequences involved in accommodating the
British Government in this particular manner." 52 In spite of this indication
that the Army desired to hold on to everything it could, Roosevelt, on 18
May, i;ent an optimistic message to Churchill. After informing the British
Prime Minister that turning over the destroyers was temporarily out of the
question, because it would require congressional approval, the President
pledged to "facilitate to the utmost the Allied Governments obtaining the
latest types of United States aircraft, anti-aircraft equipment, ammunition,
and steel."113 Roosevelt's willingness to assist the Allies soon led to additional
requests for small arms and ammunition, as well as for iron and aluminum.
In his efforts to carry out the President's request to see what the War
Department could turn over to the Allies, Morgenthau dealt almost exclusively with General Marshall, rather than with Woodring. This was not
only because of the personal dislike that Woodring and Morgenthau had for
each other, but it was also because of Woodring's increasing tendency to
obstruct the President's policy of actively aiding the Allies.M In his desperate
search for more war goods, Morgenthau, on 17 May, asked General Marshall
if he would conduct a new survey to determine what ordnance materials
might be released as surplus without endangering the national defense. Although the last such study had been completed less than three months before,
a new one was undertaken. On 22 May the survey had been completed, and
a list of surplus items from World War I was turned over to the Chief of
Staff. The new report contained many items that had not been included on
the surplus list of 9 March, and the quantities on the newer one were much
larger.1111 Major discrepancies between the two lists can be seen from the
following comparison:
Item
9 March 1940 list
Enfield Rifles
100,000
JO-caliber ammunition
0
machine guns and automatic rifles
11,000
75-mm. guns
300
3-inch mortars
237
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22 May 1940 list
500,000
100,000,000 rounds
35,000
500
500

The greatly expanded list of 22 May revealed an attempt on the part of the
Army to meet the President's demands to assist the Allies by all means
short of war.
On the afternoon of 22 May, General Marshall took the new list of
surplus items to the President. He explained that the supplies were available
for transfer to the Allies but that the decision on whether or not to make the
transfer was up to the President. After expressing approval about the type
and quantity of items on the list, Roosevelt directed Marshall to consult with
Undersecretary of State Sumner Welles to see if a way could be found to
legally turn the material over the Allies.56
While efforts were being made to supply critical war items to Britain
and France, Woodring continued to maintain that surplus materials could
not be turned over to the Allies because they were at war; thus, to aid them
in the proposed manner was a violation of the policy of the War Department. He believed it was one thing to permit American industries to manufacture goods and sell them to the Allies, but it was quite another to provide
them with war materials that were currently, or had been previously, owned
by the United States government. 57 On 23 May, Marshall discussed the
transfer of the surplus materials with Welles, who, much to his own dismay,
was forced to agree with W oodring's view that under existing legislation
the transfer would be impossible.118 Welles did, however, refer the problem
to legal officers in the State Department, and Marshall also asked G-4 to seek
a solution to the dilemma.
In an attempt to find a legal means by which the surplus property
could be turned over to the Allies, officials in the War and State departments
turned to post-World War I legislation governing the sale and disposition of
surplus military property and deteriorated ammunition. On l1 May 1940
Gen. Richard C. Moore, the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-4, gave the opinion
that the surplus property could be disposed of "in any way that the Secretary
of War may deem expedient."119 The next day the legal opinion of the State
Department was set forth by counsel Green Heckworth. He maintained
that Army surplus property that was exchanged as part payment for new
equipment could be resold by the manufacturers to a belligerent without
invloving the neutrality of the United States.ii() This view was further
strengthened on 29 May, when Attorney General Robert Jackson informally
expressed his agreement with Heckworth's conclusion.61 These legal opinions seemed to open the way for the War Department to turn in or sell
surplus war materiel to a private manufacturer, who could in turn sell it to
the Allies. When Welles informed the President of these legal opinions,
which would permit disposition of the surplus property to Britain and
France, Roosevelt told him to see that the War Department proceeded with
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the transfer immediately.62 There remained, however, one obstacle to the
transaction-Secretary Woodring.
When Welles informed Woodring of the President's request to turn in
the surplus materiel to the manufacturer, Woodring was unwilling to go
along with the request. In previously disposing of surplus materiel, Secretary Woodring had always adhered to a ruling by the Comptroller General,
which provided that before surplus items could be sold or turned in as part
payment on new purchases, they had to first be publicly advertised, and if
the amount of the bid was greater than the exchange value, the items had
to be sold for cash.63 Roosevelt, Morgenthau, and W dies opposed such a
procedure in the present case, because it was a lengthy process, usually taking
several months, and the Allies needed the goods immediately. Furthermore,
the three men were antagonized by W oodring's actions, which they saw as
just one more attempt to obstruct a policy that he did not favor.
At a meeting of 31 May, Woodring discussed the proposed transfer with
Roosevelt. The Secretary informed the President that he had arranged to
have inserted into legislation currently under consideration an amendment
enabling him to exchange surplus property without previously obtaining
bids; but until such legislation was enacted or until the Attorney General
issued a formal ruling making it advisable for him to do otherwise, he
would continue to proceed as he had in the past. The President, who already
knew the Attorney General's view on the matter, agreed to go along with
the longstanding policy until a formal opinion could be given by the Justice
Department.64
That opinion was set forth on 3 June by Acting Attorney General
Francis Biddle. His conclusion was: "The provision that such supplies may
be sold upon 'such terms as may be deemed best' undoubtedly gives the
Secretary of War power to sell without advertisement."611 After reading the
opinion, Woodring agreed to the transfer, the details of which were left to
General Marshall.66 On the following day, Marshall met with Arthur Purvis
to determine just what and how much of the surplus goods the Allies dee
sired. After examining Marshall's list (that of 22 May), which included
every ordnance item that G-4 had declared to be surplus, Purvis announced
that he wanted "the whole damned lot." The Chief of Staff, having anticipated such a request, had already sent orders to arsenals and depots throughout the country, instructing them to pack the equipment and send it to New
Jersey for shipment overseas.67
·
On 4 June, Gen. Charles Wesson, Chief of Ordnance, went to see
Edward R. Stettinius, Chairman of the Board of United States Steel Corporation. Wesson asked Stettinius, who a few days before had been appointed
by the President to serve on the National Defense Advisory Commission, if
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his corporation would serve as a middleman in the transfer of goods from
the War Department to the Allies. Stettinius replied that he could not
make such a decision, because his resignation from U.S. Steel was to take
effect that very afternoon, but he added that he was almost certain that his
successor, Irving Olds, would go along with the idea. After receiving board
approval, Olds agreed; and negotiations were undertaken between the War
Department and United States Steel Export Company, a subsidiary of United
States Steel Corporation. The details were soon worked out, and on 11 June,
officials of the Export Company met with Woodring and signed the contracts, which sold all the surplus property on the list of 22 May for $37,619,556.
Five minutes later the officials from the Export Company met with representatives of the Anglo-French purchasing commission and sold them the
materiel for the same amount that they had just paid for it.68 The surplus
goods then belonged to Britain and France, and within a few days they were
on their way to those countries. Before the goods left the United States,
Woodring prepared a memorandum for the President in which he requested
retention of the 500 75-mm. guns that had been turned over, but for some
unknown reason the memo was never sent.69
Woodring's reluctance to make American aircraft and Army surplus
goods available to the Allies antagonized many top administrative officials
who were striving to carry out the President's professed policy of aiding
Britain and France.70 Woodring's actions were more popular with most
military leaders, who were opposed to having the nation's small supply of
war materiel further depleted but were hesitant to speak out against the
policy advocated by the President. Word of Roosevelt's warning to General
Arnold about what might happen to officers who did not "play ball" had
spread among the military men, and they were not about to jeopardize their
careers. General Marshall and his top advisers found themselves in a situation in which the Secretary of War was advocating a policy that they
personally favored, but they were bound to carry out the policy of their
Commander in Chief-a policy that they were less than enthusiastic about.71
General Marshall probably revealed the attitude of many military leaders
when, during a meeting on 4 June at which Secretary Morgenthau complained about all the difficulty that Woodring was causing him and the
President, Marshall said, "Now, everybody in town is shooting at Woodring
and trying to put him on the spot and I don't want to see him get on the
spot. Everybody is trying to get him out of there and I am not going to be
a party to it."72
Until early June, Woodring was the only War Department official to
speak out against the danger of aiding the Allies at the expense of the United
States Army; however, that situation began to change quickly after an

224

announcement made by the President on 11 June that he was ordering a
"re-survey" to determine what additional military materiel could be turned
back to the manufacturers for ultimate sale to the Allies. At last the military began to speak out. Feeling that to release anything more would endanger the nation's security, the War Plans Division voiced opposition to the
President's proposal. General Marshall also came to the conclusion that it
was time to call a halt to the disposition of Army material to foreign
nations. 73 Therefore, on 22 June he sent the following message to his Commander in Chief: "To release to Great Britain additional war material now
in the hands of the armed forces will seriously weaken our present state of
defense." He then recommended that "the United States make no further
commitments of this sort."74 Unfortunately, Woodring did not know about
this recommendation, because two days before this the President had forced
him to resign as Secretary of War.
The President's decision to ask Woodring for his resignation was to come
as a surprise to everyone, including Woodring. The only thing more surprising than the forced resignation was that Roosevelt retained his recalcitrant War Secretary as long as he did. On numerous occasions throughout
1939 and early 1940 the President had told close associates that he was about
to remove Woodring; however, he had not done so, and by the late spring
of 1940 the general feeling was that he never would. There were several
factors that made Roosevelt reluctant to act: his extreme distaste for firing
anyone, especially an old friend like Woodring; his desire not to antagonize
congressional isolationists and noninterventionists; and his yearning to ensure his control of the Kansas delegation at the 1940 Democratic Convention.
Nevertheless, in early May the President began to give serious consideration
to the appointment of a new Secretary of War. The earlier reasons he had
had for retaining Woodring were now being overridden by other factors,
but the primary reason for seeking a replacement for him was the increased
difficulty that he was having in getting Woodring to carry out his policies.
From March 1940 on, Woodring made no secret about opposing the President's policy of aiding the Allies at the expense of the United States. During
March and early April he fought against the release of modern military aircraft to Britain and France; then in May he did the same thing in regard
to surplus ordnance items. As Woodring's obstructionism increased, the
President's fear of antagonizing the isolationists declined, because Germany's
successes in Europe had done much to weaken their cause. Another reason
for considering removal of Woodring was Roosevelt's desire to unite the
coWltry behind him in this period of crisis. The President had come to be-
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lieve that the best way to provide the national solidarity that he desired was
to appoint several prominent Republicans to the cabinet, thereby creating a
coalition cabinet.76
In order to make the coalition a reality, Roosevelt first had to find
qualified Republicans who would be willing to join his administration. One
man that the President wanted to have join his team was Frank Knox, the
1936 Republican candidate for Vice-President. In December of 1939 Roosevelt asked Knox to become his Secretary of the Navy, but Knox refused to
accept unless another Republican was also appointed to the cabinet at the
same time. Because Roosevelt was unwilling to take such a step at that
particular time, he asked Knox to let the matter ride for a while. 70
As the situation deteriorated in Europe in the spring of 1940 and as
Secretaries Woodring and Edison continued to lose favor at the White
House, Washington was filled with rumors that the President was about to
form a coalition cabinet. The names most frequently mentioned as possible
appointees were Knox and Alfred M. Landon, the 1936 Republican nominee
for President. Landon was invited to the White House, perhaps to be offered
a cabinet position, but before he went, he issued a statement saying that he
was opposed to a coalition cabinet. On 22 May, Landon visited Roosevelt.
At that time the President said that he was looking for replacements for
Secretaries Woodring, Edison, and Perkins and that he had a number of
men under consideration; however, he did not mention the possibility of a
post for Landon. Apparently the anticoalition statement had eliminated the
former Republican standard-bearer from further consideration.77
It was at about this time that Roosevelt again approached Knox about
accepting the Navy post, and again Knox replied, though not as vehemently
as he previously had, that he would do so only if another top Republican
were appointed to the cabinet at the same time. Thereupon, Roosevelt left
the invitation to Knox open, and he began anew a serious search for another
capable appointee. The President considered a number of qualified men for
that second cabinet position. Knox personally favored William Donovan,
who was a distinguished soldier of World War I, a former Republican
candidate for Governor of New York, and a former law classmate of Roosevelt's. The President, however, for reasons known only to himself, rejected
Donovan.78 Another possibility, William Bullitt, Ambassador to France,
was championed by Secretary Ickes, but the President felt that Bullitt was
more valuable in his diplomatic position.79 Serious consideration was also
given to selecting New York's Mayor, Fiorello La Guardia. When word of
the possible appointment of La Guardia spread to the newspapers, the conservatives who dominated the House Military Affairs Committee became
alarmed because of the "extreme liberalism" of the New Yorker. Therefore,
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in early June, Chairman Andrew May and Congressman Charles I. Faddis
went to see the President. They emphatically informed the Chief Executive
that they did not want to have La Guardia made Secretary of War and that
if he were appointed, they would refuse to work with him. Roosevelt was
angered by such a dictate, but realizing the power and influence wielded
by the two men, he assured them that the appointment would not be made.80
As the President continued his search for the right Republican to join
Knox in his cabinet, the pressure to remove Woodring grew to considerable
proportions. In addition to the longstanding pressure from such members of
the anti-Woodring inner circle as Harold Ickes, Henry Morgenthau, Steve
Early, and Edwin Watson, there now appeared "outside pressure" from the
press and the public. Newspaper columnists were especially active in this
move. Drew Pearson and Robert Allen continued their long-time criticism
of Woodring, calling again for his dismissal. Frank Kent reported the likelihood of the removal of Woodring, adding that he had no idea why the
President had retained him for so long. Joseph Alsop and Robert Kintner
talked of the lack of leadership in the War Department and called on the
President to appoint a new Secretary of War. 81
In June the calls for replacement of Woodring began to reach the
editorial pages. In its edition of 14 June, the New York Times contained
an editorial criticizing the leadership of the Navy and War departments. In
discussing the War Department, it said: "It seems incredible, but it is unfortunately true, that at such a time as this . . . the offices of Secretary of
War and Assistant Secretary of War should be occupied by two men who
do not see eye to eye, do not pull together, and, reputedly, do not even
speak." Mention was then made of the many important defense measures
that had to be taken, but "none is more urgently important than the immediate appointment to the top posts in the Navy and War Departments of
thoroughly competent, thoroughly non-political and thoroughly cooperative
executives."82 Three days later an editorial in Life magazine called for replacement of Woodring, saying that the need for such action was "obvious."83
The foreign press also got into the act. On 5 June the London Daily Telegraph reported that United States aid to the Allies was being delayed by
Secretary of War Woodring, who was the leader of American "obstructionists." The article then suggested that perhaps President Roosevelt should
"take the risk ... of kicking out this disloyal member of the Cabinet who
has made a hollow mockery of the profession of his chief that the administration's policy was to aid the Allies by every means short of war." 84
By early June the retention of Woodring in the cabinet was also on the
way to becoming a possible political liability to Roosevelt. In a speech on 8
June, New York's Governor, Thomas A. Dewey, who was seeking the
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Republican presidential nomination, called upon the President to dismiss
Secretaries Woodring, Perkins, and Hopkins, who were "symbols of incompetence, disunity and class hatred." Although Perkins and Hopkins were
also criticized, the speech was especially critical of Secretary Woodring.85
Such things as Dewey's speech, along with newspaper and magazine articles
and editorials calling for dismissal of Woodring, soon led to a steady stream
of letters to the President, asking that he replace his Secretary of War. 86
One obstacle to the creation of a coalition cabinet was cleared in late
May, when Secretary of the Navy Edison was nominated as the Democratic
candidate for Governor of New Jersey. This political maneuver, which had
been arranged by James Farley at the request of President Roosevelt, provided Edison with a graceful means of stepping aside, and he took advantage
of it. On 21 May he submitted his resignation, to be effective 15 June.87 A
position was now open for Frank Knox, but Roosevelt still had not found
another prominent Republican to join the administration. Then, at a luncheon on 3 June, Roosevelt's good friend Supreme Court Justice Felix Frankfurter suggested Henry L. Stimson. According to Frankfurter, Stimson
would be a perfect choice. He was a well-known Republican; he was well
qualified, having served as Secretary of War under Taft and Secretary of
State under Hoover; and his views on foreign policy and aid to the Allies
were quite similar to those of the President. In the days that followed,
Frankfurter continually pressed for the appointment of Stimson.88
As the President gave serious consideration to the appointment of
Stimson, he also turned to the problem of how to effect the removal of
Woodring. It was quite apparent by this time that the Secretary of War
would not leave voluntarily. On numerous occasions the President had
offered him fine positions, but in each instance the offer had been turned
down. As Drew Pearson, writing in mid June, put it: "If there is anything
Roosevelt ought to know by now it is that only a blast of TNT will oust his
Secretary of War." 89 Furthermore; the President could not bring himself to
just call him in and fire him. This left the alternative of finding some pretext
for asking Woodring to resign.
On 17 June a series of events started that was to give Roosevelt the
excuse for removal that he was seeking. That morning Secretary Morgenthau informed the President that the British urgently needed some fourengine bombers (B-17's). When Roosevelt asked if the Army could spare
eight or nine, Morgenthau said that he felt that they could spare ten. "That's
fine," Roosevelt replied, "You have been doing grand work and continue to
give the English the same help." 90 Later that day, in talking with Gen.
Edwin Watson, the President's Military Aide, Morgenthau said that he intended to transfer twelve B-17's and that there was no need to consult the
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Army on the transaction. When Watson asked whether the transfer could
be made without first asking the War Department, Morgenthau assured him
that " we have the authority." At Watson's insistence it was finally agreed
to sound out the Army on the proposed transfer of the twelve aircraft.91
That afternoon Watson informed Woodring that the transfer was under
consideration and asked for the Army's reaction.
On the following morning, 18 June, Woodring and General Marshall
discussed the consequences of such a transfer. Marshall explained that he
strongly opposed the proposed action, because the Army had only fifty-two
B-17's, all of which were essential to the defense of the Canal Zone and the
Caribbean. Both men agreed that none of the planes should be released.
Marshall then wrote a recommendation to that effect and forwarded it to
Woodring, who gave it his approval on the morning of 19 June, and then
immediately sent it to the White House. 92
Upon receipt of this memorandum the President decided that the time
had come to remove his Secretary of War. Whether his decision was made
because he was fed up with Woodring's obstructionist tactics and the B-17
matter was simply the "last straw," or whether he had previously decided on
dismissing him and merely seized upon this incident as an excuse, will never
be known.93 Nevertheless, the President sat down and personally wrote, in
longhand, the following letter to his Secretary of War:
June 19, 1940
Dear Harry,
Because of a succession of recent events both here and abroad, and not within·
our personal choice and control, I find it necessary now to make certain readjustments. I have to include in this a change in the War Department-and that is
why I am asking that you let me have your resignation.
At the same time it would be very helpful to me if you would accept the
post of Governor of Porto [sic] Rico. In the light of the international situation
Porto Rico and its administration are of the utmost importance to this country.
Your service as Secretary of War has been carried out loyally and faithfullyand for this I shall ever be grateful to you. This note goes to you with the warmest feeling of friendship on my part-and let me repeat, Harry, that I shall be
always thankful to you for your help to me during all these seven years.

Affcctionally yours,
Franklin D. Roosevelt84
On the next morning the Secretary of War sat down and wrote in longhand
a letter which, in spite of the fact that its exact contents were not to be
known until years afterward, was to become a source of great speculation and
controversy:
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June 20, 1940
Dear Mr. President,
Your request of yesterday afternoon for my resignation as Secretary of War
is acknowledged and you may consider this note compliance therewith.
I assure you that my refusal of yesterday morning to agree to your request
for the release of the flying fortress bombers to foreign nations was based upon
my own belief, supported by the General Staff, that it was not in the best interests
of the defense of our own country.
Fearful of a succession of events to which I could not subscribe I prefer not
to accept your proffer of continued service in another post. For the stated reasons
I ask that my resignation be considered effective today.
I feel, Mr. President, that I cannot retire with my knowledge of the inadequacy of our preparedness for war without most respectfully urging you to
maintain your pronounced non-intervention policy. I trust you will advise those
who would provoke belligerency-a state of war for our nation-that they do so
with the knowledge that we are not prepared for a major conflict. Billions appropriated today cannot be converted into preparedness tomorrow.
I am indeed grateful to you for having given me this opportunity to serve
my country and the President of the United States to the best of my ability. I am
also grateful for your kind expression of friendship and believe me I retire with
equally warm personal affection. May I remain always most respectfullyHarry H. W oodring95

Accompanying the letter was a note in which Woodring said that he
would not make any statement or release any part of the correspondence
surrounding the resignation. He asked that any announcements concerning
the matter be made by the White House.96
A few hours after receiving Woodring's resignation, Roosevelt sent to
the Senate for confirmation the names of Frank Knox and Henry Stimson
as Secretary of the Navy and Secretary of War. Roosevelt was able to act so
quickly because he had offered the War post to Stimson the previous afternoon, and the latter had accepted with the understanding that he could name
Judge Robert P. Patterson as Assistant Secretary. (This was accomplished
five weeks later, when Assistant Secretary Louis Johnson was forced to resign in order to make room for Patterson.) 97 At the same time that the
names of the new appointees were sent to the Senate, Press Secretary Steve
Early issued more detailed announcements on the new appointments and
on Woodring's resignation. There was one very unusual facet of the news
release concerning Woodring-the usual practice of releasing the letter of
resignation of an outgoing cabinet member was not followed. The reason
for the omission was that the letter to the President was "too personal."98
The removal of Woodring and the appointment of Stimson came as a
surprise to everyone, including Woodring. Just a few days before, he had
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told Congressmen May and Faddis that there was nothing to the rumors
that he was about to be replaced; in fact, he told the two Congressmen that
the President was quite satisfied with the job that he was doing.99 Assistant
Secretary Johnson was both surprised and disappointed; he was surprised
that the President had finally mustered the courage to dismiss Woodring,
and he was extremely disappointed that he himself had not been made Secretary. After hearing of Stimson's appointment, Johnson went to the White
House and expressed his dissatisfaction: "But, Mr. President, you promised
me not once but many times," said the angry Johnson.100 Most Senators were
on the chamber floor when the announcement of the impending appointments was made. The shocked surprise of that body was typified by Senator
Bennett Clark, who cried out, "Is this true?"101
The next morning the Topeka Daily Capital carried a story reporting that
three weeks before, on 1 June, Woodring had told friends in Topeka that a
"small clique of international financiers" was trying to force him from the
cabinet because he was opposed to "stripping our own defenses" to aid the
Allies. 102 Almost immediately, newspapers throughout the country carried
the story from Topeka, and Harry Woodring was once again the center of
controversy-this time over his dismissal from the cabinet.
Congressmen and journalists looked at the story coming out of Topeka
and at the President's refusal to make public Woodring's letter of resignation, and they concluded that there must be some connection between the
two. Congressional reaction was immediate. On the floors of the House and
Senate a score of Congressmen praised Woodring for the job that he had
done and deplored the President's decision to remove him. Resolutions
calling for an investigation into the circumstances surrounding Woodring's
resignation, demanding that the President release the controversial letter of
resignation, and summoning Woodring to appear before the Military Affairs
Committee in order to explain his reason for resigning were introduced in
both houses.103 Although none of the resolutions was passed, the Senate
Military Affairs Committee authorized its chairman, Morris Sheppard, to
invite Woodring to testify if he cared to. Sheppard made the •offer, but the
former Secretary of War, in response to a general request from President
Roosevelt that he not let his resignation become a political issue, rejected
the offer.104
The only public statement that Woodring made concerning his resignation was made to reporters on 21 June, when he said, "No one sympathizes
with the European democracies any more than I do, but I feel it is America's
duty to put our own defenses in order before going to their aid. I simply
could not go along beyond the point where I felt we would be jeopardizing
our own defenses."105 With Woodring refusing to tell what had happened
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and the President failing to release the Secretary of War's letter of resignation, the entire controversy slowly dropped into the background, and
Congress and the nation turned their attention to more pressing matters.
Although there was never an official explanation as to why Woodring had
resigned, it was "universally accepted that he quit rather than go along with
Roosevelt's policy of 'anything short of war to help the Allies.' "106
One facet of the dismissal that is worthy of examination is Roosevelt's
later contention, made in private, that Woodring's refusal to transfer the
B-17's to the Allies was in no way connected with the decision to ask for his
resignation. In a personal letter written to Woodring on 25 June, the President indicated that he had fully accepted the recommendation not to release
the large bombers and that, since they both favored the same course of action,
that particular matter could not have been the basis for dismissal. The impression that Roosevelt gave was that by 19 June the time for a cabinet
reshuffle had at last come, and the fact that the bomber issue happened to be
before Woodring at that particular time was merely a coincidence.107
While Roosevelt's explanation could in fact be true, several factors would
lead one to think otherwise. First, the President's letter to Woodring asking
for his resignation and the call to Henry Stimson offering him the War post
were made almost immediately after receiving the War Department memorandum opposing the transfer of the bombers. It is difficult to believe that
the memo did not affect the President's decision. Second, in a telephone
conversation at 12:52 P.M. on 18 June, presidential aide Edwin Watson told
Secretary Morgenthau that Roosevelt had said to him, "If you and Henry
think they [ the Army] ought to do it [ transfer the bombers] go ahead."108
That conversation, plus a similar one an hour and a half before, indicates
that the President, Morgenthau, and Watson were all determined to carry
through the transfer regardless of what the War Department said.109 Yet in
a personal letter to Woodring on 22 June, Watson stated, as the President
was to do three days later, that the White House had fully intended to go
along with the War Department recommendation regardless of what it
was.11° These stated intentions, along with Roosevelt's directive of 20 June
to Morgenthau to "lay off on the ten four engine bombers," are quite different from the views expressed by Watson, Morgenthau, and the President in
the days preceding Woodring's dismissal.111 Both the Watson letter and the
Roosevelt letter appear to be efforts to lay the basis for a cover-up should the
isolationists attempt to make removal of the Secretary of War a cause celebre.
Fortunately, Woodring kept that from happening.
One question remains to be answered, and that is why, after years of
threatening to replace Secretary Woodring, did the President finally decide
to act? Certainly, political considerations were important; after all, it was

232

an election year, and Roosevelt wanted to bring about national solidarity by
forming a coalition cabinet. Furthermore, the President realized that bringing two key Republicans into the administration on the eve of their national
convention was bound to cause confusion in the ranks of the opposition.11 2
Internal and external pressures were also factors: members of the inner
circle, who considered Woodring to be anti-New Deal, continued to urge his
removal, and by early 1940 the press and the public were starting to make
the same demand. Basic disagreements over policy were also important, but
in themselves they were not solely responsible, because the President encouraged different viewpoints and saw certain benefits in having in the same
department men with divergent views.11 3 That "Woodring was the most
outspoken anti-interventionist in the cabinet" was becoming increasingly
embarrassing in light of Roosevelt's policies of aiding the Allies. 114 All of
the above reasons undoubtedly influenced Roosevelt's decision, but he had
tolerated each of them and probably would have continued to do so.
There was one factor, however, that, by June of 1940, could no longer
be ignored-Woodring's obstruction of and his delay in carrying out the
President's policies. In late 1939 Roosevelt made it abundantly clear that he
wished to aid Britain and France by all means short of war, even if it meant
a temporary weakening of United States military strength. Woodring, while
not necessarily opposed to sales to the Allies, believed that United States defenses should receive first priority. His views were, therefore, completely
different from those held by the President. To disagree with his Commander
in Chief when a policy decision was being made was, and should have been,
quite acceptable. However, once the President had made up his mind and
had clearly indicated the policy that he intended to follow, Woodring should
have carried it out without delay. Instead, he did what he could to keep that
policy from going into effect. In January 1940 the President emphasized
that he wanted to provide the Allies with the latest American-built military
aircraft, but because of Woodring's obstructionism and delaying tactics this
was not done until April. That spring, the turning over of surplus ordnance
material to the Allies was also delayed for several weeks because of Woodring's reluctance and near refusal to carry out a policy that he disagreed with.
Then, in mid June, when the question of transferring a dozen B-17's arose
and Woodring again gave evidence that he was not going to "play ball,"
President Roosevelt made the decision to replace him with a man whose
views were similar to his own.
In attempting to delay the flow of American-built aircraft and of Army
surplus goods to the Allies, Secretary Woodring was doing what he sincerely
considered to be in the best interests of the United States. His conscience
and his military advisers told him to hang on to those items, but his superior
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told him to turn them over to the Allies. Woodring was inclined to follow
the first two rather than the last. In pursuing the courses of action that he
did, the Secretary of War was in effect attempting to override the decisions
of the Commander in Chief. If there is to be order in a military establishment or in government, a proper superior-subordinate relationship must be
understood and carried out at all echelons. Secretary Woodring did not follow that principle. He undoubtedly realized how unfortunate the consequences would be if every American soldier obstructed or delayed in carrying
out the orders of his superior; however, he failed to realize that equally
disastrous consequences could result if he, the Secretary of War, balked and
delayed in carrying out the orders of his superior. Once Woodring had
demonstrated that he would not carry out policies that he disagreed with,
the President had no alternative to dismissing him. There can be no doubt
that Roosevelt had the right and that he had sufficient reason to act as he did.
On 26 June, just one week after his resignation, Harry Woodring, along with
Helen and the three children, went to the White House to pay a farewell
visit to the President. The atmosphere was relaxed and almost festive as the
two men exchanged pleasantries and reminisced about some of the trials and
tribulations of the past nine years. Again Roosevelt offered his friend the
governorship of Puerto Rico, and again it was refused. After pledging to
keep in touch, the men shook hands and said good-by. The following
morning the W oodrings piled into the family station wagon and headed for
Kansas-Harry Woodring was going home.11 5
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13
Years of Frustration

There was no bitterness in Harry W oodring's heart as he, Helen, and their
three children-Marcus, Melissa, and Cooper-headed toward Kansas. His
seven-and-one-half-year stay in Washington had been an enjoyable and, he
felt, fruitful one, and he had no regrets about the recent turn of events. That
he was not disappointed was due primarily to the self-satisfaction that he had
from knowing that he had stood firm in opposing presidential policies that
he felt certain would ultimately draw the United States into the war in
Europe. To a man of principle this was very important. Furthermore, while
his noninterventionist stand had resulted in the loss of his job, it had not
destroyed his personal · friendship with Roosevelt; for this he was quite
grateful.1
Woodring's return to Kansas was also made easier by the fact that he
had previously made plans to come home at the end of Roosevelt's second
administration, regardless of what the President did. "Win, lose or draw, I
am coming back to Kansas to live in 1941," he told his close friends in the
fall of 1939 and the spring of 1940.2 He was returning, he said, "because I
have found no place I like so well and I am anxious to give our three children a normal upbringing." When he first began to speak of going back to
the Sunflower State, living on a farm, and engaging in banking, many of his
friends found it hard to believe, especially in light of rumors that he would
accept a lucrative job with a large aviation company when he ultimately left
the War Department. Moreover, it was well known that Harry and Helen
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enjoyed the social life in Washington, and many associates could hardly
envision them forsaking that for life in rural Kansas.3 That Woodring was
serious about returning became evident in May 1940, when, after months of
searching, he purchased the 262-acre property near Lecompton that had
belonged to Governor Frederick Stanton (Territorial Governor of Kansas,
1857) and announced his intentions of refurbishing the old mansion and take
up residence there by late 1941.4 The remodeling plans were under way in
June 1940, when his dismissal came. All of these things made coming home
much easier than it might otherwise have been.
The leisurely four-day journey from Washington to Topeka ended on
1 July with a welcome that the Woodrings had not anticipated. The family
was met at the city limits by a reception committee, which loaded them into
open cars and escorted them downtown to the Jayhawk Hotel, where several
hundred well-wishers had gathered to welcome them home. After Woodring had witnessed a small parade in his honor, he was swamped by news
reporters, who sought a more extensive explanation of events surrounding
his dismissal, asked about his political future, and inquired as to whether or
not he thought President Roosevelt would be renominated at the upcoming
Democratic National Convention. As he had done in Washington, Woodring refused to say anything regarding his dismissal. "Whatever is to be said
on that subject," he told the newsmen, "must obviously come from the White
House." As to his political future, he stated: "I'll always be interested and
active in politics. But they can't run fast enough to get me to take another
political job. I've had ten years of public service. That's enough." Concerning the Democratic National Convention, he made it clear that in spite
of the recent events involving him, he would still serve as a delegate-at-large
from Kansas; but he refused to speculate about what the convention might
or might not do in regard to selecting a candidate.11
Although the Woodrings actually arrived in Topeka on July 1, the city's
formal welcome was to be extended on July 9 at a public dinner sponsored
by the Chamber of Commerce. As the dinner drew near and the controversy
over his dismissal continued to arouse interest throughout the nation, speculation grew as to what he might say in the upcoming speech. During this
period Woodring was receiving about five hundred letters a day-most of
which praised him for "relinquishing his post as Secretary of War rather
than weaken the Army's power by releasing Army equipment for the use of
the Allies." 6

On 9 July several hundred Woodring associates-both Democrats and
Republicans-gathered to honor their fellow Kansan and to welcome him
home. After dinner Woodring addressed his guests in a speech that was
carried on nationwide radio. After reminiscing about his years as Governor,
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he noted how the New Deal, under "a determined leader and ... an equally
determined Congress" and cooperating with business, labor, and agriculture,
had provided "a broad program of social, political, and economic reforms"
which came to be embraced by both political parties. He took a swat, however, at the New Dealers by saying that "simply because some things have
been done in the name of the Democratic Party does not mean that I have
always approved of many of the methods used in Washington to reach
objectives, and I have not approved of some of the brainless, impractical
advisers that think our democracy must be tinkered with and made over."
Then, after calling for a federal program that would truly provide "rehabilitation to the American farmer," he turned rather abruptly to the matter of
foreign affairs. He told his audience that in response to requests from all
over the country that he make known his views on American responsibilities
to nations involved in the war in Europe, he had this to say: "I have always
been, I am now, and I expect to remain a noninterventionist, a noninterventionist in both the military and political controversies of Europe, and I
am a strong advocate of keeping this country out of recurring European
wars." 7
While expressing sympathy towards the democracies of the world, he
maintained that "our aid should be generous, and upon a strict basis of cash
and carry, ... but only aid to that point that the sale of products to foreign
nations does not jeopardize the defenses of our country." He went on to say
that "the real decision that confronts our Nation today is whether we have
responsibilities or obligations to any warring nations sufficient to cause us to
assume an increasing provocative position that eventually will involve us in
their war." He told his listeners what he hoped the impact of his resignation
might be: "If reaction from my leaving the War Department as a known
noninterventionist has caused modification of some policies, and has sobered
some of those provocative and meddling advisers of the administration who
would strip our own defenses, then I regret that I have only one set of guts
to sacrifice on the altar of public service." He also made a plea for expanded
military preparedness which he maintained was necessary to "insulate" the
nation against. war. In closing, he said: "I am grateful, I am appreciative,
and I am humble before the President of the United States for the privilege
of having served my country to the best of my ability." 8
To isolationists and noninterventionists alike the speech was quite disappointing, because Woodring had not used the opportunity to reveal the
facts surrounding his dismissal or to attack the President and the policies
that he was pursuing. Those members of the administration who favored
aid to the Allies were relieved that the former War Secretary had not revealed more details on the aid that was being extended. The speech also

237

pleased the President, for it contained nothing embarrassing or disrespectful
to him; he was appreciative of the fact that Woodring, out of personal
loyalty, had not "told all."
Three days after the dinner honoring his return home, Woodring departed for Chicago, where he was to be a Kansas delegate-at-large to the
Democratic National Convention. At this point the Democratic political
scene was one of mass confusion. About the only thing that the party members knew for sure was that the Republicans had met in Philadelphia several
weeks before and had selected as their presidential and vice-presidential
nominees the utility magnate Wendell Willkie and Senator Charles McNary
of Oregon. The chaos among the Democrats stemmed from the fact that
President Roosevelt had still failed to declare whether or not he would seek
or accept the nomination. Although the rank-and-file party members generally supported a "draft Roosevelt" movement, party leaders were bitterly
divided over the issue of a third term. Liberal Senators such as George
Norris, James Murray, and James Byrnes and administration New Dealers
such as Harold Ickes, Harry Hopkins, and Thomas Corcoran were advancing the President's candidacy; while conservatives such as John Nance
Garner, James Farley, Senators Carter Glass, and Senator Millard Tydings
were strongly opposing such a course.9
The Kansas delegation, under instructions from the state convention,
was pledged to Roosevelt if he wanted the nomination; but in the event that
he did not, the delegates were pledged to Woodring as a favorite son. If the
former cabinet officer had any political aspirations at the convention, he did
not reveal or attempt to realize them. Instead, he spent his time and efforts
trying to get a nonintervention plank into the party's platform. Arriving
in Chicago several days before the convention was to begin, Woodring approached a number of party leaders whose views on aiding the Allies were
similar to his own. After consulting this group of men, which included
James Farley and Senators Burton Wheeler, David Walsh, Patrick McCarran, Bennett Clark, Edwin Johnson, and Gerald Nye, Woodring drew
up a proposed foreign-policy plank, which pledged unequivocal support "for
a policy of nonintervention in the political and military affairs of the Old
World." The proposal was then given to former Kansas Congressman
Randolph Carpenter, who presented it to the resolutions cornmittee.10 The
Roosevelt supporters on' that committee, realizing the strength of the noninterventionist forces, chose not to challenge the Woodring proposal for fear
the controversy might split the convention wide open.11 It was therefore
agreed to write into the platform the statement: "We will not participate in
foreign wars, and we will not send our army, naval or air forces to fight
in foreign lands outside of the Americas, except in case of attack."12 The
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adoption of this plank by the convention was most gratifying to Woodring,
for it seemed to give party sanction to the noninterventionist views that he
had been championing for the past ten months.
On 17 July, Roosevelt, in spite of the efforts of a number of activitists
who were opposed to a third term, received the convention draft that he had
hoped for. Although Woodring opposed a third term (he did so on principle, because he felt no man should serve more than two terms as President),
he did not openly do so, because of his loyalty to the President and also
because he felt that such opposition could not stop the nomination of Roosevelt. The convention's biggest fight came in selecting the man for the second
spot on the ticket. Since at the time of the draft the President had not indicated his willingness to run, he had made no mention of a possible running
mate; consequently, a number of vice-presidential booms developed. Senator
William Bankhead and Paul McNutt, a former Governor of Indiana, came
under consideration, and there was even some talk of nominating Woodring.
The President, however, indicated that Secretary of Agriculture Henry
Wallace was his choice, and after a bitter fight the convention ultimately
honored that request.13
No sooner had the convention ended than the 1940 campaign got under
way, but in that contest Woodring took little interest and no part. His
reason for not participating had nothing to with his dismissal from the cabinet but was due to his opposition to the New Dealers who now seemed to
be in complete control of the party. Writing to James Farley upon his return
from the convention, Woodring said that he felt as if a member of his
family had died or his favorite dog had been stolen, because "the Democratic
Party and its organization has been stolen from me and my friends ... by
such mavericks that do not have the courage and honesty to step out and
organize their own party."14 He expressed these same views to his old friend
John O'LaughJin when he said that the party had been taken away from
"orthodox Democrats" by "social reformers with no politics and impractical
theories who know no loyalty or party organization. Control taken by such
as ·these does not set well and is my primary resentment in the whole situation."15 That these anti-New Deal views did not stem from antagonism
over his dismissal is evident from the fact that he had been privately expressing such views for more than a year before he was forced from the
cabinet.16
Once the convention was out of the way, Woodring was able to turn
his attention to personal matters. While plans were being drawn up for remodeling the Stanton mansion, the Woodrings moved to Yorkshire Farms,
a beautiful suburban showplace just outside of Topeka. Although he was
unable to take up residence at the Lecompton farm, which he renamed Rebel
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Hill, Woodring did not delay in becoming a farmer. He immediately began
purchasing livestock, and by spring of the following year the "Hill" had
about eighteen hundred head of sheep, two hundred hogs, some horses and
cows, and two hundred chickens. One would hardly expect to find a former
banker, Governor, and Secretary of War feeding livestock, ringing the noses
of hogs, and cultivating strawberries; but Woodring was doing all this and
enjoying it immensely. As one reporter wrote after a four-hour visit to Rebel
Hill, "He is not a gentleman farmer ... but a full-fledged, practical farmer
who has found a fuller life in feeding his own livestock and collecting the
eggs laid by hens in his flock." 17 While Woodring was adjusting quite
easily to his new life, so was his family. Mrs. Woodring found the transition
from cabinet wife to housewife and mother not only easy but enjoyable, and
before long she was actively involved in various civic and service organizations, most notably the Red Cross. At the same time, Marcus and Melissa
were pursuing the joys and frustrations of elementary school, while Cooper's
world centered around blocks, toy trucks, and teddy bears.
As a former cabinet member and head of the United States War Department, Woodring was continually sought after by people in public and
private life to express his views on matters relating to defense, foreign policy,
and politics. Generally, however, he avoided making any public statements
on those subjects. Numerous requests from publishing houses, magazines,
and newspapers to secure the inside story of his years in Washington and his
subsequent dismissal were rejected.18 He likewise refused to testify before
the Senate and House Foreign Affairs committees or to make speeches on
behalf of the America First Committee. Woodring did not speak out because of the personal respect and admiration that he held for the man in the
White House. He reiterated his earlier pledges of loyalty to the President
on 15 January 1941, when he wrote FDR: "I shall never do anything to
embarrass your program. I may not always agree 1000/4 but I am always
loyal."19 To this, Roosevelt replied: "I need no pledge of your loyalty. I
always assume it as a matter of course."20 On occasion Woodring expressed
his views on a defense matter, as he did in August 1940, when he went on
record as being opposed to compulsory military service until the voluntary
system received a "fair chance"; however, in such instances he always attacked the idea rather than the administration or the personalities involved.21
Throughout 1941 Woodring's interest in his farm and his enthusiasm
for remodeling the Stanton home were on the wane. During that time he
became increasingly interested in engaging in some sort of business venture
that he hoped would lead to quick and substantial financial gains. For a
time he sought, unsuccessfully, to be named District Chairman of the Tenth
Federal Reserve Bank at Kansas City; and his efforts to purchase a small
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Kansas insurance company also failed. By the end of 1941, even though
Woodring's life was still involved primarily in farming, he was looking for
greener pastures.22
After his departure from Washington in mid 1940, Woodring had
continued to maintain the noninterventionist stand that he had long advocated. That position, however, was to be abandoned completely on the
afternoon of 7 December 1941, when word of the Japanese attack on Pearl
Harbor reached Kansas. On the following morning, Woodring sent a telegram to the President, pledging his support and offering his services if they
were needed.23 A few weeks later, in a letter thanking Roosevelt for a
Christmas present, Woodring indicated that he would be interested in the
ambassadorship to Mexico or in some position in Kansas, but that he preferred not to return to Washington. In that same letter there was also an
indication that he might be interested in running against Arthur Capper for
United States Senator-a possibility that the President called "interesting
and well worth considering."24
As the nation went to war, Woodring stepped up the efforts that he had
initiated the year before to get the War Department to build a major air base
at Topeka. Because of his connections in Washington, the former cabinet
official was expected by community leaders to use his influence to do what
he could for the area. With regard to this expectation they were not disappointed. Several letters and phone calls to Generals Marshall and Arnold
-both of whom owed a great deal to the Kansan for the positions that they
occupied-undoubtedly had some influence on the ultimate decision to establish a bomber base near Topeka.26 According to one source, it was "Harry
Woodring, with no delegation to Washington and no more expense than a
phone call [to] Hap Arnold," who secured the air base.26
Early in 1942 there was speculation that Woodring would seek the
governorship again, but when he showed no interest in that position, his
party turned to William Burke, Collector of Internal Revenue for Kansas,
who was ultimately defeated by Republican Andrew Schoeppel.27 Woodring's lack of interest in the state situation at that time stemmed from his
desire to pursue a course that would have a major impact on the national
political scene. His hope was to be the guiding force behind the formation
of a third political party.
As has previously been noted, Woodring's opposition to the New Deal,
especially its spending policies, went back to his years in Washington, but
political expediency and involvement in defense matters had precluded his
making such views known. Upon his return to Kansas, he made no bones
about his dislike for the liberal mavericks who had stolen the party away.
As one Kansas editor noted in August 1940, "Harry Woodring is so out of
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line with New Deal policies that he is entitled to be classed as an old-time
Democrat."28
In 1941 and 1942 Woodring became convinced that many Democrats
throughout the nation were as disillusioned with their party as he was, but
he decided to wait and see if the 1942 elections substantiated his views.
When the Republicans made significant gains in both the House and Senate,
he felt that the time to act had come; thus, in a speech to the Kansas Grange
on 11 December 1942, he outlined his plans for a third party. The new
political organization, to be known as the Commonwealth Party of America,
was to "offer sanctuary to voters who no longer find solace in the philosophies of the New Deal Democratic party or the currently expressionless
Republican party." According to Woodring, the recent gains by the GOP
were not the results of the voters' faith in their program but were due to
disgust with their New Deal Democrat opponents and their "bureaucratic
regulations and Washington paternalism." He expressed the hope that the
new party could be sufficiently organized to present a national ticket and
possibly state tickets in the 1944 election. Although he was critical of the
New Dealers, Woodring carefully avoided any criticism of the President,
dismissing him as a possible fourth-term candidate by saying, "Roosevelt
will be far too smart and cagey to run as he senses the trend." In closing, he
stated, in a none-too-humble fashion, that he would be willing to help create
and guide the new party that- was needed to accommodate the "millions of
politically lost souls." 29 Woodring's proposal immediately created widespread interest throughout the country, The major wire services picked up the story, and hundreds
of newspapers, including all of those in the nation's capital, carried it on the
front page. Reaction was generally favorable; hundreds of letters, phone
calls, and telegrams expressed hope that the Kansan would be able to carry
out the plan that he had set forth. 30 Because James Farley had stopped at
Topeka a few days before Woodring gave this speech, there was speculation
that the two men had formulated the scheme; however, they had not discussed such a plan.31 That the President was not upset by the speech seemed
evident when he once again sent Woodring a personal Christmas present.32
· During early 1943 Woodring continued to cite the need for the Commonwealth party, but his involvement in business affairs, plus his family responsibilities, prevented him from making a serious bid to implement his
idea. As the year passed and the proposed third party made no headway,
Woodring came to feel that the way to end control of the country by New
Dealers was not by forming a third party but by recapturing control of the
Democratic party. That end, he believed, could be achieved only if someone
other than the New Dealers' champion, President Roosevelt, were to be
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nominated and elected in 1944. Therefore, his major goal soon became the
stopping of FDR's bid for a fourth term. Consequently, in the middle of
1943 Woodring's addresses began to take on a new twist. While he continued to be critical of the "state capitalist system" that the New Deal had
created, he became increasingly critical of the President, but without mentioning him by name. For example, in a Fourth of July address in Neodesha,
he lashed out at the Chief Executive by saying that the voters "must not
permit another national election-the election of 1944-to be interpreted as
another mandate for absolute and complete domination and control by any
President over the executive, legislative and judicial branches of government."33 In the fall of the year, Woodring contacted Democratic Senator
Harry Byrd of Virginia and urged him to lead an anti-fourth-term movement within the party. Sensing the President's strength, Byrd gracefully
refused to accept the challenge, saying to Woodring, "You or someone else
of our lot would be much better to lead the fight." 34
As 1944 dawned and it became increasingly apparent that Roosevelt
would seek, and in all likelihood receive, the party's nomination again,
Woodring concluded that the time had come to make an open stand against
the President and the New Dealers who surrounded him. Consequently, in
early February, he traveled to Chicago to meet with a handful of state
Democratic leaders who were interested in "a reunited Democratic party."
Then, in a speech on 4 February to the Chicago Executives Club, Woodring
publicly stated that he opposed a fourth term for Roosevelt, and he suggested
that the Democrats nominate Secretary of State Cordell Hull. Since the
purpose of his speech was to express opposition to a fourth term, the Kansan
did not attack the President but praised the social and economic gains that
the country had made under "his friend" who would "go down in history
as the father of the renaissance of the common man." The problem, Woodring maintained, was not with the man in the White House but with the
Palace Guard, "a group of idealistic, misguided, impractical, socially minded,
so-called intellectuals" who felt that Democracy had failed and that the
nation should be made over.311
Immediately after the speech a group of anti-New Deal Democrats from
nineteen states announced that they were forming, under the chairmanship
of Woodring, the American Democratic National Committee, a group dedicated both to blocking a fourth term for Roosevelt and to regaining control
of the party from the "Palace Guard." It was also announced that national
headquarters would be opened in Chicago and that a national convention
might be held late in April to determine party strategy or select a candidate.36
In the weeks that followed, Woodring devoted all of his time and energy
to developing the new organization. Operating out of Topeka, he spent time
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selecting state committeemen and committeewomen, ra1smg money, and
developing political strategy. Although the course agreed upon was to "stop
Roosevelt," it was decided that because of the late date, no effort would be
made to try to elect delegates to the National Democratic Convention.37 In
late February, when Woodring traveled to New York seeking funds and
political support, he openly admitted to reporters that the strategy of the
group was not firm, because its actions were dependent on whether or not
the President was nominated again. He indicated that several options were
open: they could wait until after the major party conventions and then
endorse one of the nominees, or they could nominate their own candidate.
The only alternative that was rejected outright was that of supporting the
Democratic ticket if Roosevelt was nominated. After Woodring had spent
several days in New York talking to Eastern Democrats with anti-Roosevelt
sentiments, he announced plans to organize in every state and to spend $1.5
million in an effort to block the President's reelection. No particular candidate, he said, was being championed by the committee.88 It was at this point
that he indicated to a close friend that the movement "has passed the laughing stage. It is greater and more important than smug Washington realizes."39 As the weeks passed, however, and the likelihood that the Democrats would go with Roosevelt increased, Woodring began to speak more in
terms of a third-party candidate, and he mentioned such possibilities as James
Farley, Charles Edison, Senator Harry Byrd, Senator Alben Barkley, Senator Walter George, and several others.40
Although Woodring unleashed the same dynamic energy that had made
him a champion campaigner more than a decade before, his movement
made little headway; and as March progressed, the enthusiasm of the previous weeks quickly waned. The problems hindering the American Democratic National Committee were both political and economic. Politically,
they gained little support, because few Democrats were willing to oppose the
President, especially when he seemed to have so much going for him: he
was extremely popular, the war was going well, and after having spent
nearly twelve years in the White House, he was practically becoming a
national institution. Even among those party leaders who were opposed to
a fourth term, and there were many, few were willing to challenge FDR,
because they did not feel that he could be stopped. This situation contributed
to the financial difficulties, because people were not inclined to contribute
money to a cause that appeared to have little chance of success; thus, the
committee was caught in a vicious circle in which a lack of political support
made it impossible to get the funds that were needed to carry on a campaign
to win more support.41 Thus, things were at a standstill.
One thing that Woodring had insisted on from the inception of the
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American Democratic National Committee was that President Roosevelt not
be personally attacked. He always maintained that his opposition to a fourth
term was based on the principle that no President should serve more than
two terms and on his belief that the government could be saved from the
totalitarian state that was being set up by the New Dealers only if the President and his followers were driven from office. 42 What Woodring never
explained, or even attempted to explain, was how he could attack the New
Dealers and the "Palace Guard" and not criticize their leader-President
Roosevelt. Apparently Woodring's loyalty to the President blinded him to
this inconsistency.
By early April 1944, with the ineffectiveness of the stop-Roosevelt movement becoming increasingly apparent, dissension became rampant as the
various leaders of the American Democratic National Committee attempted
to fix responsibility for the failure of the organization. Some placed the
blame on party members who gave lip service but no money. The growing
consensus, however, was that there could be no real progress as long as they
refused to criticize the President. They therefore urged that the direction of
attack be shifted toward Roosevelt and that "a smear campaign against him
and his family be carried out."43 Woodring could not and would not agree
to this approach, and so, on 2 April, he resigned the chairmanship of the
American Democratic National Committee and severed all ties with it.44 In
giving up the fight, he publicly stated that he was doing so because there
was "not sufficient time nor are there sufficient funds to organize the rank
and file within all the states to such proportions as I had contemplated." He
also criticized those Democrats who were "too timid, politically and economically, to stand up and be counted."411 After his departure, the committee
continued to function right up to election time, but it remained an extremely
weak and ineffective political body. W oodring's failure to stop Roosevelt
was almost inevitable in light of the fact that while he despised the New
Deal, he loved and respected its leader and therefore was unwilling to attack
him.46 In other words, he wanted to battle the "monster" without striking
at its head; and consequently, he was able to inflict little damage.
Returning home, the frustrated Woodring awaited the inevitable-the
renomination and reelection of Roosevelt. The one note of optimism that he
found in the 1944 campaign and election was when his friend Senator Harry
S Truman of Missouri became Vice-President.47 Less than two months after
Roosevelt was elected to an unprecedented fourth term he sent a Christmas
gift to Woodring, just as he had in the past.48 Woodring replied with his
usual pleasantries, and the friendship between the two continued just as if
nothing had happened.49 That these men could remain the best of personal
friends after their numerous political disigreements from 1940 on is a tribute
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to the character of each of them. Such understanding and tolerance are rare
in the political world.
The year 1945 was to be a busy one for Harry Woodring as he temporarily turned his attention from politics back to his family and business
interests. The children were all in school now, and that they brought much
joy and happiness to his life was evident from the letters he wrote to friends
and acquaintances. Business ventures became increasingly important as the
former banker searched for a means of boosting his own sagging bank
account, which had been lightened by the purchase of a beautiful mansion
at 1000 Gage Boulevard in Topeka. In addition to his farm, which was
actually becoming more of a hobby than a business, he acquired several Royal
Crown Cola franchises, secured the statewide agency for the Overland
Civilian Jeep, and invested rather heavily in several wildcat oil ventures. 50
But involved as Woodring was with these numerous pursuits, he could not
keep his mind off politics. As early as January 1945 he informed James
Farley that he was making public appearances and statements that would lay
the groundwork for his candidacy for the governorship in 1946 should he
decide to run. 51
As the war against the Axis powers headed for a successful conclusion
in early 1945, the United States turned its attention to the peace that would
follow. On this subject Woodring was in complete accord with Roosevelt's
call for United States participation in an "International Peace Union." In
late March, the Kansan wrote to the President, pledging his support for
the peace organization and offering to make speeches urging its acceptance.
Roosevelt thanked him for his support and said that he would take up the
matter of the speeches with the State Department; but he never did so,
because three weeks later, on 12 April, he died-the victim of a cerebral
hemorrhage.52 The news of the President's death stunned and saddened
Harry Woodring and the entire nation. When Woodring heard the news
from Warm Springs, Georgia, he wept for several hours.53 He had lost a
close and dear friend.
As the shock of FDR's death wore away, Woodring came to the conclusion that things were not as bad as they had at first seemed, because the
man that he had championed for Vice-President three years before-Harry
Truman-was now President. In fact, the more he looked at the situation,
the more he entertained the thought of using his friendship with Truman to
return to public life via appointment to a key government post.
On 23 July 1945 Woodring, having learned that the President was about
to appoint an Ambassador to France and that General Marshall would probably be called upon to make a recommendation, wrote to Marshall and said
that while he did not want a job "as a result of pressure and wire pulling,"
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he would be "tempted" to accept the French ambassadorship or to have "the
opportunity of bossing you around again as Secretary of War." 54 On that
same day he wrote to his friend John O'Laughlin of the Army and Navy
Journal, reiterating the same ideas and adding, "I have always felt I did a
good job as Secretary of War-and there is the vindication angle that bobs
up in my mind." 55 A week later, again in a letter to O'Laughlin, he said:
"Marshall could be the actual medium and determining factor in my being
named [Secretary of War] if he cared to so advise the President. He owes
me his appointment as Chief of Staff." He then asked the publisher to approach the General on this matter. 56 Woodring was confident that "George"
would repay the debt that he had incurred years before, but on this point the
former Secretary of War was to be sorely disappointed, because Marshall,
being the professional that he was, refused to champion anyone for the War
post. As the Chief of Staff told O'Laughlin, he could not do such a thing,
because to do so would imply that he was dissatisfied with Secretary of War
Stimson, and such was not the case. In informing Woodring that he would
not discuss the appointment with the President, he said that he could not do
so "without seriously compromising my purely military position." 57 What
Marshall left unsaid was that after his experience with the WoodringJohnson feuds of 1938-1940, which he later called "the worst experience of
my life," he would probably not have recommended him under any circumstances.58 On 21 September, Secretary Stimson resigned, and Woodring's
hopes for returning to his old War Department post soared; but the subsequent appointment of Robert Patterson dashed those hopes and any further
thoughts that he had of returning to Washington.
With the possibility of returning to the national scene now gone, Woodring turned his attention once more to state politics. Longing for the days
of glory and excitement that political life had previously given him, he decided to seek the governorship in 1946. He had considered the move since
early 1945, but his friends advised him against it, because they feared that
there would be a postwar reaction against the Democratic party. They also
pointed out that the political machine that he and Guy Helvering had developed a decade and a half before had completely disintegrated, as evidenced
by Governor Schoeppel's 1944 reelection over Democratic candidate Robert
Lemon by the margin of 231,000 votes. The odds against Woodring were
overwhelming, but he could remember overcoming such odds sixteen years
before, and so with the dawning of 1946, he began to search for an issue on
which to build his campaign. That search did not last long, because he
quickly found his cause-prohibition.119
The "bone dry" status of Kansas stretched back to the 1880s, when a
constitutional amendment prohibiting the sale or possession of intoxicating
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beverages had been passed. In the years that followed, the residents of the
Sunflower State spoke with pride of their refusal to let "demon rum" contaminate their citizenry. Refusal to accept the national amendment to repeal
prohibition in 1934 gave evidence that the antidrink attitude was still strong
at that date. The war years, however, saw those views start to change, and
with the end of the war, returning Kansas servicemen brought with them a
desire to purchase alcoholic beverages just as they had been able to do overseas and in other states.60
Woodring's political sense quickly told him that the liquor issue was
the one subject that could stir the voters; thus, in February he opened his bid
for the governorship with a speech that labeled prohibition a "farce" and
called for its repeal. Immediately a number of key Democrats began to rally
behind the "wet" advocate. In the months that followed, he continually
pointed out that while Kansas officially maintained that it was dry, it was in
reality wet, and therefore that this "hypocritical condition" should be ended.
Then, in mid June he officially became a candidate. The drys in the party,
however, were not about to give up, and they put forth as their candidates
Fred Hinkle of Wichita and Ewell Stewart of Topeka. A fourth Democrat,
Worden Howat of Wakeeney, also sought the nomination. Expecting little
difficulty in winning the primary, Woodring did little campaigning, being
content to make a few public speeches and several radio addresses.61
It was in the midst of this campaign that the Woodrings were to receive
what he called "the greatest blow that has ever come in our lives," when
their twelve-year-old son, Marcus, died of polio.62 The boy, who became sick
after returning from scout camp, died within three days of the onset of the
illness. The sudden death came as a terrible shock to Woodring, and it so
crushed him that he was never the same again. Those close to him noted
that the once jovial, even-tempered extrovert was thereafter a much more
sober, irritable, and withdrawn individual. Several days after Marcus's death,
eleven-year-old Melissa contracted the dreaded disease, but fate dealt her a
kinder hand, and by the end of the summer she had recovered completely.63
Although his son's death virtually ended Woodring's primary campaign,
it did not seem to hurt him at the polls, for he won a smashing victory,
gathering more than three times as many votes as all the other Democratic
candidates combined. In the meantime the Republicans chose as their
gubernatorial nominee the six-term Congressman from Concordia, Frank
Carlson.64
In the subsequent general election campaign, Woodring pursued the
same hectic pace that he had back in 1930 and 1932; on some days he gave
as many as fifteen political speeches. Although he talked about such things
as roads, welfare, and education, his campaign centered on one issue-
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prohibition. Woodring succeeded in pushing through a wet plank which
advocated that the prohibition amendment be resubmitted to the voters, that
the amendment be repealed, that there be state-operated liquor stores, and
that there be county option; he then built his campaign around those ideas.
When his Republican opponents pointed out that his election would not
necessarily assure that the state would go wet, he merely replied that if the
voters gave a clear mandate for repeal, he was sure that "the honest men in
the legislature ... would see that the people got what they wanted." He
also pointed out what every Kansan already knew, that prohibition was not
prohibiting a thing and, consequently, that while bootleggers were becoming
rich, millions of dollars of tax revenues that could be used for education and
welfare were being lost.85 Helen Woodring also pitched in, campaigning
for her husband and against a "prohibition law which does not prohibit."86
Woodring's vigorous campaign and, especially, his wet stand had the
Republicans frightened. While there was strong sentiment in the party to
embrace the wets, the majority were willing to follow the lead of their aged
leader, Senator Arthur Capper, who accused Woodring of "trying to ride a
modern Trojan horse" and convinced the GOP to take no stand at all on
the prohibition issue. Carlson conducted a rather quiet, colorless campaign
in which he avoided the liquor issue other than to say that he would be
willing to submit the issue of repeal to the people and let them decide.67
On 5 November, Kansas voters went to the polls and rejected Woodring's bid to return to the Governor's chair as they cast 254,283 votes for him
and 309,064 for Carlson. Although he had cut the Republican margin of
two years before from 231,000 to 55,000, it had not been enough. Woodring
conceded defeat on election night with a statement that he had simply been
caught in a "Republican tidal wave" that swept the country.88 Undoubtedly,
the age-old story of "Republican Kansas" was a key factor in his defeat.
Whether his wet stand hurt or helped him is not clear, because while it
enabled him to garner much of the veteran vote, it cost him the support of
organized religion; and in "churchgoing" Kansas that was bound to hurt.
But if Woodring lost the prohibition battle of 1946, he won the war, because
his strong showing helped to convince the next session of the legislature to
submit a prohibition-repeal amendment to the voters in 1948, and that measure was easily ratified. Consequently, the following session passed enforcement legislation, and at 3:56 P.M. on 8 March 1949 prohibition in Kansas
officially came to an end.89
In the years following his 1946 defeat, Woodring maintained an avid
interest in both state and national affairs, but it was the latter that he followed most closely. During this period he maintained continual contact with
President Truman through occasional visits to Washington and frequent
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correspondence. Woodring was inclined to express in great detail his views
on inflation, price controls, labor problems, foreign affairs, and party politics.70 After the new Secretary of State, George Marshall, put forth his plan
for the economic recovery of Europe in June 1947, Woodring became a major
advocate of the program and served as an unofficial spokesman for it in the
Midwest. Consequently, in early 1948 Truman arranged for Woodring to
make a visit to Germany, France, Italy, and several other European countries
in order to observe the situation firsthand. That trip convinced Woodring
more than ever that the containment policy was necessary in order to stop
Russia from spreading "her doctrine by propaganda, by pushing and
shoving."71
As the presidential election of 1948 drew near, Woodring continued, as
he had in the past, to work actively for Truman's election. In the spring of
1946 he had helped to organize the Kansas "Truman for President Club,"
the very first one in the country.72 Thereafter he continued to shout his
praise of the President, even when it became unpopular to do so; thus,
Woodring was happier than most Democrats assembled in Philadelphia in
July 1948 when he witnessed the nomination of the "Man from Missouri."
Several days later he went to the White House to congratulate the new
nominee and to pledge his support in the campaign. That fall Woodring
made several speeches on behalf of his friend, even though a number of fellow Democrats felt that it was foolish to do so.73 After all, they asked, what
chance did Truman have against Thomas Dewey? Nevertheless, Woodring
continued to be optimistic. On 14 October he sent a telegram to the President, in which he said, "You are making the greatest, wisest and most
effective one-man campaign in the history of Presidential campaigns."74
Apparently the statement was true, because three weeks later Truman pulled
the greatest political upset of all time as he defeated the Republican nominee
and earned four more years in the White House. For the next four years
Woodring remained a loyal supporter on every policy stand, domestic or
foreign, that HST took. For example, he was in complete accord with
Truman's Korean policy, because it gave "warning to Russia that no further
aggressive conflict in the world will be accepted without a war."75
No sooner had Truman won the election of 1948 than Woodring began
to search for a man that the Democrats could support for the presidency in
the next election. Consequently, it was for th.at reason that he traveled to
Paris in 1951 to see General Eisenhower, who was then serving as commander of NATO. At that meeting, Woodring urged Eisenhower, his
friend of thirty-three years, whose political affiliation was unclear at that time,
to enter the presidential race as a Democrat. Ike side-stepped the offer by
claiming that he did not want to be President; but he did leave the door
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open to further consideration by stating that he had always served his country
in whatever capacity he had been called.76 Convinced that Eisenhower
would not run in 1952, Woodring then urged another old friend, Gen.
Douglas MacArthur, to seek the post, even if it meant running as a Republican.77 This offer was likewise rejected. When in 1952 Eisenhower subsequently became the Republican presidential candidate, Woodring was not
only disappointed with his friend's choice of party, but he also found himself
in a political dilemma. On the one hand, he considered Ike to be the best
man for the job, but in order to support him he would have to abandon
the Democratic party. On the other hand, if he maintained his party allegiance, he would be supporting a man in whom he did not have confidence,
Adlai Stevenson. Being unwilling to commit himself to either course,
Woodring merely watched the campaign while privately hoping for an Eisenhower victory.78
When Eisenhower won the 1952 election and moved into the house at
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue, Woodring was quite pleased that, for the third
time in a row, one of his friends was occupying that residence. Unfortunately, Woodring was unable to benefit from his friendship with the new
President, because he virtually destroyed that relationship in the summer of
1954 when he instigated the Woodring-Marshall-McCarthy controversy.
This incident took place in August of 1954, when a motion of censure
against the "great Communist hunter," Senator Joseph McCarthy of Wisconsin, was being debated on the floor of the Senate. During that discussion
Senator Herbert Lehman of New York called attention to a 1951 speech in
which McCarthy launched an "unwarranted attack" on Gen. George
Marshall. At that point McCarthy, in order to back up his claim that the
statements in that speech were justifiable, introduced a letter written by
Woodring to a friend in New York.79 In the letter, which McCarthy had
reprinted in the Congressional Record, Woodring had claimed that when
General Marshall went to China in 1946 to try to settle differences between
the Communists and the Nationalists, he had known that "he was selling out
to the Reds." Woodring then went on to say: "I learned to know him
[Marshall] better than most people who have not had the close association,
and I can tell you that he would sell out his grandmother for personal advantage; that he would sell out his policies, beliefs, and standards to maintain
his political and military position with the powers that be."80 These charges
against a man as well known, respected, and loved as Marshall attracted
considerable attention throughout the nation. Immediately, many Americans came to Marshall's defense, but, of all the defenders, none was so
effective as President Eisenhower.
Just two days after Woodring's controversial letter was made public,
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Eisenhower held a previously scheduled news conference at which the first
question asked was what he thought of W oodring's statement. After a few
moments of silence, the President launched into an emotion-packed acclamation of Marshall, who, he said, "has typified all that we look for in what
we call an American patriot." After calling attention to specific acts of
unselfish service that Marshall had rendered to the country, the President
concluded, "I think it is a sorry reward, at the end of at least fifty years of
service to this country, to say that he is not a loyal, fine American and that
he served only in order to advance his own personal ambitions." At no time
did Ike mention the man whose statement had started the controversy.81
After the President had made his statement, Woodring felt that he had
no alternative but to let the matter rest. To make a further statement would
have only complicated matters by opening the way for a series of charges and
countercharges. Because Woodring felt that his letter, whose authorship he
openly acknowledged, had already antagonized too many people, he said
nothing. Marshall likewise refused to make a statement, and subsequently
the controversy just faded away, but not without having a drastic effect on
the Eisenhower-Woodring relationship. From that time on, Eisenhower had
very little to do with his fellow Kansan, and when they did meet, as they
did in connection with Woodring's later work on the Eisenhower Foundation, their encounters were quite perfunctory.
After the Woodring-Marshall controversy, most Kansans felt (and many
hoped) that they had heard and seen the last of Harry Woodring; but they
were mistaken, because he had enough fight left in him to make one last
attempt to reenter politics. Early in 1956 a number of state Democratic
leaders approached Woodring about running for the governorship once
again, but he rejected their offer, claiming that he was not interested in
returning to political life. As a result, they turned to their unsuccessful 1954
nominee, George Docking, a prominent Lawrence banker. Convinced that
they had avoided an expensive and divisive primary campaign, the Democrats began to plan ahead for the general election. Those plans, however,
had to be scrapped on 20 June, when, just fifteen minutes before the deadline, Woodring filed as a Democratic candidate.82 Just why he entered the
race never became clear, but several of his closest political associates feel that
it was to prove to his family and friends that he still had the ability and
stamina to seek, win, and hold a high political office. Others who knew him
saw it as an attempt to regain the glory, recognition, and feeling of importance that he had once known as Governor and as a cabinet member.88
Publicly, Woodring claimed that he was entering the primary race in
response to requests from people throughout the state to "unite [the] party
and in the general election unite the state." His move shocked, confused,
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and divided Kansas Democrats, and while Docking's forces were clearing
their heads, Woodring went to work. Although the former Governor stated
initially that he would not conduct a vigorous campaign, he did not stick to
that pledge, because it simply was not his style. His pace in the weeks that
followed was hectic, and it needed to be if he were going to win, since there
were just seven weeks between the day he filed for candidacy and the
election. The first three weeks were spent raising money and creating a
statewide organization. He got former State Chairman Evan Griffith to
head his campaign, and together they hammered out a viable force made up
of old political allies and party leaders who were still peeved at Docking's
failure "to cooperate in perfecting a harmonious organization" in 1954.114
On 11 July, just four weeks before the election, Woodring traveled to
Hays, where he officially opened his campaign. In the next twenty-eight
days the sixty-nine-year-old candidate, with his wife always at his side, set a
pace that most observers marveled at. Traveling to six or eight towns a day,
he gave between fifty and sixty speeches a week. Such vigorous campaigning
appeared to be winning increased support, but the question remained as to
whether or not he had time to catch up with Docking. Rather than focus
on one issue as he had ten years before, Woodring utilized a broad-based
appeal which called for increased aid to education, a statewide probationary
system for paroled prisoners, an expanded mental-health program, a new
state budgetary system, greater state promotion of tourism and industry, and
an updated conservation program. He was also critical of Republican
"bickering in state government," and he stated that neither candidate in the
opposition party was "fit to be Governor." In appealing to Kansas Democrats, Woodring put himself forth as a "true Democrat"; and while he did
not personally attack Docking, he let his supporters note that "Mr. Docking
registered as a Democrat for the first time on February 1, 1950." The
Docking forces, on the other hand, labeled Woodring a "pseudo-Republican,"
who had bolted the party in 1944 and attempted to block the reelection of
President Roosevelt.811 These charges, especially with their anti-FDR tone,
undoubtedly hurt Woodring to some extent, but they were not as damaging
as they might have been had it not been for a letter from James Roosevelt,
then a United States Congressman from California, which clarified the
relationship between his father and Woodring. That letter, which Woodring
widely publicized, said in part:
I have heard ... that it might be expected that you would be attacked on
the grounds that there had been serious differences between you and my father.
While I am sure that it is not necessary, I would like to make the record clear
that not only were there not any serious differences but to the very end my father
considered you as one of his loyal and trusted friends and advisers.86
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Thereafter the Woodring-Roosevelt relationship was not brought up by
either side.
In contrast to Woodring's dynamic, aggressive campaign, Docking ran
a dignified but low-key contest which was aimed more at the Republicans
than at his Democratic opponent. On 7 August more than 150,000 Kansas
Democrats, a very large number for that state, went to the polls to select their
gubernatorial candidate, and in the end, Docking edged out Woodring by
less than 900 votes-76,187-to-75,333.87 After winning his three previous
primary contests, Woodring went down to his first defeat, and with that
setback his political career came to an end. Even though his age perhaps
hurt him, the telling factor was probably the late date that he entered the
contest, for by that time most party leaders had already committed themselves to Docking. Nevertheless, the fact that Woodring could enter the
primary just seven weeks before the voting and almost single-handedly wage
a battle that was to bring him so close to victory is a tribute to his organizational ability and his political skill. For Woodring's sake it was too bad
that he did not win, because it was destined to be a Democratic year for the
governorship, since the Republicans were badly split after Topeka at_torney
Warren W. Shaw defeated Governor Fred Hall rather handily in the Republican primary. Therefore, in November, Docking romped to an easy
victory and became only the sixth Democrat to hold the highest elective
office in the state.88
After the 1956 setback, Woodring resigned himself to the fact that his
political career was at an end, but that was not to mean that the years to
follow were to be any less active than the first seventy had been. While he
continued to pursue a variety of business interests, his search to find that one
big financial venture that would bring him a fortune and end his financial
worries never came to an end. The boy from Elk City made a fair amount
of money in his lifetime, but he spent it about as fast as he could earn it,
and thus, in his later years, he continually experienced financial difficulties.89
One of the most enjoyable experiences that he had during the 1950s and
1960s was in serving on such advisory agencies as the Franklin Delano
Roosevelt Citizens Commission, the Kansas Commission for Constitutional
Revision, the Eisenhower Foundation, and the Hoover Citizens Commission. It was through his work on the last-named that he became the best of
friends with former President Hoover. Woodring also kept up with developments in the Army through personal contacts with such men as Secretaries
of the Army Frank Pace, Jr. (1950-1953) and Cyrus R. Vance (1962-1964).
Woodring also served on the Board of Trustees of the Woodlawn Foundation, a group that ultimately succeeded in getting the Virginia mansion that
the Woodrings had once lived in established as a public shrine.90
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As Woodring's involvement in politics declined he devoted more and
more time to reading-especially history and biography. One very important
task that he started several times during these years, but, unfortunately, never
finished, was an autobiography, or a firsthand account, of his controversial
political career. Each time one of his old cronies, such as Henry Morgenthau, Jr., Harold Ickes, or James Farley came out with his account of what
had happened, Woodring would indicate that he was going to tell his side
of the story; but he never did. On a few occasions he began to work on his
memoirs, only to turn his attention elsewhere.91 He rarely commented on
his own career or his place in history, and to justify that stand he would say,
"Well, history will tell the tale-the man himself will tell on himself."92
The fifties and sixties also saw him return to the bridge table-a pastime
that he had so enjoyed in his prepolitical days. One of his regular playing
partners was his former political rival Alf Landon. They were frequently
joined by another of Topeka's most famous citizens, Dr. Karl Menninger,
the world-renowned psychiatrist who had become a good friend of Woodring's many years before. These men, along with several friends, would
usually get together once a week to play bridge and discuss everything from
politics to psychiatry.93
Woodring had other joys in these years. One of these was the satisfaction of seeing his children grow up, marry, and have children of their own.
Melissa, after graduating from Stanford University, married a geologist
and had three children, while Cooper, who graduated from the University
of Kansas, became an industrial designer and the father of two children. As
the Woodring children were experiencing the happiness of marriage, Harry
and Helen were having their difficulties, and in March 1960, after nearly
twenty-seven years of marriage, they were divorced. They parted without
bitterness, and he stayed in Topeka, while she returned East, going to
Wilmington, Delaware, where she resumed the art career that she had given
up nearly three decades before.94
The years following the divorce were lonely ones for the former political
figure. Melissa and Cooper had moved out of the state, and thus they and
their children got back to Topeka only occasionally. The number of his
friends also declined, due to death and illness, and those who were more
active found less and less in common with the worn-out politician. Consequently, Woodring became increasingly reclusive, although he did spend
considerable time out of doors, maintaining the extensive and beautiful
flower gardens that surrounded his showplace on Gage Boulevard.
To loneliness were added the problems of failing health as the human
dynamo began to wear out. In 1958 he became a diabetic, and complications
from that condition caused him to be hospitalized from time to time there-
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after. In 1963 he required surgery on a broken hip received in a fall, and
three years later he suffered a cerebral hemorrhage that nearly resulted in
death. The following September, while he was standing near his kitchen
stove, his pajamas caught fire, and he suffered first- and second-degree burns
over a large portion of his body. Two days later, on 9 September 1967, "a
stroke suffered while he was recuperating from the burns" proved fatal.
Three days later the Woodring children, along with their gracious mother,
who had returned for the funeral, stood in Topeka's Mt. Hope Cemetery as
105-mm. howitzers boomed out the final salute to the eighty-year-old former
Secretary of War.95
The last twenty-seven years of Woodring's life had indeed been frustrating. Removal from his cabinet post in 1940, followed by an unsuccessful
attempt to block President Roosevelt's bid for a fourth term; defeat in the
1946 Kansas gubernatorial election; the death of his young son Marcus; a
controversy that cost him the friendship of two long-time friends-General
George Marshall and President Dwight D. Eisenhower; defeat in the 1956
Kansas gubernatorial primary; and the end of a once-happy marriage-all
served to make these years ones of frustration. Woodring was a man whose
political career had peaked when he was still in his forties; thus, when he
was forced out of public life at the age of fifty-three, he began a search that
hopefully would enable him to recapture the glory and to exercise the power
that he had previously known. Although, unfortunately, he was never able
to regain those golden days, he was fortunate in having had the opportunity
to enjoy them once; that is more than most men can say. Perhaps the most
fitting epitaph was provided by Woodring himself in the closing lines of his
Topeka address of 9 July 1940, when he said:
The fact that a Kansas country boy, without previously seeking or holding public
office, could be elected governor of this great commonwealth of ours, and subsequently serve in the Cabinet of the President, is further evidence that our great
democracy does work .... It has been a great experience for me in Washington.
A Kansas boy has dined with kings and queens, with princes and princesses,
ambassadors and foreign diplomats, and has sat at the right hand of the President.
But, truly, a Kansas boy has seen Utopia from the mountaintops. But today a
Kansas boy returns to heaven.96
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The following shortened forms have been used throughout the notes:
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Topeka Daily Capital
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Kansas State Historical Society, Topeka, Kansas
LC
Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.
NA
National Archives
PPF
President's Personal File
PSF
President's Secretary File
RG
Record Group
Star
Kansas City Star
WGP
Woodring's Governor Papers
WPP
Woodring's Personal Papers
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Although many primary and secondary sources were extremely valuable for the
writing of this book, two of them-the Woodring Personal Papers and the Secretary of War's General Correspondence, 1932-1942-were absolutely essential. For
the former collection I am deeply in debt to Mr. Cooper C. Woodring of Plandome, New York, who gave me complete access to these papers, which are as yet
uncatalogued. In going through this collection, which I estimate to contain
approximately 4,000 letters, 200 telegrams, 5,000 news clippings, 800 pamphlets
and published reports, 1,000 photographs, and hundreds of miscellaneous items,
I tentatively organized the material into the following categories:

1. Woodring's family-ancestors, parents, sisters, relatives, etc.
2. Pre-1928 Activities
a. news clippings
b. letters
3. American Legion Activities
a. news clippings
b. pamphlets, programs, etc.
4. GovernoF
a. campaign material
b. published speeches, reports, etc.
c. personal letters, memorandums, telegrams
d. news clippings
5. Assistant Secretary of War
a. official correspondence
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6.

7.

8.

9.
10.

b. personal correspondence
c. invitations-social engagements
d. appointment books
e. news clippings
Secretary of War
a. official correspondence
b. personal correspondence
c. memorandums
d. social matters
e. news clippings
Post-1940 Activities
a. campaign material
b. personal correspondence
c. news clippings
Photographs
a. family
b. official
( 1) Governor
(2) Assistant Secretary of War
( 3) Secretary of War
Miscellaneous letters, newspapers, pamphlets of historical value
Political mementoes

This collection was especially valuable in providing information on Woodring's
prepolitical career and his activities after leaving public life, but the material from
his years as Governor and as a War Department official is rather sketchy and
therefore will be of limited value to the in-depth researcher. Nevertheless, when
this collection is completely organized and indexed, it should prove of great value
to students of both Kansas and United States history.
The Secretary of War, General Correspondence, 1932-1942, which is located
in the National Archives, was also indispensable to the study. This collection of
several hundred boxes of material contains nearly every piece of official correspondence that crossed Woodring's desk at the War Department between 1933
and 1940.
Other material of value is listed in the following selected bibliography.
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As President Franklin D. Roosevelt's assistant secretary of war from 1933 to
1936 and secretary of war from 1936 to 1940, Harry H. Woodring headed the
War Department during one of the most critical periods in the nation's
history. When he split openly with FDR over key decisions and actions
preceding World War II, he earned the dubious distinction of being the only
man that Roosevelt ever removed from his cabinet. This volume, a detailed
study ofWoodring's political career, provides the first clear picture of this
controversial man and reveals a new perspective on the military history and
civilian-military relationships of the period.
"This well-written biography not only covers all aspects ofWoodring's political
career but also sheds valuable light on the isolationist mentality of the 1930s:
the danger involved in permitting the military establishment to atrophy;
the disadvantages of allowing Congress to legislate foreign policy; and the
machinations of an imperial president who refused to accept limitations on
his executive power when the national interest dictated bold action."
-Journal ofAmerican History
"Harry Woodring deserved a biography, and McFarland has provided a good
one." -American Historical Review
"Keith McFarland's biography fills a gap in New Deal history."- The Historian
"McFarland's biography of Woodring is balanced and well researched. In
addition to documenting the story of an almost forgotten member of the
Roosevelt administration, it provides insights into the politics and mechanics
of rearmament. It is a valuable addition to the literature on the Roosevelt
administration and World War !!."- Aerospace Historian
"McFarland's study is a helpful addition to the historiography of military
affairs in the age of the Democratic Roosevelt." - Military Affairs
Keith D. McFarland is president emeritus of Texas A&M-Commerce, where
he also served as professor of history and dean for graduate studies and
research. He is the author or coauthor of three books, including Louis
Johnson and the Arming ofAmerica: The Roosevelt and Truman Years.
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